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Pt. 1

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PANDIT KSHETRESA CHANDRA CHATTOPADHYAYA

Among the many distinguished scholars of Sanskrit whom Uttar Pradesh has produced, Pt. K. Chattopadhyaya deserves to be in the front rank. From time immemorial, Uttar Pradesh has been the home of Sanskrit Learning, and the Pandits of Kashi have kept on the tradition of Sanskrit Scholarship from generation to generation. Their work has inspired many of their dsiciples, and Pt. Chattopadhyaya is one of them. He had the singular good fortune of reading with the giants of old like Dr. Mm. Ganganatha Jha, Dr. Venis and Mm. Pt. Gopinath Kaviraj. By his indefatigable industry and devotion to learning he has maintained their traditions to this day and there are many younger men who have kindled their modest rush-lights at his benignant lamp. He has been a source of inspiration to many of them and every Sanskritist in the country knows what Pt. Chattopadhyaya has contributed to the cause of Sanskrit learning. Beginning his carrer as a humble lecturer in a college, he rose to the position of Professor and Head of the Sanskrit Department in the Allahabad University and was invited to attend learned conferences in foreign countries where his scholarship was much appreciated.

A man of plain living and high thinking, Pt. Chattopadhyaya has lived a pure and spotless life and stands as a beacon light to many a humble worker in the path of scholarship. Besides being a distinguished Sanskrit Scholar and teacher, Pt. Chattopadhyaya was greatly interested in upholding the constitutional laws of the University. In our councils and committees he was seen at his best. He was thoroughly conversant with the laws of the University and could press home his points with great effectiveness. His uncompromising attitude in upholding the high standards of the University, desire to see justice done to all, without distinction, his insi on the quality of research, made an impression on all th shared the honour of membership of Academic C Committees with him. He was indeed a Constituti more than once he had to go to the High Cou Even the Chancellor's decisions he called int been found that in a number of cases he wa teacher Mm. Pandit Ganganatha Jha, he

examinations and nothing could make him swerve from the high standard which he had set before himself. So great was his love for academic excellence that he was sometimes called too rigid and blamed for it. But he never chose to sacrifice a principle for the sake of popularity.

He was a genuine scholar and was always eager to promote the cause of learning. His habits were those of a devoted savant. His intellectual keenness, his penetrating insight into letters, his analytical powers, are of a high order and entitle him to a place in the forefront of our eminent scholars of Sanskrit.

A malignant fate has confined him to bed for more than three years and his intellectual activities have been brought to a stand still. He is not in a position to take up active work in the present state of his health but the fire is not wholly extinguished in him. He can still guide and inspire those who seek his advice on learned topics. Verily Pt. Chattopadhyaya is a scholar and a gentleman who is thoroughly devoted to learning and is still capable of giving effective guidance and inspiration to those who work with him. In paying him this tribute I am fully conscious of the debt I owe him. Words are a poor vehicle to express my gratitude to him. I am proud of the affection he always felt for me and the confidence he reposed in me.

This volume is primarily the creation of the members of Pt. K. C. Chattopadhyaya Felicitation Volume Committee. Subsequently, an Editorial Board was formed with the approval of the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi, which helped in a great many ways at all stages. They were, unfortunately, compelled to exclude a number of articles for want of space. Yet Drs. Aryendra Sharma and M. D. Balasubrahmanyam deserve our thanks [illegible]r the careful management of the articles, correspondence and [illegible]f correction which have been helpful in the production of this [illegible] Although some slips and misprints have become inevitable [illegible] shortage of time and other difficulties, the credit of [illegible]o parts of this volume goes to the Allahabad Block [illegible], Allahabad, who have done a fine job within [illegible].

ISHWARI PRASAD

PREFACE

Pt. K. C. Chattopadhyaya, one of the most brilliant students of Dr. Ganganatha Jha, joined the University of Allahabad as Lecturer in Sanskrit in 1924. In 1950 he was promoted to Readership and from 1956 for about a couple of years he acted as professor of Sanskrit. As the Director of Research at the Sanskrit University, Varanasi, he was in a position to guide research exclusively—a subject which is dearest to him. As teacher his reputation has always been very good and he enjoys the affection of all those who had the good fortune of sitting at his feet. He was a beolved colleague of mine at the University of Allahabad till the date of his retirement and we have had the best of relations more as brothers than as colleagues, as both of us are the pupils of Dr. Ganganatha Jha. Pt. Chattopadhyaya was not able to produce as much in the academic world as was hoped for and expected from him. He is an idealist and the dictum that the best is the greatest enemy of the good holds true in the case of Pt. Chattopadhyaya. He was always after the best. During the reeent few years he has been keeping very bad health. This prevented him from completing several good things that he has in his mind. Pt. Chattopadhyaya is one of those few teachers in this age who inspired every young man and young woman that come into their contact. Pt. Chattopadhyaya's scholarship deserves recognition and the present volume is a small token of the great regard in which his colleagues, students and friends hold him. It was at the 24th session of the All-India Oriental Conference held at Varanasi in October 1968 that the idea of presenting a felicitation Volume to Pt. K. Chattopadhyaya was mooted and an Editorial Board was formed with the following members : Dr. Adityanatha Jha (Chairman), S/Shri S. C. Deb, Gaurinath Shastri, S. P. Chaturvedi, Aryendra Sharma, G. R. Sharma, G. C. Pande, A. D. Pant, U. N. Tiwari, Vidya Niwas Misra, T. R. Tiwari, T. R. Chopra (Members), and S/Shri M. P. Lakhera and L. N. Tiwari (Secretaries). In bringing out this volume Drs. Aryendra Sharma and

M. D. Balasubrahmanyam of the Ganganatha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidhyapeetha and S/Shri M. P. Lakhera and L. N. Tiwari rendered considerable help for which I express my sincere appreciation and thanks. Later on it was at the instance or Dr. Aditya Natha Jha, the youngest son of Mm. Pt. Ganganatha Jha and one of the distinguished pupils of Pt. Chattopadhyaya, that the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, Ministry of Education and Youth Services, Government of India, agreed to the wishes of the Editorial Board and recommended to the Ganganatha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidhyapeetha that Volumes 27 (Pts. 3 & 4) and 28 (Pts. 1-4) of this Journal be brought out as Pt. K. C. Chattopadhyaya Felicitation Volume. The Board of Editors is also grateful to the contributors of the Articles in this volume.

3, Bank Road,
Allahabad, U.P.,
20.3.72.

BABU RAM SAKSENA
Chairman,
Editorial Board.

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BIO-DATA OF KSHETRESA CHANDRA CHATTOPADHYAYA

Pt. Kshetresa Chandra Chattopadhyaya of late Sri Atula Chandra Chattopadhyaya and Srimati Surasundari Devi, of Village Nimta, District 24 Parganahs of Bengal, was born on October 27, 1896, in a family of Kulīna Brāhmaṇas, descended from Āvasathya Gangananda Chattopadhyaya of Deshmukho in District Hoogly of Bengal. His mother was a deeply religious lady and his father, an assistant in the Government of India Secretariat, a good scholar of English. He had two sisters, Abha Devi and Praubha Devi. He married Srimati Jagat Lakshmi Devi, daughter of Professor Jyotish Chandra Banerjee.

Pt. Chattopadhyaya studied in a number of schools and passed the Matriculation Examination of the Calcutta University in 1913 from the Hindu School of Calcutta. He then studied in the Presidency College of Calcutta for the Intermediate Examination in Arts and passed in 1915. He then migrated to the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh and passed the B. A. Examination of the Allahabad University from the Muir Central College, Allahabad, in 1917, and the M. A. Examinations in Sanskrit (Philosophy Group) from the Queen's College Benares, in 1919. He also passed the M. A, Examinations in Sanskrit (Veda Group) of Calcutta University in 1921 and (Vedānta Group) in 1922. He had also passed the First Examination in Pāṇinian Grammar of the Bengal Sanskrit Association in 1913.

While he was a young child, his mother read out to him and his sisters a Bengali drama on the life of Sri Śaṅkarāchārya. This early created in his mind a deep interest in Vedānta Philosophy. From his father and his Head Master in the Hindu School, Rai Bahadur Rasamay Mitra, he got interested in linguistic studies. While in School in Bengal, the young boy felt sad that Bengali Pandits of the Orthodox School, though well-versed in other branches of Sanskrit learning, practically knew nothing of the Vedas. He decided that he would himself try to make good this deficiency and specialise in Vedic studies. Study of the Vedas in all their

aspects has remained his chief goal of academic endeavour. Vedanta has been his next love.

At Allahabad, his Professor of Sanskrit was Mm. Dr. Sir Ganganatha Jha, F. B. A., who taught him Vedānta, besides Sanskrit Literature. This was very fortunate for him. At Benares, the greatest centre of Sanskrit learning, his teachers were Padma Vibhūshaṇa Mm. Dr. Gopinath Kaviraja, late Dr. Arthur Venis, Mm. Pandit Lakshmana Shastri Tailang, Mm. Pandit Vama Charana Nyāyāchārya, Mm. Ambadasa Shastri and Pandit Achyutananda Tripathi. He imbibed from these scholars the method of Sanskrit learning on traditional lines. Under his Professor of Sanskrit in the Queen's College, Benares, the late Dr. Tukaram Krishas Laddu he studied Pali and Prakrits and Elements of Comparative Philology. He was later helped in his study of Linguistics by Professor Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji and the late Professor Dr. Irach Jehangir Sorabji Taraporewala. The latter and the late Sir Jivanji Jamshedji Modi helped him in Avestan Studies. The late Pandit Ganesha Shastri and Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Chinnaswami Shastri helped him in the understanding of Vedic Śrauta rituals.

After passing his M. A. Examination in 1919, he worked as research scholar on the Vedānta Sūtras under Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopinatha Kaviraja for a few months. He joined as a Lecturer in Sanskrit in the Carmichael College, Rangpur, in November 1919, and as a Lecturer in Sanskrit in the University of Allahabad in September 1924. At Rangpur he had to teach Veda, Sanskrit Texts, Dramaturgy, Dharmaśāstra, History of Sanskrit Literature and also Bengali. At Allahabad, where he served for about 34 years as Lecturer, Reader and Professor, he had to teach a large variety of subjects, Veda, Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta, Classical Sanskrit Literature, Pali, Prakrit, Linguistics, Avesta and Ancient Persian and Ancien Indian History.

History was a favourite subject of study of Pt. Chattopadhyaya from his school days. While at Allahabad, he paid several visits to the ancient city of Kaushambi, now a village called Kosam, and realised its archaeological importance. In accordance with his wishes, the Archaeological Department of the Government of India took interest in its systematic excavation. But when

the Department abruptly stopped the work, Pt. Chattopadhyaya wished that the work should be taken up by Allahabad University. He induced the authorities of the University to move the Archaeological Department to give license to the University to carry on excavations at Kaushambi. The Department permitted Professor Govardhan Rai Sharma, who had been trained in the modern technique of archaeology by the then Director General of Archaeology, Dr. Robert Mortimer Wheeler, to start this work. It had led to very valuable results.

The Government Sanskrit College of Benares was converted into the Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya in March 1958. Pt. Chattopadhyaya was appointed its first Director of Research in August 1958. His own literary activities had started when he was an undergraduate at Allahabad and writing of reseach articles when he was a Lecturer at Rangpur and Guidance of research began when he was a Lecturer in the Allahabad University. Being appointed Director of Research in the Varanaseya Sanskrita Vishvavidyalaya, he had an opportunity of organising research both on traditional and modern lines in the University. He himself supervised the work of some research scholars in Veda, Pāṇinian Grammar and Classical Literature. The Government Sanskrit College had published the *Saraswati Bhawan Texts and Studies*. The Sanskrit University took them over, continued them and added publications under several new heads. A University Press was also started through his efforts. Pt. Chattopadhyaya held the post of Director of Research for five years with a break of one and half years. He was also for about one year acting Vice-Chancellor of the University in addition to his duties as Director of Research.

After the Termination of his services in the Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, he was appointed Adviser for Sanskrit Programmes in the All-India Radio by the Government of India. He held this post for three years and six months. He prepared the Sanskrit Lessons that are being broadcast twice a week by the All-India Radio. These Lessons have been revised and are again on the Air. These lessons seek to teach the Sanskrit Language and also the culture enshrined in it.

He was also appointed a special Scholar for comparative study of Vedas and Avesta by the Ministry of Education, Government of India of the Kendriya Sanskrita Vidyapeetha, Tirupati. Three Inaugural Lecturers were delivered at Tirupati on August 21 to 23, 1966. A book in Sanskrit, named *Vedavittaprakāśikā*, has been written and is being revised for publication.

The Calcutta University appointed him Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lecturer on Comparative Religion for 1960. Eight Lectures on the subject were delivered in 1963 and 1964. The title of the Lecturers was "God reaches out his Hands". He was appointed Guru Govind Singh Professor of comparative religion by the Patiala University but he could not join the post on account of his prolonged illness from 1967 to 1969. He delivered three lectures on Vedic Literature in Hindi in 1960 at Ahmedabad under the auspices of the Jnanodaya trust and three seminar lectures on the History of Vedic Religion in the same year before the Sanskrit College of Calcutta. He delivered three lectures in Hindi before the Lal Bahadur Shastri Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha of Delhi on Kālidāsa.

The President of India awarded him on August 15, 1966, a Certificate of Merit for Distinction in Sanskrit with a life Pension.

Pt. Chattopadhyaya has been actively connected with the All-India Oriental Conference since its third session held in Madras in December 1924. He presided over its Veda and Indo-Aryan Section in the ninth Session held at Trivandrum in 1937 and its Veda Section in the Eighteenth Section held at Annamalainagar in 1955. He presided over the Philosophy Section of the Akhil Bhāratīya Hindi Sāhitya Sammelan held at Karachi in December 1946. He was actively connected with the efforts of the Sammelan to get Hindi accepted as the official language of the Indian Union by the Constituent Assembly in 1949. It recently passed resolution conferring on him the title of *Sāhitya-Vāchaspati* for his services to the cause of Hindi.

Though Pt. Chattopadhyaya has been studying Sanskrit mostly from the modern point of view, he realises the great value of studies on traditional lines. His teachers, the late Mm. Dr.

Ganganatha Jha and Dr. Arthur Venis had impressed on his mind the value of the Panditic approach in the understanding of the old texts. When the Government of U. P. was seized of the Bhagavandas Enquiry Committee on the Revision of the Curriculum of studies of the Government Sanskrit College, Banaras, he sent a full note to Government against the modernisation of the curriculum of Sanskrit Pāṭhashālas and pleaded for the retention of the traditional methods before the Sanskrit Commission presided over by Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji, appointed by the Government of India.

Pt. Chattopadhyaya comes from a family of administrative and judicial officers. But he chose the avocation of teaching. Being deeply influenced by some of his inspiring teachers, in schools and colleges, he thought it his duty to pay off this ṛṣi.ṛṇa by tring to be helpful to his own pupils. Many of these pupils have acquired distinction in the field of scholarship or administration.

The Board of Editors wish long life and health to Pt. Chattopadhyaya with the hope that this doyen of Indology will carry the torch of Sanskrit learning as brilliantly as he has done in a long career of continued and strenuous activity.

भद्रं कर्णेभिः शृणुयाम देवाः भद्रं पश्येमाक्षिभिर्यजत्राः ।
स्थिरै रङ्गै स्तुष्टुवांशस्तनूभिः व्यशेम देवहितं यदायुः ॥

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

Pt. Kshetresa Chandra Chattopadhyaya

प्रसूनार्पणम्

१

शालप्रांशुरुदञ्चदम्बुदघटागम्भीरघोषः स्फुरद्—
भस्मालङ्कृत भालभृत्समुदयब्राह्मण्यपुण्योज्ज्वलः ।
शिष्यश्रेणिनवीनपादपवनीकारुण्यधाराधरः
प्रौढः पण्डितमण्डनो विजयते क्षेत्रेशचन्द्रः कृती ॥

२

मातुः सेवनतत्परेण जगतामाश्चर्यचर्यावहं
चीर्णं येन सुदुष्करं भुवितपः प्रत्यग्रतेजोमयम् ।
तस्याऽद्य प्रथमान सद्गुणगणग्रामाभिरामात्मनः
क्षेत्रेशस्य मुनीश्वरस्य तनुमः शुद्धं सपर्योत्सवम् ॥

३

गङ्गानाथ दिनाधिनाथ किरणैरन्तः प्रविष्टैश्चिरा—
दापूर्णी धवलाम्बरः कविकुलैरुद्गीयमानोदयः ।
संसत्कैरविणी विकासकुशलः सन्ध्यानुरक्तः शुचि—
र्नेत्रानन्दकरः सतां विजयतां क्षेत्रेशचन्द्रोत्तमः ॥

४

काशीवासपवित्रता परिणतस्वान्तः प्रयागान्तरे
यागं यो व्यतनिष्ट शिष्टपरिषन्मान्यो निजाध्यापनैः ।
गम्भीरां गुरुवाचमन्तरनिशं धत्ते गुणिग्रामणीः
क्षेत्रेशाऽभिधया जगत्प्रविदितः सोऽयं समुद्योतताम् ॥

५

तन्मित्राऽन्यतमस्य पण्डितमणे र्नारायणस्यात्मजो
नाम्नाऽयं बटुकस्तदीयचरितश्रद्धानिबध्दादरः ।
विद्वद्वृन्दविधीयमानविततार्श्यर्चाविधौ धौतधी—
राधत्ते विनयात्तदीयपदयोः पद्यप्रसूनाञ्जलिम् ॥

बटुकनाथ शास्त्री खिस्ते

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61. Can we accept the traditional date of Zaraθustra ? (Communicated to the *XXVI International Congress of Orientalists,* New Delhi, 1964).

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63. Indologists, Western and Indian (*Cultural Forum,* May 1964, pp. 60-72).

64. The Tātparya of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (Communicated to the *XXII All-India Oriental Conference,* Gauhati, 1965).

65. Progressive Importance of Miθra Worship in Zoroastrianism (Communicated to the *XXVII International Congress of Orientalists,* Ann Arbor, U. S. A., 1967).

66. Meghadūte Rāmagiriḥ - in Sanskrit (*Dr. Adityanatha Jha Abhinandana Grantha*), 1969, Vol. I, pp. 276-284.

67. Kālidāsa ke Kāla, kṛti tathā Kalā - in Hindi (Three Lectures delivered in the Lal Bahadur Shastri Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyāpeetha, Delhi, November, 1969).

68. Conception of īśvara in the *Nyāya Sūtras* of Gautama, (Communicated to the *XXVI All-India Oriental Conference,* scheduled to be held at Ujjain).

69. Gāyatrī Mantra kā Ṛṣi tathā Māhatmya - in Hindi (*Viśvajyoti,* Vedāṅka, to be published in March, 1972).

70. Kālidāsa and the Cloud Messenger *motif* in the Chinese Poet Tsui Kan and the German writer Schiller (Communicated to the *International Conference of Sanskritists,* to be held in New Delhi, 1972).

ṚGVEDA V 78, A COMPOSITE LEGEND SPELL

L. ALSDORF

Hamburg University, West Germany.

In my article "The ākhyāna theory reconsidered"[1] I have referred to three famous ṛgvedic hymns (III 33, X 108, I 179) for which P. Thieme[2] has coined the term "legend spell" ("Legendenzauber") : they have in common that an account of an historical or mythical event is followed by an incantation, a spell receiving its magic power from the truth of the story, analogous to the desired effect, which precedes it. In III 33 (to quote myself), "the saṁvāda proper tells the tale of the successful crossing of the Vipāś and Śutudrī by the Bharatas, and it is followed by a single stanza quite unconnected with the old story and containing a general prayer or conjuration for the safe crossing of a river with an ox-cart. Lüders has pointed to the striking similarity of the Old High German Merseburg spells. In one of them the conjuring formula for healing a broken limb is preceded by a short mythological account of the healing of the sprained foot of God Balder's foal . . . . . The dispute between Saramā and the Paṇis (X 108) is concluded by a stanza which alludes to the liberation of the cows by Bṛhaspati and the Aṅgiras in the imperfect, which means that this stanza cannot be assumed to have been spoken by the Aṅgiras but must be considered to be a spell to be

1. *Journal Or. Inst. Baroda* XIII pp. 195-207.
2. Agastya und Lopāmudrā" ZDMG 113 p. 69 ff.

used when cows have gone astray and cannot be found, the presumption then being that they have been enticed and hidden by demons like the Paṇis; and the story relating how Agastya, succumbing to Lopāmudrā's entreaties, broke his vow of chastity (I 179) is concluded by two stanzas spoken according to tradition by a barhmacārin in order to expiate the same sin committed by himself."

I have then discussed the question whether such legend spell sūktas are original compositions, i. e. whether (as Thieme prefers to think) tale and appended spell were composed by the same poet at the same time, or whether "existing ākhyāna verses are secondarily put to magical use, are converted into a charm, by subsequent addition of the spell." Against Thieme I have decided in favour of the second alternative. The fact that in two cases (III 33 and I 179) the metre of the spell stanza is different from that of the body of the hymn seems to me significant, and Thieme himself (ZDMG 113 p. 78 note 16) draws our attention to a number of modernisms in III 33,13 and I 179,5 and, in the latter stanza, the word *pulukāma* with what he considers a "vernacular"; his explanation, however : "I think it possible that. . . the poet himself has on purpose given the magic incantation a form contrasting with the archaic style of what preedes", seems to me highly improbable, not to say unnatural.

I shall try to adduce additional evidence for my contention by analyzing a hymn which, in my opinion, not only furnishes a perfect further specimen of a "legend spell" but shows with unusual clarity the process of compilation of a vedic hymn from "prefabricated" materials.

Ṛgveda V 78 opens with an invitation of the Aśvins :

1. O Aśvins, come hither, o Nāsatyas, do not turn away !

Like two geese fly hither to the pressed (soma potions) !

2. O Aśvins, like two antelopes, like two buffaloes (going) to pasture, like two geese fly hither. . .

3. O Aśvins, rich in (race-) mares[3], accept with favour our sacrifice so that you may grant our desire ! Like two geese fly hither. . .

These three uṣṇih stanzas might serve as introduction to any Aśvin sūkta. But while in the normal Aśvin hymn (cf. e. g. I 116-119) such an introduction is followed by what might be called a litany listing their deeds in the same metre, here the metre changes : the next stanza is a triṣṭubh.

4. When Atri, descending into the ṛbīsa, invoked you like a woman in labour, you came, o Aśvins, with the propitious swiftness of a falcon such as (you display) to this day.[4]

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3. Very frequent epithet of the Aśvins ; lit. "Whose wealth consists in mares." H. Lommel ("Gedichte des Rig-Veda") translates : "Ihr mit trefflichsten Rennstuten." The usual translation "rich in gifts" seems liguistically unjustified.

4. L. Renou (*Étude védiques et Pāninéennes*, XVI, p. 42) : "*nūtanena*, cette même vitessequ' on voit en vous 'maintenant' encore" ("this same swiftness which one sees with you even 'now' "); an appeal to the Aśvins to be "now" as swift as they were in the mythical past.

After this one triṣṭubh devoted to the Atri myth, there occurs another change of metre; the myth of Saptavadhri who was wedged in a tree trunk is dealt with in two anuṣṭubhs :

5. "Open, o tree, like the vulva of a woman about to give birth! Hear, o Aśvins, my call and release Saptavadhri!"

6. For the frightened, distressed ṛṣi Saptavadhri you, o Aśvins, squeeze the tree open and to.

The last three stanzas are not indeed in a different metre, but they differ radically in their subject matter: they are a conjuration in which neither the Aśvins nor any of their deeds are mentioned; they stand to the body of the sūkta in exactly the same relation at the concluding charm III 33,13 to the story of the Bharatas' river-crossing.

7. As the wind sets in motion the lotus pond on all sides, even so shall thy embryo stir, he shall come out (being now) ten months old.

8. As the wind, as the tree, as the sea moves, so come thou down, ten-months-old (child), together with the after-birth.

9. The boy[5] who has been lying in his mother for ten months shall come out alive, uninjured, alive out of the living one!

In his translation, Geldner gives the following analysis of V 78: "The hymn consists of three parts. The first triad contains the invitation of the Aśvins to

5. A girl is of course out of the question!

the soma (1-3), the second their praise, which is restricted to two rescues fitting the situation in 7-9, the rescue of Atri out of the ṛbīsa (4) and of Saptavadhri out of the tree (5-6) ; the second legend is transposed to the present and represented in 5 as direct speech of Saptavadhri. The conclusion, the real purpose of the hymns, is a benediction for easy birth. "This shows that Geldner did not—or only partially understand the real relation of the three parts of the sūkta : the two legends are only *quoted* in order to make the charm (not a mere "benediction") efficacious. H. Lommel is nearer the true understanding when (in the introduction to his translation, p. 48) he says : "As is often the case with such healing charms (cf. the Merseburg spells), one refers to a former, comparable deed of the gods," but when he speaks of midwife-godesses of Vedic religion comparable to Greek Eileithyia and Roman Juno Lucina and states that in the present case not one of these godesses but the Aśvins are invoked for help, he is wrong : nowhere in the hymn are the Aśvins asked to interfere and help the woman in labour ; they are just as little invoked for help as the man wanting to cross the river with his oxen in III 33 invokes the rivers or Indra : he merely tells the story of the Bharatas' crossing in order to make his charm more efficacious. III 33, 13 is not a charm *appended* to the old saṁvāda but the old saṁvāda is *prefixed* to the (more modern) charm.

In the case of V 78 it is even clearer that the concluding charm is the real starting point ("the real purpose" of the hymn as Geldner says) ; the two legends—in two different metres !—are, as stated above, quotations, selected from the huge store of Aśvin myths

told in one or two stanzas or even more briefly because their wording happened to compare the situation of the two ṛṣis with that of a woman in labour.

That the spell, V 78, 7-9, is younger than the rest of the hymn was correctly recognised a hundred years ago by Grassmann. In his ṚV translation he relegates vv. 4. 7-9 to the appendix and remarks there (Vol. I p. 544) : "v. 4 is addressed to the Aśvins but separates itself through its metre. It seems to come from an old hymn. 7-9, on the other hand, are of late origin, as testified e. g. by *sarvatas*"[6] ; we may add that the style of 7-9 is unmistakably different and similar to that of the younger parts of the Atharvaveda.

But if the Aśvins are not asked to help, if their deeds are merely referred to in order to make the charm more efficient, their invitation to come and partake of the soma (vv. 1-3) is really superfluous. Why was it added ? For that it is a secondary—or even tertiary—addition is hardly doubtful and is underlined by its different metre, the (comparatively rare) uṣṇih. The reason may simply be that in the first myth, v. 4, the name of the Aśvins appears only at the end of the stanza ; at the beginning they are referred to by *vām* as if they had been addressed or spoken of before. Thus a true beginning was felt to be lacking, and a normal beginning, i. e. the usual invitation, was borrowed somewhere, without regard to its inappropriateness in this special case. It seems, however, quite possible

6. Cf. Wackernagel, *Altindische Grammatik III* Sect. 265 c (p. 582) : *viśva* and its derivatives old, *sarva* young ; in the ṚV *viśvatas* occurs 68 times, *Sarvàtas* only twice, as against Atharvaveda: *viśvàtas* 21, *sarvàtas* 13.

that the invitation was only prefixed when the poem, v. 4-9, was to be included in the saṁhitā—with this introduction it would better conform to the normal appearance of an Aśvin sūkta.

I am far from maintaining that *every* sūkta of the legend spell type must be a secondary combination of a charm and an existing old legned prefixed to it later ; but the case of ṚV V 78 seems to me to be unequivocal, and it strengthens my conviction that at least ṚV III 33 and I 179 must be viewed in the same light—they are composite hymns, not homogeneous compositions.

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THE GAṄGĀ-ŚĀNTANU LEGEND

U. P. ARORA

University of Allahabad.

The legend of Śāntanu and Gaṅgā occurring in the *Ādiparva* of the *Mahābhārata* (92-93, cr. edn., Poona) is one of the most interesting legends in the history of Indian Mythology. The legend is significant due to its many motifs which deserve a serious study. In the present paper an attempt has been made to give an anthropological explanation of this legend as compared to similar motifs found in Greek Folk Tales.

King Śāntanu, while wandering along the bank of the Ganges, fell in love with a lovely damsel. She promised to marry the king on the understanding that the King should not interfere with her acts, whether these are agreeable or disagreeable to him. Agreeing to this condition, Śāntanu married the celestial damsel, and he lived happily with her in love and joy. She bore him seven sons. As soon as each child was born, she threw it into the waters of the Gaṅgā saying : "This is my wish". The king naturally could not approve of such a conduct, but he did not speak a word of reproof to her for fear of being abandoned by her. When the eighth son was born, the king insisted on keeping his child and said sorrowfully to the smiling Gaṅgā, "Do not kill this child. Who are you and to whom do you belong. Why do you torture your own sons and kill them? Do not incur the greatest of sins and stand condemned for it".

Gaṅgā said, "As you wish to have a son, I shall not kill this child. But the time has come for me to leave you according to our past compact. I am Gaṅgā, the daughter of Jahnu, worshipped by all the great sages. I have lived with you so long only to accomplish the design of celestials. The eight sons I bore you were the illustrious and radiant Vasus who were forced to assume human form because of the curse of sage Vasiṣṭha. There was no one on earth who claimed to be their progenitor; nor was there any woman, who could be their mother. Hence I assumed a human form and gave birth to them. My compact with the celestial Vasus was that I would release them from their human birth as soon as they were born. Thus the Vasus have got rid of the curse of the illustrious sage Vasiṣṭha".

The following motifs are noteworthy in the above legend :

(i) There is a marriage of a mortal with a fairy. It is an example of a mixed marriage.

(ii) There is a Taboo in the marriage that the king will not interfere with the damsel in any of her acts, whether he agrees or disagrees. When the Taboo is broken, the damsel goes again to her formal life.

(iii) The seven children born to her were thrown in the river.

(iv) The eighth one was saved after the interference of Śāntanu.

(v) Vasus got rid of mortality after they took a dip in the river. It was the touch of water which released them from their human form.

The legend of Śāntanu and Gaṅgā has many parallels in Greek mythology, the most striking of which is of Peleus and Thetis. This legend has been described by many ancient Greek writers. It is as follows :[1]

'Peleus the king of Myrmidons was married to the nymph, Thetis. She gave birth to six children. Thetis burnt them successively in order to make them immortal like herself and sent each of them in turn up to Olympus. But Peleus contrived to snatch the seventh one from her when she had already made all his body, except the ankle bone, immortal by laying it on the fire and afterwards rubbing it with ambrosia, the half charred ankle-bone had escaped this final treatment. Enraged by his interference, Thetis said farewell to Peleus, and returned to her home in the sea, naming her son 'Achilles' because he had as yet placed no lips to her breast. Peleus provided Achilles with a new ankle bone, taken from the skelton of the swift giant Damysus, but this was fated to prove his undoing".[2]

According to another story at the birth of Achilles, his mother made him invulnerable by dipping him into the waters of the river Styx. But his heel by which she held him, was not wetted by the water and so remained vulnerable.[3]

(i) Like Gaṅgā and Śāntanu the marriage of Thetis and Peleus is also a mixed marriage of the water goddess with a mortal man.

1. Apollodorus iii, 13.6
2. Robert Graves, *Greek Myths*, I. 272-3
3. Servius on Virgil, *Aen*, vi. 57

(ii) There is a Taboo of keeping silence for the king i. e. he will not interfere in the acts of the nymph.

(iii) The nymph bore six children, but the seventh one was saved.

(vi) Children were burnt or dipped in the river Styx.

(v) The immortality was attained by fire or by taking a dip in the river Styx.

In a modern folk tale from Crete a young boy was carried off by sea - nymphs (Nereids) to their cave. The boy used to play lyre. The nymphs listened to the music of lyre with great delight. The boy was attracted by the beauty of one of the nymphs. He fell in love with her. And he asked the advice of an old woman. She advised him to seize the nymph by the hair and though she would turn them into different shapes, he was not to be frightened or to let her go. He took the advice and though the sea nymph was turned into a dog, a serpent, a camel and fire, he held her by the hair till the cocks crew. Then she came into her own form and followed him. They lived as husband and wife for a year and a son was also born to them. But the nymph used to remain always silent. Her strange silence perplexed the boy and he again went to the old woman and sought her advice. According to her advice, the boy heated the stove and taking the child into his arms, threatened to throw it into the fire if she would not speak to him. At that the nymph started up crying, "Leave my child alone, you dog." She snatched the child from him and disappeared, never to return.[4]

4. B. Schmidt, *Das Volksleben der Neugriechen*, 115-7 ; Leipzig, 1871

This tale from Crete shows a very significant feature in ancient stories of Gaṅgā and Śāntanu and Peleus and Thetis. It is possible that in the ancient stories of India and Greece the sea of river brides remained completely silent until Śāntanu and Peleus questioned their wives in their acts of putting children on the fire or (in case of the Gaṅgā) throwing in the river. At that sight fathers must have cried out, thus reproaching their wives. We come to know from the fragments of Sophocles that Thetis left Peleus because she was reproached by him.[5] Sophocles in his drama 'Trilus' referring to the marriage of Peleus and Thetis says that it was a silent or voiceless marriage. J. G. Frazer[6] has explained the silence of the bride as a remains of a custom of imposing reticence for some time after the marriage. Among the Wabende of Lake Tanganyika, a wife does not speak to her husband for several days after the marriage ; she waits till the husband has made a present. Similarly among the Tedas of Tibesti in central Sudan, a bride is shut up after marriage for seven days in a special compartment of her husband's house and does not utter a word.[7]

In the story of Ūrvaśī and Purūravas Taboo is placed on male nudity, in the presence of Ūravaśī. It was believed among the primitive people that, if a woman looked upon the nakedness of a man (even if he was her husband), he would lose his virility.[8] In the

5. *The Fragments of Sophocles*, Ed. A. C. Pearson, Vol. I. 106 ff.
6. Apollodorus, *Eng. Tr.*, p. 385.
7. *L' Anthropologie*, xxx (1920), p. 121
8. W. Crooke, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, XLIX, 1938

Yakṣa praśna of the *Mahābhārata* (*Āraṇyakaparva,* 297-8) water from the lake could not be drunk without fulfilling a condition laid down by the guardian of evil spirit residing in water places. Among the primitive people it was believed that man's soul rests in the form of his reflection in water or in a mirror.[9] The changing of form of king Bhangāsva (*Anuśāsanaparva* XII 9-10) into a woman after taking bath into a lake and similarly in the *Matsya-Purāṇa,* the emergence of Kaṇva Nārada in the shape of a girl after he plunged into the water, are also water Taboos as occuring in the legend of the Yakṣa Praśna. We have in the *Kādambarī* the example of a sage Kapiñjala who regained his original form from horse, which he had obtained due to a curse because he took a dip in the lake, *Acchoda.*

Both in ancient India (*Manusmṛti* IV 38) and ancient Greece there was a maxim not to look at one's reflection in water, and Greeks regarded it as an omen of death.[10] They feared that the water spirits would drag the person's reflection or soul under water, and thus he would perish.

In the stories of Jarat Kāru and Eros and Psyche it is the husband and not the wife who is the fairy spouse, and is liable to vanish away from their wives when they offended them by breaking some rule, the observance of which was enjoined on them as a condition of their wedded bliss.

The legends of Gaṅgā and Śāntanu, Ūrvaśī and Purūravas, Jarat Kāru and his wife of the snake race on one hand, and Peleus and Thetis and Eros and Psyche on

9. *Golden Bough,* Pt. II, p. 92
10. *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum,* L. 510

other hand, seem to have their roots in totemism which has broken the hearts of many lovers. There came a stage in primitive society when this system ceased to exist, and people forgot the principles on which totemism was based. But the tales of mixed marriages based on the idea of totemism continued. Now these tales had no connection with this primitive custom but they were narrated simply as fairly tales for the entertainment of people. In old tales there were many features which appeared unbelievable and too barbarous to more civilized people than their ancestors. Thus they discarded the old ones and replaced them with others which were suitable in accordance with the changing beliefs of time.

The animal husband or animal wife dropped the character of beast and assumed the form of a fairy. This stage of decay has been exhibited by the above-mentioned legends. The original bird nature of Ūrvaśī is known while she was swimming as a swan or duck along with other nymphs in the lotus-covered lake. Similarly Gaṅgā is obviously a river; lady Jarat Kāru a snake; and the damsel who met Parīkṣita was a frog. In Greek mythology Thetis like Gaṅgā is a nymph or water goddess. Signifying the sea and snake character of Eros, the husband of Psyche is shown in the oracle of Apollo.

The study of various tribes show that generally totem may be an animal, bird, fish, plant, river or often material objects or parts thereof. A clan of Konyak Naga tribe and a clan among Galongs of Assam[11] believe to have descended from frog. Many castes in Orissa, the Kurmi, Kumber, Bhumia are named after the serpents.[12]

11. V. John, F., *Totemism in India*, p. 215
12. D.N. Majumdar, *Races and Cultures of India*, p. 346

Animals such as bull, cow, horse, snake, tortoise, tiger, rivers, native creatures, different plants and material objects figure prominently in the totemic structure of primitive tribes.

Macdonell (*Vedic Mythology,* p. 153) finds the survival of Totemism in the names Kaśyapas (tortoise), Matsyas (fishes) Ajas (goat), Vatsas (calves), Śunakas (dogs), Sigrus (horse raddish), Kauśikas (owls) and Maṇḍūkayas (frogs). It was forbidden to eat swan, frog and bull's flesh. According to Oldenberg (*Die Religion des Veda,* p. 83) the idea of wearing deer's skin by Brahmacāris in the Vedas is based on Totemism, though Keith links it with magic. The divinity of the cow rests on the element in totemism which consists in the deification of that class of animals which provides a livelihood.

The throwing of seven Vasus into the river Gaṅgā and the killing of seven children of Devakī by Kaṁsa in Indian myths, and the burning of children by Demeter and Thetis, the sacrifice of seven Athenian youths to Minotaur, the murder of defeated suitors who came to marry Hippodamia, and the killing of his children by Kronos in Greek myths, remind us of an ancient custom of the sacrifice of youths and children. The Phoenicians sacrificed children to their Sanguinary god, Moloch.[13] Similarly in Greece infants were sacrificed to Melicertes on the Island of Tenedos and probably also at Korinth.

Lastly in our tale of Gaṅgā and Śāntanu, we find that Vasus got rid of their curse and mortal forms after taking leap into the river. In the *Mahāprasthānaparva*

13. Plut. *de Sernum, Vind* 6. p. 552 A.
14. Ovid, *Metamorph.* xiii. 924 ff

of the *Mahābhārata,* Yudhiṣṭhira also having bathed in the celestial river Gaṅgā, cast off his human body and assumed a celestial form. In Greek myths, Glaucus,[14] Ino and Melikertes[15] are said to have taken a leap into the sea and then to have attained immortality. The leap into the sea is also told of the divinities, Dionysus, Aphrodite, or heroic personages with such divine names as Molapadias and Parthnos of Caria, Dictynna Brinthomartis of Crete—all vegetation powers of similar value appearing as the legends of Cauldron. Dionysus[16] and Pelops[17] were revived in a boiling water put in the Cauldron. From the period of the early Vedas down to Hinduism of the present day, water in India has been considered as a tangible manifestation of the divine essence. In the beginning everything was like a sea without a light, declares an ancient hymn (*RV*. X. 129.3; ŚB 11.1.6.1), and even today one of the most common and simple objects of worship in the daily ritual is a jar or a pitcher filled with water, representing the presence of the divinity and serving in the place of sacred image.[18] In the *Brahmavaivarta-Purāṇa,* Śiva sings a hymn in praise of Gaṅgā: "She is the source of redemption. Heaps of sin, accumulated by a sinner during million of births are destroyed by the mere contact of a wind charged with her vapour. As fire consumes fuel, so this stream consumes the sins of the wicked. Sinners who expire near the water of the Ganges are released from all their sins. They become Śiva's attendants and dwell at his side. They become identical with him in shape; they never die—not even on the day of total dissolution of the Universe."

15. *Pausanias,* I. 42.6
16. Euripides, *Bacchae,* 92-102
17. Apollodorous, *Epitome,* ii. 3
18. Zimmer, *Myths and Arts in Indian Art and Civilisation,* 34

This passage of the *Purāṇa* is in conformity with the Vasus who were released of their curse or sin and mortal frame after taking a dip into the river Gaṅgā. It is told of the Rajah of Manipur and his wife that their sins which were washed away by water fell on a human scape goat. 'In one of the parts of Newzeland' a service was performed over an individual, by which all the sins of the tribe were supposed to be transferred to him ; a fern stalk was previously tied to his person, with which he jumped into the river and there unbinding, allowed it to float away to the sea, bearing their sins with it.[19]

In the case of Demeter and Thetis the attempt was to make immortal their children through fire. Similarly Isis essayed to confer immortality on the infant son of the king of Byblus.[20] According to Frazer (Apollodorus II) these legends point to "a custom of passing newborn infants across a fire to save their lives from the dangers which beset infancy and which to the primitive mind, assume the form of demons or other spiritual beings lying in wait to cut short the frail thread of life. Similar customs have been observed for similar reasons in many parts of the world". In Indian legends, Purūravas is said to have attained the state of Gandharva through the fire and Yavakrita, the son of Bharadvāja, was resurrected with him on entering the fire (*Āraṇyakaparva* 139-18). In the *Ṛgveda* (1.31.7) Agni and Soma (1.84.4) are said to render mortals as immortals. In one of the verses of the RV. (10.16.6), Agni is requested to temper the unborn portion (*ajobhaga*) of man with his flames, but not to consume it. Being consumed by fire the body only

19. Frazer, *Golden Bough*, Abd., 711-2
20. Plutarch, *Isis et Osiris*, 16

perishes, whereas the real personality remains indestructible.

In Greek myths Hercules became a god in the burning pile on Mount Oeta. The human element in him, which he had inherited from his mortal mother, was burnt in the flame, while the divine element[21] ascended the pure and spotless realm of the gods.

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21. Apollodorus II. vii. 7

VEDIC STARYA- AND PĀṆINI 3, 1, 123*

M. D. BALASUBRAHMANYAM,

Allahabad

1. . . . . *A.* 3,1,123

Pāṇini (=P.) teaches in *A* 3, 1, 123—

छन्दसि निष्टर्क्य - देवहूय - प्रणीय - उन्नीय - उच्छिष्य - मर्य - स्तर्या - ध्वर्य-खन्य-खान्य-देवयज्या-आपृच्छ्य-प्रतिषीव्य-ब्रह्मवाद्य-भाव्य-स्ताव्य-उपचाय्यपृडानि।

—that in the Sacred Literature (*chandasi*), *niṣtarkya-* and the other words listed in the rule, are *nipātana-s*. This is one of the rules which demonstrate the fact that P. has exploited Vedic sources from first-hand experience.

Of the seventeen *nipātana*-words listed in the rule, four words—*unnīya-*, *khānya-*, *pratiṣīvya-* and *stāvya-* — may be considered as belonging to the class of unattested Vedisms, since these do not occur in the extant *Saṁhitā*, *Brāhmaṇa* and *Āraṇyaka* texts. Concomitantly, six words belong exclusively to the domain of the *Ṛg* and *Yajurvedas*. Such words are : *devahū́ye* (*ṚV* 7,85,2), *khánya-* (*TS* 7,4,13,1), *brahmavā́dyam* (TS 2,5,8,3), *ucchiṣyóḥ* (*MaiŚ* 3,9,2), *praṇī́yaḥ* (*MaiŚ* 3,9,1) and *upacāyyâ-pṛḍam* (*KāṭhaS* 11,1).

2. . . . . *Pāṇinīyas on A* 3,1,123

Following the explanation offered in the *Mahābhāṣyam* and the *Kāśikā*, we can conveniently group the 17

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nipātana-words under the Kṛtya-kṛt-suffixes (gerundives in *-ya-*) with which these words are formed, as follows :

KyaP-words	ṆyaT-words	yaT-words
— āpṛcchya-	upacāyyâ-pṛḍam	khánya-
ucchiṣyá- (?)	khānyâ-	devayajyā (?)
unnīya-	niṣṭarkyâ-	dhvárya-(?)
devahūya-	brahmavādyâ- (?)	márya-
praṇīya-	bhāvyâ-	stáryā (?)
pratiṣīvya-	stāvyâ-	

3. . . . . *stárya-* (√*stṛ*+*yaT*)

In this paper I focus my attention on *starya-*. That the word is derived from the process :√*stṛ* (or *stṛ-* according to the *Altindische Grammatik*, II. 2, p. 791)+*yaT*, is shown by P a t a ñ j a l i (*Mahābhāṣyam*, Ed, Kielhorn, II.88.1) who reads *staryā* (fem.). Accordingly, the author of the *K āśikā* comments :

staryā, striyām eva nipātanam/

B h a ṭ ṭ o j i (*Sid.Kau.*3407) voices a similar opinion;

staryā / striyām eva ayam/

The grammatical steps with which *stáryā* is constructed, are shown below :

√stṛ	+ya-T	... ...	nipātana by *A* 3,1,123
,,	+ya-ϕ	... ...	T=ϕ by 1,3,3;9
star	+ya	... ...	guṇa by 7,3,84
= stárya-		... ...	barytone by 6,1,213
stárya-	+Ṭ-ā-P	... ...	ṬāP by 4,1,4
,,	+ϕ ā ϕ	... ...	Ṭ/P = ϕ by 1,3,5;3;9
= stáryā.		... ...	barytone remains, since /P/ indicates *anudātta* of suffix by 3,1,4.

Thus *stáryā* 'to be laid low' or 'overthrown' or 'conquerable' is a barytone in the Pāṇinian system of accentuation.

4. . . . . *The Vedic Facts*

The fem. word *stáryā* is not attested in the *Samhitās* that have come down to us. Nevertheless *MaiS* 1,5,10 (*Brāhmaṇa* prose) records the fem. negative formation, *astaryā̂*, as a perispomenon :

eṣā́ vā́ agnér astaryā̂ḥ priyā́ tanū́r varū́thyā́ |

(v. Schroeder's edn., I. 78).

It also occurs in AV (*Paippalāda*) 2,23,5-d:

urvī́r astaryā śaradas tarema| (Raghuvira's edn., I.31).

Among the *Brāhmaṇa* texts, the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (=*ŚB*) alone records the masculine *stárya-* (barytone) twice at 2,2,2,10 and 14 (=*ŚB Kāṇva :* 1,2,2,7;9). The oxytonic negative compound *astaryá-* (masc.) also occurs side by side with the barytonic *stárya-* in *ŚB*. Before citing this passage, a word may be said about the context of *ŚB* 2,2,2,10. The Devas wanted to conquer the Asuras, their mortal enemies. In order that the enemies may be vanquished, the Devas thought it proper to keep the immortal, consecrated Agni who alone among mortals is immortal, in their innermost souls; then they would become unconquerable (*astaryāḥ*) and immortal (*amṛtāḥ*). To quote *ŚB* 2,2,2,10 :

ते होचुः । हन्तेदम् अमृतम् अन्तरात्मन्नादधामहै, तऽइदम् अमृतम् अन्तरात्मन्नाधाय, अमृता भूत्वा, अस्तर्या भूत्वा, स्तर्यान् सपत्नान् मर्त्यान् अभिभविष्याम, इति । [Weber's edn.]

Eggeling (*SBE* XII. p. 310) renders the passage as under :

> They said, 'Come, let us place that immortal element in our innermost soul ! When we have placed that immortal element in our innermost

soul, and become immortal and unconquerable, we shall overcome our conquerable, mortal enemies.

S ā y a ṇ a glosses the word *astaryāḥ* with '*ahimsyāḥ*', and his explanation of the word at 2,2,2,14 reads as follows :

अमृतरूपाग्निधारणेन यस्मादाहिताग्निरहिंस्य : तस्माद् विवदमानोऽसौ अनाहिताग्निम् अभिभवितुं शक्नोति इत्यर्थ : ।

(Bombay edn., Part I. p. 385)

5.....*Thieme's argument*

In his *Pāṇini and the Veda* (p. 94), Thieme candidly admits of "Pāṇini's independence in arranging Vedic facts, and his originality in putting a problem touching on Vedic grammar". Yet he thinks (p. 19) that if P. had known the masculine forms (*stáryān* and *astaryāḥ*) attested in *ŚB*, "he would have read *starya-* beside *staryā*". Furthermore, he writes (p. 20) :

> It is not impossible that Pāṇini knew such a form (**stáryā* : MS *astaryā̂* = MS *médhya-* : MS *amedhyâ-*), but it seems more likely that he knew only *astaryâ* and abstracted * *staryā̂* from it (cf. KS *aniṣṭarkyâ-* : *niṣṭarkyâ-* against Pāṇ. 6,2,160). I even think, it is again the accent that has induced him to include the word in his list.

We have to face two difficulties in accepting Thieme's assumption : first, that the circumflex accent falling on the last syllable of *staryā̂ goes against the *yaT*-suffixation, that is to say, if *yaT* is suffixed to √stṛ-, the resultant kṛt-derivative must be barytonic according to P.'s rule : *yato'nāvaḥ* (*A* 6,1,213); and second, that the perispomenon of *astaryā̂* occurring in *MaiS* 1,5,10, contradicts the oxytonesis of *astaryā́*, since P. specifically

teaches in the rule: *kṛtya-uka-iṣṇuc cārvādayaś ca* (*A* 6,2,160), that a negative compound whose second component is made by means of the gerundive suffix in- *ya-* and others, is oxytonic. To put it particularly, the negative compound *astaryā* (f.) must be oxytonic according to A 6, 2, 160 while *stárya-* must be barytonic in P's system of accentuation through the force of *A* 6,1,213, if *yaT* is the suffix with which both the words are formed.

6. . . . . *The Samādhāna-*

I may now suggest a more convenient solution than the one suggested by Thieme. We have, of course, to tamper with the sandhi of " . . . *staryādhvarya* . . . " (occurring in *A* 3,1,123), and dissolve the words as follows : " . . . *starya* + *adhvarya* . . . " I now read *starya-* in lieu of *staryā* and *adhvarya-* instead of *dhvarya-*. In fact the gerundive adjective *starya-* will take proper care of the masculine *staryaḥ* and the fem. *staryā*. Therefore the supposition of the *Kāśikā* that *staryā* must be treated as a *nipātana* only in the feminine, runs on slippery grounds. Neither in the *Mahābhāṣyam* nor in the *Kāśikā* do we find any Vedic illustration for *staryā* and *dhvarya-*. Consequently a student of P. and the Veda is legitimately tempted to refurbish the text of the *Mahābhāṣyam* (II.88.I) as follows : *caturbhyaś ca yato vidhiḥ|maryaḥ, staryaḥ, adhvaryaḥ, khanyaḥ|*

Having dissolved the sandhi of *staryādhvarya-* as *starya-* and *adhvarya-*, we may now bring a 'rapprochement' between P. and ŚB. To explain fully, the barytonic *stáryān* and the oxytonic *astaryāḥ*, both of which belong exclusively to the property of ŚB, could be perfectly justified in the light of P.'s accent rules, 6,1,213

and 6,2,160 respectively. If my interpretation is correct, I think here lies the proof for P.'s acquaintance with ŚB.

My justification for accepting the reading, *stárya-* and *adhvaryá-* stems from another important consideration. The word *dhvarya-* is attested neither in the *Saṁhitās* nor in the *Brāhmaṇa* texts. But the negative compound, *adhvayaḥ* occurs in the famous *Prāyaścitti* hymn of *KāṭhaS* 35,7 (= KKS 48,9) :

adhvaryô'yáṁ yajñó astu : "Let this sacrifice be unimpaired". Thieme (op. cit., 24) again hypothesises that P.'s *dhvarya-* (√*dhvṛ* + *yaT*) might go back to *adhvarya-* in the same way as *staryā* is abstracted from *astaryā*. Obviously his hypothesis runs on uncertain grounds. It may incidentally be pointed out that Roth-Boehtlingk (*PW*, p. 1261) record *stárya-* (not *staryā*) with the following note :

> stárya (von 1. star) adj. Pāṇ. 3,1,123, niederzustrecken, ŚB 2.2.2.10.

Consequently I am led to believe that P. might have had *starya-* and *adhvarya-* in his mind, although his commentators have dissolved the sandhi of *staryādhvarya-* as *staryā* and *dhvarya-* without any justification whatsoever. As has been rightly stated by Thieme (*Introduction,* p.xi, f.), "none of the later interpreters took the trouble of questioning the completeness of the Vedic details given by Pāṇini, which was taken for granted already by Patañjali".

Yet one difficulty remains to be solved. We get into trouble with the accent of the negative compounds, *adhvaryāḥ* (a√*dhvṛ*+*yaT*) occuring in *KāṭhaS* 35,7 and *astaryāḥ* (*a√stṛ* + *yaT*) attested by *MaiS* 1,5,10. In conformity with the rule *A* 6,2,160, both the negative

compounds must be oxytonic, whereas these derivatives in *-ya-* are perispomenised in the Veda. This apparent irregularity between P. and the Veda in the system of accentuation could be explained by adding Vedic *adhvaryâ-* and *astaryâ-* to the list of permutations (*vyatyaya-s*) taught by P. in the rule : *vyatyayo bahulam* (*A* 3,1,85). To explain fully, both words are perispomenised in the Veda on the strength of the rule: *tit svaritam* (*A* 6,1,185) which, although not actually prescribed here for operation, replaces *A* 6,2,160 which is applicable *sensu stricto* in this particular situation. That both the negative words in *-ya-* are clear instances of *svara-vyatyaya-s*, is shown by the fact that P. has treated these as *nipātanas*.

7. . . . . *Conclusion*

The problem posed here, although not exhaustive, is sufficient enough to furnish us with the following criteria governing the relevancy and applicability of P.'s rules to Vedic facts :

(i) P. has minutely observed the linguistic peculiarities of several Vedic texts which are intimately known to him and which appear more or less in the same form as these have been handed down to us through an unbroken, oral tradition.

(ii) The Pāṇinian commentators did not approach the problem *au grand sérieux*, what kind of Vedic texts furnished P. with the *nipātana*-words taught in *A* 3,1,123 — a rule which was commented upon by them in a rather lethargic mood, without providing us with apt Vedic illustrations.

(iii) In consequence of (i) and)ii), a student of P. and the Veda is legitimately inclined to dissolve the sandhi of *staryādhvarya-* in *A* 3,1,123 as '*starya-*' and '*adhvarya-*' (against Pāṇinīyas). If this interpretation holds good, here lies one positive clue regarding P.'s acquaintance with the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* text.

(iv) It is now admitted beyond doubt that P. has drawn *devahūya-* exclusively from *ṚV*, *khanya-* and *brahmavādya-* from *TS*, *ucchiṣya-* and *praṇīya-* from *MaiS* and *upacāyya- pṛḍam* from *KāṭhaS*. Correspondingly, the forms *stárya-* and *adhvarya-* which exclusively belong to the domains of ŚB and *KāṭhaS* respectively, are known to Ācārya P ā ṇ i n i, a *śrotriya-* par excellence.

ABBREVIATIONS

A	...	*Aṣṭādhyāyī*
AV	...	*Atharva veda-saṁhitā*
KKS	...	*Kapiṣṭhala-kaṭha-saṁhitā*
KāṭhaS	...	*Kāṭhaka-Saṁhitā*
MaiS	...	*Maitrāyaṇīya-Saṁhitā*
PW	...	*Sanskrit Woerterbuch, st. Petersburg*
ṚV	...	*Ṛgveda-saṁhitā*
SBE	...	*Sacred Books of the East*
Sid-Kau	...	*Siddhānta-Kaumudī*
TS	...	*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*

PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDA AS VIEWD BY THE KĀLACAKRA SCHOOL

BISWANATH BANERJEE
Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan.

Pratītyasamutpāda or Causal Genesis or the Law of Dependent Origination forms the basic concept of Buddhist Philosophy and is held as an original contribution of the Buddha to Indian and World thought.

Etymologically the terms *Pratītyasamutpāda* means that every object is subject to dissolution, and dissolved objects appear again and again. The Law explains the fixed, unchangeable, and this-conditioned nature of things. Modern scholars have offered varied explanations of the origin and significance of the formula. The theory, however, is not intended to be an explanation of the origin of the world. It is a chain of instances to illustrate the dependent origination of things. A thing originates not by itself nor without a cause but depending on certain other things it originates as a fruition. The chain does not demonstrate a course of evolution but moves in a circle without a beginning or end and having no reference to time and place. The phenomenal existence is represented as a wheel with twelve spokes. The early Buddhists utilised this theory to show that the constituted objects have no substantiality as they have a preceding cause and condition. The Mahāyānists have used this formula to establish that the world is relatively existent and as such is unreal like the objects seen in a dream.

From a study of the different schools of Buddhism it becomes clear that though a wide difference of opinion exists among them on many points in the interpretation of the theory, they are all agreed on the central importance of this law. There is complete unanimity among them with regard to the fact that the *Truth*, as conceived by each of them, is attainable through the comprehension of the Causal Law. These schools are unanimous in holding : *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṁ paśyati so dharmaṁ paśyati, yo dharmaṁ paśyati so Buddhaṁ paśyati.* Nāgārjuna even identifies *Pratītyasamutpāda* with *Śūnyatā: yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṁ taṁ pracakṣate.*

It is, however, to be remembered that these schools are agreed on the importance of the principle as a key to the *Truth* but interpret and explain the theory in the light of their respective teachings.

The Kālacakra school, the latest phase of Buddhism, views the Law from a different angle. The *Laghu-Kālacakratantra* contains five verses (*verses : 113-117*) in the first chapter, which deal with the theory of the *Pratītyasamutpāda.*

It appears from available materials that the Buddhists of the Kālacakra school are great masters of Astronomy and Astrology and all the teachings and philosophy of the school centre round *Time* (Kāla). *Kāla* is the source of everything in this Phenomenal world. The *Wheel of time* is ever revolving with the movement of the Sun causing birth, decay, death, and so on in the process.

The Buddhist theory of the *Pratītyasamutpāda* is interpreted by this school as the movement of the Sun through the twelve Zodiacal signs in twelve months.

To understand life and the cause of life, to know the real nature of the phenomenal objects, one should comprehend this movement and the process. To put an end to the mass of evils is to stop it.

The verses run thus :

Puṣye māse tvavidyā makaragataravau kumbha-Sūrye ca māghe

Saṃskāro mīna-sūrye bhavati narapate phālgune meṣa-sūrye

vijñānaṃ nāmarūpaṃ vṛṣa mithunagate caitrāvaiśā-kha-jyaiṣṭhe

netrādyaṃ karkaṭe'rke-bhavati hari-ravau sparśanaṃ vedanā ca // 113.

āṣāḍhe śrāvaṇe yoṣid api tulagate bhādramāse-'śvine ca

tṛṣṇopādānam eva prabhavati ca bhavaḥ kārtike vṛścike' rke

jātiś cāpastha Sūrye maraṇamapi tathā mārgaśīrṣe krameṇa

Evaṃ sūryendubhedair ubhayagativaśād dvādasāṅgāni rājan // 114.

puṣye māghebhisandhau makaragataravau tatra vāre tvavidyā

tasmān mṛtyu dvitīye bhavati narapate jātirevaṃ tṛtīye

evaṃ sarvaṃ bhavādyaṃ kramagatiguṇitam dvādaśāṅgāni yāvat

tasmād vahnyabdhivāṇaṃ makaragativaśāt ṣaṣṭhamāṅgaṃ kadācit // 115.

pakṣa tithyākhyavāraiḥ ravicaraṇavaśāt ṣolaśāṅgaiḥ kadācit
saṃskāro māghasandhau kalaśagataravau tatra saṃskāra eva
vijñānaṃ tad dvītye prabhavati divase nāmarūpaṃ tṛtīye
evaṃ māsadvaye'ṅgaṃ bhavati ravivaśāt sṛṣṭisaṃhārayogāt // 116.
Tatrāvidyādyamaṅgaṃ viṣamamapi bhavecchobhanaṃ sarvakārye
saṃskārādyaṃ samaṃ yat tvaśubhamapi sadā sekayātrāvivāhe
evaṃ pakṣaprabhedaiḥ śaśigamanavaśād dvādaśāṅgāni yāni
śukle kṛṣṇe ca pakṣe prathamatithivaśāt sṛṣṭisaṃhārayogāt // 117.

The contents of the verses mentioned above are as follows : the Sun having gone into the Zod. sign of makara in the month of Puṣya is Ignorance, in the association of Sun with Kumbha is Formation in the month of Magha ; in the combination of Sun and Mīna in Phālguna is Consciousness; in Sun and Meṣa in Caitra is *Mind and Body*; in Sun and Vṛṣa in Vaiśākha are the *six planes,* with the position of the Sun in the sign of Mithuna arises Contact in the month of jyaiṣṭha; the Sun entering into the sign of Karkaṭa gives rise to Emotion in the month of aṣāḍha ; with the combination of Sun and Siṃha rises Craving in the month śrāvaṇa ; the Sun having gone into kanyā gives rise to Attachment in bhadra ; the entry of the Sun into Tulā and Vṛścika in the months of āśvina and Kārtika respectively cause

Becoming and Rebirth ; and the stay of the Sun with Dhanu in the month of mārgaśīrṣa causes Decay and Death.

This is the order of rising of the twelve factors with the movement of the Sun. The reference to the months here, says the *Vimalaprabha*, are all to be understood as the junction of the expiry of the month mentioned in a particular case and the beginning of the following month, e. g., "*puṣyanirgame māgha praveśa dine*".

Avidyā or Ignorance is understood as the root of all, the primary cause of existence and the Kālacakrayānists place *Avidyā*, the first *nidāna*, in the Sun's entry into the sign of capricorn i. e., with the beginning of the northern movement of the Sun.

Time flows on with the movement of the Sun through the Zodiacal signs and the twelve links (*dvādaśāṅga*) of the *Pratītyasamutpāda* are connected with the twelve Zodiacal signs in twelve months.

The order of the *nidānas* which we get in the verses above takes place in relation with the bright or dark fortnight of the months. In the bright fortnight of the month it is in the order of creation and in the dark fortnight it is in the order of destruction. These orders (creation-destruction, *sṛṣṭi-saṃhārayogāt*) may refer to the *anuloma* and *pratiloma* orders. The chain of Causation is to be understood, then, in both these orders.

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CALCUTTA-TOKYO LANGUAGE AXIS

P. N. BANERJEE

Paradoxical as it may sound, the Bengali and Japanese languages are strikingly akin to each other. Morphologically, syntactically, lexically and idiomatically there are striking parallelisms between these two great oriental languages, specially in their present-day colloquial forms prevalent at Calcutta and Tokyo.

There is no article in Japanese, and pure Japanese nouns, like pure Bangali nouns, normally do not indicate gender and number. Let us take, for example, the Japanese, word *inu* (dog) and its Bengali equivalent *kukur*. In Japanese as in Bengali, the word may mean either dog or dogs, bitch or bitches. Of course, if it is desired to emphasise the gender, special words like *o* (short for *osu*) and *me* (short of *mesu*) may be prefixed to *inu* forming *o-inu* and *me-inu* meaning dog and bitch respectively. Similarly, by adding *maddā* and *mādi* to *kukur*, we get in Bengali the words for both the sexes of the animal in question. Japanese, like Bangali, has a number of endings for indicating number, although it is not the general practice to use them. One of these plural endings is the common termination *ra*. Thus, by adding it we get inu*ra* in Japanese, and kukur-*era* in Bengali to indicate dogs.

Morphology

Japanese, like Bengali, is a highly analytical language. The noun, the adjective and the pronoun do not undergo any flectional changes when used in different cases which are indicated by the addition of postpositions as in Bengali. Let us take, for instance, any noun

at random, say the Japanese for fool which is *baka*. The following table gives in three parallel columns, the Japasese, Bengali and English declensions of this word in the three languages concerned :—

Case	*Japanese*	*Bengali*	*English*
Nom.	baka *ga*	bōkā	the fool
Acc.	baka *wo*	bōkā-*ke*	,,
Dat.	baka *ni*	bōkā-*ke*	*to* the fool
	baka *no tameni*	bōkā-r *jonnō*	*for* the fool
Gen.	baka *no*	bōkā-r	the fool's
Abl.	baka *kara*	bōkā-*hōte*	from the fool
Instr.	baka *ni*	bōkā-r *dārā*	by the fool
Loc.	baka *de*	bōkā-te	in the fool
	baka *no ueni*	bōkā-r opore	on the fool

It will be seen that the oblique cases in Japanese are obtained, as in Bengali, by the addition of appropriate postpositions, the basic word (noun) retaining all the time its original form. The adjective in Japanese which is placed before the noun remains unchanged in gender, number and case like a pure Bengali adjective. Take, for instance, the adjective *yoi* (good). By adding it to *otoko* (man) and to *onna* (woman) we get the following paradigm :

	Singular		*Plural*	
Nom.	*Yoi* (otoko	ga	*Yoi* (otokotachi	ga
	(onna		(onnatachi	
Acc.	*Yoi* (otoko	no	*Yoi* (otokotachi	wo
	(onna		(onnatachi	wo
Dat. (i)	*Yoi* (otoko	ni	*Yoi* (otokotachi	ni
	(onna		(onnatachi	
(ii)	*Yoi* (otoko		*Yoi* (otokotachi	
	(onna no tame ni		(onnatachi no tame ni	
Gen.	*Yoi* (otoko	no	*Yoi* (otokotachi	no
	(onna		(onnatachi	

It is interesting to compare the above paradigm with the following table giving the corresponding declension in bengali :

	Singular	*Plural*
Nom.	bhālo batāchhele / meye mānush	bhālo batāchhelera / meye mānushera
Acc.	bhālo batāchhele-*ke* / meye mānush-*ke*	bhālo batāchhele-*digake* / meye mānushe-*digate*
Dat. (i)	bhālo batāchhele-*ke* / meye mānush-*ke*	(1) bhālo batāchhele-*digake* / meye mānush-*digake*
(ii)	bhālo batāchhel-*er gonno* / meye mānush-*re gonno*	(ii) bhālo batāchhele-*der gonno* / meye mānush-*der gonno*
Gen.	bhāle batachheler / meye mānush-*er*	bhālo batāchhele-*der* / meye mānush-*der*

Like the noun and the adjective, the personal pronoun in Japanese remains constant in all cases. In this, it is more analytical than Bengali as will be seen from the following comparative table :—

1st Person.

	Singular	*Japanese*	*Plural*
Nom.	Watakushi	*ga*	Watakushi-domo *ga*
Acc.	Watakushi	*wo*	Watakushi-domo *wo*
Dat. (1)	Watakushi	*ni*	Watakushi-domo *ni*
(2)	,,	*no tame ni*	,, *no tame ni*

etc., etc.

Bengali		*English*	
Sing.	*Plu.*	*Sing.*	*Plu.*
āmi	āmarā	I	We
āmā-*ke*	āmā-*digāke*	Me	Us
āmā-*ke*	āmā-*digake*	(1) to me	(1) to us
āmā-*rjonnō*	āmā-*der jonno*	(2) for me	(1) for us

2nd Person

Nom.	Anata	*ga*	Anata-gata	*ga*
Acc.	Anata	*wo*	Anata-gata	*wo*
Dat. (1)	Anata	*ni*	Anata-gata	*ni*
(2)	Anata*no tame ni*			
	Anata-gata *no tame ni*			
	etc., etc.			

āpni	āpnā-ra	You	You
āpnā-*ke*	āpnā-*dige ke*	You	You
āpnā-*ke*	āpnā-*diga-ke*	to you	to you (1)
āpnār jonnō	āpnā *der-jonnō*	for you	for you (2)

N. B.—*anata* is the polite form corresponding to *āpni* in Bengali. The less polite forms are *kimi* and *omae* which correspond roughly to Bengali *tumi* and *tui* respectively.

3rd Person.

	Japanese		*Bengali*		*English*	
	Sing.	*Plu.*	*Sing.*	*Plu.*	*Sing.*	*Plu.*
Nom.	are *ga*	arera *ga*	Shay	tārā	he / she	They
Acc.	are *wo*	arera *wo*	tā-ke	tāhā-*digake*	him / her	Them

ete., etc.

Besides *are* there are many words in Japanese for he/she. Like *shay* in Bengali these words may stand either for he or she. The polite form for he/she in Japanese is *ano o kata* corresponding to *tini* in Bengali.

Syntax

The word order in a Japanese sentence follows broadly the same pattern as in Bengali. The following few examples will illustrate this point:—

(1) O ba-san ga mekura in narimashita.
Soko de, o isha san wo yonde :
"Sensei, moshi anata ga watakushi no
me wo naoshite, mata mieru yo ni shite
kudasareba, o rei wo takusan itashimasu; keredomo
naoshite kudasara-nakereba, nanni mo
agemasen. Ko iu koto ni shite wa ikaga de
gozaimasho."

The literal Bengali translation of the above Japanese passage would be :

ek jōn bṛdhhā aundho holen. Takhan dāktār ḍeke (bollen) : moshai, jodi āpni āmār chōk Shāriye ābār dekhte pāri emon kore dite pāren, puraskār jathesṭo debo,

kintu sāriye nā dite pārle, kichui debo nā ay rakam korle kamon hoy ?

The literal English translation of the same passage will be—An old woman blind became. Then doctor calling (said), "Sir, if you my eye curing, again can see like doing give, present much shall make; but curing if give not nothing shall pay. Like this doing how would be ? " While the literal English translation of this Japanese passage makes no sense whatever, its literal Bengali translation is not only syntactically but idiomatically correct. In English, the passage would read : An old woman became blind. Calling a doctor (she said); "If you cure my eyes and enable me to see again, I shall give you a good present. But if you do not cure, I will offer nothing. What do you say to such a line of action ?"

(2) Ikura kenyaku shite mo, rainen no uchi ni kaeri wo kesshite shimau koto wa dekimai to omoimasu.

The literal Bengali translation of the preceding Japanese sentence is—

katō mitabbyay koreō āshche bochorer bhetare rin parishod korte pārbo nā tāi mone hoy.

If the initial word *kato* in the literal Bengali translation is replaced by *atō* the sentence would be idiomatically correct. The literal English translation of the Japanese sentence will be : "how much economy doing even, next year's inside loan repay cannot so think." Needless to say that this is nothing but a farrago of disjointed words. The sentence has to be entirely recast to convey the sense, thus : however much I practise economy, I think I cannot repay the loan by next year.

(3) Komban watakushi hima dattara O KaSan ni tegami wo kitto kakimasho.

The literal Bengali translation of the passage is—

āj shondhyay āmi aboshar hole mātridebike chiṭhi nishchoy likhbo.

Vocbulary

The literal English translation of the same Japanese sentence will be : this evening I leisure if there were mother to letter certainly shall write.

While the literal Bangali translation reads well, in Bengali the literal English translation is clotted nonsense. The proper English translation would be : If I have leisure this evening, I would certainly write a letter to my mother. In some typical Japanese expressions, not only the word order but even the words used are very similar in form and sound. For example, *nai koto wa nai* in Japanese is equivalent to *nāi amon katā noy* in Bengali. The nearest English would be 'not that there is not' i. e. there are some. An extended form of this expression in Japanese *ika nai koto wa nai*=Bengali *jābo na amon kaṭā noy* (The verb *iku* in Japanese corresponds to *jāwa* in Bengali). Rendered into English the sentence will read : not that I would not go—i. e. I shall go. Similarly, it is interesting to compare the common Japanese expression, *baka na koto wo iuna* with its Bengali equivalent *bōkar moto katā bōlō nā* (Don't talk like a fool.)

There are some Japanese words like *baka* (fool), *sara* (plate), *namae* (name), *sokoni* (there) and *itatte* (extremely) which have their counterparts in Bengali *bōka, shara, nām, sekhane, ottanto.* There are many particles, interjections and onomatopoetic words in Japanese which have close parallels in Bengali. The Japanese interrogative particle *ka* corresponds to the Bengali *ki*, and like it is placed at the end of an interrogative sentence. For

example, the English sentence 'Have you got it ?' will read as 'anata wa motte imasu *ka*' in Japanese and 'āpnar kāche āche *ki* 'in Bengali. Both Japanese and Bengali add *na* at the end of a verb in the imperative mood in two different senses, the one being negative and the other affective-exhortative. The first meaning (negative) is illustrated in a Japanese sentence like ' sonna koto wo *iuna*' and in its Bengali equivalents 'amon katā bōlō *na*' (Don't say such a thing). The second meaning is illustrated in such short sentences as 'otabe*na*, kudasai*na*' and their Bengali equivalents : khān *nā, din nā* (Please eat, please give it). Another imperative verbal ending *ro* in Japanese has its parallel in Bengali *re* as in tabe*ro* in Japanese and khā *re* in Bengali.

The Japanese interjections *ma, ara* with their extended forms *oya ma* and *ara ara* are represented in Bengali by *māgo, āre,* ō mā *āre āre*. One or two examples will illustrate the similarity in usage between Japanese and Bengali. Thus, the Japanese sentence : *ma, nanno oto desho* would be in Bengali : māgo, *ki shabdo hote pāre* ? meaning : Oh ! what noise could this be ? Let us take another typical Japanese sentence containing the intensive interjection *are ara : ara ara* asoko wo goran nasai, and compare it with the corresponding Bengali sentence conveying the same sense *āre, āre, ō dike dekun* (well, well, look over there).

There are many onomatopoetic words in Japanese with striking paralles in Bengali as will appear from the following table :—

Japanese	*Bengali*	*English*
doki doki	dhuk dhuk	Pit-a-pat (sound of heart-beat)
gara gara	ghaṛ ghaṛ	sound of rattling sound,

gasa gasa	khash khash	sound of rustling sound.
goro goro	goṛ goṛ	sound of rumbling sound.
musha musha	mashāmash	sound of munching sound.
tobo tobo	thap thap	sound of shuffling gait.

The use of these words in sentences in both Japanese and Bengali will further illustrate their affinity. The Japanese commonly say 'mune ga *doki doki* suru' as we say in Bengali 'buk *dhuk dhuk* korche.' The Japanese word *suru* following *doki doki* is the same as the Bengali word *korche*. The nearest English equivalent would be : the heart goes pit-a-pat. Let us compare the use of the onomatopoetic Japanese word *gara gara* in 'gyusha ga gara gara kimashita' with that of the Bengali 'gorur gāṛi ghoṛ ghoṛ kore elo' (the bullock cart came with a rattling sound). Incidentally, the Japanese word *gyusha* which is of learned origin resembles the Bengali word *go shakaṭ*. The English sentence, the bear came out of the thicket with a rustling noise would be : 'kuma ga yabū kara *gasa gasa* dete kimashita' in Japanese and, bhāduk jhōṅp theke khash khash kore beriye elo' in Bengali. The Japanese—kaminari ga *goro goro* narimasu (the thunder is rumbling)—would be in Bengali : megh goṛ goṛ kore dākche. The Japanese say : ara wa *musha musha* tabemasu, as we say in Bengali : Shay mashā mashkore khāchche, the meaning in both cases being : he is eating with a munching sound. The English sentence—he is walking with a shuffling gait—would be expressed in the same way in Japanese and Bengali by making use of a similar onomatopoetic word, thus : Ara wa *tobotobo* aruite ikimasu, in Japanese, and 'shay thap thap kore hiṅte jāchche' in Bengali.

The Japanese use *dara dara* as the Bengalees use *dar dar* in speaking of copious perspiration. For example

dara dara ase ga deru in Japanese is in Bengali : dar dar kore ghām parche (perspiration is coming out copiously.

Idiom

Japanese has quite a few common idioms and turns of expression which have striking parallels in Bengali. To give only a few instances at random, 'hone ori no shigoto' has an exact equivalent in the Bengali idiom : hāṛ bhāṅgā khatuni, the Japanese compound word *hone-ori* meaning, like its counterpart in Bengali, bone-breaking. *Do shite* in Japanese=ki kore in Bengali (how : literally, what doing). For example: Do shite suru no desu ka ? in Japanese is equivalent to : ki kore karā hoy ? in Bengali (How is this done ?)

The Japanese idiom *chichikusai* and its Bengali equivalent *duder gando beroy* is commonly used to mean raw, inexperienced (literally, milk-smelling). For example, 'ano hito wa mada chichikusai' has an exact equivalent in Bengali : ōr mak diye akhono duder gando beroy. In English this would read : He is still callow (His mouth still smells of milk). Some common Japanese verbs like *miru, oku, iku* which in bengali are *dekā, rākā, jāwā,* have special idiomatic usage when preceded by other verbs in the gerund. For example, *Kangaete miru* which in Bengali is *bhebe, dekā* (Kangeru being equivalent to think) means to think over (literally, thinking see). Similarly totte oku=*niye rākā* (toru=take and oku=keep) means to put by (lit. taking keep). Compare a typical Japanese sentence : Kore wo totte oite o kure, with its literal Bengali translation : *eṭā niye reke daō* (Put this by; lit, this taking keeping give). Let us take an English sentence like 'Hadn't you better tell your father ? The Japanese say : O to san ni hanashite mitara ii ja nai ka ?

The literal Bengali translation of this sentence will be : pitridebke bole dekle bhālo hoy nā ki ? The English verb 'to obey' is commonly rendered both in Japanese and in Bengali exactly in the same way, namely, to listen to one's word : *iu koto wo kiku* in Japanese and *kotā shonā* in Bengali. In this connection it is interesting to compare *yonde kikaseru* with its literal Bengali translation and idiomatic equivalent *poṛe shōnāna* both meaning to read over. To have loose motions is *hara ga kudaru* in Japanese and *peṭ nāmā* in Bengali, both meanihg literally, the belly to descend.

From this short sketch it is abundantly clear that the Japanese and Bengali languages have many common features.

INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENTS OF IRANIANS IN RELATION TO NON-IRANIAN CULTURAL INFLUENCES

SOHRAB H. BATLIVALA,

Bombay

Just as individuals are affected in many ways by influences from different persons and in turn they exercise their own influence upon others, so do the nations. It will be seen from this article how various nations influenced the people of Iran culturally and how the Iranians reacted to those influences in a cultural manner down the ages up to the end of Arab rule over them in the ninth century after christ.

Introduction of Alphabet Into Iran

There is a legend that in the reign of King Tahmuras of the Pishdadian dynasty of Iran, certain demons were captured and were about to be slain, but they pleaded with the King to save their lives and in return, offered to instruct him in the art of writing in different scripts. According to the Pahlavi book "Mino-e-Kherad" Chapter XXVII, 21-23 (West's translation in the Sacred Books of the East Series, Volume XXIV, pp. 58-59), the chief of the demons taught the King the art of writing in seven different scripts. Ferdausi, in "*The Shah Nameh*" recounts this tale, refers to thirty scripts, but names six only, the Roman, Persian, Arabic, Soghdian, Chinese and Pahlavi. (*Vide* "*The Shah Nameh* of Firdausi." Done into English by Warner and Warner, Volume I, p. 27). I provide an explanation of this legend.

These so called "demons" who introduced into Iran the art of writing in symbolic characters were the ancient Arameans. Here, I might mention that amongst the pre-Islamic Iranians, foreigners or non-Iranians and non-Zoroastrians were often called by such appellations as *diy* (demon) and *dregvant* (liar), in much the same derisive way as Moslems used to call non-Moslems *Kafers* (Infidels) and Christians used to call non-Christans Pagans. These Arameans, who were amongst the earliest mercantile community of the world to visit distant lands introduced into Iran the art of writing through contacts with its inhabitants as traders and barterers. (*Vide* H. G. Wells, *The Outline of History*, Edition of 1931, pp. 191-193). Again, according to the Western scholars, the Avestan and Pahlavi Alphabets are ultimately derived from the old Aramaic characters. (*Vide* the Article of Junker on "The Origin of Avestan Alphabet," in *Dr. Modi Memorial Volume,* pp. 767-768). Thus, the two findings of Western scholars firstly that the Arameans sojourned in Iran in ancient ages during which they showed to the Iranians the art of writing in symbolic characters and secondly that the origin of ancient Iranian Alphabets is Aramaic, provide the clues that these so called "demons" of Tahmuras were the Arameans who introduced into Iran the art of writing in Alphabets.

Iranians Improve The Semitic Alphabet

But how did the Iranians react to this cultural contact ? The Aramaic characters had hardly any vowels. They consisted mostly of consonants, like the Hebrew and Arabic. (Vide *The Alphabet*, by David Dirringer pp. 253 *et seq.* for the Hebrew Aramaic, and pp. 304 *et seq.* for the Iranian Alphabets). It was the genius of Iran

that improvised vowels, and the Avestan Alphabet contains some fourteen vowels and compared to three at the most of the present Perso-Arabic script namely *alef*, *waw* and *va* or six of the Roman script *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, *u* and occasionally *v*. According to Professor Poure Davoud, the Avestan Alphabet is the most appropriate of all the Alphabets of the world to convey adequately the various Iranian speech sounds. He deprecates the suggestion of some Iranians of the present day that the Roman script should be adopted for writing the Modern Persian language because, according to him, the Iranians already possess their own national and phonetically perfect Avestan script for writing the language of modern Iran. The reader who is interested in this topic of determining the most suitable script for Persian in the present age might well acquaint himself with the contents of the two discourses in Persian of professor Poure Davoud on *Din Dahireh* or the Avestan script, one appearing in his translation of the *Gathas* of Zarathushtra, (First Edition of 1927, pp. 16-20) and the other in his *Pouran Dokht Nameh* (Edition of 1928, pp. 16-17).

Iranians have cultural contacts with Vedic Aryans.

Another early cultural contact the Iranians had was with the Vedic Brahmins. There is a Persian tradition that Changhraghacha (Shankaracharya ?) and Vyas, two sages of India, had a discussion with Zarathushtra, the prophet of ancient Iran on ethical and spiritual subjects and were convinced of the truth preached by him. (*Vide* Williams Jackson, *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran,* pp. 85-88). There is a reference in the Avestan literature to one Gaotama (*Farvardin Yasht* paragraph 16). Some orientalists like Tiele take him to

be the sage mentioned by that name in the Vedas, while others like Haug and Darmesteter consider him to be the Buddha himself. He is depicted in Avestan as one defeated in a controversy with the Iranians. Considering the fact that the Avestan literature is contemporaneous with the Vedic, the late Dastur Dr. Darab Sanjana holds the verdict of Tiele to be the correct one, and Professor Poure Davoud rejects the opinions of Haug and Darmesteter for a number of reasons he specifices (Vide "*Gaotama in the Avesta*", by Dastur Dr. Darab Peshotan Sanjana, pp. 7-8 and Poure Davoud's article in Persian entitled *Gaotam* in his Persian translation of the *Yashts*, Volume II, pp. 28-40). In the *Vedas* themselves there are references to Goshtasp and other heroes of Iran, who lived in the time of Zarathushtra, besides some of the other Pishdadians and Kayanians. At one place in the *Rig Veda*, even the Persians and Parthians are distinctly mentioned by name. Vedic divinities like Indra, Sharva and Nasatya are referred to as demons in Avestan and are named Indra, Saurva and Naonghaithya at *Vendidad* X 9 and XIX 43. All these matters connected with references to the ancient Iranians in the *Rig Veda* are discussed at length by Martin Haug in his *Essays on the Parsis* and by Shapurji Kavasji Hodivala in his book *Zarathushtra and His Contemporaries in the Rig Veda.*

Iranian Magi become a Famous Tribe

It might be added that magi, the most renowned people of Iran, are the only Aryan tribe who are mentioned by name in all the three major Semitic scriptures. In the Hebrew text of the Old Testament at *Jeremiah*

39 : 3, this name occurs in the title *Rab Mag* or Lord Magus. In the Greek text of the New Testament at *Matthew* 2 : 1 it occurs as *Magoi* and is translated in the Authorised Version as "wise men". In the Arabic text of the *Qur'an* at Surah *Al-Hajj* verse 17, it occurs as *Majoos* or "Magians". This topic is discussed in the Essay in Persian of Mohammad Jawad Mashkoor entitled "*Magi as Mentioned in Semitic Holy Books*", in Publication No. 4 (pp. 92-106) of Iranology Society, Teheran. These Magi are mentioned as *Maga* by Zarathushtra in his *Gathas* at *Yasna* 29 : 11 and 46 : 14. Ardeshir Khabardar in the Glossary at the end of his work *New Light on the Gathas of Holy Zarathushtra* has noted the fact that this name *Maga* occurs in the *Rig Veda* and Dr. Irach Taraporewala in his work *The Divine Songs of Zarathushtra,* in commenting upon these Gathic verses says that *Maga* are a people from Shaka-dvīpa who are mentioned in the ancient Indian *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa* also. Thus the Magi, the most renowned people of Iran, happen to receive express notices in all the five major religious literatures of the world, the Zoroastrian, Brahmanic, Hebrew, Christian and Moslem. Some ancient Greeks, Aristotle among them, have noted the fact of the Magi being older than even the Egyptians. Stray references in the Avestan and Vedic literature to the Gods and heroes of one another disclose the earliest historical contacts the dwellers of Merv and Gandhara had with the inhabitants of the Punjab and Sind. These last two regions are also mentioned by name in Avestan as *Hapta Hindu* or the region of the seven rivers and as *Hindva* or the region of the Indus (*Vide* Kavasji Kanga's "*Avesta Dictionary*" foot note, on pp. 577-78 and the last word on p. 588). Conversely

Merv as Meru and Gandhara are both mentioned by name in Sanskrit literature.

Wars Between Iran and Turan

The next are the Turanians of western Turkistan, who exercised influence on the Iranians with respect to their martial spirit. The wars between the Iranians and Turanians described in *the Shah Nameh*, of Ferdausi are even grander in concept and description than any mythological or historical war narrated either in the *Illiad, Odyssey* or *Mahābhārata.* These Turko-Iranian wars brought out and developed the true martial spirit of the Iranian nation which stood them in good stead during later ages in their wars against other hostile nations. One of the tactics employed and developed in these wars is commonly known as scorched earth policy, *i.e.* burning and destroying every thing in the path of a pursuing enemy so as to slow down and even arrest his advance. This Iranian tactic was employed successfully by the Parthians against the Romans during the centuries preceding and following the birth of Christ and recently by the Russians against the Germans during 1941-1943 A. C. On the authority of a number of Pahlavi works, Sohrab Bulsara has shown that well known Turanians such as Fryana (known as Piran in *the Shah-Nameh*) Yoishta-Fryana and Aghraeratha (Agreras of *The Shah Nameh*) known as Prince of Gopat in Pahlavi literature), were the first converts to the Zoroastrain faith. (See *The Religion of Zarashushtra Among non-Iranian Nations,* pp. 16-19). Zoroastrian religion must have survived among them down to comparatively later ages, for Edward Gibbon has noted the fact that Altai Turks were professing the religion of Zarathushtra (*Decline and Fall of the Roman*

Empire, Chapter XLII) round about sixth century of the Christian Era.

Iranian Cultural Contacts with other Western Nations

Other cultural contacts the Medes and the Persians had were with the Elamites, Assyrians, Babylonians and Egyptians. The Elamites and Assyrians were conquered by the Medes and thereafter the Babylonians and Egyptians were conquered by the Persians. The sculptural bas-reliefs, rock inscriptions and engraved figures of the Achaemenian Persians display strong Elamite, Assyrian, Babylonian and Egyptian influences. Firstly, most of the major Old Persian inscriptions are accompanied by their translation in the Elamite language along with the Babylonian. Secondly, the typical figure of the Assyrian Bull is observed even in Persian bas-reliefs. Thirdly, the Egyptian winged figure has become the proto-type of the Iranian *Khoreh* or the Royal Glory engraved on the rocks over the Persian figures. Conversely, the Assyrian inscriptions refer to the Medes while an inscription of Darius the Persian has been discovered at Suez in Egypt. Sohrab Bulsara has noted the fact that several names of Babylonian divinities have an Iranian impress. Besides that, Iranian influences are discernible in the ancient Egyptian script, calendar, beliefs in certain divinities connected with worship of the Sun, the mode of disposal of the dead and in the life hereafter. (Vide *"The Religion of Zarathushtra Among non-Iranian Nations"*, pp. 2-7 and 20-22). These particulars show the cultural contacts the Medes and the Persians had with their Western neighbours, the Elamites, Assyrian, Babylonians and Egyptians, two thousand five hundred years ago. For details one may refer to *Ancient Monarchies* of George

Rawlinson and numerous other archaeological works of Tolman, Herzfeld and Cameron dealing with ancient rock inscriptions and tablets found in the Near East and Iran. In fact, even Hebrews of the prophetic ages were influenced by Zoroastrian rites and modes of worship. At *Ezekiel* 8 : 16-17 there appears to be a reference to certain Jews who worshipped the rising sun with *Barsam* twigs.

Iranian influence on Post-Exilic Jews.

Coming down to the Achaemenian dynasty it is found that many Jews were employed in the service of Iranian monarchs as secretaries and quite believably, documents of the State of Iran were copied out in the Aramaic and Hebrew languages by these Jewish scribes. Some of these Iranian court decrees in Aramaic and Hebrew have been preserved *Verbatim* in the Books of Ezra, Nehemiah and Esther. On the other hand, Iranian words and idiomatic modes of expression are noticed in the Books of the Major Prophets, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Daniel, besides some other Books of the Hebrew Old Testament. Incidentally, beliefs in immortality of the soul and in the future life were borrowed by Jews from the Iranians during the Exilic and the post-Exilic ages. In these matters, the reader can consult profitably, *Zoroastrianism and Judaism,* by George Carter, particularly its Chapter IX. Cyrus the Great, as a matter of state policy, encouraged his subject-nations in the observance of their respective religious customs and rites. He enabled the Jews to rebuild the Temple of Jehovah at Jerusalem and enthroned again the idol of Marduk at Babylon. (See *The History of Ancient Iran,* in Persian by Peer-Naya Volume I, pp. 232 *et seq.* and

History of the Persian Empire by A. T. Olmstead pp. 34 *et seq.*). In all probability, it was this very reason of favours shown to foreign creeds that estranged and antagonised the Achaemenian Kings in the eyes of the devout Zoroastrian priesthood and hence their names have not been recorded in the native registers, although these monarchs in their rock inscriptions invariably pay homage unto Ahura Mazda, the Supreme Diety recognised by Zarathushtra.

Iranians Come In Contact With Buddhism

During the early Parthian period Buddhist preachers had crossed over into Balkh and the central region of the Oxus from Nepal and the basin of the Ganges. Those of the Iranians who were attracted by teachings of the Buddha, imported into its propaganda a zest of their own, carried its message across the steppes to the Far East and translated several books on Buddhistic teachings into the Chinese language, some of which with their translations have survived even to the present day. (See the article of Kentak Hori of Imperial University, Tokyo, entitled *Persian Buddhist Translators in China* in Dastur Hoshang Memonial Volume, pp. 509-513 and the Article of Poure Davoud in Persian entitled *Gaotam* in his *Yashts* Volume II, pp. 28-37). Nav Bahar of Balkh was a great Iranian Buddhist *Vihara* or monastery and the ancestors of the Barmakites were the *Para-maka* or *Pramukhs* or Deans of its Monastic Chapter. The name of the town Bokhara is a Turkish adaptation of the Buddhistic word *Vihara*, for there had been many Buddhist shrines in the region of Balkh and Bokhara during those ages. (See the derivation of the names *Bokhara*, *Barmak* and *Bahar* given by Professor Mohammad Moin in Persian in his

foot-notes to these words in his edition of *Borhan-e-Qate*). So, it will be seen how the Iranians reacted to Buddhistic influences and served the cause of Buddhism so devotedly.

Cultural Contacts Between Parthians and Greeks

It was during the Parthian times that Iran came in closer contact with Greek culture through the Seleucids. On a series of coins of the Parthian kings we find inscriptions in Greek. This is natural, since the whole region from the Euphrates to the Indus was under the rule of the Greek Commanders of Alexander for a period of eighty years, from 330 B. C. to 250 B.C. before the Parthians established their own rule in the region of Khorasan. According to the Greek biographer Plutarch (46 A. C.-120 A. C.) Orodes, a Parthian Prince was acquainted with the Greek language and literature and could enjoy the representation of a play of Euripides. (Vide George Rawlinson's reference to this statement of Plutarch in "The Sixth Monarchy", p. 424). On the other hand, as pointed out by Theodor Noeldeke (1836 A.C.-1930 A. C.) "Hellenism never touched more than the surface of Persian life" (Quoted by Edward Browne in *Literary History of Persia*, Volume 1, p.6). Nevertheless, some Iranian literary influence on the Greek language can also be discerned as Avestan *Nasks* or sacred writings were done into Greek (Dhalla, *History of Zaroastrianism*, p. 293). In fact, two well known Avestan words have found their way through Ancient Greek even into Modern English. The Avestan word *Pairi-daeza*, which in modern Persian would be *Peeraamoon-e* dezh (the environs of a castle), was adopted by the Greeks as *Paradeisos*, from which is derived the modern English word Paradise.

(Vide derivation of the word Paradise in *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*). Similarly the Avestan word *Shoithra-paiti*, which in Modern Persian would be *shahr-baan* (the mayor of a city or the ruler of a region), was adopted by the Greeks as *Satrapes*, from which is derived the Modern English word Satrap (*Vide* derivation of the word Satrap in *Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary*).

Parthians come in touch with Christianity

It was during the middle Parthian period that Jesus Christ was born. According to certain traditions of the Christian Church, three Magi went to Bethlehem in Judea to do obeisance to him. They have been called by various names, but Malchior, Baltasar and Gaspar are the ones that are more familiar. But these are not Magian names and the countries they came from namely Nubia, Chaldea and Tarshish are not Iranian lands. On the other hand, a Syrian Christian tradition records the names of these Magi as Goshan-asp, Hormisdas and Zarvandad. (Vide "The Story of the Magi" by the Rev. H. Heras S. J. p. 5). These are definitely Iranian names. Considering the fact that on the one hand Christ has been called in the New Testament as "The King", (*Matthew* 21 : 5), "The priest" (*Hebrews* 3 : 1) and "The Shepherd" (*John* 10 : 11) and the gifts of gold, frankincense and myrrh as mentioned in *The Gospel of Saint Matthew* (Chapter II verse 11) are taken to be the royal, priestly and pastoral gifts respectively and on the other hand, that in ancient Iran there had been three great Cathedral Fire Temples one called Adar Goshasp situated in Azarbaigan dedicated to the Kings, another called Adar Khordad situated in Pars dedicated to the Priests and the third called Adar Burzi - Mehr situated

in Khorasan dedicated to the Pastors, this writer is disposed to hold that the Magi or "wise men" of the first Gospel were the three officiating functionaries of these three Fire Temples dedicated to Kings, priests and Pastors, situated in Azarbaigan, Pars and Khorasan respectively. (See the history of these three famous Fire Temples of ancient Iran, given by Professor Mohammad Moin in his Thesis in Persian entitled *"Mazdayasna and its influence on Persian Literature"*, pp. 197-231). It is also recorded in the New Testament in *The Acts of the Apostles* (Chapter II), that Saint Peter, the first Vicar of Christ, preached to the Parthians amongst others at Jerusalem on the day of Penticost and according to early Ecclesiastical historians, Saint Thomas, an Apostle of Christ preached in Parthia, in Northern India and Malabar. (See *The Two Apostles of India*, by the Rev. Henry Heras S. J. and published by The Catholic Truth Society of India, Trichinopoly, 1944). Thus, the Iranians came in direct contact with Christianity at its very inception.

Spread of Mithraism in the Roman Empire

It was during the first century of the Christian Era, that Mithraism, *i. e.* worship of Mithra, the Zoroastrian divinity presiding over the light of the Sun, spread into the then Roman world. H. G. Wells observes, "It is highly probable that he (Saint Paul) had been influenced by Mithraism. He uses phrases curiously like Mithraic phrases." (*Vide* "The Outline of History," Book VI, Chapter 28 Section 5). Poure Davoud has given a very lucid account in Persian of the historical and religious aspects of Mithraism prevailing in the Roman Empire during the first four centuries of the Christian Era (See *Yashts* Volume I pp. 407-420). According to this account in

Persian several Mithraic rites have been incorporated into Christianity by the Pontiffs of Rome. In this connection Poure Davoud says, "In matters of the religion of Jesus, it was considered advisable to adopt the usages and religious rites of Mithraism which had taken deep roots in Rome during a long period of centuries and in this manner bring the religion of Jesus nearer to the prevailing customs of the people of those ages, or else there was no other way to popular appeal. The people had not left off religious observances to be kept on Sundays, the days specially dedicated to the Sun and the 25th of December which is the festival of its advent. So that in the end, during the fourth century of the Christian Era, out of sheer necessity, the 25th of December was fixed as the day of the birth of Christ. Sunday is also considered by the Christians to be the day of the rising of Jesus and the day on which he ascended to heaven just as this day is also considered by worshippers of Mithra as a day specially dedicated to their patron divinity Mithra." (Vide "*Yashts*" Volume I pp. 419-420). From this statement of Poure Davoud, it will be seen that the observance of Sundays and 25th December are really Mithraic festivals adopted in the fourth century as Christian feast-days.

Mani and his Religio

A little before this time, *i. e.* in the third century after Christ, Mani began practising and preaching his religion in Mesopotamia and the neighbouring countries including Iran. He formed his doctrines by a process of syncretism or a sort of synthesis of various beliefs. (See George Rawlinson, *The Seventh Monarchy*, p. 96). Under the influence of Buddhism as preached in Eastern

Iran, Iranian dualistic philosophy, Trinitarian Christianity, various Gnostic cults of Syria, Mesopotamia and Greece, Alexandrian Neo-Platonism, Bobylonian Astronomy and Astrology together with his own observation upon the various phenomena of nature, Mani formulated a speculative system which according to him would lead mankind to salvation. The reader interested in Manichaeism should read the two lectures in Persian delivered by Sayyed Hasan Taqui-Zadeh before the Iranology Society of Teheran, and published by that Society under the title *Mani and his Religion.* As observed by this scholar of Modern Iran in the aforesaid speeches, Mani's doctrines had certain objectionable social and economic features. He advocated celibacy, discouraged propagation of the human race and enforced abject poverty on his followers. Such practices would spell ruin to the welfare of the people and the state and hence Behram then the ruling king of Iran actively and forcefully suppressed Manichaeism. Professor Dr. S. H. Taqui-Zadeh is quite clear on the point that it was not due to any religious or doctrinal differences which Mani had with the Zoraostrian Clergy that he was executed but due to the adverse economic and social factors brought about by some of the perverse practices he advocated and carried out by his followers. In the end such practices would bring disaster to the Iranian nation and mankind in general. (See p. 27 of the Persian text of *Mani and His Religion*).

Christianity in Zoroastrian Iran

If the Iranians were opposed to the Manicheans on economic and social grounds, they were opposed to the Christians on political grounds. Christianity first came

into prominence in the neighbouring regions of Armenia through the propagandist efforts of Gregory the Illuminator himself an Iranian of noble birth. (See *Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* Volume I, p. 803, under the caption "Extension of Christianity in Armenian : Saint Gregory the Illuminator"). The Zoroastrian Iranians at first allowed the Armenians complete religious freedom and Yezdegard I even provided them with special facilities and favours (See George Rawlinson, *The seventh Monarchy,* pp. 274-275). But the Armenians abused the religious freedom afforded to them. Abdaas the Bishop of Ctesiphon burnt down the great Fire Temple of that place and refused to rebuild it (*Ibidem*). Whenever a war broke out between the Persians and the Byzantines or Romans, the Armenians took side of the Christian westerners against their own masters, the Zoroastrian Persians (*Ibidem* pp. 304 *et seq*). Under these circumstances, it was no wonder that the Sassanian Kings like Yezdegard I and Yezdegard II embarked upon religious wars against the Armenian and the Persian Christians to reclaim and reconvert them back to Zoroastrianism (*Ibidem*). As pointed out by Professor Edward Browne, a picture of the struggle Sassanians had with the Christians, is preseted by Syrian writers, a source of information not sufficiently used by most orientalists. (Vide *A Literary History of Persia*, Volume I, p. 134).

Sassanian Cultural Contacts With Medieval India

A bright spot during these troubled times is the visit of King Behram-e Goor to India. There is a tradition recorded by Ferdausi and other Persian historians that this King brought from Northern India twelve thousand musicians and settled them in the region that is now

called Lorestan. The fact that modern Lors are the most musical of the present day Iranians lends support to this tale that their distant ancestors were Indian musicians. Thus, in the matter of music, Iran owes much to India. Apart from this, the late Dr. Jivanji Modi, the late Mr. Sohrab Bulsara and others have contributed articles in the Journals of the K. R. Cama Oriental Institute of Bombay and elsewhere showing that several paintings in fresco on the walls of certain caves in the western coastal regions of the Indian Peninsula depict court scenes in which Sassanian Persian ambassadors are discernible by their peculiar dresses. In southern India, inscriptions in the Pahlavi language and script are found on old Christian Crosses and hence it is said that the Syrian Christians of South India are really descendants of Persian Christians who had settled there in former times. They are being called Syrians just because they observe liturgy of the Syrian Church and conduct their church services in the Syrian language. Thus, the northern, western and southern Indian peoples had direct cultural contacts with Persians during the Sassanian regime. Various topics dealing with the spread of Christianity in the Near East, Persia and India can be culled out from the corresponding articles in the Roman Catholic Encyclopaedia, which by the way records the fact that one of the Popes of those ages (consecrated 514 A. C.—died 523 A. C.) had borne the name *Hormisdas* a distinctly Persian name. In other words, a Persian had risen to and occupied the highest throne of the Hierarchy.

Iran Rejects Mazdakite Communism

During the next generation, Iranians had to face communistic indoctrination of Mazdak. George Rawlinson

in his *Seventh Monarchy* (p.344) vividly describes the elaborate and clever imposture of Mazdak on the authority of the Persian historian Mirkhond. He says, "He (Mazdak) excavated a cave below the fire-altar, on which he was in the habit of offering and contrived to pass a tube from the cavern to the upper surface of the alter where the sacred flame was maintained perpetually. Having then placed a confederate in the cavern, he invited the attendance of Kobad and in his presence appeared to hold converse with the fire itself, which the Persians viewed as the symbol and embodiment of divinity. The King accepted the miracle as an absolute proof of the divine authority of the new teacher and become thence forth his zealous adherent and follower." Thus, the first communist the world ever saw, commenced his mission with a deliberate hoax and a fraud. As noted by Edward Gibbon, the people of Iran were deluded and influenced by the fanaticism of this communist "who asserted the community of women and the equality of mankind whilst he appropriated the richest lands and most beautiful females to the use of his sectaries." (See Edward Gibbon, "*Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,*" Chapter XLII). According to the Pahlavi commentator of *Vendidad*, iv. 49, Mazdak himself ate fully, but starved others to death. All these details have been noted by the late Dr. Jivanji Modi in his article "*Mazdak, the Iranian Socialist*" published in *Dastur Hoshang Memorial Volume,* pp. 116-131. According to Ferdausi, it was king Anoshirwan the son of Kobad and his Zoroastrian prelates who ultimately refuted the communistic arguments of Mazdak and saved Iran and the world from the grip of this forerunner of Lenin and Trotsky.

Iranians Interested in Greek and Indian Philosophical Works

But this attitude of Anoshirwan and his prelates should not be taken to mean that they were blind and deaf to new ideas. On the contrary, when the seven Greek sages namely Damascius of Syria, Simplicius of Calicia, Eulamius of Phyrgia, Priscianus of Lydia, Harmeias and Diogenes of Phoenicia and Isidorus of Gaza sought refuge at the court of Iran, Anoshirwan readily welcomed them. These philosophers found that Plato's *Timaeus, Phaedo, Gorgias* and *Parmenides* were among the treatises read by Anoshirwan in a Persian dress. (See George Rawlinson *The Seventh Monarchy* p.448 foot-notes 1 and 5). There is an instance on record depicting tolerance of the King in religious matters. A noted Zoroastrian preceptor embraced Christianity and later became the Patriarch under the name of Mar Aba the Great. The Zoroastrian priesthood clamoured for his death and the law of the country supported them. It was the great admiration that King Anoshirwan held for the Partiarch that saved his life. (See Dhalla, *History of Zoroastrianism* p.329).

This age of Anoshirwan was the golden age of Pahlavi literature. *Khodai-Nameh* or "The Book of Kings", was compiled by his order and the King's physician named Borzuyeh recovered from regions of the Indus and the Ganges the fables of Bidpai (Vidya-pati) popularly known as *Kalileh wa Dimnah* and the particulars about the games of chess and draughts. These were translated from the Indian into the then Persian tongue. The King took special interest in the Greek art of healing and established a University at Gond-e Shahpur in the vicinity of modern Susa where besides medicine, other subjects like philosophy

and rhetoric were also studied. (*Vide* George Rawlinson, *The Seventh Monarchy* pp. 448-450). Thus, the Iranians were quick to absorb wisdom and knowledge from wherever these faculties of enlightenment came and it was this noteworthy ability of the Iranians which caused the prophet of Arabia to remark that even if wisdom be hid amongst the Pleiades, the Iranians would find it out from there. (This saying has been recorded by Professor Mohammad Moin in his Persian Thesis *Mazdayasna and its Influence on Persian Literature,* p.284 and also by Awrang in his Persian book *Monotheism in Ancient Iran,* p. 21).

Contact of Iranians With Arabs And Islam

Towards the end of the Sassanian rule, Mohammad the Prophet of Arabia, began preaching Islam to the Bedouins. Iran had cultural contacts with Arabia even during the pre Islamic times as is shown by the presence of Iranian words in pre-Islamic Arabic poems. (See the last Chapter of the late Professor Dr. U.M. Davoud Pota's thesis, *The Influence of Arabic Poetry on the Development of Persian Poetry*). Salman-e Farsi was one of the earliest Iranians with whom the Prophet came into personal contact and who became one of his most intimate companions. It was he who acquainted the Prophet with the Iranian art of defending a military position by digging trenches (See the Biography in Urdu of Salman-e Farsi by Moin-ud-Din Nadvi in the series entitled *Emigrants*, published by the Daru'l-Musannefeen of Azamgadh, U. P.). Historicity of this anecdote is further reinforced by the fact that the Arabic word for trench *i. e. Khandaque* is adopted from the Pahlavi *Kandak* (Modern Persian *Kandeh*) from the root *Kan* (dig), as in the infinitive *Kandan* (to dig), (See "*Borhan-e Qate*" under

the word *Kandeh*). In fact, there are some forty words in the Arabic *Qur'an* which are etymologically of Iranian origin as has been shown by Arthur Jeffery in his "Foreign Vocabulary of the *Qur'an*". How much the prophet of Islam valued the friendship of Salman-e Farsi and regarded him and his nation as the standard-hearers of Islam in the future, could be seen from the following incident recorded in the Traditions and Annals.

It is related that once the Prophet recited Surah *Mohammad* and when he ended it with the words "And if you turn back, He will bring in your place another people who will not be like unto you", those near him asked the Prophet, "Who are the people who would be even better than what we are ?" At that moment Salman-e Farsi happened to be sitting next to the Prophet, so the Prophet clapped his palm upon the thigh of Salman and said, "He and his nation". Then the Prophet continued, "If wisdom were to be hid in the heaven behind the constellation of Pleiades, the pepole of Persia would acquire it somehow even from there also". In the Persan book entitied "*Monotheism in Ancient Iran*" by Awrang this incident is recorded on pp. 20 and 21. (See also the foot-note of George Sale to the last verse of Surah *Mohammad* in his translation of the *Qur'an*). In this connection of the Traditions it might be of interest to note that the most authentic collection of sayings of the Prophet and next in importance to the *Qur'an* namely *Sahih Bokhari* was compiled most scientifically by a Persian. (*Vide* the Article of Brockelmann in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* under *Bukhari* wherein he has stated that Bukhari was a Persian by descent). As for the critical acumen of *Bokhari*, note the statement of Professor Reynold

Nicholson in *A Literary History of the Arabs* on page 146, wherein he says, "We may see now enormous was the number of false Traditions in circulation from the fact that when Bukhari drew up his collection entitled The Genuine, (*al-Sahih*), he limited it to some 7,000 which he picked out of 600,000". Further details about Bokhari and his compilation may be gathered from the discourses of Muhammad Asad (Leopold Weiss) given in his preface to *Sahih al-Bukhari* containing Arabic text and translation in English published by the Arafat Publications Srinagar, Kashmir. According to Mohammad Jawad Mashkoor whose Essay is already referred to, the Arabian tribe of Tamim had a number of its tribal peoples observing Magianism at the advent of Islam. Further, it is also on record that Fire-Temples existed in Arabia during the lifetime of the Prophet. The Chapter entitled "The Influence of Parsism on Islam" by Professor Goldziher and translated by the late Mr. G. K. Nariman in *Persia and Parsis* (Part I) pp. 37-68 and the note thereon by the Translator on pp. 69-74 of that book indicate the strong influence the culture of Sassanian Iran had on Abbasside khelafat. The Pahlavi Tract named *Gajastak Abalish* depicts Khelifeh Mamun presiding over a disputation Adar Fren-e Bagh Farrokh-zad the Grand Mobed of Pars had with Abalish a Zendique or Zoroastrian heretic and upholding the Grand Mobed, while G. K. Nariman in his Note referred to above mentions that al-Kisai, the famous tutor to the sons of Harun ar-Rashid namely Amin and Mamun, was an Iranian, whose Persian name was Bahman Pur-e Firuz. During the next generation, a treatise was composed in Pahlavi-Pazend entitled *Shikand Gumanik Vichar* or "Doubt-dispelling Explanation" to show excellence of the Zoroastrian faith over Judaism,

Christianity, Islam and Manichaenism. This work is still in existence, the text of which has been edited and translated into English, Persian and some other European languages (See also "A Literary History of Persia", by Edward Browne, Volume I, page 106). In fact, the researches of such profound scholars as M. Huart, Von Kremer, Carra de Vaux, and a host of others have shown that the so called Arabian Science is mainly a Persian contribution to the cultural activities that took place in the Islamic countries of the Near and Middle East during the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries A.D. (For details about this topic the reader may consult works of the late Mr. G. K. Nariman).

Shuubiyeh Movement in Iran

But in spite of this formidable Iranian contribution to Islam, certain Arab elements tried to belittle the Persians and their various cultural activities. Hence, those of the enlightened Iranians who had embraced Islam took their stand on a passage from the *Qur'an* (Surah *al-Hujurat* verse 13) which recites "O mankind, verily We have created you of a male and female and have made you nations (*Shuuban*) and tribes (*Qabaayel*) that you may know one another. Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of Allah is the most pious of you." Since as per this verse, the distinction before God is not according to the race (*Shuub*) or community of an individual but according to a person's piety, those Iranians who called themselves of the nations, came to be nicknamed *Shuubiyeh*. They championed the cause of the past glories of Iran and ridiculed the pretensions of the Arabs. Many poets, historians, scientists and administrators, particularly of non-Arab extraction supported

the *Shuubiyeh* movement and it was through the literature left by this Iranian elite that the later chroniclers drew their material for recording achievements of Iranians of the pre-Islamic ages. They provided necessary inspiration and zest for laying the foundation of a future Iranian national state which resulted in Iran throwing off the yoke of the Arabian Khalifahs and regaining their lost political and cultural independence. Numerous translations of Ibnol-Moquaffa, in particular from Pahlavi into Arabic made during eighth century of the Christian Era, enlightened the early Abbasid Khalifahs and the Arabic reading public of that age on the profoundity of Iranian civilisation. (See the Biography in Persian of Abdollah Ibnol-Moquaffa by Abbas Iqbal Ashtiyani, Publication of *Iranschar* No. 15, Berlin 1927). The Arabian rule over Iran thus ended due to the efforts, in the main of the *Shuubiyeh* (See Zahih-Ollah Safa's article entitled *Shuubiyeh* in his Persian book, *The History of Persian Literature*). How strongly the ancient culture of Iranians persisted even amongst the Transoxianians as late as the ninth century of Christian Era can be seen from the fact that Ishaq, an adherent of Abu Muslim who had been extremely helpful in overthrowing the Umayyad Khelafat and setting up the House of Abbas in 750 A. C. had fied amongst these on Abu Muslim's death and preached that that Abu Muslim was a prophet sent by Zoroaster and that Zoroaster was alive and had never died, but would reappear in due season to restore his religion. (See Edward Browne, *Literary History of Persia*, Volume I, p. 315).

Conclusion

From this short survey one can see the indelible stamp of Iranian genius in the various contacts they

made with foreigners whether they be Indians, Armeans, Turanians, Elamites, Assyrians, Babylonians, Egyptians, Hebrews, Greeks, Romans, Chinese, Armenians, Syrians or Arabs. Few nations of yore have shown so much stamina and done so much for others or absorbed so much from others or gave of its own to so many, yet survive as a nation and as a state with a distinctive characteristic of its own from time immemorial to this very day, as has been demonstrated by the great Iranian nation.

Finally, I conclude this article in the manner of Sassanian writers by quoting their customary formula in Pahlavi, with which they usually close their treatises :

FRAJAPT PA DARUPT U SHATIH U RAMISHN

"Completed in Peace und Joy and Pleasure."

ON THE SANSKRIT LITERARY GENRES PARYĀYABANDHA AND SAṀGHĀTA

H. C. BHAYANI

Gujarat University, Ahmedabad

1. *The Vrajyā, Paryā and Paryāyabandha*

While describing the various types of literary compositions or genres Viśvanātha has defined *Kośa* as a collection of verses that are contextually independent from each other, and that *Kośa* which is arranged in Vrajyās is, according to him, specially attractive.[1] Vrajyā here designates any collection of homogeneous verses, the homogeneity consisting in the sameness of topic. We have several well-known instances of Sanskrit and Prakrit anthologies of stray verses arranged topic-wise into sections called Vrajyā. Vidyākara's *Subhāṣitaratnakośa*[2] (c. 1100 A. D.) consists of fifty Vrajyās which include Vasanta-vrajyā, Māninī-vrajyā, Asatī-vrajyā, Kavistuti-vrajyā, etc. Similarly the Prakrit anthology *Vajjālagga*[3] (after eighth century A. D.) and Sādhāraṇadeva's recension of Hāla's *Saptaśataka* (about fourteenth century A. D.) have Sk. *vrajyā* or Pk. *vajjā* as the section

1. Kośaḥ śloka-samūhas tu syādanyonyānapekṣakaḥ/
   Vrajyā-krameṇa racitaḥ sa evā timanoramaḥ.//
   Sajātīyānāmekatra sanniveśo Vrajyā, yathā Muktāvalyādi.
   (*Sāhityadarpaṇa* - 6, 329.)
2. *Subhāṣitaratnakośa*, ed. D. D. *Kosambi* and V. V. *Gokhale* (1957), Introduction p. XXX.
3. *Vajjālaggaṁ* ed. M. V. *Patwardhan* (1969), Introduction p. X.

name. Now *Vrajyā* is indeed "a rare word for 'section."[4] It is otherwise known only in the meaning of 'the act of going or moving'. The connection between the two meanings of *vrajyā* is anything but obvious. The fact is, *Vrajyā* in the sense of 'a topical section of a verse anthology' is not a genuine Sanskrit word. As defined by Viśvanātha and as known from Sanskrit verse anthologies, it is nothing but a Sanskritization of the Prakrit term *Vajjā*. Prakrit *Vajjā* with the meaning *adhikāra* 'topic, section' is recorded by Hemacandra, significantly as a *deśī* word in his *Deśīnāmamālā* (7, 32). Again the *Vajjālagga* equates *Vajjā* with *paddhai*, Sk. *paddhati*, and defines it as a group of Gāthās pertaining to the same subject-matter or topic.[5] Thus according to the *Vājjālagga*, the meaning and function of the term *vajjā* are the same as those of the term *paddhati* used in Sanskrit anthologies like Bhartṛhari's *Nītiśtaka*, Jalhaṇa's *Sūktimuktāvali*, Vallabhadeva's *Subhāṣitāvali*, etc. The meaning *adhikāra* for *vajjā* given by Hemacandra is obviously based on such usage as he found in Prakrit (and Sanskrit) anthologies. But still the question remains : what is the etymological origin of this *vajjā* and how did it come to have the meaning *adhikāra* or *paddhati ?* Outside of the usage of the anthologies, these meanings remain unattested from the rest of Prakrit and Sanskrit literatures. Luckily a remark of Hemacandra helps us to solve the problem.

In his commentary on *Deśīnāma-mālā* 6,I Hemacandra has observed that of the three Prakrit words having the same phonological shape *pājja*, only the one

4. *Kosambi*, Introduction to the *Subhāṣitaratnakośa* p. XXX.

5. ekkathe patthāve jattha paḍhijjaṁti paura-gāhāo/
taṁ khalu vajjālaggaṁ vajja tti paddhaī bhaṇiyā//
(*Vajjālagga* 4)

meaning 'ladder' is Deśya. The other two with the meanings '*adhikāra*' and '*mārga*' derive respectively from Sanskrit *paryāya* 'a type of composition' and *padyā* 'road'. Now Prakrit *pajjā* and *vajjā* both meaning *adhikāra* cannot be different words. Sanskrit *p*, when medial and intervocal, corresponds to Prakrit *v*. When *pajjā* formed the latter member of a compound as in *vasaṁta-pajjā*, *asaī-pajjā* etc., its *p* could be treated as medial and so be changed to *v*. Thus *pajjā* and *vajjā* both meaning *adhikāra* 'topic, section' derive from Sanskrit *paryāya* through the itermediate form pajjā : paryāya->pajjāa-> vajjā. *Vrajyā* is nothing but false Sanskritization or a sort of back formation devised by Sanskritists who lost sight of the connection between Sanskrit *paryāya* and Prakrit *vajjā*. Feeling some insecurity about the coinage *Vrajyā*, Ratnadeva has offered *padyā* (=*paddhati*, *saraṇi*) as an alternative explanation of Pk. *vajjā* and sought some justification for it from the *Amarakośa*. Hemacandra clearly states that *paryāya* the source of Prakrit *pajjā*, had the meaning of '*prabandhabheda*' 'a type of literary composition'. Ānandavardhana is the earliest authority to refer to the *paryāya* type as *paryāyabandha*. The *Locana* defines it as a verse composition consisting of independent units given to describing a single subject like the spring season.[6]. This definition is borrowed by Hemacandra and the *Agnipurāṇa*, but they have *paryā* and *paryābandha* in the place of *paryāya* and *paryāyabandha*. *Paryā* is just a syllable-to-syllable Sanskritization of the later Prakrit form *pajjā*. The various Sanskrit

6. 'avāntarakriyāsamāptāv api vasantavarṇanādyekavarṇanīyoddeśyena pravṛttaḥ paryāyabandhaḥ. *Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka*, III. 7)

and Prakrit forms of the name of the genre *Paryāyabandha* are to be correlated as under :

Sk. *paryāya* > Pk. *pajjāa, pajjā*>Pk. *vajjā*
Pk. *pajjā* > Sk. *paryā, padyā*
Pk. *vajjā* > Sk. *vrajyā-*

We may note in passing that the strange developments undergone by the term *paryāya* find a striking parallel in what happened to the term designating the divisons of the Paiśācī *Bṛhatkathā*.[7] From original *lambha* (meaning 'aquisition, attainment'), it became *lambhaka* through pleonastic extension. Due to ignorance or phonological change these were turned into *lamba* and *lambaka*, were adopted in sanskrit and were reinterpreted or else they were replaced by the acceptable Sanskrit synonym *lābha*. Thus misunderstanding of a Prakrit term, Sanskritization and reinterpretation are the common features in the history of the terms *lambha* and *paryāya*.

The appropriateness of the designation Paryāyabandha is quit obvious. It is a composition in which the same topic is described in its various aspects (*paryāya*) ; or variations (*paryāya*) are worked out on the same theme. The aptness of the term *paryāya* is in glaring contrast with the forced and artificial interpretation of the manufactured term *Vrajyā*.

The identification of the Paryāyabandha with the Vrajyā readily solves a mystery: How was it that even though authorities like Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta thought it worthwhile to take note of the type

7. For a recent discussion, see Raghavan, *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*, (1963) pp. 844-6 .

Paryāyabandha, so far we had not been able to identify even a single actual work of that type ? It now becomes clear that in the Vrajyās or Vajjās of the Subhāṣita anthologies we have as many examples of the Paryāyabandha as we would wish to have. Hemacandra has stated this clearly : Paryās are seen in abundance in the Kośas. This is echoed by Viśvanātha in the definition we cited previously. The same characteristic of the Paryāyabandha which is specified by Abhinavagupta with the expression *ekavarṇanīyoddeśya* is expressed by others with different wordings, e. g. *eka-praghaṭṭakopanibandha* (Hemacandra, *Alaṅkāracūḍāmaṇi* on *Kāvyānuśāsana*, VIII 12),[8] *sajātīyānām-ekatra sanniveśaḥ* (Viśvanātha).

Now prior to Ānandavardhana we do not get any treatment of the Paryāyabandha as a literary genre.[9] Instead we find a very similar type called Saṁghāta. But this point requires to be discussed separately.

2. *The Paryāyabandha and the Saṁghāta.*

Under the Anibaddha class of literary compositions, the authorities on Sanskrit poetics generally mention Muktaka, Saṁdānitaka (= Yugalaka), Viśeṣaka, Kalāpaka, Kulaka, Kośa, Saṁghāta and/or Paryāyabandha, besides a few others.[10] Daṇḍin and Bhoja do not mention the Paryāyabandha. Similarly Ānandavardhana is silent about the Saṁghāta. Hemacandra and Viśvanātha have both, the Paryāyabandha and the Saṁghāta. Some difficulty seems to have been felt about formulating the

8. Besides Hemacandra has also reproduced Abhinavaguptás definition.

9. See *Raghavan*, op cit pp. 611, 631.

10. See for example Hemacandra's *Kāvyānuśāsana* VIII 10, commentary. For a general and comparative survey, see *Raghavan*, op. cit., ch. XXI.

principles of distinction for a few of these literary types and there was probably some confusion and uncertainty about classifying the middle-length compositions as can be seen from their conflicting treatments. Abhinavagupta defines the *Paryāyabandha* as follows :

> *avāntara-kriyā-samāptāv api vasanta-varṇanādy-eka-varṇanīyoddeśyena pravṛttaḥ paryāyabandhaḥ.*
>
> (*Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka,* III 7)

This means that the verse composition called Paryāyabandha consisted not of one but several self-contained syntactic-semantic units and it aimed at describing one single subject like the spring season. Compare with this what Bhoja has to say about the Saṁghāta:

> *eka-praghaṭṭopanibaddhānāṁ subhāṣitānāṁ samūhaḥ Saṁghātaḥ. Aneka-praghaṭṭakopanibaddhānāṁ tu kośaḥ.*
>
> (Raghavan, *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, p. 630)

This means that the Saṁghāta is a collection of independent verses on one single theme, while the Kośa is a collection of verses on various themes.

This would make the Paryāyabandha and the Saṁghāta as one and the same type. And the same conclusion would follow from Ratnaśrījñāna's definition of the Saṁghāta, which is as follows:

> *nānā-bhittayo bhinna-kriyāḥ svatantrāḥ ślokāḥ kośavat sthā [pitāḥ kośaḥ]. Ekāṁ bhittiṁ prāvṛḍādikān varṇayituṁ samudāyena pravṛttā bhinnakriyāḥ ślokāḥ Saṁghātaḥ.*
>
> (*Kāvyalakṣaṇa 1 13, commentary*)

This means that the Kośa is a treasury of self-contained verses syntactically independent and pertaining to

various themes, while the Saṁghāta is a group of verses syntactically independent but purporting to describe one single theme like the rainy season.

Accordingly one would suspect that what was called Saṁghāta earlier came to be called Paryāyabandha later. But in the definition of the Saṁghāta given by Bhoja at another place one additional detail occurs :

eka-praghaṭṭake yas tv eka-kṛto bhavati sūkti-samudāyaḥ
Saṁghātaḥ sa nigaditaḥ Vṛndāvana-Meghadūtādi.

(Raghavan *op cit., p. 808*)

This means that Saṁghāta is a group of self-contained verses pertaining to a single theme and *of single authorship,* like the *Vṛndāvana* and the *Meghadūta.*

Hemacandra, seems to have made a clever use of this for providing separate niches for the Saṁghāta and the Paryāyabandha types. According to him Paryā is a group of Muktakas pertaining to the same theme, and this definition he takes to be substantially the same as given by Abhinavagupta, which also he reproduces. Further he defines Kośa as consisting of a number of Paryās. And as for the Saṁghāta, he reproduces Bhoja's definition.[11] Thus the distinction between the Saṁghāta and the Paryāyabandha would rest solely on the fact of authorship : if the work is an anthology of stray verses of *different authors* on the same theme it would be

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11. *muktakānām eka-praghaṭṭakopanibandhaḥ Paryā. avāntaravākya-samāptāv api vasantādyekavarṇanīyoddeśena muktakānām' upanibandhaḥ paryā. Sā kośeṣu pracuram dṛśyate. yathā Saptaśatakādiḥ. Ekapraghaṭṭake ekakavikṛtaḥ sūktisamudāyo Vṛndāvana-Meghadūtādiḥ saṁghātaḥ. Alaṅkāracūḍāmaṇi* on *Kāvyānuśāsana,* VIII 12-13)

called Paryāyabandha; but the same type of work of *one author* would be called Saṁghāta. In actual practice we find the term *Vrajyā*, a fourth reincarnation of the term *Paryāya*, frequently used in the anthologies. But the term *Saṁghāta* seems to have gone out of vogue quite early, and so when Bhoja mentions the *Meghadūta* as an example of the Saṁghāta type, one justifiably feels skeptical about there being a sound earlier tradition in this regard.[12]

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12. Compare Raghavan's reaction, op. cit p. 629.

ON THE PUN AS POETRY

EDWIN CEROW

University of Washington, Seattle.

The pun is a figurative device which occupies a unique place in Sanskrit literature. Next to grammatical virtuosity, it is the aspect of Sanskrit style which has received the most abuse from Western critics.[1] Yet some poets appreciated by traditional Indian criticism have, like Māgha and Shrīharṣa, depended in part for their poetic effect upon this highly expressive figure of speech.

In this short paper I want to investigate some formal relations between the pun and other figures which may illuminate the high regard in which the pun evidently was held by the writers and critics of the classical period.

In our own rhetorics, there is a confusion between pun and word-play, which are often termed indiscriminately "paronomasia". Warren Taylor[2] defines paronomasia as "playing on the sound and meaning of words : punning" (p. 116) and offers the example : "Be sure of his sword before you trust him of his word" (from Henry Peacham). The *Oxford Dictionary* agrees—paronomasia is "a playing on words which sound alike...a

1. e.g. Keith, *History of Sanskrit Literature* pp. 311-3. Das Gupta and De, *History of Sanskrit Literature* (vol. 1) pp. 221-3; 334-6; etc.
2. "Tudor Figures of Rhetoric", Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1937 Edwin Cerow, University of Washington Seattle.

pun"—but then defines the pun as the "use of a word in such a way as to suggest two or more meanings" as in "Great Praise be to God and Little Laud to the Devil" (referring to the Arch-Bishop).

No Indian rhetorician ever confuses, as in these examples and definitions, pun and word-play, *śleṣa* and *yamaka*. Failure to distinguish clearly between the two is, I think, one element in the typical Westerner's inherent dislike of the pun, and one reason for the low esteem in which its "poetic" use is generally held. Poets like Ogden Nash and the Madison Avenue group have become our standard sources for the pun.

In the Indian rhetorics, word-play is usually defined as a repetition of identical syllable sequences somewhere in the line or verse in such a way that the meaning of each sequence is different (Rudraṭa 3.1). (Example : For News you can depend on, depend on the Chicago Daily News; or sword-word). A pun, however, is the use of a single word or phrase in such a way that two meanings are simultaneously apprehended (*yugapat*) (Rudraṭa 4. 1., 10.1). (Example : little Laud to the Devil). The charm of the former is thought to reside in the iterative similarity of verbal appearances merely; of the latter to be a function of the expressive power of the words themselves.

The pun conveys two meanings at once; from the point of view of expressive technique the pun, as a figure of speech, is a prime example of density of meaning-always, as we know from the *dhvani* theorists, a highly prized quality in the work of art.

The oldest view of the figures of speech seems to be that they were elements of non-literal expression (*vakrokti*

B) by which poetic writing was distinguished (*viśiṣṭa*) from other genres, notably shastraic or literal writing. Bhāmaha explains that a touch of exaggeration (*atiśaya*) or deviation from the exact is to be found in all the figures. The poet's means are language of a peculiar sort involving usages and references which are technically speaking equivocal and which presuppose the ability of the audience to grasp relations which are not stated as such. The oldest such figure, and traditionally the most important, is *upamā*, simile. Two things, not literally comparable, are compared : a girl's face and the moon. Incomparable in the sense that no generic relationship exists between the two; no writer on scientific subjects would refer to one in explaining the other. But the poet, focussing upon some aspect of the girl's mood which he wants to convey, and not intending the face or the moon as such, makes the conjunction of the two, whereby a specific understanding is awakened of the charm or the softness of the girl's regard. This apprehension of an imposed quality constitutes the aim of the poet who employs simile.

It is inevitable that the pun, whereby the two ideas are conjoined in simultaneous expression, would be considered in the same context as simile; the pun can even be seen as the most characteristic figure of speech, being inherently or essentially non-literal (not in virtue of the context).

Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha define the pun as a variety of metaphor (*rūpaka*), itself a comparison raised to the status of an identification. Instead of being "like the moon," the girl's face "is" the moon (e. g., the orb of her face rises behind the hill of her breast). Pun carries

the identification one step further in those cases where the two metaphorized things are expressed not by the predication inherent in a compound noun, but by the *same* word; for example, the word "rājā" conveying both senses of king and moon. (Daṇḍin's example, 2.311 :

"asāv udayam ārūḍhaḥ kāntimān raktamaṇḍalaḥ /
rājā harati lokasya hṛdayaṁ mṛdubhiḥ karaiḥ. //)

The simple simile underlying the pun "Laud" (the arch-bishop) and "praise" (to be given to the Devil) is evident.

The earlier view of the pun as comparison was retained in later writers, notably Rudraṭa, but certain cases were pointed out and distinguished in which the grammatical structure of the punned meanings forbade the same analysis ; these were called "verbal" puns, as in "Focus : where the sons raise meat" (name of a ranch). Here a nominative plural (sons) is punned on a genitive singular (sun's) and a verb (raise) is punned on a noun (rays). Comparison requires an identity in morphemic structure and function. With these "embarrasing" puns and other verbal devices (word-play) out of the way, Rudraṭa goes on to give an elaborate analysis of figures whose expressive power can be traced only to the meanings of the words used. He divides these figures into four categories : descriptive (*vāstava*—rhetorical arrangements of the phrase), comparative (*aupamya*—based on simile), hyperbolic (*atiśaya*—in which a property is exaggerated), and lastly, puns. Just as the category *vāstava* meant neither comparative nor hyperbolic, we may infer, since Rudraṭa is generally systematic, that this last category, pun, refers to poetic devices which are *both* comparative and hyperbolic,

Here the pun is the crucial figure, involving the poetic issue in its extreme form. The pun not only forces a comparison of its two constituent ideas, but the simultaneity of their apprehension is such a potent expressive device that an exaggeration of the presumed similitude is conveyed *a fortiori*. Rudraṭa devoting his tenth chapter to this important type gives ten examples showing how the two meanings of the pun can compliment one another, and so serve a genuinely aesthetic end. Puns cannot be made at random.

Among the more obvious types are puns involving a risqué second meaning, and those, ironic, where the two meanings differ, as praise and blame. The delightful effect of these puns, involving simultaneity, is of course lost in translation ; it may even be a peculiar property of the Sanskrit language, which possesses so many more synonyms than our own. The pun as simile is nevertheless apparent : A girl sends her emissary to arrange a rendez-vous with the lover. Instead, the emissary is seduced by the lover. She returns showing the wounds of passionate kissing on her lips. This evokes the retort : You have gone for my sake and given your body to my lover (word also means "reptile"); for what you have done how will I ever repay you ("get even with you"). The bites on the messenger's lips make the pun on the snake even more appropriate.

Some English poets have understood the poetic aspect of punning. John Donne, also seducing someone, writes : "License my roving hands and let them go/ Before, behind, between, above, below,/ O my America! my New found land!/ My kingdom's safest, when with one man manned. . ." Rudraṭa's example (10.10) contains an exact parallel.

This I think illustrates at least the kind of pun the Indian poet took as his model. As an extremely forceful simile, it could be used in contexts where strong feeling or emotion was expressed. Viewing such puns as concealed similes and not as mere "word-play" may enable us to appreciate more fully some of the more recondite "jewels" of Sanskrit literature.

चमत्कार-तत्त्व का रहस्य

परशुराम चतुर्वेदी वकील, बलिया, (उ० प्र०)

चमत्कार के विषय में "दैवी" "अतिप्राकृतिक" अथवा "अलौकिक" जैसे शब्दों के प्रयोगों का कोई औचित्य स्वीकार कर ले सकें तो हमारे सामने कुछ कठिनाई भी आ जाती जान पड़ती है और हमें किसी ऐसी समस्या का सामना करना पड़ जाता है जिसका वैसी दशा में आप से आप उठ जाना स्वाभाविक है। हम स्वभावत: इस प्रकार सोचने लग जाते हैं कि क्या कभी किसी प्राकृतिक नियम का उल्लंघन भी संभव हो सकता है, अर्थात् क्या कभी हम ऐसा भी अनुमान कर सकते हैं कि कोई घटना किसी प्राकृतिक नियम के विरुद्ध भी घट जाती होगी ? ऐसे प्रश्न की ओर आज तक अनेक विद्वानों का ध्यान आकृष्ट हो चुका है तथा उनके द्वारा इस सम्बन्ध में प्रकट किये गये विचारों में मतभेद भी पाया जाता है जिसका विवेचन कर लेना कदाचित् हमारे लिये यहां पर कुछ असंगत भी नहीं कहा जा सकता। उनमें एकाध विचारक तो ऐसे भी मिलेंगे जिन्होने विश्व की सारी बातों में ही किसी न किसी चकत्कार-तत्त्व का अनुभव किया है जिस कारण उन्हें कदाचित् उक्त प्रश्न पर कोई गंभीर विचार करने की आवश्यकता ही नहीं प्रतीत होती। प्रसिद्ध अमेरिकन लेखक वाल्ट व्हिटमैन का कहना है, "क्यों, वह कौन सा व्यक्ति है जो चमत्कार को वैसा महत्त्व प्रदान करता है ? स्वयं मुझे तो ऐसी किसी बात का पता ही नहीं जो चमत्कार न हो।" तथा "मेरे लिए प्रकाश एवं अंधकार की प्रत्येक घड़ी चमत्कार है, स्थल का प्रत्येक इंच चमत्कार से भरा है।" इसी प्रकार, ऐसी धारणा के विषय में, किसी प्रकार का सन्देह प्रकट करने वालों के प्रति लारेन्स हाउसमैन की भी चुनौती है, "कोई भी ऐसी बात निकाल सको तो ढूंढ निकालो जिसमें चमत्कार न भरा हो और तभी तुम उस पर आश्चर्य भी प्रकट करो[1]।" परन्तु अन्य प्रकार के लेखकों में से कुछ ने स्पष्ट शब्दो में कह दिया है कि "चमत्कार एक ऐसी घटनामात्र है जो हमारी समझ में नहीं आती, इसका कारण चाहे जो भी कुछ हो। तथा यह भी सत्य है कि चमत्कारों के द्वारा हमारे ज्ञान में कोई वृद्धि भी नहीं हो पाती"। प्रसिद्ध दार्शनिक स्पिनोज़ा का यह कथन इस सम्बन्ध

1—"दि मिरेक्युलस ऐंड मिस्टीरियस" आदि पृ० १ पर उद्धृत।

में उल्लेखनीय है कि "प्रकृति के अन्तर्गत इस प्रकार की कोई भी घटना नहीं घट सकती जो उसके विश्वव्यापक नियमों के प्रतिकूल लगती ठहरायी जा सके।"[2] इसके विपरीत कुछ लोगो का ऐसा विश्वास है कि चमत्कार-तत्त्व प्रकृति के अन्तर्गत बराबर विद्यमान रहा करता है और वह केवल समय पाकर प्रकाश में आता है। तदनुसार किसी दैवी शक्ति में पूरी श्रद्धा रखने वाले का तो यहां तक भी दावा है कि वैसे चमत्कारों का प्रदर्शन उस दशा में आप से आप संभव हो जाया करता है जब किसी उपयुक्त माध्यम के सहारे उक्त प्रकार की स्थिति के प्रत्यक्ष में आ जाने का समय उपस्थित होता है।

इन दोनों प्रकार के मतों को एक समन्वयात्मक-सा रूप देते हुए डॉ० हर्नाक नामक जर्मन लेखक ने बतलाया है कि "जो कुछ भी बातें हमें चामत्कारिक समझ पड़ती हैं उनमें हमें किसी न किसी दृढ़ संकल्प एवं अटल विश्वास का शारीरिक चेतनता के ऊपर प्रभाव डालना तथा, इस प्रकार, कोई ऐसा दृश्य भी उपस्थित कर देना प्रकट होता है जो हमें आश्चर्य-जनक लगा करता है। कौन ऐसा होगा जिसने आजतक निश्चित रूप में सभी संभावनाओं तथा वास्तविकताओं का क्षेत्र निर्धारित किया होगा ? कोई नहीं। कौन ऐसा व्यक्ति है जो कह सके कि कोई एक जीवात्मा किसी अन्य पर कहां तक प्रभाव डालता है अथवा वह किसी शरीर को भी कहां तक प्रभावित करता है ? वास्तव में कोई भी ऐसा नहीं जो इस प्रश्न का भी सही उत्तर दे सके। इसके सिवाय ऐसा कौन है जो कह सके कि जो कुछ भी हमें यहां पर विचित्र जान पड़ता है वह केवल हमारी भूल अथवा धोखाधड़ी मात्र है। वास्तव में, चमत्कार तो कोई भी कभी घटित नहीं हुआ करता किन्तु इस प्रकार की बातें हमें यथेष्ट संख्या में अवश्य दीख पड़ती हैं जो न्यूनाधिक आश्चर्य से भरी रहा करती हैं तथा जिनके लिए हमारे पास कोई समाधान नहीं है।"[3] इसी प्रकार एक

2—"भारतीय संस्कृति और साधना" (प्रथम खण्ड) पृ० ३९९ पर उद्धृत।

3. We see that a firm will and a convinced faith act even on the bodily life and cause appearance which appeal to us as miracles. Who has hitherto here with certainty measured the realm of the possible and the real ? Nobody. Who can say how far the influences of one soul on another soul and of the soul on the body reach ? Nobody. Who can still affirm that all which in this realm appears as striking rests only on deception and error ? Certainly no miracles occur, but there is enough of the wonderful and the inexplicable.

—भारतीय संस्कृति और साधना (प्रथम खंड) के पृष्ठ ३९९ पर उद्धृत।

अंग्रेज लेखक वायकाउंट सेमुअल का भी मत है कि जो कुछ किसी प्रार्थना के बल पर विभिन्न रोगों के दूर हो जाने के विषय में कहा जाता है उसे स्वीकार कर लेने पर भी हमें किसी ऐसी विशिष्ट अतिप्राकृतिक शक्ति का कभी स्पष्ट भान नहीं हो पाता जिसके द्वारा उस घटना का समुचित रूप में घटित हो जाना भी मान लिया जा सके।[4] इस विश्व के अन्तर्गत काम करने वाली प्रकृति की रहस्यमयी कार्य-पद्धति का पता लगा पाना हमारे लिए केवल उतना ही संभव हो सकता है जितना वह किसी ऐसे व्यक्ति के लिए भी कहा जा सकता है जो किसी 'घड़ी' के भीतर सदा निवास करते हुए, यह बतला देने का यत्न करे कि उसकी सुइयों का चलना अमुक बातों पर निर्भर है अथवा यह कि वे किस नियम के अनुसार चला करती हैं।

परन्तु क्या तब हम इस बात को किसी तथ्य के रूप में स्वीकार कर लें कि जिन प्रसंगों की चर्चा हम इसके पहले, 'चमत्कार' का स्वरूप निर्धारित करते समय, छेड़ते आये हैं उनके किसी अंश का समाधान प्राकृतिक नियमों के अनुसार नहीं किया जा सकता ? यह प्रश्न अत्यन्त महत्त्वपूर्ण है और इस पर प्रस्तुत संदर्भ में विचार कर लेना बहुत आवश्यक भी जान पड़ता है। इसकी ओर अनेक विद्वानों का ध्यान भी आकृष्ट हुआ दीख पड़ता है जिन्होने इसे विभिन्न दृष्टियों से हल करने का यत्न किया है। इनमें से एक तो यह है कि हमें सर्वप्रथम इस बात को भली-भांति समझ लेना चाहिए कि जब हम यहां पर प्राकृतिक एवं अतिप्राकृतिक जैसे दो भिन्न-भिन्न शब्दों का व्यवहार करते हैं तो हम उनके वास्तविक अभिप्रायों में कैसे अन्तर का अनुमान किया करते हैं अथवा क्या ये दोनों वास्तव में, किन्हीं दो नितान्त भिन्न-भिन्न अर्थों के वाचक ठहराये जा सकते हैं ? बात का विवेचन करते समय लोगों में से प्रायः सभी वस्तुतः एक ही निर्णय पर पहुँचते जान पड़ते हैं। उनके अनुसार "प्राकृतिक" शब्द से तात्पर्य यहां पर केवल उस क्षेत्र तक ही सीमित समझा जा सकता है जहां तक अभी हमारी पहुँच हो पायी है और इसी प्रकार 'अति-प्राकृतिक' शब्द हमारे लिए इसके उस अवशिष्ट अंश की ओर भी संकेत करता जान पड़ता है जिसका परिचय हमें अभी तक प्राप्त नहीं हो पाया है तथा जिसके यहां तक जा पाने के लिए हम सतत यत्नशील बने रहते हैं। उदाहरण के लिए योरप एवं अमेरिका के कई शिक्षा-संस्थानों में आजकल किसी ऐसे नवीन प्रकार के प्रयोगों का अभ्यास किया जाने लगा है जिनके आधार पर इस बात का भी पता लगाया जा सके कि जो अनुभव हमें कभी-कभी कुछ विलक्षण ढंग से हो जाया करते हैं तथा जिन्हें हम प्रायः "दैवी" वा "अलौकिक" नियमों के ऊपर आधारित मान लिया

4—दे० 'बिलीफ़ ऐंड ऐक्शन' (पेलिकन बुक्स) पृ० ५७।

करते हैं वे सर्वथा "अतीन्द्रिय" तो नहीं हैं ? अथवा क्या यह किसी प्रकार संभव नहीं कि यदि हम अपनी ज्ञानेन्द्रियों की शक्ति को समुचित रूप में विकसित करते जाएँ तो किसी दिन उन अनेक रहस्यमयी अनुभूतियों को समझ सकें जिन्हें अब तक 'चामत्कारिक प्रसंग' मात्र कह देते आये हैं। इस प्रकार की विद्या का नाम (पैरा साइकालोजी) अर्थात् 'परा-मनोविज्ञान' दिया गया दीख पड़ता है तथा इसके विवेच्य को इसी कारण एक्स्ट्रा-सेन्सरी परसेप्शन अथवा, संक्षेप में, ई० एस० पी० द्वारा सूचित करने की एक परम्परा भी चल पड़ी है। अतएव, यदि उक्त प्रकार के यत्नों में यथेष्ट सफलता मिल सकी और हम क्रमशः यहाँ तक सिद्ध कर पाने की स्थिति में आ गये कि वैसी अनुभूतियों को "अतीन्द्रिय" समझने की कोई आवश्यकता नहीं तथा वे वस्तुतः इन्द्रियाधारित ही कही जा सकती है तो हमारे उपर्युक्त प्रश्न का समाधान आपसे आप हो जा सकता है।

भारतवर्ष में उक्त विषय की चर्चा संभवतः प्राचीन काल से ही होती आयी है तथा योग-साधना एवं उसके परिणाम स्वरूप उपलब्ध 'सिद्धियों' का परिचय देने वाले पंडितों ने तत्सम्बन्धी प्रश्नों के कुछ न कुछ उत्तर भी दिये हैं। योग साधना के जिन आठ अंगों का विवेचन, योग-शास्त्र में किया गया मिलता है उन (अर्थात् यम, नियम, आसन, प्राणायाम, प्रत्याहार, धारणा, ध्यान एवं समाधि) में से अंतिम तीन को वहाँ पर विशेष महत्व दिया गया है। उन्हें एक योगसूत्र के द्वारा एक साथ 'संयम' जैसे विशिष्ट पारिभाषिक नाम से अभिहित भी किया गया है[5] और उसके आगे वाले दो सूत्रों के[6] अन्तर्गत हमें बतलाया गया है कि उसमें यथेष्ट सफलता मिलते जाने पर 'प्रज्ञालोक' में विकास होने लग जाता है। अंत में क्रमशः एक ऐसी स्थिति भी आ जाती है जिसमें ध्येय वस्तु का यथार्थ साक्षात्कार हो जाना तक भी संभव है। इस सम्बन्ध में अपना विचार प्रकट करते हुए एक पाश्चात्य विद्वान् मिसिय एलिएड ने, अपने ग्रन्थ "योग, इम्मार्टलिटी ऐन्ड फ्रीडम" के एक स्थल पर कहा है "संयम की युक्ति विशेष द्वारा इस प्रकार के "ज्ञान" को वास्तव में, हम उस तत्व की उपलब्धि अथवा उसे आत्मसात् कर लेने की स्थिति ठहरा सकते हैं जो योगियों का परम लक्ष्य हुआ करता है। जिस किसी के ऊपर अपना ध्यान केन्द्रित किया जाय वह वैसी ध्यान-साधना के कारण आत्मसात् हो जाया करता है। यह बात हमें स्वाभाविक-सी जान पड़ती है कि जिन लोगों को कभी योग-सम्बन्धी रहस्यों का कोई भान भी नहीं था उन्होंने उक्त प्रकार से उपलब्ध शक्ति

5—त्रयमेकत्र संयमः ॥४॥-पातंजल योगसूत्र

6—तज्जयात्प्रज्ञालोकः ॥५॥ तथा, तस्यभूमिषु विनियोगः ॥६॥—वही

(सिद्धि) को केवल योग क्षेम की ही बात मान लेने की भूल दिखलायी और कदाचित् इसी कारण भारत में किसी योगी को सदा एक 'महासिद्ध' वा अपूर्व शक्तिसम्पन्न जादूगर तक स्वीकार कर लिया जाता आया।[7]" इस प्रकार, इस लेखक के अनुसार उपर्युक्त सिद्धियाँ केवल योगजनित शक्तिविशेष का ही प्रतिनिधित्व नहीं करतीं। उन्हें हम किसी भी ऐसी स्थिति में प्राप्त कर ले सकते हैं जो उनके लिए सर्वथा उपयुक्त एवं अनुकूल मानसिक दशा बन जा सके। दूसरे शब्दों में हमारे लिए यह अनिवार्य नहीं कि उनके उपलब्ध करने के यत्न में, हम किसी धार्मिक वातावरण की ही शरण लें। इसके सिवाय यहाँ पर यह भी उल्लेखनीय है कि उक्त प्रकार प्राप्त की जाने वाली शक्ति हमें केवल किसी वैसी वस्तु जैसे योगियों के चरम ध्येय परमतत्व के साक्षात्कार में ही सहायता नहीं देती। उसके द्वारा हम अनेक प्रकार का "अतीन्द्रिय" ज्ञान भी प्राप्त कर ले सकते हैं तथा वैसे अनेक दुष्कर कार्य तक कर ले सकते हैं जिनकी चर्चा आगे के सूत्रों में की गयी दीख पड़ती है। उदाहरण के लिए, चन्द्र में संयम करने से नक्षत्र-मंडल मात्र को दृष्टिगत कर सकते हैं[8]। ध्रुवतारा में संयम करने पर उसकी गति का ज्ञान भी उपलब्ध कर लेते हैं।[9] अपनी मूर्धा की ज्योति में संयम करके अदृश्य सिद्धों को देख सकते हैं।[10] इसी प्रकार अपने कानों एवं आकाश के सम्बन्ध पर संयम कर लेने पर दैवी श्रवण शक्ति भी प्राप्त कर ले सकते हैं।[11] अतएव, डॉ० राधाकृष्णन् के शब्दों में, इस निर्णय पर पहुँच जाते हैं कि, "प्रकृति की एक अपनी कार्य-पद्धति है जिस कारण 'अतिप्राकृतिक' भी, उसकी वास्तविक व्यापकता एवं गूढ़ता को ध्यान में रखते हुए, 'प्राकृतिक' ही कहला सकता है। इस प्रकार की बातों को प्रकृति के नियमों से विपरीत दिशा की ओर काम करने वाला नहीं मान सकते।"[12]

उपर्युक्त पैरा साइकालोजी (परा-मनोविज्ञान) को कुछ लोग, केवल 'न्यू साइकालोजी' अर्थात् 'नया मनोविज्ञान' मात्र कह देते भी दीख पड़ते हैं जिनमें से एक

7—मिर्सिया एलिएड : 'योग, इम्मार्टलिटी ऐंड फ्रीडम' (लन्दन १९५८ ई० पृ० ८८)।

8—चन्द्रे ताराव्यूहज्ञानम् ॥२७॥

9—ध्रुवे तद्गतिज्ञानम् ॥२८॥

10—मूर्धज्योतिषि सिद्धदर्शनम् ॥३२॥

11—श्रोत्राकाशयोः सम्बन्धसंयमाद्दिव्यं श्रोत्रम् ॥१॥

12—'ऐन आइडियलिस्ट व्यू आफ लाइफ़' पृ० ५९।

प्रसिद्ध विद्वान् विलियम वाकर ऐटकिन्सन ने अपने उक्त ग्रन्थ में एक स्थल पर लिखा है, "नवीन मनोविज्ञान" को इस बात के सिद्ध कर देने में सफलता मिल चुकी है कि जहाँ तक इसके अनुसार अनुसन्धान-कार्य किया गया है, (उस दृष्टि से) प्रत्येक बात 'प्राकृतिक' है तथा जिस बात को 'अति प्राकृतिक' समझा जाता रहा है वह केवल एक ऐसी प्राकृतिक घटना है जिसका मर्म अभी तक समझ में नहीं आ सका है। अब नयी दृष्टि से समझ में आती जाने वाली मानसिक वृत्तियां बराबर प्रत्यक्ष होती जा रही हैं और उनके आधार पर प्राकृतिक नियमों के भेद भी खुलते जा रहे हैं।[13] ऐटकिन्सन ने, अपनी एक अन्य पुस्तक 'थाट्स आर थिंग्स' में किसी प्रो० ओकोरोविज की कई पंक्तियाँ उद्धृत करते हुए यह सिद्ध करने का भी यत्न किया है कि हमारे चिन्तन की प्रक्रिया स्वयं एक प्रकार की शक्ति है। प्रो० ओकोरोविज का कथन है कि, "हमारी चिन्तन-प्रक्रिया केवल उसी रूप में जहाँ की तहाँ रह जाती कही जा सकती हैं जैसे किसी बैटरी का रासायनिक प्रभाव अपने ही यहाँ तक सीमित रह जाता कहा जा सकता है किन्तु उसका प्रतिनिधित्व वहाँ वस्तुतः कोई विद्युत-धारा करने लग जाती है। इसी प्रकार मानसिक क्षेत्र में काम करने वाली चिन्तन-प्रक्रिया के विषय में भी कहा जा सकता है कि यहाँ भी इसका कोई न कोई प्रतिनिधित्व अवश्य करता है जिसका हम नाम-करण नहीं कर पाते। परन्तु, उसको जो भी नाम दिया जा सके, वह चिन्तन-प्रक्रिया का अपना बन कर ही सक्रिय रहता है तथा वह गतिशील भी है।"[14] वास्तव में हमारी चिन्तन-प्रक्रिया एक ऐसी शक्ति है जो प्रत्यक्षतः असंभव से असंभव प्रतीत होने वाले परिणामों तक को भी अस्तित्व में ला दे सकती है और इसके लिए कोई दृश्यमान भौतिक साधन अपेक्षित नहीं है।

एक अन्य लेखक ने इस विषय पर कुछ भिन्न प्रकार से विचार किया है, किन्तु वह भी प्रायः ठीक उसी परिणाम पर आता है। उसका कहना है कि, "यदि समुचित रूप में समझा जा सके तो चमत्कार, उस जगत् एवं जीवन-सम्बन्धी प्राकृतिक नियम के अतिरिक्त कुछ भी नहीं जिसे हम अपनी श्रद्धा एवं विश्वास की दृष्टि से देखा करते हैं और यही वस्तुतः उसके रहस्य में प्रवेश भी कर सकता है। जीवन एवं जगत् का वही नियम यदि बाहर की ओर से देखा जाता है और इसके लिए

13—'न्यू साइकालोजी' (कम्पैरेटिव ऐण्ड क्रिटिकल स्टडी आफ मंत्र-शास्त्र एम० पी० झावेरी के पृ० ६–७ पर उद्धृत)।

14—प्रो० ओकोरोविज जिसे 'थाट्स आर थिंग्स' के पृ० २४ पर उद्धृत किया गया है।

केवल बुद्धि वा तर्क पद्धति की सहायता ली जाती है तो विज्ञान एवं धर्म का क्षेत्र बन जाया करता है तथा उसे हम भली भाँति समझ पाने में असमर्थ हो जाया करते करते हैं।"[15] इस प्रकार की श्रद्धा एवं विश्वास पर आधारित हमारी दृष्टि के निर्माण का भी अपना एक नियम विशेष है जिसकी कुछ व्याख्या करते समय प्रसिद्ध विचारक एडवर्ड कार्पेंटर ने अपनी पुस्तक 'दि आर्ट आफ क्रियेशन' में हमें बतलाया है। उन्होंने कहा है कि जब कभी कोई दो व्यक्ति प्रेम-व्यापार की घटना का श्रीगणेश होते समय एक दूसरे के आमने सामने आ जाते हैं, "कोई एक विलक्षण स्मृति-सी जागृत हो उठती है और एक धुंधला-सा संस्मरण हो जाया करता है। ऐसी दशा में बाहर वाली मरणशील भौतिक आकृति, भीतरी अमर तत्व में जाकर लीन हो जाती है जिसके परिणाम स्वरूप कोई एक ऐसा अलौकिक रूप हमें प्रत्यक्ष होने लग जाता है जो प्रकाशमान रहता है तथा जिसका तेजस्वीपन व्यापक मानव जीवन तक को झंकृत कर दिया करता है और एक ही साथ सहस्रों प्रेमगाथाओं की स्मृति जागृत-सी हो उठती है। ऐसे जागरण की दशा में मनुष्य अत्यन्त विह्वल तथा मतवाला जैसा बन जाया करता है और इस प्रकार का भाव उसके भीतर प्रज्वलित हो उठता है। फलतः, उसके मानस-मन्दिर के पवित्र स्थल पर, कोई एक देवी सी आ खड़ी हो जाती है जिसके प्रकाश द्वारा वह अभिभूत हो जाता है जिसका एक प्रत्यक्ष परिणाम इस रूप में दीखता है कि सारा संसार ही उसे किसी परिवर्तित रूप में लक्षित होने लगता है।"[16] उनके अनुसार "यह एक शाश्वत नियम है जिसे, हम जब चाहें, अपने मनस्तल एवं शरीर पर काम करते पा सकते हैं और इसके ही द्वारा केवल संवेदन वा इच्छा मात्र से सदा रूप की सृष्टि हो रही दीख पड़ती है जो क्रमशः स्पष्टतर होता चला जाता है और अन्त में सूक्ष्म एवं अदृश्य बने रहने की जगह स्थूल वा स्पर्श योग्य तक हो जाता है।"[17] मेरा कहना है कि इस नियम को हम अपने भीतर उस प्रक्रिया के रूप में भी देख सकते हैं जिसके अनुसार हमारा मनोवेग हमारी चिन्तन-पद्धति का रूप ग्रहण कर लेता है और फिर, अन्त में, विशुद्ध क्रिया से बाह्य जगत् के रूप तक में भी आ जाता है। वास्तव में यही उस मानवीय कला का भी

15—डा० वी० ए० परब की पुस्तक 'दि मिरैक्यूलस' इत्यादि के पृ० ४६७ पर उद्धृत डा० अलफ्रेड ल्वायजी का मत

16—एडवर्ड कार्पेंटर : दि आर्ट आफ क्रियेशन (लन्दन, १९२१ ई०) पृ० १४९

17—वही पृ० ३१-२

आधार है जिसे हम विभिन्न चित्रों, मूर्तियों आदि के निर्माण के मूल में पाया करते हैं। तदनुसार, जहाँ तक प्रार्थना के आधार पर किसी रोग विशेष के दूर हो जाने के विषय में कहा जा सकता है, ऐसा ही है जैसे कोई गहरा दर्द हो जाए और फिर कुछ थोड़े से ही समय के भीतर उसका अचानक मंद पड़ जाना भी अनुभव में आने लगे। यहाँ पर चमत्कार की बात केवल इसी रूप में दीख पड़ती है कि उसमें सुधार आ जाने के लक्षण अत्यन्त शीघ्र हमारे सामने आ जाते हैं। इस प्रकार घटने वाले परिवर्तन का कोई दूसरा कारण हमारी समझ में नही आता। इसके लिए यह अनिवार्य नहीं कि स्वयं रोगी ही अपनी ओर से प्रार्थना करे क्योंकि वह कभी-कभी अधार्मिक वृत्ति का भी हो सकता है। केवल इतना ही पर्याप्त होगा कि कोई न कोई उसके सान्निध्य में रहकर प्रार्थना में प्रवृत्त हो और यह इसीलिए विशेष रूप में उल्लेखनीय है। "इसके द्वारा पता चलता है कि, मनोवैज्ञानिक एवं कार्बनिक अथवा इन्द्रियाधारित कार्य-पद्धतियों के बीच कोई इस प्रकार के गूढ़ सम्बन्ध हैं जिनका ज्ञान हमें आज तक नहीं हो पाया है। ये बातें आध्यात्मिक सक्रियता के उस वस्तुपरक महत्व की ओर इंगित करती हैं जिसकी उपेक्षा स्वास्थ्यशास्त्र, चिकित्साशास्त्र, शिक्षाशास्त्र एवं समाजशास्त्र के पण्डितों द्वारा लगभग सदा से की जाती चली आई है, किन्तु, जिनके आधार पर मनुष्य किसी नये संसार को प्रत्यक्ष कर लेता जान पड़ता है।"[18] कहते हैं कि नैतिक आचरण अथवा धार्मिक भावनाएँ किसी प्रशिक्षण विशेष द्वारा उपलब्ध की जाने वाली बातें नहीं हैं, हम इन्हें गणित, व्याकरण, इतिहास जैसी बुद्धि एवं स्मृति के ऊपर आधारित विषयों की भाँति सीखा नहीं करते। इनको हम सदा केवल अपने संवेदन के द्वारा केवल वातावरण विशेष में रहते हुए ही प्राप्त करके इनके अनुसार अभ्यस्त हो जाया करते हैं। आश्चर्य तो यह है कि ये बातें हमें इतना अधिक प्रभावित कर देती है कि ये हमारे भीतर जैसे प्रवेश करके हमारे जीवन का अंग बन जाती हैं ये हमारे लिए अपने व्यक्तित्व का प्रमुख अंश बन कर हमें संचालित करने लग जाती है और अपने स्वभाव का रूप तक ग्रहण कर लेती हैं जिस कारण हमारा उक्त प्रकार की भावनाओं का सर्वथा त्याग कर पाना कभी संभव नहीं जान पड़ता। इन भावनाओं के ही अनुसार अथवा यों कहें कि इस प्रकार बन गये अपने स्वभाव के ही अनुकूल, हम अपने किसी आदर्श की कल्पना किया करते हैं तथा धार्मिक क्षेत्र के अंतर्गत, अपने किसी इष्ट देव-विशेष की आराधना भी किया करते

18—डॉ० अलेक्सिस कैटेल : "मैन दि अननोन" (लन्दन, १९५६ ई०) पृ० १४५।

हैं।[19] हम उसे प्रायः कोई न कोई विलक्षण मूर्त्त रूप दे दिया करते हैं तथा उसे अपने अत्यन्त निकटवर्ती आत्मीय स्वामी, संरक्षक, सहयोगी, अथवा स्वयं अपने आप जैसी किसी अनिर्वचनीय सत्ता की भाँति, निरंतर अपने पास वर्तमान तक मानते रहते हैं। उसके प्रति हमारी आस्था कभी-कभी यहाँ तक भी दृढ़ हो जा सकती है कि हमें इससे कोई भी बाह्य शक्ति विचलित नहीं कर पाती, प्रत्युत् यहाँ तक देखा जाता है कि इसके कारण हमारे भीतर कोई ऐसी दुर्लभ शक्ति भी आ जाती है जिसका प्रभाव दूसरों के ऊपर आपसे आप पड़ने लग जाता है तथा उन्हें वह प्रायः अपने से विमुख रहने की जगह, अपने प्रति उन्मुख अथवा अपने अधीन तक भी बना डालता है और वे न केवल हमारे साथ सहयोग करने अपितु हमारे शासन में रहने तक के लिए उद्यत बन जाते हैं। इस प्रकार के व्यक्तित्व के उदाहरण हमें अपने अनेक प्राचीन पौराणिक, ऐतिहासिक वा आधुनिक महापुरुषों तक में भी देख सकते हैं और उनमें श्री कृष्ण, गौतम बुद्ध, परमहंस रामकृष्ण, गांधी जी, स्वामी रामतीर्थ आदि के कुछ विशिष्ट नाम भी लिये जा सकते हैं।

यदि हम संत नामदेव एवं संत कबीर की उपलब्ध रचनाओं वाले उपर्युक्त चामत्कारिक प्रसंगों के ऊपर एक बार और ध्यान देकर देखें तो हमें पता चल सकता है कि वहाँ पर प्रस्तुत की गयी घटनाओं का चमत्कार-तत्व किस रूप में लक्षित होता है। यदि उन पर आधुनिक मनोवैज्ञानिकों की दृष्टि से विचार किया जाय तो उसका क्या परिणाम निकलता है। तदनुसार संत नामदेव-सम्बन्धी मन्दिर के दूसरी ओर घूम जाने तथा संत कबीर-सम्बन्धी जल के उन्हें डूबने न देने की रहस्यमयता हमें इस बात में निहित जान पड़ती है कि कोई पत्थर (मन्दिर) वा जल जैसा जड़ पदार्थ भी कभी-कभी किसी चैतन्य (यहाँ पर दोनों संतों) के प्रभाव में आकर अपना स्वभाव त्याग कर के कोई 'अतिप्राकृतिक' कार्य कर दिया करता है। एक ओर जहाँ अचल पत्थर सक्रिय बन कर अपनी स्थिति में स्वयं परिवर्तन ला देता है, वहाँ दूसरी ओर जल जैसा द्रव पदार्थ भी ठोस बन जाकर किसी को डूबने नहीं देता और दोनों ही किसी न किसी चैतन्य व्यक्ति से प्रेरणा ग्रहण करते हैं। इसी प्रकार संत कबीर सम्बन्धी हाथी वाले प्रसंग में भी हम लगभग इसी ढंग से कार्य होता हुआ पाते हैं। यहाँ पर

19—जैसा श्रीमद्भगवद्गीता (अध्याय १७ श्लोक ३) में भी कहा गया है—

सत्त्वानुरूपा सर्वस्य श्रद्धा भवति भारत।

श्रद्धामयोऽयं पुरुषः यो यच्छ्रद्धः स एव सः॥

अर्थात् जिसकी जैसी श्रद्धा रहती है वह वैसा ही हुआ करता है।

अंतर केवल इतना ही है कि उक्त जड़ पदार्थ का स्थान कोई एक पशु ग्रहण कर लेता है। वह सजीव अवश्य है जिस कारण वह चाहे तो किसी कार्य को कर सकता है अथवा उसे करने से विरत भी हो सकता है। परन्तु यह भी सभी को विदित है कि वह कभी उचित वा अनुचित का निर्णय नहीं कर पाता तथा अपने महावत के आदेश का प्रायः यन्त्रवत पालन करता हुआ अर्थ का अनर्थ कर देता ही पाया जाता है। परन्तु यहाँ पर अपने उक्त स्वभाव को सर्वथा छोड़-सा देता है और किसी मनुष्य को कुचल डालने के लिए बार-बार प्रेरित करने पर भी वह अपने महावत की इच्छा का पालन नहीं करता, प्रत्युत् वह कदाचित न केवल अपने सामने उपस्थित किये व्यक्ति के प्रति अपनी सहानुभूति प्रकट करता है, अपितु उसके द्वारा प्रभावित होकर, उसे श्रद्धापूर्वक नमस्कार करता-सा भी जान पड़ता है वहाँ, इस तीसरे में, एक निरे पशु द्वारा विवेक से काम लिया जाना तक भी प्रमाणित हो जाता है। अन्त में, उपर्युक्त छान के छवा जाने की संत नामदेव सम्बन्धी घटना के विषय में कहा जा सकता है कि वह इन तीनों में कुछ विलक्षण है। वहाँ पर हम किसी जड़ पदार्थ अथवा पशु विशेष का उक्त प्रकार प्रभावित होकर अपने स्वभाव के प्रतिकूल कार्य कर बैठना नहीं देखते। वहाँ पर तो वास्तव में हमें यह बात प्रत्यक्ष ही नहीं हो पाती कि उस संत की छान किस व्यक्ति ने छायी होगी। वहाँ पर हमें केवल कुछ संकेत मात्र ही मिलते हैं जिनके आधार पर हम ऐसा अनुमान कर लेते हैं कि उक्त कार्य स्वयं उनके इष्टदेव ने कर दिया होगा। अतएव, इस प्रसंग में हमें चमत्कार का तत्व किंचित् भिन्न रूप में दिखलायी पड़ता है। यहाँ पर हमें उसका ज्ञान केवल इस प्रकार हो पाता है कि प्रत्यक्षतः निरीह एवं असहाय व्यक्ति की सहायता का किसी 'अतिप्राकृतिक' अथवा दैवी सत्ता द्वारा कर दिया जाना भी कभी-कभी संभव बन जा सकता है जो बात हमारे दैनिक जीवन में बहुत कम दीख पड़ती है और इसी कारण हमें उक्त घटना में निहित किसी चमत्कार-तत्व का भी बोध होता है। यहाँ पर एक विशेषता केवल यही दीख पड़ती है कि, जिन दो व्यक्तियों के सम्बन्ध में उपर्युक्त घटनाओं का घटित हो जाना कहा जाता है वे दोनो ही बहुत बड़े आस्तिक एवं दृढ़ भक्त जान पड़ते हैं और वे दोनों न केवल अपने 'गोविन्द' के ऊपर पूर्ण रूप से निर्भर प्रतीत होते हैं तथा उसकी ओर निरन्तर दत्तचित्त भी हैं, प्रत्युत् आदर्श भक्त प्रह्लाद के दृष्टान्त से अनुप्राणित होने के कारण अपने विषय में भी किसी न किसी निश्चित कल्याण के लिए भली भाँति आश्वस्त हैं।

भौतिकवादी वैज्ञानिकों में से अनेक इस प्रकार की संभावना को स्वीकार करते नहीं पाये जाते तथा कुछ ऐसे विचारक भी मिल सकते हैं जो किसी ईश्वर जैसी

सत्ता में पूर्ण विश्वास करते हुए भी चमत्कारों को असंभव वा निरर्थक तक मानते हैं। इसके सिवाय हमें उन वैज्ञानिकों एवं दार्शनिकों की भी संख्या कम नहीं जान पड़ती जो 'अतिप्राकृतिक' की व्याख्या केवल अद्यावधि अज्ञात रहस्य के रूप में करते हैं तथा इन्हें (चमत्कारों को) अनिर्वचनीय-सा ठहरा कर प्रायः टाल दिया करते हैं। परन्तु बहुत से अन्य ऐसे विचारक भी मिलते हैं जिन्होंने किसी ईश्वर में विश्वास न करते हुए भी इन्हें न्यूनाधिक महत्व प्रदान किया है और जिनकी ऐसी धारणा भी रहती आई है कि इनकी सम्यक् समीक्षा के बल पर हम किसी दिन प्रकृति के गूढ़ रहस्यों तक को भी जान लेंगे। विश्वात्मक सत्ता का विवेचन करते समय, चाहे किसी जगन्नियन्ता ईश्वर की कल्पना भले न की जाय, इतना मान लेने में कदाचित् किसी को भी आपत्ति न होगी कि जिन किन्हीं विशिष्ट नियमों को हम सदा 'प्राकृतिक' समझते आये हैं वे स्वभावतः सहज, शाश्वत एवं सार्वभौम ही हो सकते हैं तथा उसकी ऐसी विशेषताओं में अपना विश्वास रखते आने के ही कारण हम अभी तक उनकी कार्य-पद्धति के साथ अधिक से अधिक परिचित होते जाने के विषय में सतत यत्न भी करते आये हैं। तदनुसार जो कुछ हमें आज तक अपनी समझ में आता गया जान पड़ा है उस पर हमने दर्शन एवं विज्ञान के क्षेत्रों में विचार किया है तथा जो हमें न्यूनाधिक रहस्यमय वा अज्ञेय-सा प्रतीत हुआ है, उसके पीछे किसी विलक्षण नियति अथवा आकस्मिक नियमों का काम करना अनुमान करके हमने उसे तब तक आगे के लिए छोड़-सा दिया है। उसका सदा भविष्य में भी अज्ञात बना रह जाना हमने कदाचित् स्वीकार नहीं किया है। आधुनिक वैज्ञानिको के सामने कभी-कभी ऐसे अनेक प्रश्न उठते आ रहे हैं जिन्हें हल करना वे अपना कर्तव्य समझा करते हैं और उनके द्वारा उस ओर किये गये प्रयोगों के फलस्वरूप नवीन क्षेत्रों की सृष्टि होती जा रही है। तदनुसार विज्ञान के विभिन्न विभागों की नवीन शाखाएँ तथा उपशाखाएँ तक भी बढ़ती चली जा रही हैं। चमत्कारों के 'कारण', 'स्वरूप' और 'परिणाम' सम्बन्धी समस्याओं की जटिलता ने इसी प्रकार मनोविज्ञान के अन्तर्गत पैरा-साइ-कालोजी वा न्यू साइकालोजी को जन्म देकर हमें किसी एक नयी दिशा की ओर उन्मुख कर दिया है। अतएव, उनका महत्व इस दृष्टि से भी कम नहीं है। परन्तु, यदि उनकी सामाजिक उपयोगिता पर विचार किया जाए तो वहाँ पर भी हमें वे नितांत निरर्थक नहीं जान पड़ते। उन्होंने जहाँ एक ओर हमें इस बात के कारण विनम्र बना दिया है कि हम अभी तक अपने प्रत्यक्ष में आने वाली भी बहुत सी गुत्थियों को सुलझा पाने में असमर्थ हैं, वहाँ दूसरी ओर उन्होंने हमारे लिए एक ऐसे विशाल क्षेत्र का द्वार भी खोल दिया है जहाँ पर हम किसी 'असंभव'सी जान पड़ने

वाली 'संभावना' के रहस्य का भी उद्घाटन कर सकें । असंभव को संभव कर दिखाना यह कोरी कल्पना की बात नहीं है । अपने भीतर अदम्य आत्मविश्वास, अपने वास्तविक आदर्श के प्रति निर्भ्रान्त निष्ठा एवं सत्साहस के बल पर हम सभी कुछ कर सकते हैं—जैसी बातों ने मानवीय शक्ति की असीमता की ओर भी हमारा ध्यान आकृष्ट कर दिया है ।

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पैगंबरीय धर्मों में पाप और प्रायश्चित्त

नर्मदेश्वर चतुर्वेदी, ऐतिहासिक हिन्दी व्याकरण विभाग,

हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय, वाराणसी—५

धार्मिक क्षेत्र में पैगंबरीय धर्मों का बहुत ऊंचा स्थान एवं महत्व है। संसार की एक बड़ी संख्या इनकी अनुयायी है। जीव-जगत्, आत्मा-परमात्मा और पाप-प्रायश्चित्त जैसे विषयों के संबंध में इनकी धारणा और दृष्टिकोण इतर धर्मों से भिन्न और पृथक् है। संसार की प्रायः सभी जातियों में पाप और प्रायश्चित्त की धारणा किसी न किसी रूप में पायी जाती है। सभ्य, असभ्य अथवा अर्धसभ्य सभी वर्गों में प्रकारान्तर से इनकी मान्यता है। आस्तिक और नास्तिक दोनों ही अपनी-अपनी रीति से इन्हें स्वीकार करते हैं। एक यदि इन्हें धार्मिक क्षेत्र का विषय मानता है तो दूसरा इन्हें सामाजिक परिवेश में देखता है। फिर तीसरा नैतिक दृष्टि से इनका आकलन करता है। पाप और प्रायश्चित्त को चाहे व्यक्तिगत कृत्य माना जाय अथवा सामाजिक स्तर पर इन्हें सामाजिक विकृतियों और उनके निवारण का उपाय ठहराया जाय, वास्तव में ये सामाजिक चेतना के ही परिणाम हैं। पैगंबरीय धर्मों में मुख्यतः ईसाई धर्म इस्लाम धर्म, यहूदी धर्म और जरथुश्त्र धर्म के नाम लिये जाते हैं।

ईसाई धर्म के अनुसार पाप मनुष्य को आदम और ईव से रिक्थ रूप में मिला है। ईश्वरीय आदेश का उल्लंघन कर दोनों ने वर्जित फल खा लिया था। इस कारण इनके उत्तराधिकारी मानव को विरासत में पाप का कुफल मिला है। फलतः पाप करने की प्रवृत्ति मनुष्य मात्र में पायी जाती है और सभी को प्रायश्चित्त करने की आवश्यकता पड़ती है। पाप-कर्म करने से मनुष्य ईश्वरीय संतति कहलाने का अधिकारी नहीं रह जाता है। मनुष्य न केवल अपने पूर्वजों द्वारा किये पापों का भागीदार बनता है, अपितु स्वयं भी पापाचरण में प्रवृत्त हो जाता है। यह प्रवृत्ति दैवी प्रयोजनों की विरोधी और पृथ्वी पर ईश्वरीय साम्राज्य का विस्तार करने में बाधक है।

मनुष्य में पुण्य की अपेक्षा पाप में प्रवृत्त होने की सहज रूझान है। पाप ईश्वर और मानव के प्रति निष्ठावान् तथा कर्तव्य-परायण बनने की अयोग्यता का प्रमाण

है। पाप न केवल कुत्सित कर्मों तक ही सीमित है, अपितु संपूर्ण मानवीय जीवन तथा विचार-सरणि तक विस्तृत है। पाप-मुक्त होने के लिए ईश्वरीय क्षमा की आवश्यकता एवं अनिवार्यता है। ईश्वर मनुष्य को पाप के गर्त में गिरने नहीं देना चाहता, इसलिए वह उसे दैवी गुणों से संपन्न होने का अवसर देता है क्योंकि पापकर्मी होने के बावजूद वह ईश्वरीय संतान भी है।

ईसाई धर्म में पाप को व्यक्तित्व प्रदान कर उसे 'शैतान' कहा गया है, यद्यपि विज्ञान-युग में शैतान के अस्तित्व के प्रति संदेह प्रकट किया जा रहा है। अध्यात्मवादी क्षेत्र तक में इसका विरोध किया जाने लगा है। आधुनिक युग में परस्पर विरोधी प्रक्रियाओं की प्रकृति न समझ पाने के कारण बहुधा नैराश्य की भावना प्रबल हो उठती है। लोग यह भूल जाते हैं कि मनुष्य अपने आप में क्षम और समर्थ है। इस प्रकार अपने को दैवी गुणों से संपन्न कर वह ईश्वरीय संतान सिद्ध करने का अधिकारी है। मनुष्य की सर्वोपरि विजय और उपलब्धि अपनी पाप-प्रवृत्ति से मुक्ति पाने में है और यह प्रवृत्ति सामाजिक चेतना के अभाव का कुफल है। ऐसा होने पर पाप-कर्म भी संभव न हो सकेगा।

ईसा पापियों के प्रतिनिधि रूप में अथवा स्थानापन्न होकर ईश्वरीय दंड को भोगने के लिए उपस्थित रहता है। ईसा के रूप में यहाँ भगवान् अवतरित हुआ जिससे वह पापियों द्वारा पाप का प्रायश्चित्त करा के प्रभु की ओर उसे उन्मुख कर सके। ईसाई धर्म मनुष्य का दैवीकरण करता है। पाप-मुक्त होकर मनुष्य प्रभु का प्रिय बन जाता है। वह ईश्वरीय गुणों और प्रेम का पात्र बनता है। क्रास मानव समुदाय के प्रति ईसा के प्रेम का प्रतीक है। इस प्रकार वह पाप विहीन मानवता की सृष्टि का साधन है। उसके अनुग्रह से प्रभु के प्रति भय के स्थान पर प्रेम का प्रादुर्भाव होता है। हमारे पापों के लिए ईसा क्लेश भोगते हैं जिससे हमारा सान्निध्य प्रभु से संभव हो जाए। ईसा के हस्तक्षेप बिना मनुष्य पापमुक्त नहीं हो सकता।

इस्लाम पाप के परंपरागत अस्तित्व को स्वीकार नहीं करता। मनुष्य व्यक्तिगत रूप से अपने ही पापों का फल भोगता है। विभिन्न प्रकार की अनेक भूलें अविश्वास के कारण होती है। पाप के अन्तर्गत ईश्वर के प्रति अविश्वास और बुरे कर्मों की गणना होती है। कुरान के अनुसार पाप घमंड और ईश्वरीय विरोध को लेकर है। ईबलिस अर्थात् शैतान ईश्वरादेश के रहते आदम के अधीन न होकर पाप का भागी बना। घमंड में आकर उसने ईश्वर के प्रति अविश्वास किया। अविश्वास के रूप में ईश्वरीय विरोध करना, नास्तिक होना, बहुदेववादी होना और अधार्मिक होना

है। इसलिए कुरान मनुष्य को ईश्वर के प्रति विश्वास करने और पापों के लिए पश्चात्ताप और प्रायश्चित्त करने की बात करता है।

मनुष्य की ईश्वरीय अवज्ञा और हठधर्मिता उसे पाप-कर्मों की ओर प्रवृत्त करती है। मुहम्मद साहब ईश्वरीय शुद्धता और पवित्रता के प्रति कहीं भी दोष अथवा संदेह नहीं प्रकट करते। वे दूसरों से यह मांग नहीं करते कि वह अनुभूति के विपरीत ज्ञान का दावा करे।

इस्लाम के अनुसार पाप दो प्रकार के होते हैं: एक सगीर (छोटा) और दूसरा कबीर (बड़ा)। आदम और ईव द्वारा किये गए मूल पाप मानव के लिए फलप्रद हुए क्योंकि पाप न कर, यदि वे स्वर्ग में ही रह गए होते तो मानव-सृष्टि ही संभव न हुई होती। बड़े पापों को न कर जो छोटे पापों को करते हैं उन्हें ईश्वर अपने अनुग्रह से क्षमा कर देता है। उससे छोटी भूलों का निवारण प्रार्थना और नैतिक कर्मों द्वारा किया जा सकता है। इस्लाम धर्म में प्रार्थना का बहुत बड़ा स्थान एवं महत्व है।

यदि मुल्ला-मौलवी छोटे पाप करके दूसरों को पथभ्रान्त अथवा पथभ्रष्ट बनाते हैं तो यह उनका बड़ा पाप बन जाता है। यदि छोटे अपराध अनजाने हो जाएँ तो उन्हें बड़ा पाप नहीं गिना जाता, किन्तु वह यदि जानबूझ कर किया जाए तो बड़ा पाप बन जाता है। इस्लाम के अनुसार बड़ा पाप ईश्वर के स्थान पर किसी अन्य को स्थानापन्न करना है। इसके अतिरिक्त अन्य अपराध क्षम्य हो सकते हैं। अपराधी मुसलमान सदा के लिए नरक में नहीं छोड़ दिया जाता बशर्ते कि वह पाप की पुनरावृत्ति न करे और ईश्वरादेश को वैधानिक ठहराये। इस्लाम में प्रायश्चित्त का कोई विशिष्ट विधि-विधान नहीं हुआ करता, वहाँ केवल पाप-कर्म करने के उपरांत पश्चात्ताप करना और ईश्वर से क्षमा-याचना करना पर्याप्त समझा जाता है। कुछ लोग मुसलमान होना मात्र पश्चात्ताप करने जैसा प्रभावकारी मानते हैं। अन्य कुछ लोग उसे हर हालत में आवश्यक और अनिवार्य मानते हैं। पापों का उन्मूलन प्रार्थना और पश्चात्ताप के बिना संभव नहीं है।

पैगम्बर पाप-मुक्त होते हैं। अशीरी में विश्वास किया जाता है कि उनसे पाप नहीं होता, किन्तु शियाओं की सहशमिया शाखा की मान्यता है कि केवल इमाम शुद्ध और पाप रहित है। पैगम्बरों से भी पाप-कर्म होना संभव हैं। कुरान (II33 F) भी इसकी पुष्टि करता है। परम्परागत प्रवादों द्वारा पता चलता है कि मुहम्मद साहब को भी अपने पापों के लिए क्षमा-याचना करनी पड़ी थी। ईसा के अनुसार मुहम्मद

साहब ईश्वर से अपने अपराधों के लिए क्षमा-याचना किया करते थे और हुरैरा द्वारा भी इसका समर्थन होता है। ईश्वर स्वच्छन्द कर्ता, शासक, और नियामक हैं। वह बिना किसी स्पष्ट कारण के भी नियम-निर्धारण कर सकता है। इसी धारणा ने पाप की प्रवृत्ति जागृत की। उदाहरणार्थ, ईश्वर के अतिरिक्त अन्य किसी की पूजा पाप है, किन्तु देवदूत ईश्वरादेश का पालन कर आदम की पूजा करते हैं। ईबलिस (शैतान) ने ऐसा करना अस्वीकार कर दिया। इसलिए उसे स्वर्गलोक से बहिष्कृत कर दिया गया। स्वर्ग के लिए जो सही है, वह पृथ्वी पर पाप है।

यहूदी धर्म के अनुसार पाप नैतिक तथा धार्मिक क्षेत्रों में दैवी विधान का उल्लंघन करने में है चाहे वह उपेक्षा किसी भी कारण से क्यों न हो। आदम ने ईश्वरेच्छा का उल्लंघन कर पहला पाप किया था जहाँ से उसका प्रचार-प्रसार आरंभ हुआ। नवजात शिशु हो अथवा प्रौढ़ व्यक्ति सबमें मूल पाप की छाया रहती है। मनुष्य देवलोक स्वर्ग से च्युत होकर देहपिंड धारण करता है। यहूदी धर्म मूल पाप को बहुत अधिक महत्व देता है जब कि ईसाई धर्म ऐसा नहीं करता, यह मानव कृत पाप-कर्मों को महत्व देता है जो ईश्वरादेश और नैतिक आदर्शों की हत्या करके की जाती हैं। ईश्वरेच्छा से विमुख हो मनुष्य जब अपनी स्वच्छंद रीति से आदम का अनुसरण करता है तो वह पाप का भागी बनता है।

यहूदी-परम्परा में पाप का प्रायश्चित्त मनुष्य के हाथों में है। ईसाई धर्म के अनुसार मनुष्य केवल अपने स्वतन्त्र प्रयासों द्वारा प्रभु से विच्छिन्न संबंधों को जोड़ नहीं सकता। इसके विपरीत यहूदी धर्म ने पाप-मोचन के लिए विस्तृत विधानों की व्यवस्था दी है। शुद्ध चित्त से पश्चात्ताप करना मनुष्य को प्रभु के निकट ला देता है। पश्चात्ताप करने पर ईश्वरीय अनुग्रह अपने आप सुलभ हो जाता है। यहूदी धर्म वर्ष की एक निश्चित तिथि पर प्रायश्चित्त दिवस मनाया करता है। इस अवसर पर धार्मिक कृत्य और अनुष्ठान किये जाते हैं जिसमें पाप-स्वीकार को बहुत बड़ा महत्व प्राप्त है। यहूदियों का विश्वास है कि उक्त दिन वर्ष भर के पापों का मोचन होकर ईश्वरीय अनुग्रह प्राप्त हो जाता है। प्रायश्चित्त के लिए कष्टरहित पश्चात्ताप करना यहूदी धर्म का विहित कृत्य है। मृत्यु के अंतिम क्षणों में किया गया पश्चात्ताप सभी पापों का प्रायश्चित्त कर देता है। सांप्रदायिक आधार पर यहूदी पापात्मा और पुण्यात्मा माने जाते हैं। उनके यहाँ पश्चात्ताप जनित प्रायश्चित्त न करना भी पाप के अन्तर्गत गिना जाता है। प्रभु की संतान के रूप में रहने की मनुष्य की अपरिमित तथा उत्कट अभिलाषा तब तक तीव्र बनी रहती है जब तक वह उसे उपलब्ध नहीं कर लेता।

जरथुश्त्र के अनुसार मनुष्य का पाप अहुरमजदा के सद्विचारों को अस्वीकार करना है। मनुष्य भले-बुरे कर्मों का चुनाव करने के लिए स्वतन्त्र है। उसके अन्तर में सुरासुरी वृत्तियों के बीच संघर्ष हुआ करता है। बुरे कर्म आंग्रमैन्यु जैसे दैत्यदेव से उत्पन्न होते हैं। अहुरमजदा का ईश्वर और आंग्रमैन्यु ईसाई धर्म के भगवान् और शैतान से मिलता-जुलता है और उसका नैतिक विधान बाईबिल के आदेशों जैसा है। ईश्वरेच्छा के अनुसार किया गया कार्य अच्छा है और ईश्वर जो कुछ करता है वह अच्छा होता है। काम के अच्छा होने पर ही ईश्वर उसकी कामना करता है। अवेस्ता ने पाप-मोचन के लिए तपश्चर्या की व्यवस्था दी है।

पाप का भी स्वतन्त्र अस्तित्व है। केवल मनुष्य ही नहीं, संपूर्ण सृष्टि को अपूर्णता से पूर्णता की ओर अग्रसर होना है। पाप-कर्म करना उचित नहीं है, किन्तु वह यदि हो जाए तो प्रायश्चित्त कर लेना चाहिए। प्रायश्चित्त रहित पाप-कर्म बढ़ता जाता है। अहुरमजदा ने पापकर्मी की तीव्र भर्त्सना की है। इसलिए प्रत्येक व्यक्ति को सोने के पहले अपने पाप-कर्मों के लिए तोबा करना चाहिए, क्योंकि पता नहीं सूर्योदय के पूर्व ही यमदूत उसे सोने की दशा में ही ग्रस्त कर लें। पाप से विरत रहने की इच्छुक आत्मा आंतरिक पश्चात्ताप करने भर शुद्ध बन जाती है। पुण्यात्मा स्वर्ग में निवास करता है और नीचकर्मी कुटिल नरकवासी बनता है। पाप-पुण्य के बराबर होने पर वे त्रिशंकु की भाँति हमेस्तगान में ही रह जाते हैं।

जरथुश्त्र धर्म पुनर्जन्म में आस्थावान् नहीं है, किन्तु उसका विश्वास है कि अंततोगत्वा एक नया दैवी संसार प्रादुर्भूत होगा ही। शावशियंत आंग्रमैन्यु के सभी पाप-कर्मों का अंत करेगा। सर रुस्तम मसानी के अनुसार, ऐसी दशा में कुकर्मियों को नरक से बाहर लाकर उन्हें पाप-मुक्त कर दिया जायेगा और उनके दंड-भोग की अवधि का अन्त हो जायेगा। इस प्रकार 'रिश्ताखेज' अर्थात् प्रलय के बाद की परिवर्तित स्थिति उत्पन्न हो जायेगी।

ऐसी दशा में न तो कोई वृद्ध होकर ह्रास को प्राप्त होगा, न मरेगा और अंत में जीव ईश्वर में अंतर्भुक्त हो जायेगा। अंधकार का स्थान प्रकाश ग्रहण कर लेगा और प्रत्येक प्राणी ज्योतिर्मय हो जायेगा। ईश्वरेच्छा का शमन हो जायेगा और ईश्वर ही सब कुछ रह जायेगा।

इस प्रकार पैगम्बरीय धर्मियों में पाप और प्रायश्चित्त के प्रति दृष्टिगत भेद भले ही लक्ष्य किया जा सके, किन्तु जीवन में नैतिक निष्ठा के स्थान एवं महत्व के

प्रति सबका आग्रह एक ही जैसा है। आदम और ईव की कथा को अपने-अपने सिद्धान्त प्रतिपादन का आधार बना सबमें मूल पाप के कारण का निर्देश करते हुए उससे निवृत्त होने का मार्ग पश्चात्ताप और प्रायश्चित्त सुझाया गया है।

फिर भी संसार के सभी धर्म इस विषय में एकमत नहीं हैं। उनके तात्विक भेद और परमार्थिक अंतर का विवेचन अपने आप में एक स्वतन्त्र अध्ययन का विषय है।

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सूर की काव्य भाषा

रामस्वरूप चतुर्वेदी

हिन्दी विभाग, इलाहाबाद विश्वविद्यालय, इलाहाबाद

ब्रजभाषा हिन्दी की मध्यकालीन काव्यभाषा का सर्वश्रेष्ठ रूप मानी जा सकती है; देश और काल दोनों दृष्टियों से उसका प्रसार भी सर्वाधिक रहा। फिर ब्रजभाषा के प्रयोग में सूरदास का स्थान शीर्षस्थ है। स्वभावतः विवेचन के इस अंश का हमारे लिए विशिष्ट महत्व है।

मध्यकालीन संदर्भ में सूर की काव्यभाषा का परीक्षण करते समय एक बात हमारे सामने उभर कर यह आती है कि तत्सम शब्दावली की दृष्टि से सूर और तुलसी की भाषा एक तरह की है, कबीर और जायसी की भाषा दूसरी तरह चलती है। सूर और तुलसी में संस्कृत परम्पराओं के प्रति आदर और विनम्रता है तथा संस्कृत शब्दावली के प्रति उन्मुखता है। कबीर संस्कृत परम्परा और शब्दावली के प्रति खुली उपेक्षा रखते हैं, जायसी में अनभिज्ञता की मुद्रा है। इस तरह सूर और तुलसी में संस्कृत शब्दावली का जड़ाव एक अपना सौंदर्य रखता है; जब कि कबीर और जायसी में तद्भवता की खड़खड़ाहट और मिठास है। सूर और तुलसी की अपनी तुलना में तुलसी ने आरंभ में मंगलाचरण और विनय के संस्कृत श्लोक रख कर 'भाखा' में रचना करते हुए भी संस्कृत को प्रतीकात्मक महत्व दे दिया है, पर सूर सबसे अलग हैं। उनमें न तो संस्कृत के प्रति कोई आतंक भाव है और न तद्भवता के लिए कोई मुखर आग्रह है। उनकी काव्यभाषा और पूरे रचना-संस्कार में तद्भवता या देसीपन अपने एकदम सहज रूप में है, यहाँ तक कि उस की कोई प्रतीति भी नहीं होती। और यह प्रतीति न होना ही तद्भवता या देसीपन की सबसे खरी पहिचान है।

मध्यकालीन कवि अपनी काव्यभाषा के आधार को संस्कृत से अलग करने के लिए प्रायः 'भाखा' कह कर उसे अभिहित करते हैं। पर एक 'भाखा' शब्द का प्रयोग अलग-अलग कवियों ने अलग-अलग अर्थ-छायाओं के साथ किया है, जिससे उनकी अपनी रचना-मनःस्थिति पर अच्छा प्रकाश पड़ता है। काव्यभाषा के प्रति

कबीर का दृष्टिकोण लोक-परम्परा में प्रसिद्ध है-"संसकिरत है कूप जल भाखा बहता नीर"। यहाँ स्पष्ट ही संस्कृत के प्रति एक हल्के तिरस्कार और अवमानना का भाव निहित है, और भाखा के लिए अदम्य उत्साह है। दूसरी तरफ, अनुश्रुति के अनुसार काशी के संस्कृत पंडितों से अपमानित होकर भी, तुलसी अपने भाखा-प्रयोग को लेकर कोई अप्रिय विवाद नहीं खड़ा करना चाहते। इसीलिए वे सीधे-सीधे आत्मतोष का हवाला देते हुए कहते हैं-'भाखा बद्ध करबि मैं सोई। मोरे मन प्रबोध जेहिं होई।' एक अन्य स्थल पर वे संस्कृत और भाखा का विवाद मिटाते हुए प्रेम के तत्त्व पर बल देते हैं—

का भाखा का संस्कृत, प्रेम चाहिए साँच
काम जु आवै कामरी, का लै करै कुमाच।

किंतु परवर्ती कवि केशवदास भाखा का प्रयोग करते हुए अपने को लज्जित अनुभव करते हैं—

भाखा बोलि न जानहीं, जिनके कुल के दास
भाखा कवि भो मंद मति, तेहि कुल केशवदास।

'भाखा' को लेकर कबीर की ललक, तुलसी का अप्रकट और तटस्थ सन्तोष, तथा केशव की कुंठा उनके इन प्रयोगों में साफ झलकती है। पर सूर को काव्यभाषा के किसी विशेष प्रकार के सम्बन्ध में उद्घोषणा करने की आवश्यकता महसूस नहीं होती। उन्हें ब्रजभाषा का प्रयोग सहज भाव से करना था, जिसके लिए कुछ भी सफाई क्यों अपेक्षित थी ?

सूर में ब्रज की तद्भव शब्दावली है, और उससे भी महत्त्वपूर्ण बात यह कि ठेठ प्रयोग हैं। सूर की भाषा में यह अघोषित भाखापन उनके संप्रेषण को अधिक दक्ष बनाता है। एक ओर उनकी शब्दावली पाठक को आत्मीयता का भाव देती है, और दूसरी ओर अर्थ-छायाओं का सटीक प्रयोग संभव करती है। रचना में सम्प्रेषण की दृष्टि से ये मूलभूत गुण हैं। यहाँ ठेठ प्रयोगों के कुछ चुने हुए उदाहरण प्रस्तुत हैं। पाठ का आधार धीरेन्द्र वर्मा द्वारा सम्पादित 'सूरसागर-सार' है, जो स्वयं 'सभम' के संस्करण पर आधारित है। जहाँ उद्धरण के साथ अंक दिए हुए हैं वे 'सूरसागर-सार' की पद-संख्या के द्योतक हैं—

करत अचगरी नन्द महर कौ ('कौ का अर्थ 'का बेटा') ३:११०, दिया बाति जनु मिलकी (प्रज्वलित हुई) ५:८३, सुरति स्याम की आई (स्मृति) ५:९९, दियौ तुरत पलनाई (लाद दिया) ६:२३, व्यौंत (व्यवस्था) ६:१२८,

दै घाली (दे भेजी) ६:१६७, कोतें (के स्थान पर) ७:३१ ।

इन शब्दों और प्रयोगों में ब्रजभाषा की ठेठ प्रकृति का बड़े शांत भाव से साक्षात्कार होता है, जो जन-जन में प्रचलित कृष्ण-भक्ति की संवेदना को प्रगाढ़ करता है। कहीं-कहीं तो तद्भव प्रयोग बड़े विलक्षण, पर उतने ही सटीक भी हैं। कृष्ण की शरारतों के प्रसंग में, उदाहरण के लिए, 'निर्दोष' से बेहतर शब्द गढ़ा गया है 'अनदोषे': अनदोषेकौं दोष लगावति-२:४८। 'निर्दोष' में दोष से छुटकारे की बात है, पर 'अनदोषे' में 'दोष' ही अकल्प्य है। ऐसा ही प्रयोग लावण्य-रहित के अर्थ में 'बिलोनी' ४:११३ का है।

तत्सम शब्दावली कृष्ण के सौन्दर्य वर्णनों में अपेक्षया अधिक है। यहाँ रूप और शोभा वर्णन के प्रसंगों में कवि परम्परानुमोदित अलंकार-विधान का प्रयोग करता है, और इसीलिए पूर्व प्रचलित तत्सम शब्दावली का सहारा अधिक लेता है। इसके विपरीत जहाँ बाल या युवा कृष्ण की विविध चेष्टाओं के प्रसंग हैं, वहाँ तत्सम शब्दावली बहुत हल्की है, और प्रधानता तद्भवों की है। स्थिर वर्णनों के लिए तत्सम और गत्यात्मक वर्णन के लिए तद्भव, ऐसा कुछ सजग चुनाव कवि की ओर से जान पड़ता है। इससे सूर की वर्णन कुशलता तो झलकती ही है, तत्सम और तद्भव शब्दावली की अपनी प्रकृति और रचना-क्षमता पर भी अच्छा प्रकाश पड़ता है। तत्सम शब्दों में अर्थ का स्थिर रूप है, तद्भव में अर्थ-छाया गत्यात्मक है। यहाँ दोनों प्रकार के उदाहरणों से बात अधिक स्पष्ट होगी—

सोभा कहत कहे नहिं आवै।
अचँवत अति आतुर लोचन-पुट मन न तृप्ति कौं पावे।
सजल मेघ घनस्याम सुभग बपु तड़ित बसन बनमाल।
सिखि सिखंड बन धातु बिराजति सुमन सुरंग प्रबाल।
कछुक कुटिल कमनीय सघन सिर गो-रज मंडित केस।
सोभित मनु अंबुज—पराग—रुचि—रंजित मधुप सुदेस।
कुंडल—किरनि कपोल—लोल छबि नैन कमल—दल मीन।
प्रति प्रति अंग अनंग-कोटि-छबि सुनि सखि परम प्रबीन।
अधर मधुर मुसुक्यानि मनोहर करति मदन मन हीन।
सूरदास जहँ दृष्टि परति है होति तहीं लवलीन।

मैया बहुत बुरौ बलदाऊ ।
कहन लग्यौ बन बड़ौ तमासौ सब मोड़ा मिलि आऊ ।
मोहूँ कौं चुचकारि गयो लै जहाँ सघन बन झाऊ ।
भागि चल्यौ कहि गयौ उहाँ इत काटि खाइ रे हाऊ ।
हौं डरपौं, काँपौं अरु रोवौं कोउ नहिं धीर धराऊ ।
थरसि गयौ नहिं भागि सकौं वे भागे जात अगाऊ ।
मो सौं कहत मोल कौ लीनौ आपु कहावत साऊ ।
सूरदास बल बड़ौ चबाई तैसेहिं मिले सखाऊ ॥

इन पदों की सामान्य तुलना से ही दोनों की भाषिक प्रक्रिया का अन्तर स्पष्ट हो जाता है । स्थिर शोभा-वर्णन के पहले पद में तत्समों-अर्द्धतत्समों की भरमार है, वाक्य-विन्यास काफी सीमा तक संस्कृत जैसा सामासिक है, और इस तत्सम शब्दावली के आधार पर परम्परित ढंग का विस्तृत अलंकार-विधान तैयार हुआ है । दूसरा पद चेष्टा-वर्णन का है, जो आरम्भ से ही गत्यात्मक है । यहाँ तत्सम शब्द प्रायः नहीं है, तद्भव और ठेठ प्रयोगों की व्याप्ति है और समास-शैली का प्रयोग नहीं हुआ । इसके अतिरिक्त ब्रज के औकारांत शब्दों का बाहुल्य है-संज्ञा, विशेषण, क्रिया-सभी रूपों में । फिर बाल कृष्ण की चेष्टाओं का स्वाभाविक और अनलंकृत चित्रण है । भाषिक प्रयोग और संवेदना, दोनों ही दृष्टियों से पहले पद में कृष्ण का तत्सम रूप है, और दूसरे में तद्भव । कहना न होगा कि अधिक काव्यात्मक प्रसंग दूसरी कोटि में ही आते है ।

रूप या शोभा वर्णन के प्रसंगों में एक ओर भाषा का रूप तत्सम-प्रिय हो जाता है; कभी-कभी तो क्रिया तक तत्सम पर आधारित हो जाती है, उदाहरणार्थ 'निर्तत' ३:१४९-दूसरी ओर परम्परागत अप्रस्तुत विधानों के बीच से बिंब-योजना आरम्भ होती है, यद्यपि इनके पीछे सहारा बहुत बार साङ्ग रूपक या उत्प्रेक्षा का रहता है । इसीलिए तत्सम शब्दावली से युक्त शोभा-वर्णन के बिंब-प्रयोग प्रायः प्राचीन शैली के अलंकारों से आच्छादित है । सूर के बिंबों की वास्तविक क्षमता स्वतन्त्र प्रसंगों में ही अधिक द्रष्टव्य है ।

रचना की भाषिक प्रक्रिया में बिंब की क्षमता जटिल अनुभूतियों के सूक्ष्म अङ्कन में अच्छी तरह समझी जा सकती है । जैसा कहा जा चुका है, बिंब की मुख्य प्रक्रिया दृश्य तत्वों को उभारने में उतनी निहित नहीं जितनी कि किसी जटिल

और गतिशील भाव को अर्थ की द्वन्द्वात्मक शक्ति से परिचालित कर देने में है। इसी माने में बिंब मूलतः अर्थ-संश्लेष है। गोपी के प्रणय की व्याकुलता का अङ्कन है—

सदा रहै मन चाक चढ्यौ, सो और न कछू सुहाइ
करत उपाइ बहुत मिलिबे कौं, यहै बिचारत जाइ
सूर सकल लागत ऐसीये, सो दुख कासौं कहिये
ज्यों अचेत बालक की बेदन, अपने ही तन सहिये। :४:५७:

यहाँ पहली पंक्ति में मन की अस्थिरता और व्याकुलता को व्यक्त करने के लिए पहले घूमने वाले चाक का एक प्रचलित अप्रस्तुत लिया गया है। पर बहुप्रचलित और रूढ़ होने के कारण यह अप्रस्तुत बिंब के रूप में संक्रमित नहीं हो पाता, यद्यपि मन की सूक्ष्म प्रक्रिया को रूपायित करने के लिए वह एक उचित दृश्य उपकरण है। अर्थ-संश्लेष के रूप में बिंब की असली शक्ति अंतिम पंक्ति में अनुभूत होती है। मन की व्याकुलता, जिसे चुपचाप अपने आप सहना है, को अंकित करने के लिए पीड़ित पर अचेत बालक का बिंब विकसित किया गया है। इस बिंब में सारी स्थिति की पीड़ा, निरीहता, निर्दोषता और साथ ही अवशता का जो द्वन्द्व एक साथ उभरता है, वह गोपियों के सरल, निश्छल पर मर्मांतक पीड़ा देने वाले प्रणय को पूरी बारीकी और सुकुमारता में अंकित कर देता है, और अर्थ-प्रक्रिया कहीं पूरी होकर खत्म होती नहीं जान पड़ती, वरन् निरंतर विकसनशील लगती है। पहली और चौथी पंक्ति का अन्तर यहाँ स्पष्ट हो जाता है। 'सदा रहै मन चाक चढ्यो' में एक बहुप्रचलित अप्रस्तुत होने के कारण अर्थ की सूक्ष्मता और गति नहीं है। घूमने की एक ही क्रिया को संकेतित करने के कारण यहाँ अर्थ का द्वन्द्व नहीं चलता। 'चाक चढ्यो' इसीलिए बिंब नहीं बनता, एक मुहाविरा जैसा होकर रह जाता है, जिसमें दृश्यमयता है, संश्लिष्टता नहीं। पर अंतिम पंक्ति में बालक की पीड़ा, निरीहता, निर्दोषता आदि के अनुभव एक दूसरे से टकरा कर एक सूक्ष्म प्रक्रिया को परिचालित करते हैं, और इस प्रकार बिंब की अपनी क्षमता को उन्मुक्त करते हैं। और तब यह बिंब पूरे पद में अलग-अलग अप्रस्तुत विधान नहीं लगता, वरन् चुपके से समूची भाषा का अंग बन जाता है। काव्य-भाषा की बनावट में पौराणिक 'संदर्भ' और 'मिथ' में जो अन्तर है, वैसा ही अन्तर अलंकार और बिंब के बीच में है। संदर्भ और अलंकार भाषा के विन्यास में उभरे-से रहते है, जब कि मिथ और बिंब भाषिक संरचना में घुल जाते हैं।

एक दूसरा बिंब कुब्जा-प्रसंग का लें। कुबड़ी कुरूप कुब्जा को रसेश्वर कृष्ण

के संदर्भ में ग्राह्य बनाना संवेदना के स्तर पर एक कठिन कार्य है। यों कृष्ण परब्रह्म के अवतार हैं, और वे जिस पर चाहे जिस रूप में कृपा कर सकते हैं। पर अनिंद्य सौंदर्य से युक्त कृष्ण मनुष्य रूप में भी हैं, और कुरूप कुब्जा कैसे उन्हें भा गई, इसका कोई संतोषजनक और विश्वसनीय समाधान काव्य की रचना-प्रक्रिया के स्तर पर कवि को देना है। कृष्ण चरित के प्रमुख गायक सूरदास का यह और भी प्रधान दायित्व हो जाता है। कृष्ण और कुब्जा के इस अटपटे दीखते सम्बन्ध को कवि ने एक बिंब के बीच से अंकित किया है। कुब्जा गोपियों को पत्र लिखती है—

हौं तो दासी कंसराइ की, देखी मनहिं विचारी
फलनि मांझ ज्यों करुइ तोमरी, रहत घुरे पर डारी
अब तो हाथ परी जंत्री के, बाजत राग दुलारी
तनु तें टेढ़ी सब कोउ जानत, परसि भई अधिकारी
सूरदास स्वामी करुनामय, अपने हाथ सँवारी। (६ : १७)

यहाँ देखा जा सकता है कि कवि ने किस प्रकार सांग रूपक के विधान को अस्वीकार कर दिया है। कवि द्वारा थोड़े से अन्तर से सांग रूपक के अन्तर्गत तोमरी की कड़ुआहट, टेढ़ापन, उसका तिरस्कृत होना, फिर किसी वादक के हाथ पड़कर उसका बीन होकर मीठा राग प्रसारित करना—ये सब तत्व क्रमशः तुलनीय हो सकते थे। कुब्जा की कुरूपता, उसका विकृतांग होना, समाज में तिरस्कृत होना, फिर कृष्ण के अनुग्रह से उसमें सौंदर्य विकसित होने से। पर सूर पहली पंक्ति के प्रस्तुत का उल्लेख करके छोड़ देते हैं, और फिर धीरे-धीरे कड़ुई तोमरी का बीन में रूपांतरित होने का बिंब उभरता है। तब हम कृष्ण और कुब्जा के निकट सम्बन्ध को अधिक गहरे और संवेदनात्मक स्तर पर ग्रहण करते हैं। कुब्जा की कुरूपता बीन की सुर लहरी में बिलीन हो जाती है।

सूर के बिंब विधान में से अकचक चुना हुआ एक और प्रसंग है। गोपियाँ उद्धव के योग संदेश को अस्वीकार कर देती हैं। पर यह अस्वीकार ऐसा होना चाहिए जिससे कि उद्धव का अपमान न हो, और कृष्ण के लिए कोई संकोच की स्थिति उत्पन्न न हो, साथ ही यह भी स्पष्ट हो जाए कि यह योग-संदेश गोपियों को एकदम अग्राह्य है। इस जटिल और सुकुमार मनःस्थिति को एक विशिष्ट बिंब में से विकसित किया गया है –

जो हित करि पठयौ मनमोहन, सो हम तुमकौं दीनौ
सूरदास ज्यौं बिप्र नारियर, करहीं बंदन कीनौ। (६: १०७)

ब्राह्मण का आशीर्वाद-रूप में दिया गया नारियल भी गृहस्थ स्वीकार नहीं करता। हाथ से स्पर्श करके प्रणाम की मुद्रा में उसे वापस कर दिया जाता है। उस नारियल के प्रति पूरा सम्मान, उस की पवित्रता को मान्यता, पर उसे स्वीकार न करना और यह ध्यान रखना कि देने वाले ब्राह्मण का अपमान न हो—यह बिंब गोपियों के योग-संदेश के प्रति दृष्टिकोण को बड़े सटीक और मार्मिक ढंग से व्यक्त करता है। 'बिप्र नारियर' का बिंब मध्यकालीन काव्य के संदर्भ में बेजोड़ है।

सांग रूपक के भी कुछ बड़े कुशल और नये ढंग के प्रयोग सूरदास में मिलते हैं। ऐसे ही एक प्रसंग में एक विस्तृत सांग रूपक को बाँध कर मानो कवि स्वयं उसे निरस्त करता हुआ अंत में सामान्य भाषा में अपनी बात कहता है। अलंकार का वैभव, उसकी सीमा, और दोनों का संश्लिष्ट प्रयोग सूर की काव्यभाषा की अद्भुत सामर्थ्य को प्रमाणित करता है। सूर का प्रसिद्ध छंद है –

देखियति कालिंदी अति कारी। (५: ६४)

उमड़ती हुई यमुना का सन्निपात में विक्षिप्त युवती से पूरा सांग रूपक बाँध कर अंतिम पंक्ति में कवि कहता है –

सूरदास प्रभु जो जमुना गति, सो गति भई हमारी।

यहाँ पहले तो यमुना प्रस्तुत है और ज्वर में ग्रस्त युवती अप्रस्तुत है। पर अंत तक आते-आते विरहिणी गोपी प्रस्तुत हो जाती है, और यमुना स्वयं अप्रस्तुत। इस प्रकार कवि लंबे सांग रूपक का उपयोग एक नये और कुशल ढंग से करता है। प्रस्तुत और अप्रस्तुत की इस मिलावट में यमुना, विक्षिप्त युवती और विरहिणी गोपी सब अभेद हो जाते हैं, और सांग रूपक की आलंकारिकता अंतिम पक्ति में पहुँच कर सामान्य कथन की भाषा में पर्यवसित हो जाती है। और इन दोनों भाषिक स्तरों की टकराहट से एक नया अर्थ व्युत्पन्न होता है। काव्यभाषा की सर्जनात्मक क्षमता की दृष्टि से सूर का यह पद विशेष रूप से महत्वपूर्ण है।

एक ओर कवि द्वारा अलंकारों का ऐसा कुशल प्रयोग है, और दूसरी ओर अलंकारों की अधिकता और विकृति भी है। बहुत जगह कवि परंपरित अलंकार विधान को यथावत् दुहराता चलता है, और तब अनुभव होता है कि रीतिकाल के अलंकृत और चमत्कार-प्रधान कृष्ण-काव्य का मूल स्रोत शायद सूर के ऐसे पद ही हैं। इस दृष्टि से 'अद्भुत एक अनूपम बाग' (५: १०६) वाला पद प्रायः कुख्यात है। कवि की इस प्रवृत्ति पर टिप्पणी करते हुए रामचन्द्र शुक्ल ने लिखा है "साहित्य-प्रसिद्ध उपमानों को लेकर सूर ने बड़ी-बड़ी क्रीड़ाएँ की है। कहीं उनको लेकर

रूपकातिशयोक्ति द्वारा 'अद्भुत एक अनूपम बाग' लगाया है; कहीं, जब जैसा जी चाहा है, उन्हें संगत सिद्ध करके दिखा दिया है, कहीं असंगत।" (त्रिवेणी, पृ० ९५)

पर चमत्कारप्रियता और अत्युक्ति की इन प्रवृत्तियों के बावजूद सूर की काव्यभाषा का मूल स्वर मितकथन का ही है। शब्दों और प्रयोगों के अतिरंजित प्रभाव को न ग्रहण करके उन्होंने प्रायः उनकी हल्की छायाओं को उभारा है। मितकथन की यह प्रक्रिया कई स्तरों पर देखी जा सकती है। सामान्य शब्द प्रयोग के रूप में, रामचरित से संबद्ध पदों में सीता प्रचलित नाम त्रिजटा को 'त्रिजटी' कह कर (पः ९) मानो अपने हृदय की कोमलता, पीड़ा और आत्मीयता को अधिक संप्रेषित कर पाती हैं। इसी प्रकार राम के आगमन की प्रतीक्षा में सगुन मनाती हुई कौशल्या काग से कहती है-"दधि-ओदन दौना भरि दैहौं, अरू माइनि में थपिहौं" (पः १६) मातृका पूजन में काग का अंकन बहुत-सी स्त्रियां करती हैं। इससे बड़ा सम्मान और क्या दिया जा सकता है? ब्रज क्षेत्र में प्रचलित लोक-जीवन की इस मधुर प्रक्रिया का कवि ने यहाँ बड़ा संवेदनशील उल्लेख किया है।

एक अत्यन्त कोमल प्रसंग वहाँ आता है जब कृष्ण उद्धव को ब्रज भेजने के पूर्व वहाँ के निवासियों का संक्षिप्त परिचय देते हैं—

पहिले प्रनाम नँदराइ सौं।
ता पाछैं मेरौ पालागन, कहियौ जसुमति माइ सौं।
— — —
मित्र एक मन बसत हमारैं, ताहि मिलैं सुख पाइहौ
करि करि समाधान नीकी बिधि, मोकौं माथौ नाइहौ। (६: २०)

कृष्ण ने अपने जिस एक 'मित्र' का नामोल्लेख तक नहीं किया, उसकी व्याख्या का प्रयत्न काव्यभाषा के स्तर पर अन्याय जैसा लगता है। सूर द्वारा 'मित्र' शब्द का ऐसा प्रयोग आधुनिक छायावादी काव्यभाषा का स्मरण दिला देता है–

शशि-मुख पर घूंघट डाले
अंचल में दीप छिपाए
जीवन की गोधूली में
कौतूहल से तुम आए! (आँसू, पृ० १९)

पुल्लिग और स्त्रीलिंग रूपों का यह संश्लेष कुछ छिपाने के लिए नहीं है, वरन् सम्बन्धों की सुकुमारता व्यंजित करने के लिए है। प्रसाद ने कहीं-कहीं ऐसी ही स्थिति में 'अथिति' शब्द का भी प्रयोग किया है।

मितकथन की भाषा, और उससे भी अधिक मुद्रा का एक बढ़िया उदाहरण सूर के रुक्का-प्रसंग में मिलता है। रामचरित वाले अंश का पद है–

बिनती किहिँ बिधि प्रभुहिँ सुनाऊँ ?
महाराज रघुबीर धीर कौं, समय न कबहूँ पाऊँ !
जाम रहत जामिनि के बीतैं, तिहिँ औसर उठि धाऊँ !
सकुच होत सुकुमार नींद मैं, कैसें प्रभुहिँ जगाऊँ ।
दिनकर किरनि-उदित,ब्रह्मादिक-रुद्रादिक इक ठाऊँ ।
अगनित भीर अमर मुनिगन की, तिहिँ तैं ठौर न पाऊँ ।
उठत सभा दिन मधि, सैनापति भीर देखि, फिरि आऊँ ।
न्हात खात सुख करत साहिबी, कैसें करि अनखाऊँ ।
रजनी-मुख आबत गुन-गावत, नारद तुंबुर नाऊँ ।
तुम हीं कहौ कृपा निधि रघुपति, किहिं गिनती मैं आऊँ ?
एक उपाउ करौ कमलापति, कहौ तौ कहि समझाऊँ ।
पतित-उधारन नाम सूर प्रभु, यह रुक्का पहुँचाऊँ। (प०१८)

यहाँ कुछ भी न कह पाने की मुद्रा जैसे सब कुछ कह देती है। इस दृष्टि से सूर का यह 'रुक्का' तुलसी की 'पत्रिका' (विनयपत्रिका छं० २७७-७८-७९) की तुलना में अधिक कोमल है, यद्यपि सूर यहाँ राम को संबोधित कर रहे हैं जो तुलसी का क्षेत्र है। मितकथन की समस्या से तुलसी भी जूझे हैं अपने ढंग से— "कहे बिनु रह्यौ न परत, कहे राम! रस न रहत" (२५६)। पर सूर ने तो उपर्युक्त पद में कहने और न कहने के बीच की भाषिक प्रक्रिया रचना के स्तर पर प्रदर्शित ही कर दी है। 'बिनती' सुनाने में जो संकोच और कठिनाइयाँ हैं उन्हें गिनाते-गिनाते बिनती स्वयं कह दी गई है।

अभी तक हम ने सूर की काव्यभाषा के सर्जनात्मक पक्ष का विवेचन किया। अब काव्यभाषा के आधार-रूप का संक्षिप्त व्याकरणिक विश्लेषण अपेक्षित होगा।

संज्ञा—

संज्ञा के अधिकतर बली रूप ब्रज की परम्परानुसार औकारांत है। ये बली रूप अपनी प्रकृति में प्रायः तद्भव हैं; 'अन्य' रूपों में तत्सम, अर्द्धतत्सम तथा विदेशी प्रमुख हैं। उदाहरणार्थ कुछ रूप प्रस्तुत हैं—

बली :– बानौं (१:५), पानौ (१:५) टीकौ (१:२२), समौ (१:३८), ताँवरौ (१:४२), रानौ (१:४३), अचंभौ (१:४८), दहियौ (२:५२), अधारौ (३:९८), ब्यौरो (४:८७), सँदेसौ,(५:५८), सोधौ(६:२२)

अन्य :—चरन (१:१), कमल (१:१), हरि (१:१), राइ (१:१), कृपा (१:१), पंगु (१:१), गिरि (१:१), रंक (१:१), सिर (१:१), छत्र (१:१), स्वामी (१:१), कर (प:१४), बान (प:१४), प्रतिज्ञा (प:१४), असुर (प:१४,) जननि (प:१६), सगुनौती (प:१६), पाँखि (प:१६)

अपवाद रूप में कहीं-कहीं अवधी-भोजपुरी की तरह दीर्घ रूप भी मिल जाते हैं—मोरवा (५:९८)

औकारांत रूपों की प्रमुखता केवल संज्ञाओं में ही नहीं बली विशेषण और क्रिया के भूतकालिक कृदंत रूपों में भी द्रष्टव्य है-कहन लग्यौ बन बड़ौ तमासौ (३:१२)। यहाँ स्मरणीय है कि देवनागरी में बहुप्रचलित औ लिपिचिह्न का ब्रज के अर्द्धविवृत मूल स्वर उच्चारण की ध्वन्यात्मक दृष्टि से सही रूप होगा ओँ।

सर्वनाम—

हौं (१:१५), मैं (१:२३), मो (१:११), हमैं (१;२६)

तुम (१:९), तुव (१:११), तैं (१:३३), तू (२:३३), तो (२:५९)

आपु (१:९)

वै (३:१२), बा (३:४४), वा (३:४७), वह (३:४७)

जा (१:१), जिहिँ (१:९), यह (१:१०), इन (१:२४), या (३:४३), ये (४:११५)

जो (१:२), जे (१:१७)

सो (१:२), सु (१:२०)

ता (१:८), तिन (२:३०), तिहिँ (१:१)

कौन (१:५), को (१:७), कोऊ (१:१०), किहिँ (१:१०)

काहू (१:३०), का (१:४७) कहा (२:१६), किन (४:१५१)

विशेषण—बली : बड़ौ (१:१०), आछौ (१:१९), नीकौ (१:२२), मेलौ (१:२४), रीतौ (१:४४), नयौ (१:५०), मीठौ (२:२९), खाटौ (२:२९), सगरौ (२:६१)

अन्य : सब (१:१), अधम (१:४३), मधुर (२:३७,) दृढ़ (३:८४), बड़े (४:३७)

परसर्ग :

कर्म-संप्रदान–अंबे कौँ (१:१), मो कौँ माथौ नाइहौ (मेरे लिए–सम्प्रदान के अर्थ में 'कौ' का प्रयोग-(६:२०), फल कौ (१:२), तुम सौं (१:११), काल व्याल पै (१:४२), देहरि लौं (२:२१)

करण—मो पै (२:३), गुन करि (६:८२)

अपादान—ता तैं (१:८)

सम्बन्ध—गरीबनि हूँ के (१:८), जा की (१:१), प्रान जिवन सब केरे (५:४१)

अधिकरण–राजसूय मैं (१:५), पांडव कैं (१:८), जा पर (१:१०) मन माहिँ (४:४४) पिय पहियाँ (४:१५५), मोहनि पै (४-१५५)

अन्य परसर्ग रूप — कहँ लगि (१:५), ग्वालनि हेत (१:७), घर माँझ (१:१२), कब धौं (२:१२), अँचरा तर (२:१९), मुख तन(२:५०)

आधुनिक भाषावैज्ञानिकों द्वारा पश्चिमी हिन्दी-पूर्वी हिन्दी के भेदक रूप में बहुचर्चित कर्ता कारक का परसर्ग –ने यहाँ (और कबीर में भी) अनुपस्थित है ।

परसर्गों के संश्लिष्ट रूप ब्रज की एक प्रमुख विशेषता है । सूर की ब्रजभाषा में भी इन रूपों का बहुतायत से प्रयोग हुआ है । यहाँ कुछ उदाहरण दिए जा रहे हैं–

ज्यौ गूँगै मीठे फल कौ रस (कर्म–१:२), छिनक माहिँ उर नखनि बिदार्‌यौ (करण-१:७), आवत गाढ़ैं काम (अधिकरण-१:४), जो सुख होत गुपालहिँ

गाऐं (कर्म, और दूसरे प्रयोग में क्रियार्थक संज्ञा से संश्लिष्ट करण का परसर्ग–१:१६), अब कैं राखि लेहु भगवान (सम्बन्ध के परसर्ग में अधिकरण का रूप संश्लिष्ट-१:१८), अपने भरोसैं लरिहौं (करण-१:२१), स्रबननि तुलसीदल (अधिकरण-१:२६), होत कहा अब के पछिताऐं (क्रियार्थक संज्ञा से संश्लिष्ट करण का परसर्ग १:३६), कन-कन कौ चौहटें नचायौ (अधिकरण-१:४२), सुपनैं ज्यौं डहकानौ (अधिकरण-१:४३), भ्रमि-भ्रमि जमहिं हँसावै (कर्म:१:४८), द्वारैं भीर (अधिकरण-२:४), जसोदा हरि पालनैं झुलावै (अधिकरण-२:७), ताहिं मँगावत (कर्म-२:२९), आपु गऐं हरुऐं सूनैं घर (क्रियाविशेषण से संश्लिष्ट करण का परसर्ग-२:४६), लाजनि सकुचि जात मुख मेरौ (करण-२:७१), गाढ़ैं बोलि न पावत कोऊ (क्रिया विशेषण से संश्लिष्ट करण का परसर्ग-३:१५), घामैं राखी डारि (अधिकरण -३:५०), बसुधा-भार-उतारन काजैं (सम्प्रदान–३:७७), भक्तनि प्रान अधारौ (कर्म-३:९८), प्रात होत मेरे लाल लड़ैतैं (कर्म-५:५८)

परसर्ग रहित प्रयोग–गर्ब सहित आयो ब्रज बोरन (३: ७५)

परसर्गों के ये संश्लिष्ट प्रयोग अथवा परसर्ग रहित प्रयोग वस्तुतः भाषा की अभिव्यक्ति सामर्थ्य के द्योतक हैं, और परसर्गों के विषय में यह सामर्थ्य भाषा के प्रवाह तथा भंगिमा से सभंव होती है। उपर्युक्त संश्लिष्ट प्रयोगों को क्रमबद्ध रूप में इस प्रकार रक्खा जा सकता है।

कर्म	– ऐं'	– ऐं,	– हिं	– नि
करण	–	– नि,	– ऐं,	–
संप्रदान	– ऐं		—	
अधिकरण	–	– ऐं,	–	नि

इन परसर्गों में, या कि संश्लिष्ट होने के कारण इन्हें संस्कृत ढंग की विभक्ति भी कह सकते हैं; – हिं या – हि के संबंध में रामचन्द्र शुक्ल का पर्यवेक्षण महत्व-पूर्ण है। 'जायसी ग्रंथावली' की भूमिका में जायसी की भाषा पर विचार करते हुए वे लिखते हैं "किसी समय संबंध की 'हि' विभक्ति से सब कारको का काम लिया जाता था, पीछे वह कर्म और संप्रदान में नियत सी हो गई। इस 'हि' या 'ह' विभक्ति का सब कारकों में प्रयोग जायसी और तुलसी दोनों की रचनाओं में देखा जाता है।" (पृ० १९६), जायसी और तुलसी की तुलना में, सूर की भाषा में इन संश्लिष्ट परसर्गों

या विभक्तियों का वैविध्य स्पष्ट ही अधिक है, और सूर ने -'हिं' को केवल कर्म-संप्रदान के लिए ही प्रयुक्त किया है।

क्रिया—

सहायक क्रिया—हौं (१: २१), हौ (४: २८), है (१:१०), हैं (१ :३), हुते (६: १), हुती (१: ३६), हुतौ (२: ३०), ही (थी –३: १३७), हे (थे–४:७), आहि (४: १०९), आहिं (प:५)

यहाँ अंतिम दोनों रूप अवधी के प्रयुक्त हुए हैं। रामचरित के पदों में आया हुआ 'आहिं' का प्रयोग तुलसी के ग्राम-वधूटी प्रसंग का स्मरण दिला देता है। 'इनमें को पति आहिँ तिहारे' (सूरदास)-'सुमुखि कहउ को आहिँ तुम्हारे' (तुलसीदास)।

मूल काल - काफी संख्या में मूल काल के प्रयोग अकेले वर्तमानकालिक कृदंत से संभव हुए हैं। जैसे - हरषति, चितवत, किलकत (२:१३)। कहीं-कहीं अकेले भूत-कालिक कृदंत का प्रयोग वर्तमान का भाव द्योतित करने के लिए किया गया है, उदा-हरणार्थ–काली उरग रहै जमुना मैं, उरग करै तहँ घात (३: १९)।

मूल काल के कुछ सामान्य प्रयोग इस प्रकार हैं–बंदौं (१:१), लंघै (१: १), दरसाइ (१:१), सुनै (१:१), बोलै (१:१), चलै (१:१), धराइ (१:१), आवै (१:२) आई (१:३), देखौ (१:४), मानत (१:४), उबार्‌यौ (१:५), छुड़ायौ (१:९), ढरै (१:१०), सुनौ (१:११), लीन्है (१:११), टरिहौं (१:२१), दुहावै (१:२५), रह्यौ (१;२७), पछितैहौ (१:२७), सेइये (१:३१), पतिआइ (१:३१), खोए (१:३२), कीनो (१:३३), भजिए (१:३८), करियै (१:३९), खैहैं (१:३९), गीध्यौ (१:४२), सिरानौ (१:४३), बंधत (१:४४), दिखराऊँ (१:४७), जैयतु (२:४७), परानै (२:५८), सिखावहु (३:२), कहियौ (३:२०), परबोध्यौ (३:७६), तरौगी (३:८२), लाग्यौ (३:९४), दीजै (३:९५), पठाई (३:१००), लजानी (३:१५१), बिकाने (३:१६३), कहवैहौ (४:३७), ककोरत (४:७७), त्रासी (संस्कृत तत्सम से सीधे बना क्रिया रूप-४:८९), कीजै (आदरार्थ ४:१५४), होवे (५:२०), जियौ (५:३०) जीजै (५:४०)।

नामधातु–सूरसागर में नामधातु के काफी संख्या में और अच्छे प्रभावशाली प्रयोग मिलते हैं–

पतझरै (१:३१), बुढ़ानी (१:३७), घिनैहैं (१:३९), बिरोधै (१:४०), गरबानौ (१:४३), रिसात (२:५७), त्रसायौ (संस्कृत से सीधे नामधातु २:६५) अधिकैहै (३:१६१), अतुरानी (४:१२४), आदरैं, अपमानैं (४:१३३), सगुनावै (६:२५)

प्रेरणार्थक–बरनावत (५;६५)

संयुक्त क्रिया–संयुक्त क्रिया के प्रयोग सूर की भाषा में प्रायिक हैं–चलि आयौ (१:५), लिये डोलति (१:११), राखि लेहु (१:१८), उघरि नच्यौ चाहत हौं (१:२१), दूरि करौ(१:२३)जात टरौ (१:२४), ठानी हुती (१:३६), चाखन लाग्यौ (१:४५), सूंघि फिर्यो (१:५३), सुनि आई (२:४), दिवावति डोलति (२:१४), बजावन दै (३:५२), ढूंढ़ति फिरौं (३:९४), ठगति फिरति (३:१२४), लीन्हे आवति हौं (४:८१), जानि लीन्हौ (४:९३), जानि कै (४:१२४), उठि आवत हैं (४:१३२), धँसि लैहौं (५:१५), जरी जात (५:४३), सुरति करत (५:४४), डसि गयौ (५:४४), दियौ–पलनाइ (६:२३)

नामधातु और संयुक्त क्रिया की दृष्टि से सूर का भाषा प्रयोग उनके समकालीनों की तुलना में कहीं अधिक विकसित है; तीन और चार तत्वों तक से बनी संयुक्त क्रियाएँ मिलती हैं-उठि आवत हैं (४;१३२), उघरि नच्यौ चाहत हौं (१;२१)। इससे एक ओर तत्कालीन ब्रजभाषा की अपनी क्षमता प्रमाणित होती है और दूसरी ओर सूर की रचना-स्तर पर आत्मविश्वास भावना। यों ये दोनों प्रक्रियाएँ भी परस्पर सम्बद्ध हैं। भाषा के प्रवाह में शब्द और प्रयोगों को गढ़ सकना किसी भी कवि के लिए उसकी रचना सामर्थ्य का द्योतक है। इस दृष्टि से नामधातु और संयुक्त क्रियाएँ व्याकरण और मुहाविरे के संधि-स्थल पर निर्मित होती हैं। नामधातु और संयुक्त क्रिया जितना व्याकरण का तत्त्व है उतना ही शैली और मुहाविरे का भी। सूर ने इस तरह अपने क्रिया प्रयोगों को रचना के सदर्भ में बहुत उपयुक्त रूप में गढ़ा है। सांस्कृतिक सदर्भों से संपृक्त नामवाची शब्दावली अप्रस्तुत विधान और बिंब योजना के लिए उचित आधारभूत तत्त्व हैं, और क्रियावाची प्रयोग भाषा में मुहाविरे का हल्का प्रवाह उत्पन्न करते है। (संज्ञाओं पर निर्मित बड़े मुहाविरे गद्य-भाषा में कुछ खप भी जाएँ, कविता की भाषा में तो मूल संवेदना से ध्यान विकेन्द्रित ही करते हैं। उर्दू शायरी में भी कुशल प्रयोग क्रियाओं या छोटे अव्यय शब्दों से बने हल्के मुहाविरों के माने जाते हैं न कि संज्ञा आधारित लंबे मुहाविरों के[1]) सूर ने काव्यभाषा की सृजन प्रक्रिया मे संज्ञा और क्रियाओं का इस दृष्टि से बहुत सही और सार्थक प्रयोग किया है।

१–तुलना कीजिए ग़ालिब की पंक्तियों में दोनों तरह के प्रयोग। संज्ञा पर आधारित मुहाविरा 'मुफ़्त हाथ आये, तो बुरा क्या है'। क्रिया या अव्यय से बना मुहाविरा–'कोई बतलाओ कि हम बतलायें क्या,' 'हम कहाँ के दाना थे'।

कृदंत–कपट करि (१:३), मारन आई (१:३), अघ व रिबै(१:२२), उघरत नाथ पुकारी (१:२७) भ्रमत-भ्रमत (१:३६), कर कह्यौ न मानत (१:३७), तेई लै खोपरी (१:३९), सिर धुनि-धुनि पछितायौ (१:४५), सो सर छाँड़ि (१:४६), मिलिबे की तरसनि (२:१७), तुरत मथ्यौ दधि-माखन पायौ (२:४६), ताहूँ के खैबे-पीबे कौं (२:५६), बन तें आवत धेनु चराए (३:११), न इहिँ पथ ऐबौ (३:५८), मेरे कहे मैं कोउ नाहिँ (३:१३८), लैन सो इहाँ सिधारे (५:२०), चलत गुपाल के सब चले (५:६०)

यह पहले ही कहा जा चुका है कि सूर की भाषा में अनेक स्थलों पर अकेले कृदंत क्रिया के पूरे रूपों की तरह प्रयुक्त हुए हैं।

अव्यय—

पुनि (१:१), बार-बार (१:१), न (१:२), हीं (१:२), कित (१:२), बिनु (१:३), नाई (१:३), सौं (१:४), कै (१:५,) जहँ-जहँ (१:९), तहँ-तहँ (१:९), फिरि-फिरि (१:१०), कत (१:२१), तौ (१:२२), क्यों (१:२५), नाहिन (बलार्थक निषेध १:२७), जिनि (१:३१), हूँ (१:३२), जैसौ (१;४९), जनि (२:२२), जौ (२:४५), किन (२:५१), कैसौ (२:५१), सौ (२:५८), परस्पर (३:६), जनि (३:१०), काहैं (३:४६), एकै (–ऐ प्रत्यय बलार्थक है ३:५२), कहा (३:१६७), जब तौं प्रीति स्याम सौं कीन्ही (व्यंग्यार्थ के लिए बलार्थक ४:५७), धौं उनहिँ चुराई (निश्चयार्थक ४:७९), क्यौं करि (४:१०५), किधौं (४:१११), हयाँ (५:४२), लौं (५:४४), तन (५:११४), सकल ग्वालनि कौं मेरौ कोतौ भेट्यौ (स्थान पर-६:२०), मति लै जाइ (निषेधार्थक ६:३४), मति हिय बिलख करौ सिय (प.१०)।

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CORRESPONDENCE IN POETIC SANSKRIT BETWEEN AN ENGLISHMAN AND AN INDIAN PANDIT IN 1836 A. D.

S. P. CHATURVEDI,
Allahabad.

As a token of homage to my revered teacher, Prof. K. Chaṭṭopādhyāya, who evinced great interest therein on the occasion of the Delhi session of All-India Oriental Conference held in 1957, I am reproducing the two unique letters in ornate poetic Sanskrit written one hundred and thirtyfive years ago. They were discovered by my colleague, Prof. K. K. Budholia (History Dept., Morris College, Nagpur) in Mandla (M.P.). The first letter marked 'A' is written in shining black ink on one side of a paper-sheet of 13" × 8" and contains thirty two verses in 45 lines. The second letter (marked 'B') is written on both sides of a thinner paper-sheet of 8" × 6" and contains in 35 lines twelve verses. The size of alphabets in 'B' is bigger and shows a less skillful hand in writing. The following items of information can be culled out from a close perusal of these letters. The letter (A) is written by one Pandit Rāmachandra of a place near Mandla (M.P.) and is addressed to one Lancelot Wilkinson in Shihoor nagar in Madhya Bharat, and the letter 'B' is a reply from Lancelot Wilkinson to the above-named Pandit. The date as given in letter 'B' is आषाढ़ मास, कृष्णपक्ष, सूर्यतिथि, बुधवारे of the year 1758 corresponding to 1836 A.D.; and the letter 'A' was written about one month earlier, i.e. आषाढ़ मास (अधिक) कृष्णपक्ष अष्टमी तिथि of the

same year. Curiously enough, the Indian Pandit's letter, like Bāṇa's in the Harṣacarita, gives details of the month, Tithi and fortnight, but not of the year. The year, mentioned in the Englishman's letter 'B' is 1758 reckoned in Shaka era. In Shaka era, the अधिक मास precedes the शुद्धमास, therefore there is an interval of about one month intervening between the two letters. Taking into consideration, the means of communication available one hundred years before, and assuming that Shihoor nagar is modern Sihore near Bhopal, the time of one month is quite reasonable.

We know that the fourth decade of the nineteenth century was the time when the medium of education was a topic of hot discussion among the authorities of East India company. Though ultimately, English was declared as the official language and began to be taught as the medium of instruction in Indian schools and Sanskrit was dethroned from its high position, it is interesting to see that the correspondence between an English officer and an Indian Pandit was carried on in Sanskrit, and that too in high-flown verses of various metres. Herein lies the importance of these letters.

Below is summarised the contents of the two letters. In the letter 'A' Pandit Ramchandra sends (Vs. I & II) his blessings to the great patron of letters, Wilkinson Saheb, saying that his own poetic Muse need not have the feeling of despair due to the Kali age, because the great ruler Wilkinson is there ruling over the earth. After conveying (Vs. III) the news of his all-round welfare, he refers (Vs. IV.) to the Saheb's letters received earlier by him with great delight. Then he meets (Vs.V) the charge of the Saheb of पुनरुक्तिदोष in

his earlier letters by saying that a knot should be tied more than once to make it stronger. Then he refers to his present chief Maclot Saheb, who though very busy spares some time to study Sanskrit, and has made fairly good progress (Vs. X.). Then he proceeds (Vs. XII) to mention that a Maithila Brāhmaṇa named Vāsudeva, has been employed in Mandla for teaching children. As the employed teachers were taking classes in their own houses, their mode of teaching could not be known by him and Maclot Saheb. The construction of a school building was under active consideration (Vs. XV). To an earlier enquiry from Wilkinson about the number of students in his school, Pandit Ramachandra says that the people there (Vs. XVI) are rustic and are not study-minded. Then he enquires from Wilkinson about the condition of study in his place (Vs. XIX) and requests him to send if available, some easy books useful for children (Vs.XX). He strikes a personal note by saying (Vs.XXI) that he was very sorry to hear that the Saheb suffered from eye troubles. In the end he asked pardon for saying (Vs. XXII–XXV) in ornate language some striking and charming things, and reproduces the (Vs. XXVII) well-known Verse that Saheb's well-known fame in the form of a she-swan reached heaven and there coming in union with the he-swan of Brahmā gave birth to a child, the white shining moon seen in the sky. After imploring the Saheb (Vs. XXX) for sending a reply, he closes the letter (Vs. XXXI), giving details of the month, day, etc. but not of the year.

In the letter 'B' Lancelot Wilkinson in a similar strain pays (B Vs. I-II) his humble homage to the well-known Pandit Shri Rāmachandra, After intimating his

(Vs. III) welfare in Sihoor nagar, he expresses his joy on reciving the Pandit's letter. He congratulates (Verse IV) the Pandit for meeting successfully his charges of पुनरुक्तिदोष made in earlier correspondence; he says that he purposely raised the objection to arouse the Pandit to indulge in poetic fancy, as one blows out breath over the fire only to make it to emit more flames. About the condition of study in Sihoor, the Saheb says that (Vs. VII) it was the same as seen by him before. About his eye-trouble, he says that (Vs. VII) his eye-trouble was chronic and that it was better at the time of writing the letter. He also refers to the rusticity of the locality and to the sparse population in that region. But, he adds, (Vs. VIII) there is nothing impossible in the world and hopes that, like the marks caused by the rubbing of a rope on the well-stone, improvement can be effected in the knowledge of the local people. In the end, he refers (Vs. IX) to the poetic excellence of the Pandit's letter and expresses his inability to fully comprehend it. After the subsequent three Verses (X-XII) by a scribe, also named Ramachandra, the letter comes to a close with इत्यलमतिपल्लवितेन, followed by the signature in initials "L. W." with words P. A. (Political Agent, or Personal Assistant) written below the initials. In the tenth Verse of the letter, it is stated that under the command of the great master, i.e. Lancelot Wilkinson, the preceding nine Verses have been composed in honour of Pandit Ramachandra. Thus it becomes clear that Wilkinson Saheb got these Verses composed as his reply to Pandit Ramachandra's letter, 'A'

As compared to Pandit Ramachandra's letter, Wilkinson's letter is rather formal, less ornate, to the

point and is comparatively free from hyperbole and exaggarations. So there is no doubt that the ideas are his own and that they were put into Sanskrit by another Pandit. As Wilkinson himself was a तीक्ष्णमति student of Sanskrit and a great patron of Pandit, not only the ideas but also expressions and phrases may have originated from him. The similes (Vs. V & VIII) यथा फूत्कृतेनाग्निरुद्दीप्यमानः and कूपविनिबद्धदृषत्सुरेखाः are obviously his own.

The language of these two letters and the homely subject matter found in these letters clearly show the Panditic traidition of correspondence is Sanskrit. That an Englishman scrupulously followed the current tradition is an ample proof, if it were needed, of the current practice of those days to employ Sanskrit as a medium of correspondence.

The Sanskrit of the letters is direct, forceful and of practical nature. There is a flow and an air of popular language in the letters, though it cannot be denied that the very idea that the letters were written in Verses and long compounds were not avoided, show the artificiality of the style. Sometimes, the expressions are uncouth, and complicated. Metrical defects are not absent (e,g, खलु प्राग in B-VI). Pandit Ramachandra and the scribe Ramachandra, both are not free from spelling mistakes (e.g, श्रुणोतु (A-VIII), ब्रूम : (A-VIII), कूर्मो (A-XVI), विद्वस्नेह (A-26), शुभेशु (A-26), पश्यंतु (B-8), विनिवत्ध (B-8), आपीतरे (B-9)

But despite these blemishes, there is a literary ornateness. The varieties of metres is striking, and there are as many as eleven varieies of metres in only twelve

verses of the Englishman's letter, 'B'. The popular metres of Sanskrit poetry, like शार्दूल-विक्रीडित, आर्या, हरिणी, इन्द्रवज्रा, भुजंगप्रयात, स्रग्धरा, वसन्ततिलका, मालिनी, प्रहर्षिणी, ताण्डवछन्द etc. all figure there in the English-man's letter, 'B'. This fact alone will show the *great* literary flourish in these letters. It may also be noted that these two letters were not the only letters between the Englishman and the Indian Pandit, as can be easily inferred from the statements in the letter 'A'.

A

विद्राणैव गुणज्ञता समुदितो भूयानसूराभरः
कालोयं कलिराजगाम जगतीलावण्यकुक्षिभरिः ।
इत्थं भावनया मदीय कविते मौनं किमालम्बसे
जागर्तु क्षितिमण्डलोपरि महान् विल्किन्सनाख्यो नृपः ॥

स्वस्तिश्रीलसितेषु तीक्ष्णमतिषु क्ष्मापालभालस्थल-
प्रत्यक्षोन्नतभूषणेषु विदुषां जीवातुभूतेषु च ।
बालाज्ञानतमस्त्रिमूर्तिषु तथा भूते(षु) प्रसूतेष्वपि
सद्योद्यत्करुणाकरेषु सततं तथ्यार्थसंवादिषु ॥१॥

यैः स्वप्रोद्दामधाम्ना निजमतिविभवैर्द्राक् प्रयत्नान् सुरत्नान्
कृत्वा दत्वा बुधेभ्यो गुणगणतरवो रोपिताः पोषिताश्च ।
तेषु क्ष्मारक्षकेषु प्रणयिजनमनः कल्पनाकल्पकेषु
विल्किन्सन्साहिबेषु प्रगुणगुणगणानन्दकोद्यद्यशस्सु ॥२॥

श्री रामचन्द्राभिधपण्डितेन भवत्कृपामौक्तिकमण्डितेन ।
अनेककोटिप्रमिता इतः कृता भवत्सु राजन्तुतरां सदाशिषः ॥२॥

इहातिकुशलं प्रभो निरवधि त्वदीयं हित—
न्ममास्ति समपेक्षितं रचयतात् तथा शंकरः ।
भवद्भिरतिसुन्दरी बुधमनोरुचेस्तोषिणी
कृपाभरविबोधिनी स्वशुभपत्रिका प्रेषिता ॥३॥

तया धनसमानया मम मनोमयूरः क्षणात्
प्रतिक्षणविलक्षणं विविधलक्षणं नर्तितः ।
भवत्सुभगवृत्तकं जनगुणर्द्धिसञ्चिन्तकं
निवेद्य खलु साधितोप्यनुभवः सुधाया मम ॥४॥

यत्पूर्वपत्रे भवता व्यलेखि मदीयपद्ये पुनरुक्तिदोषः ।
ज्ञेयो न सोस्मन्मतसम्मतो यतो न्यायैरनेकैर्भवतीह वारणम् ॥५।

निबध्यते ग्रन्थिरनेकवारमेकैव लोकैर्दृढताप्तये यतः ।
तेनैव पद्येन तदेव देव मयाप्यतः प्रार्थितमस्ति पत्रे ॥६॥

यद्वा युवत्यन्तरं त्वं शृणु नृप भवता साधितः स्वान्तसंस्थो
भावः सर्वोप्यतो मे तदितरमधुना प्रार्थितुं नास्ति किंचित् ।
इत्येतद्ज्ञापितु तल्लिखितुमपि पुनः पत्रिकायामलेखि
प्राज्ञैश्चित्ते विचार्यं सदसदिदमिति प्रायशो दर्शिता दिक् ॥७॥

अतो न वाच्यः पुनरुक्तिदोषः सन्तोषकस्वीयगुणैर्जनानाम् ।
अयि प्रभो स्वीयनृपस्य वृत्तं ब्रूमः श्रु (?) णोतु प्रथमं भवान् तत् ॥८॥
अनेककार्याकुलचित्तवृत्तेः श्री मेखलोटाख्यनृपालमौलेः ।
संजायते नो बहुशोऽवकाशो यथावकशं पठतीह नित्यम् ॥९॥

अतीवमतितीक्ष्णताभरबलान्मदीयो नृप–
स्तथापि सुरवाक्यदेविविधमर्मवेत्ताभवत् ।
अनेकजनुभिः कृतं सततधर्म सत्कर्म यत्
तदीयफलभागसाविति न माननीयः स्मयः ॥१०॥

गीर्वाणी श्रेणिगर्भस्थितमिदमखिलं कर्तृकर्मादि किञ्चित्
किञ्चित् ज्ञात्वा मदीये मनसि घनतरानन्दकन्दं विधाय ।
सम्यग्ग्रम्यः सुगम्यः संततजनहित श्रावकः संप्रतीत्थं
ग्रन्थोनेनाधिपेन प्रथममतिमुदा पठ्यते बोध्यमेतत् ॥११॥

मदीयराज्ञः खलु धर्मकर्म किन्न श्रुतं ख्यातमपीह लोके ।
यदेकविप्रोऽर्भक पाठनेऽत्र नियोजितो योजितपाठनक्रमः ॥१२॥

यवननगरकल्पेऽनल्पलोको द्विजानामिह न पठति विद्यां चेतसीत्थं विचिन्त्य ।
यवनजनवरीणः स्वीयशास्त्रे धुरीणः सुजनशिशुगणानां पाठकः सोप्यकारि ॥१३॥

तथैव रेवातटमण्डलांकिते सदैव सत्पण्डितमण्डलीयुते ।
श्रीमण्डलाख्ये नगरेपि योजितः सत्पाठको मैथिलवासुदेवः ॥१४॥

तेषां शिक्षाप्रकारः किमपि नहि मया मन्तृपेणापि सम्यग्-
ज्ञातः शश्वद्यतस्ते निजगृह निवसद्बालकान्पाठयन्ति ।
शिक्षाशालां विशालां विरचयितुमतश्चिन्त्यते साहिबेन
स्याच्चेदत्राप्यवश्यं गुण गणरसिकाः संभविष्यन्ति लोकाः ॥१५॥

यच्चोक्तं भवता कियत् शिशुजनाः संपाठिता यत्पुन—
स्तत्रास्ति द्विजमण्डली गुणगणाभ्यासस्य चैतत्फलम् ॥

तत्प्रोक्तं सकलं सदेव भवता कुर्मो वयं किं यतो
नास्ति ब्राह्मणमण्डली किमुत हो लोका वनस्था इह ॥१६॥

अतश्च कालेन बलेन साध्या अनेकविद्याविविधा बुधाश्च ।
भवादृशा यत्र गुणप्रयोजकाः किन्तत्र यत्नेन ममास्त्यसाध्यम् ॥१७॥

अस्माभिस्तु निजं वृत्तं लिखितं निखिलं नृप ।
परन्त्वग्रिमपत्रे तु भवद्भिरपि लिख्यताम् ॥१८॥

भवत्पाठशाला अशेषबालाः कियन्तः स्वविद्यालोकसंतोषयन्तः ।
कियद्भिः कथं किं पठ्यते सर्वमेतद्भवन्तो लिखन्तु स्वान्तमानन्दयन्तु ॥१९॥

ये ग्रन्थाः शिशुपाठने ऽतिसरलाः स्वल्पास्त्वनल्पार्थका
येषामध्ययने भवन्ति विविधज्ञानानुमानान्विताः ।
स्युश्चेते तव सन्निधौ गुणनिधे संप्रेषणीया यतोऽ-
नल्पस्वान्तकृपाव्ययं प्रणयतः कृत्वैव तोष्या वयम् ॥२०॥

परन्तु राजन् भवदीयचक्षुषोः श्रुतो विकारः श्रमसंभवो मया ।
अतश्च मे चित्तमतीव दुःखितं सत्कर्मकर्तुः कथमेवमापदः ॥२१॥

भवतु मे ललितावविताभिता नृपधियेति मयेह न कल्पितम् ।
किमपि वृत्तमिदं स्वकपोलतः प्रकृतिसुन्दरमेव हि सुन्दरम् ॥२२॥

एतन्नगरकल्पस्थमित्थं वृत्तं यथामति ।
निवेदितं पुरस्तेद्य किं सुज्ञेषु विशेषतः ॥२३॥

चमत्काररसास्वादमोदसंमोदिता बुधाः ।
आनन्दं न च विन्दन्ति विना ऽलंकृत सद्वचः ॥२४॥

युक्त एवास्ति मार्गोयं दाक्षिण्यं वर्धते यतः ।
अतोऽन्यद्वक्तुमिच्छामि यत्र सन्ततविस्मयः ॥२५॥

विद्वत्स्नेहनिधे गुणोदधिसुधास्वादैकसंमोदित-
स्वान्तानन्तशुभं शुभेशु कलितं वृत्तं मया यत् श्रुतम् ।
अत्युक्तौ यदि न प्रकुप्यसि मृषावादं न चेन्मन्यसे
तत्ब्रूमोद्भुतवस्तु वृत्तकथने व्यग्राः कवीनां गिरः ॥२६॥

भ्रान्त्वा भूवलयं गुणीश्वरवर त्वत्कीर्तिहंसी गता
व्योम्नि ब्रह्ममरालसंगमवशात् सा तत्र गुर्विण्यभूत् ।
पश्य स्वर्गतरंगिणी परिसरे तद्वर्णसालक्षितं
सात्रासूत नवीनमण्डकमिदं शीतद्युतेर्मण्डलम् ॥२७॥

सदोदितकृपानिधे प्रथितकीर्तिपूर्णार्णवे
विवेकवचनोदधे श्रुणु मदीयमेकं वचः ।
भवद्गुणगणाश्रियः कणमपि प्रवक्तुं प्रभुः
कृतो न विधिनास्मि तत् प्रणयपुंजतः पूर्यताम् ॥२८॥

अलमस्त्वतिविस्तारः सुज्ञेषु वचसां मम ।
लाघवेनैव मोदन्ते पंडितास्तर्कमंडिताः ॥२९॥

इत्थमेवेह संप्रेक्ष्य पत्रं रत्नसमं भवान् ।
संतोषयतु मत्स्वान्तं क्लांतं कांत्या यथा विधुः ॥३०॥

आषाढे मलिने मासे कृष्णपक्षे अष्टमी तिथौ ।
रामचन्द्रो लिखत्प्राज्ञः श्लोकमौक्तिकमालिकाम् ।
इत्याशीराशयः शुभम् ।

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श्रीमद्वेदतदंगतर्ककविताहित्यशृंगारसन्मीमांसाद्वयनीतिनिर्णयपुराणादिश्रुतैः—
विश्रुतैः ।

आचारैरपि मण्डितेषु विमलैः श्रीरामन्द्राख्ययाख्यातख्यातिषु पंडितेषु परमानन्दानु-
संधायिषु ॥१॥

लान्सीलट् विल्किन्सन्साहबबहादुरेण संरचिताः ।
नतिततयः शतमितयः सततं विलसन्तु सन्तु तत्प्रीत्यै ॥२॥

शहूरनगरे वरे कुशलमत्र तत्रत्यकं सदा भवदनामयं विलिखितव्यमस्मन्मुदे ।
भवद्भिरधुनाऽमला विततपत्रिका प्रेषिता तदीक्षणसमक्षणं क्षण इतः सुहृल्लक्षणः।

आम्रेडितश्लोकनिविष्टदोषसंवारणं साधुकृतं भवद्भिः ।
इत्थं भवद्वाग्लहरी विनोदं द्रष्टुं किलास्माभिरधायि दोषः ॥४॥

यथा फूत्कृतेनाग्निरुद्दीप्यमानः स्फुरत्येवमाक्षिप्यमाणा महान्तः ।
रसावेशतो वीरशृंगारपूर्णा चमत्कारयुक्तां गिरन्ते गिरन्ते ॥५॥

इति भावनया लिखितं खलु प्रागितरत्सहसा न हि चिन्त्यमहो ।
विदितं सकलं यदलेखि भवत्प्रभुणा पठितं कृतकृत्यमपि ॥६॥

अत्रत्या पाठशाला सशिशुगुरुयुता यद्भवद्दृष्टपूर्वा
तद्वृत्तं किं विलेख्यं विदितमपि पुनर्लेखने को विशेषः ।
अस्मन्नेत्रव्यथा त्वव्यवसितमतिवत् सर्वदानैकरूपा
तस्मान्निश्चेतुमर्हा नहि परमधुना किंचिदारोग्यमस्ति ॥७॥

अत्रास्त्यरण्यजनता धनताविहीना तेनाशु किं पठितुमर्हति साधुविद्यां ।
इत्यद्भुतं हि विदुषां किमसाध्यमत्र पश्यंतु कूपविनिबद्धदृषत्सुरेखाः ॥८॥

अनल्पकल्पपादपप्रवालकोमलामला सरस्वती विराजते स्म रामचन्द्रशास्त्रिणां ।
विलोक्य तामुताकुला भवंति चंडपंडिता आपीतरेऽस्मदादयः प्रबोद्धुमीशते कथं ॥९॥

॥ अथ प्रम्वाश्रितरामचंद्रो वदति ॥

इतिविविधविचित्रवृत्तरत्नैर्नवभिरियं ग्रथिता मयाद्य माला ।
प्रभुवरविहिताज्ञया मनोज्ञा विलसतु पंडितरामचंद्रकंठे ॥१०॥
वत्सरे नागभूताश्वभूसंमिते शोभनाषाढके कृष्णपक्षे तिथौ ।
अर्कनाथे बुधे वासरे पत्रिकां रामचंद्रो ऽलिखत् सत्पदामत्रिकां ॥११॥

तत्पत्रसमवृत्तं यद्यत्र नास्ति तथाऽपि ते ।
लाघवेनैव तुष्यंतु शास्त्रिणः सुवचोस्त्रिणः ॥१२॥

इत्यलमतिपल्लवितेनेति नतिः ॥

HINDUS AND TURKS : INDIA—CENTRAL ASIA CONTACTS FROM PRE-HISTORIC TIMES (INDO-EUROPEANS AND ALTAICS)

SUNITI KUMAR CHATTERJI

Literature and Art among the Altaic People

Various points of contact between the Altaic and the Indo-European peoples in their original home-lands, respectively in the Eastern and Western sections of the Eurasian steppes, may come out through closer scrutiuy by competent–specialists, in both linguistics and archaeology and pre-history and culture. We may however be justified in assessing that the Hindu, at least in one of his original component elements (namely the Aryan or Indo-European), was face to face with the Altaic Turk long before either of them came to India and the lands of the Middle East, some four thousand years ago ; and that this contact was that of peaceful interchange of objects, ideas and practices of these primitive peoples living as close neighbours within the same or a similar geographical and economic milieu.

The few planks of a common cultural platform such as can be reasonably surmised to have existed among the Altai people and the primitive Indo-Europeans, say about 3000 B. C., were later on strengthened and reinforced by a closer and more intimate contact in the steppes of Central Asia and South Russia with one branch of the Indo-Europeans, the Aryans or Indo-Iranians. These latter, after having passed down from the original Indo-European homeland in the steppes to the south of the

Ural Mountains through the Caucasus Mountains to Northern Mesopotamia and Iran, became transformed into the Iranians of history by 1000 B.C. A rather backward section of these Iranians, known to their brother-Aryans in Iran as *Sakas* (and as *Śakas* in India) and to their Greek cousins as *Skuthoi* (or *Scythians*, which Greek word has been modified in English as *Scyth* and in Russian as *Skif*) appear either to have stayed on or to have come back as a back-wash to their original homeland in the steppes of Southern Russia beyond the Caucasus Mountains and to the steppes of Central Asia by the Caspian and Aral Seas to the north of the Amu and Syr (Oxus and Jaxartes) rivers. This wide tract of land came to be known to the Greeks as *Scythia*, the land of the *Skuthoi* or *Sakas*. And here these scions of the Indo-Europeans, back in their homeland more or less under the ancient conditions, built up a distinctive culture of their own which was Iranian as its basis, but very deeply modified by the art and culture of the Greeks who would come to these regions of the North for purposes of trade. The Scyths also became susceptible to a deeper influence from their Altaic neighbours in the East and the North, and they took up with zest certain art-forms in metal, wood and bone, with animal figures–horses, reindeer and other kinds of deer, tigers and panthers, which developed among the Altaics, as decorations for objects of personal use like belt-buckles, combs, weapons and clothes and trappings. Here the Altai peoples were largely under the influence of Shang and Chou and Early Han China, with whom the ancestors of the Altaic peoples–the Turks and Mongols–came to be in hostile contact, as nomadic raiders and plunderers constantly attacking a settled Chinese agricultural population which was quite early

well-established in the Hwang–Ho Valley. This apparently started from round about 1000 B.C. By the time that the great Achaemenian Empire of the Persians (Iranians) was established in the Middle East and became a force in World Civilisation of the day, roughly by 550 B.C., the Scythian Iranians had established their composite culture, which may be properly labelled as 'Altai- Indo-European' in the steppes of Scythia and the Valley of the Oxus and Jaxartes in Central Asia and further north in South-Western Siberia.

We have thus in the Central Asian and South Russian civilisation of the Scyths, with their Altaic neighours beside them as clients or underlings, another and perhaps the final period of Altaic and Indo-European–or Turk and Aryan–cultural contact and miscegenation as a significant fact in the history of the development of civilisation in Asia. The Altaic peoples did not develop any high art themselves, whether plastic or literary, in ancient times. Excepting perhaps the animal figures in a conventionalised manner, in bronze mostly, they have to show nothing of an arresting quality which goes back to the beginning of the Christian era. Iranian (Scythian) co-operation was of great importance for this. Their bronze plaques and gold belt–buckles, however, are very distinctive, and they show Altaic–Scythian art of a very fine type, going back to the 7th-6th century B.C. (See figures 19 and 20, p.31 in Tamara Talbot Rice's *Ancient Arts of Central Asia,* Thames and Hudson, London 1965. See also the whole series of beautiful colour reproductions of specimens of this nomadic Iranian-Saka-Sarmatian- and Altaic art in E. D. Phillips's *The Royal Hordes : Nomad Peoples of the Steppes* : Library of Early Civilisation : London, Thames and Hudson, 1965). Other similar

animal figures in textile and wood are from the remains at Pazyryk in Siberia, done by Altaian craftsmen in the Scythian tradition in the 5th century B.C. (See figures 21,22,23,24, pp. 32, 33 of the above work. See also the work by E.D. Phillips). There are scores of these ancient bronze plaques with animal figures which we find illusttrated in works on the art and culture of the Scythians.

We do not have any ancient literary remains in any of the old Altaic languages before 500 A. D. Doubtless there was a tradition of epic or romantic story telling which was current among the ancestors of the Turks and Mongols, prior to what we find in the Old Turki Orkhon Inscriptions in Runic characters of the first half of the 8th century A. D., and in an epic tale like that of *Oguz-Name* in Early Middle Turki of about the 11th century A. D. (?), as well as in the basic, historic and romantic ballads which form the background of the oldest Mongol work, the 'Secret History of the Mongols' (*Mongol-un Nigucha Tobchiyan*, c. 1240 A. D.), in the Old Mongol ballads like *Hoyor Zagal* or 'The Two Horses, (of Chinggiz Khan, 1155-1227, and in the Kalmyk Mongol *Epic of Jangar*, 15th century. But fortunately from Siberia we have several gold belt-buckless dating round about the birth of Christ (1st century B. C. — 1st century A. D.) which appear to have been the work of Altaic craftsmen, probably Turki-speaking, and earlier still (about 3rd century to 1st century B. C.) we have some bronze plaques from the Ordos region. In these precious artifacts we seem to see the oldest Altaic plastic depiction of some of their old romantic tales which evidently passed by word of mouth. These evoke scenes and situations from the life of the nomad Altaic horsemen of Siberia and Central

Asia in their ancient heroic age, their epic life of fighting and romance and hunting, late echoes of which we find in Old Turki and Old Mongol literature (respectively of the 8th-11th and 13th-14th centuries). In one of the gold belt-buckles, we have the figure of "a rider who has leapt from his horse to seek safety in a tree from a wild boar, whilst a second rider pursues the beast," and another gold belt-buckle, in one of its halves, "shows a warrior sleeping under a tree with his head resting on a woman's lap ; his *gorytus* (bow-case and quiver) hangs from the tree, and an attendant holds the couple's horses." All the figures in this particular buckle have typical Mongoloid features. Another gold buckle from Siberia shows a wolf fighting a serpent (see figures 105, 106 and 107, pp. 96, 97, in E. D. Phillips's work, and figures 27, 28 and 29, pp. 36-37, in Tamara Talbot Rice's book noted above). Of the bronze plaques (figures 32 and 33 in Tamara Talbot Rice's book), one illustrates the story of a hand-to-hand wrestling fight between two warriors who have got down from their mounts to settle by wrestling, and the other shows the two horses of the opposing warriors carrying on the fight among themselves.

A great artistic and cultural value in appraising the romance of old Altaic life is thus attached to these remarkable artifacts from Central Asia of 2000 years ago.

China and the Altaic people : and Indio-Aryan and Altaic (Hindu and Turki) Cultural Contacts in Central Asia through Buddhism from the first half of the first Millennium A. D.

The primitive Altaic peoples—the early Turks and Mongols—were thus going along the line of their cultural

development as a nomadic steppe people with their flocks of sheep and herds of horses and camels and cattle. There was, as said before, a good likelihood of their coming into contact with their Western neighbours the Primitive Indo-Europeans. But they had closer connexions from the beginning with their immediate Eastern neighbours, the Chinese. The beginnings of the great civilisation of China go back to some 2000 years before Christ, and Chinese tradition takes the first dynasty of kings ruling a settled and civilised country to 1800 B.C. (the Shang Dynasty, from 1766 or 1583 to 1128 B. C.), and before it to the mythological Hia (Hsia) dynasty which goes back to 2000 B.C. This civilisation was quite in contrast to that of the nomads, being based on agriculture (cultivation of rice and millets and wheat) and stock–raising (pigs, horses, cattle and sheep), with some important crafts like growing and weaving cotton and rearing silk-worms and preparing silk cloth, as well as bronze-casting and working in jade and other stones. They developed a pattern of civilised life with a well-organised economy and a stable system of administration, as well as war-fare with regular armies of infantry, horsemen and charioteers. Soon after the establishment of this civilisation of China on the material plane, the Chinese started, after 2000 B.C. that unique expression of their culture–the Chinese script, consisting of pictograms and ideograms and then of phonographs, with all sorts of combinations of these 'characters' to meet the needs of a growing vocabulary in speech and writing of a highly sensitive language. The script started with the primitive picture-characters which used at first to be scratched with an iron stylus on bone and tortoise-shell, and then would be engraved on bronze vessels, and latterly would be incised with the

stylus upon bamboo-slips ; and this gave the first Chinese books consisting of bundles of incised bamboo-slips with the writing moving from top to bottom, by 1000 B.C. Later on these bamboo-slip books were supplanted by sheets of silk cloth with the characters painted on them with brush and ink, at the turn of the Christian era, and then finally by paper and brush and ink.

This civilisation, with the good and luxurious and even opulent living it presented with its stores of grain and various kinds of meat and raiment in silk, flax and cotton, with its houses and palaces and forts, its furniture in wood and utensils in bronze, and its gorgeous ceremonial in religion and in state, fascinated and captivated the simple Altaic nomad from the bleak steppes and mountains of the North-West. And the latter, the nomads who were the ancestors of the Turks and Mongols and Manchus and other tribes, started, simultaneously with the establishment of this civilisation, the habit of raiding the settled Chinese builders of it to despoil them of their goods, and even, if occasion presented itself, to rule over them as their masters. The Chinese naturally gave resistance, and they tried all means to keep off the nomads and force them to live in their own territories, by force and by conciliatory policy if force failed, and finally by seeking to wall-off their home-land from these marauders by building as a great measure of defensive military engineering the great China Wall under the Han Emperors from the 3rd century B.C. But the nomad Altaics could not be shaken off, or restricted in their movements, and they continued to be a thorn on the side of China for over two millennia. Frequently enough, they forced themselves as conquerors and rulers over China, and gave rise to a series of ruling houses of nomad

origin in China from the early centuries of the Christian era onwards. These nomad conquerors and masters of China easily yielded to the superior civilisation of China and became themselves merged into the Chinese, losing their separate identity in language and ways of life; and the fact of their belonging to the same Mongolian race as their Chinese subjects, made their assimilation and absorption a matter of course.

We have thus the first international adventuring of of the Altaic Turko-Mongol peoples in the East among the Chinese some 3000 years ago. Century after century the Altaics were pressing upon the Chinese from the North, and were giving them a succession of *Herrenvolk* or ruling houses and ruling clans, about whom we have records in Chinese documents from the closing centuries of the first millennium B.C. like the Huns (=Chinese Hiong-nu) of Turk tribe and speech, the **Tab-gac* (=in Modern Chinese *To-pa*), the **Turk-ut* (=in Modern Chinese *Tu-kiu*—a name taken from the Mongols, showing the Mongol plural affix *-ut* added to the Turki national name *Türk*), the *Zhwan-zhwan* (or *Jouan-Jouan*—a Mongol tribe), then the Mongols (giving to China the Yuan or Mongol dynasty of emperors ruling from 1270 to 1368 A.D.), and finally the *Manchus* (also of Altaic origin, though never so important numerically and and culturally as the Turks and the Mongols, from 1644 to 1912—the Ching Dynasty of emperors in China—the Manchus became entirely Chinese in speech and culture. but sought to keep up a study of their language if only for religious purposes).

The Turks and their immediate brothers the

Mongols* have moved a great deal from their original homes. The oldest homeland of the Mongols was along the eastern valley of the Amur River, to the east of Lake Baikal, at first rather a restricted area of territory. The Turkish Altaics, unquestionably much more advanced and better organised, were in possession of a vaster terrain. The whole of what is now a land of the Mongols—the Republic of (Outer) Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia which is now under Chinese control—particularly the valley of the Orkhon River and the extensive country to the West and South of Mongolia, including present-day West Siberia, Chinese Turkistan (Sin-kiang) and the Turki-speaking Soviet States of Kazakhistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kirgizistan,—formed the vast homeland of the Turki Altaics. Of course in the West, in the valleys of Oxus and Jaxartes—Amu Darya and Syr Darya — side by side with the Turks lived the Indo-European or Aryan Scythians, and in the Tarim Valley in Sin-kiang and in Kan-su lived the Kuchians and Qarasharians (Tokharians, or Yue-chi), before these Indo-Europeans were finally absorbed by the Turks and lost their speech by 1000 A. D.

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*N. Poppé has proposed the following relationship among the Altaic speeches (*Word*, April 1950, p. 96) :



The first millennium A. D. was a period of ferment among the peoples of Asia to to the North of the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush. In South Siberia, in Mongolia, in Manchuria, in North China, in Central Asia to the West of China, in Tibet, were living and moving about, in hostile as well as friendly contact with each other, the two great branches of the Altaic people–the Turks and the Mongols, who appear to have differentiated themselves from each other over 2000 years ago, and the third branch of the Altaics, the Tungus and Manchus, were already there, not yet prominent culturally and politically. The nomadic Turko-Mongols had started their conflict with the sedentary Chinese some centuries earlier, with varying fortunes–some times with victory through military power and weight of numbers, but mostly it was in the long run a cultural submission to and gradual assimilation with China when they settled down among the highly civilised Chinese people. Strong Chinese influence also reached them all through the centuries. As said before, apart from the Primitive Indo-Europeans living mostly in the South Russian steppes to the North of the Caucasus Mountains and the Black Sea, who were the oldest neighbours of the Altaics to their West, two other and later groups of Indo-Europeans came and settled in Central Asia and North–West China as well as South-Western Siberia. They were the various tribes of the Saka or Scythian people forming the northern section of the Iranian sub-branch of the Aryan or Indo-Iranian branch of the Primitive Indo-Europeans, who appear to have left the origional Indo-European homeland before 2000 B. C. and traversing the Caucasus Mountains spread thmselves by 1500 B. C. in Northern Mesopo-

tamia, and then by 1000 B. C. into Iran, and possibly a few centuries earlier into India. The northern section of the Iranians, the Sakas, as a sort of a recial back-wash, found themselves once again in the northlands (as compared with their brother Aryans–Iranians and Indians–in the South), in Central Asia in the valleys of the Oxus and the Jaxartes and even as high up as the upper Yenisei Valley, and in Russia to the North of the Black Sea. This was before 600 B. C., and the Scythains later came under profound Greek influence in the West in the 5th century B. C. and later. These Sakas, as said before, built up with elements from the native art of the Altaics (with influences these Altaics derived from their South-Eastern neighbours the Chinese) the remarkable style of animal paintings in leather and textile. A great artistic school or tradition was created in South Russia, Siberia, Central Asia which was the joint creation of the Indo-European Scythians and the Mongoloid Altaics. This art passed in later centuries through the Slavs and Balts and Germans to the Celts in the West, reaching as far West and North as Ireland and Scandinavia. During the early centuries after Christ, the Sakas and their other Iranian relatives came in close touch with the Altaics (Turks) who were establishing themselses more securely in Central Asia within both present-day Soviet and Chinese territory. History and Civilisation in this tract was the joint creation of Turk and Iranian living side by side, and in the evolution of this civilisation China and India both took a considerable part for a thousand years.

It would appear that another section of the Indo-Europeans from the West found their home, when, it is not possible to know, in Central Asia, in Chinese

Turkistan (Sin-Kiang) to the North of the Tarim River, extending as far East as the fertile valleys of the present-day Chinese province of Kan-su. These Indo-Europeans in their language had points of agreement with the *Centum-speaking* Western Indo-Europeans—the Hellenes, the Celts and the Italians, as well as the Germans—and not with their nearest kinsmen and neighbours the Iranians (Scythians or Sakas, Soghdians and others) who are members of the *Satem-speaking* division of the Indo-Europeans. These Central Asian Indo-Europeans are known, as said before under various names, like *Tuṣāra* or *Tukhāra*, like *Ṛṣīka* as in Sanskrit, like *Yue-chi* as in Chinese (which is the Modern Chinese pronunciation of what was in old Chinese **Nguet* (or *Nguer*)-*shik*, which looks like a Chinese modification of the name *Ṛṣīka*, and **Nguer-shik* gave a Chinese phrase meaning "the Family or Dynasty of the Moon", a sort of a *Candra-vaṁśa*)). Another tribe allied to these *Yue-chi* was named by the Chinese as *Wu-sun*. One of the chief centres or towns of the *Yue-chi* or *Ṛṣīka* or *Tukhāra* people was Kuca. This was evidently originally the name of a tribe, if not of the most important tribe of the *Yue-chi*. *Kuca* had a variant *Kuśa*, and a mysterious *Kuśa* people are found in the Near East and in India. There is the form *Kuṣāṇa* (for *Kuśāna*) meaning belong to *Kuṣa* or *Kuśa* = Kuca (a genetive plural form of *Kuśa* or *Kuca*) which became a tribal name. Later on when the *Yue-chi* or the Tokharians passed into Turkestan under pressure of the *Hūṇas* (the *Hiong-nu*), and were settled there, they got mixed with the earlier Sakas or Scythians who were living there, and then under further pressure from the Altaic Huns or Turks, they went further to the South and formed a great state comprisng Eastern Iran,

Afghanistan and North-Western India, which was the Kushan Empire. They were living peacefully in their own areas in Central Asia before they came in connexion with the Turki Altaics.

The home of the Mongol section of the Altaics was in the northern bend, like a hump, of the Kerulen-Argun-Amur River just to the East of Lake Baikal in South-Eastern Siberia, to the North of the Khinyan-Range in Chinese Inner Mongolia and Manchuria (North of the city of Tsitsihar—bound in the West by the tributaries of the Amur like the Shilka, the Kerulen, the Argun, the Onon and in the East by the Nun and the Sungari). In later centuries the Mongols expanded, and their tribes like the Khalkhas, the Buriats, the Kalmyks, and others, spread over a vast area from Manchuria in the East to the Volga river and the Russian steppes ; and in this expansion, they had naturally absorbed and Mongolised a number of small allied tribes.

The Turki branch came into prominence first, during practically the whole of the 1st millennium A. D.; and the early centuries of the 2nd millennium A. D. saw the great days of the Mongols, the Turks continuing their expansion even after the Mongols. The thousand years, from 500 to 1500 A. D., was roughly the period for Altaic expansion and conquest, and the Turks and Mongols changed the face of Asia as a puissant people who formed the *Herrenvolk* for centuries among other civilised peoples, like the Chinese on the one hand and the Iranians, Indians, Greeks and Arabs, besides Slavs and some Latins, on the other. The Altaics

in this way formed noteworthy rivals of the Indo-Europeans, whose great period of expansion however started much earlier, roughly from 2500 B. C. and continued down to the 19th century A. D., when they brought practically the entire world under their political or economic and cultural domination, and went a long way in welding the entire mass of humanity in Europe and Asia, Africa and the two Americas, and Australasia into a single cultural mould in material civilisation as well as in a common intellectual life.

The first Altaic people to leave their mark on civilised lands of Asia and Europe were the Huns, from what is now Mongolia, and the Turkic tribes are their descendants. They were known first to the Chinese as the **Xiwong-Nuo*, which in a simplified form became **Khyun-nu* and **Hiun-nu* or *Hun-nu, and these old forms are the sources of the Greek and Latin forms like *Chunos*, *Funos*, *Unnos* and *Hunnus* (Latin plural *Hunni*) and a Sanskrit form like *Hūṇa*. We do not know the meaning of the name. The movements and fortunes of this Turki-speaking Altaics forms a complicated story, and this has been narrated in works, like René Grousset's *Histoira de l'Extreme-Orient* in 2 volumes (Paris, Paul Geuthner, 1929) and *Empire des Steppes* (Paris, Payot, 1939) ; and a good résumé from the Indian point of view will be found in Prabodh Chandra Bagchi's *India and Central Asia* (Calcutta, Jadavpur University, 1955). The Turks built a succession of noteworthy empires and states, and the Hunnic tribes went out to the West under Attila (died 404 A. D.) and became a conquering and destroying force in the Roman empire. They ruled over Northern China under their **Tab-gac*, or ** Tab-ghac*

or *Toba or Topa* (*Wei* dynasty) rulers during the 5th-6th centuries A. D. Their king Kultegin established a strong kingdom after ridding themselves from Chinese control during the 1st half of the 8th century A. D., and Kultegin left a number of stone stelae with inscriptions in Old Turki carved in a special alphabet of its own, the Turki Runic alphabet, which in its simplicity and beauty stands worthily beside the Old Phoenecian, Old Greek, Latin, Indo-Brahmi and Germanic Runic scripts. These Orkhon inscriptions of the Turki kings of early 8th century form the oldest specimens of an Altaic tongue, and they give a fine expression to the epic spirit of early Turki history, besides allowing us an insight into the personality of the King who inspired the inscription, as much as the Inscriptions of Rameses the Great, of Cyrus the Great, of Darius, of Asoka, of Rama Gamhaeng of Siam (c.1290) tell us about the character, the aims and ideals of these ancient rulers of men.

The Turks, while creating history for Central Asia and the Far East, came in close touch with diverse peoples ; and through adventuresome merchants, teachers and missionaries from different nations of the time visiting them, they enlarged their mental horizon which was at first circumscribed by their old Shamanistic religion, and took over the teachings and ideals of Buddha, Zoroaster, Christ and Mani, and finally of Muhammad.

The South-Western areas of the original Altaic world, in the valleys of the Amu (Oxus) and Syr (Jaxartes) Rivers, the tract known to Latin writers as *Transoxiana,* now the home of a number of Turki-speaking peoples of the Soviet Union, formed one of the most important

meeting grounds of peoples and cultures during the first millennium A. D. Here lived Iranian (Scythian) and Tokharian Indo-Europeans side by side with Turkish Altaics ; here under the long arm of Achaemenian rule Iranian civilisation found a new home among both settled Iranians and Scythians. Here too the Iranian speech took a number of new dialectal forms among the various tribes which spoke it—Persian proper (as in Soviet Tajikistan of the present day), and then Soghdian, and the Saka or East Iranian speech of the Khotan area ; besides Tokharian ; and Turkish dialects (Uigur or what later became Eastern Turki). Syrian-speaking traders from the Western Asian provinces of the Achaemenian empire, from the Seleucid Greek Empire of Syria, and after Rome had conquered Western Asia, from the empire of Rome (which in distant China during the great days of the empire came to the known as **Fu-rim*, now *Fu-lin*—the Latin name *Roma* was transformed in this way—*Roma*, Greek *Rhōmē*, Syriac**Frūmī *Frūm*, **Fū-rim*, then *Fu-lin*), who were largely Christians, passed through Transoxiana as far as interior China and introduced Nestorian Christianity in Central Asia among some of the Turks and among the Chinese themselves, and left inscriptions in Syriac and Chinese), formed a great link through trade between China and the West. Indian merchants from the Panjab and Sindh were in the habit of visiting places within the empire of the Persians, and they also penetrated into Central Asia and Turkistan (Sin-kiang). Brahmans and Buddhist Monks came in the wake of the Indian merchants—an exiled prince from India as early as the 3rd century B. C. is believed to have founded the city and kingdom of

Kustana or Khotan among the local Iranians, and to have established on sure foundations the Buddhistic religion and Indian culture there. This connexion between India and Central Asia as well as Iran and Western Asia (Iraq etc.) through both Indian merchants from Panjab and Sindh and through Indian mendicants and *sādhus* or Hindu religious men continued down to the 20th century A. D., throughout the medieval period. Then, during Sasanian times came Zoroastrian priests, and also preachers and followers of the composite religion—a mixture of Zoroastranism and Christianity with elements from Buddhism and the old Babylonian religion—founded by the Persian prophet Mani (c. 216-276 A.D). Zoroastrianism was the religion of the Persians in Transoxiana before their conversion to Islam, and the religion of Mani spread among the Iranians and the Tukharas, and from them, it passed on to the Turks also. Thus the Turks found themselves face to face with several religions. First, there was their own national religion, the old Altaic Shamanism centering round the worship of *Kök Tängri* or the *Sky-God* or *Heaven-God*. The religion had individual wizards or priests who were supposed to declare the will of *Tängri*, but no organised priesthood; and a priest who showed that he was ambitious and interfered with the affairs of the state for his own aggrandisement and power was put out of the way by the people to whom he gave offence, as we see from the fate of Kokocu Tab-tangri, son of Chinggiz's father's trusted servant Munlik, the wizard-priest in the Mongol court later on under Chinggiz Khan. The Mongols however believed in the guardian deities (*sulde*) who looked after both individuals and peoples. Chinese

religion had some points in common with Altaic religion, and in some matters both primitive Chinese religion (with its notion of Tao, or the Way, the duality in the universe of Yang and Yin) and pre-Buddhistic Bon religion of the Tibetans may have influenced the Altaic people. Chinggiz had an intelligent man's interest in all religions, Taoism and Buddhism, but he himself had some sort of faith in his ancestral religion, and he wanted to organise it properly. He appointed, as *Baiki* or *Beki* (or Chief priest and Sooth-Sayer of the State, reviving in an old title in a new sense), an old man called Usun, the oldest member of the senior clan of the ruling family.

But the higher philosophy of India through Mahāyāna Buddhism would seem to have influenced the Altaic people most profoundly, along with pageantry of popular Buddhism. The formal acceptance of Buddhism by the highly civilised people of China from the first century A.D., according to Chinese tradition, obtaining this religion from India by way of Transoxiana or Eastern Turkistan, and the enthusiasm of a large section of the intellectual elite of China for Buddhism, gave it a very great impetus throughout the whole of Eastern and Central Asia and among all the various peoples dwelling there. One may mention in this connexion how the Altaic mind and sensibility of the Turkis reacted to the philosophic and aesthetic aspects of Buddhism in creating among the Chinese in North China, under the sponsorship of the nomadic Turki rulers of the Wei or To-ba (*Tabgrac') dynasty, a school of Buddhist religious sculpture in stone and bronze, and specially the grottos and statues at Yun-kang in Northern China, which in its spiritual quality and aesthetic beauty is one of the finest and

most inspiring things in art created by man anywhere on earth.

As a matter of fact, the first millennium B. C. and the first millennium A.D. found the period of greatest glory for the composite Hindu people of India, arising out of the racial and cultural fusion of the Austric (Munda or Kol and Mon-Khmer), Dravidian, Mongoloid and Aryan (Indo-European), which started before 1000 B.C. What India found for herself through the thought and spiritual attainments of her Sages and Saints—her Brahmans and Rishis, her Jinas and Buddhas, her scholars, teachers and masters, Ācāryas, Gurus and Paṇḍitas, passed out of India as a culture drift with her Brahmans and Bhikkhus who followed in the wake of her merchants and adventuring wanderers. The ideals of India—her *Weltanschauung*, her way of thought and way of life, her *Bhārata-dharma* or Indianism, was found acceptable by most peoples, who adopted them and modified or extended them according to their needs and their national genius. A great expansion of Indianism took place in this way, and practically the whole of Asia was brought within the orbit of a common spiritual ideal and quest, which was that of Brahmanical Vedānta and Yoga and of Buddhism (both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, the latter having a close philosophical agreement with the Vedānta). India had completed her culture and had found herself, so to say, for herself and for the service of humanity. And in this process, the first millennium after Christ saw India in her great role as a civilising and humanising force. : "India the Civiliser"—*L'Inde Civilisatrice*, as René Grousset, the great historian of the Culture of Asia has characterised her. India's service or contribu-

tion to humanity was in bringing her own gentleness of spirit, her tolerance, her sense of sacredness of all life and her high seriousness in going to fundamentals of existence. It did not impose any restriction upon the great qualities and achievements of all the various peoples India came in contact within their own lands—the various Iranians, the Tokharians, the Chinese, the Altaic Turks and Mongols and Manchus and others, the Koreans and the Japanese, the peoples of Indo-China (Mons and Khmers, and Pyus, Burmese and Siamese), the Malays, Javanese, Balinese and other Indonesians—all of whom gave new contents and added beauties to the basic things they received from India.

In spite of warfare and racial and tribal dislocations, Buddhism made steady progress, and the philosophy and science as well as the literature, arts and crafts of India brought in a very potent intellectual, artistic and spiritual leaven for all the peoples of Asia from Japan to Eastern Europe and from Siberia to Indonesia. The Altaic Turks got their Buddhism from both the Iranians of Transoxiana and the Tokharians (Yue-chi) of Eastern Turkistan, particularly from the Tokharians, who, like the Sakas of Khotan, were quite advanced in Buddhistic religion and studies in their cities of Aqsu (in Sanskrit Bharuka = Bālukā), of Kuci or Kuca and of Agni (later Qarashahr) on the northern bank of the Tarim River. The Uigur Turks of this area, with their strong admixture with the Indo-European Tokharians, became the most advanced among the Turks. They had already conquered some of their kinsmen who had come to prominence earlier, notably the Turks of the Orkhon Valley, among whom a Turkish national literature for

the first time name into existence in the epic inscription of the Turkish king Kul-tegin, written in the Turkish national Runic script. The Uigurs came to be largely under the influence of the Manichaean religion from Iran, and then again of Nestorian Christianity, and finally Buddhism mainly from their contact with the Tokharians. Their Manichaean religion as well as Buddhism came through the Soghdian Iranians. In their Buddhism, however, they would appear to be first influenced by the Chinese. In later times, they were of course much influenced by Sanskrit, as well as Soghdian. But judging from some common terms of Buddhism in Old Turki, it will be clear that the extent of Chinese Buddhist influence on Old Turki life in Central Asia was quite remarkable. Thus to give a few of these Buddhist terms in Old Turki taken over from the Chinese of the middle of the 1st millennium A.D. :

(1) *Bur-xān* = 'Buddha' (a word which later came to India with the Muslim Turks after 1200 A.D.—as in the name of the city of *Burhān-pur,* where *Burhān* was a Turki personal name which continued as an inheritance from pre-Muslim times), The word *Bur-xan* consists of two elements: T'ang Chinese **But* or **Bur* = 'Buddha' (from Old Chinese modifications of the Indian word *Buddha* as **Bhywat*, **Bhyut*, **Byut* etc., in Modern Chinese *Fu* in Peking, *Fwat* in Canton, and borrowed into Korean as *But*, into Old Japanese as *Butu* (which has become in Modern Japanese *Butsu* or *Buts*), into Old Burmese as *Bhurāḥ*, now pronounced in standard Burmese as *Phayā* and in Diaectal Arakan Burmese as *Pharā*): the Turks added to the Chinese form *Bur* their own word *Xān* = *Khān*, 'King, Prince'; *Bur-Xān* = 'Buddha the King'

:cf. Tibetan *Sangs-rgyal*, now pronounced *Seng-je* = 'Buddha', literally 'Wise King'.

(2) *Wap* = T'ang Chinese, **Wap*, Modern Chinese *Fo* = 'Dharma', 'Law'.

(3) *Saṅ* (*Sang*) = 'Sangha', also taken from Chinese.

(4) *Bursang* (*Bursong*) = Old Chinese **Bhywat-sang* = '*Buddha* and *Sangha*, the Buddhist Sangha'.

(5) *Pusar* = 'Bodhi-sattva', from Old Chinese **Bhuo-sat*, **Puo-sar*, whence Old Japanese *Bosatu*, Modern Japanese *Bosatsu*.

(6) *Baxsi* = 'Teacher, Master', compare Old Chinese **Pak-śi*, Modern *Po-shi* : also suggested as being a Turki modification of the Sanskrit *bhikṣu* = 'monk'.

(7) *Quansiin* = 'Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva', from Chinese *Kuan-shi-yin* or *Kuan-yin*.

(8) *Sawśing*, *Siośing* = 'Hīna-yāna', Chinese *Siao-cheng*.

The Uigurs derived what became their own special system of writing from the Soghdians, and this Soghdian writing for an Iranian language was based upon the Syrian script which Syrian merchants brought to Iran and it became established as a most convenient form of writing in Iran, the Old Persian Cuneiform script making place for it. In Central Asia, among the Altaics, the Syrian-Soghdian-Uigur script became widely current. The Old Turki Runic script was used in inscriptions as in Orkhon and along the Yenisei river in the 7th and 8th centuries and it was used in writing manuscripts also which were of Manichaean inspiration. The Turkish Runic script gradually fell out of use, although a modification of it was current among some Turki tribes who were settled in

Europe, right down to the 15th century. Apart from these two scripts, the Runic and the Uigur, the Turks in Central Asia, particularly those who were in touch with with the Tokharians and the Khotan Sakas, wrote their language also in the Indian Brāhmī script which was brought to them with Buddhism and with Sanskrit. From the 9th century, Uigur Buddhists used Brāhmī not only for studying Sanskrit, like other Central Asian peoples, and the Chinese, Koreans and the Japanese, but they also had a number of Mss. in Brāhmī of translations into Turki of Buddhist texts made mostly from the Tokharian. The Mongols had no script of their own, and Chinggiz Khan (1155-1227), for having a seal made for him, employed a literate Uigur prisoner for writing and cutting a seal for him in a piece of green jade in the Chinese manner, which probably formed the first piece of official or formal Mongol writing. (This seal of Chinggiz, c. 1206, which was in Mongol in Uigur script, ran like this : 'God in Heavens. The Khagan, the Power of God on Earth. The Seal of the Emperor of Mankind'). The art of writing thus came to the other great branch of the Altaics, the Mongols, from their Turk brothers. Chinggiz gave a great impetus to this newly acquired cultural device of a Mongol alphabet, and started getting written down some of the *Yasag* or Common Law and Customs of the Mongols as well as his *Biliks* or Sayings or Oral Orders, and this had a very great political and administrative value. The Mongol script, a slightly variant form of Uigur, became established; and with the adoption of Tibetan or Lama Buddhism, through the missionary zeal of the Tibetan teacher and scholar Ḥphags-pa (erudite in Tibetan, Mongol and Sans-

krit), under Kubilai Khan when he was ruling over China, Mongolia and Tibet, this Mongol alphabet of ultimate Syrian origin became a great help in creating a Mongol literature, both a national literature of songs and ballads and chronicles and a learned and sacred literature of Tibetan and ultimately Sanskrit inspiration. A flourishing Turki literature first grew up, from the 7th century onwards, mainly in the Uigur script, and some noteworthy pieces of original composition came into being, like the *Qudatqu Bilik* and the *Oguz-nameh*. But after the Central Asian Turks were conquered by the Arabs under Ibu Qutaiba about 786 A.D., and Islam began to spread among them, they gradually abandoned their own scripts, associated as these were with Buddhism, Manichaeanism and Nestorian Christianity, and took over the Arabic script, emulating the example of their close neighbours and teachers the Iranians who after the Arab conquest left the Old Avestan and Pahlavi scripts to the priests of Zoroastrian religion, and adopted an extended Arabic script. The Mongols unlike the Turks have remained true to their Lamaic Buddhism and they have kept up their old script, and Ḥphags-pa (his Sanskrit name was Ārya Matidhvaja Śrībhadra) even tried to build up an ornate system of writing in 1269 (but it did not become popular)—the *Durbaljin*, based on the Tibetan. (Tibetan had become the language of religion and ritual, of science and philosophy, with the Mongols, and Sanskrit influences reacted Mongol through Tibetan). During the last few years, the Mongols within the orbit of Russian (Soviet) influence, have changed their old script into the Cyrillic, both in Mongolia (or Outer Mongolia) and among the various Mongol tribes living within the Soviet

Union, just as the Turks in the Soviet Union have done (the Azerbaijanis, the Turkmans, the Uzbeks, the Kirghiz, the Kazakhs, the Bashkirs and others). The Western Turks—the Azeris, the Seljuks and Osmanlis of Ankara and Istanbul—have also under the lead of Mustafa Kemal Ata-Turk similarly abandoned their old Arabic script for the Roman or Latin Alphabet.

The Altaics thus used whatever script came handy to them. They even employed the Chinese script, with its pictograms, ideograms and phonograms, to write their language, although it was a most inconvenient medium. The oldest book in Mongol, the *Mongol-un nigucha Tobchiyan* or 'the Secret History of the Mongols', was composed by 1240 A. D. and it was a biography of Chinggiz Khan and the history of the rise of the Mongol power. It is based on old songs and ballads, at least in part, and has quite a direct and primitive epic character. But the transcript of this fairly large work in Chinese characters, because of the unsuitability of Chinese writing for indicating properly the sounds of any language, was almost impossible to make out in the original Mongol speech, and scholars had to fall back upon a Chinese translation of this great Mongol classic in Chinese transcript, before Paul Pelliot with his profound erudition could restore the Chinese transcription with the original Mongol, which was published after his death in 1949, with partial translation in French.

While these tremendous cultural and political changes were taking place among the Altaics in Central and Eastern Asia, and they were coming out of their isolation into the hub of Asian affairs, they started their *dig-vijaya,*

their world-conquest and expansion, in the course of which they extended widely the area of their permanent occupation throughout the greater part of Asia and Europe. The Turks and the Mongols in this process were both passive receivers and active givers. They received culture and civilisation, and they gave organisation and strong government, and helped international contacts.

The Altaics, *both the Turks and the Mongols,* somehow developed a genius for Government, particularly in foreign lands they conquered. Their freedom from narrow religious inhibitions, and their great common sense, were their great helps in this In this matter, they can be very well compared with their Indo-Europeans neighbours, who, however, had the advantage of being earlier in the field, and had highly civilised peoples as their teachers and models. In conquest, the Altaics were swift and cruel, but before Islam hardened their mental flexibility, they were not religiously fanatical, but tried to be just and straightforward. In later times, Turkish rule in Europe, outside of certain limits, was always fair and equitable to the Christians. *Jawr al-Turk, walā 'adl al-'Arab*—'better the tyranny of the Turk, rather than the justice of the Arab'—so goes an Arab proverb from Syria. The Moguls of India (Mughals, i.e. Turks whose ancestors were of Mongol origin) gave to India a fairly good system of government which endured for more than three centuries. Akbar (1542-1605), a Turko-Mongol from his father's side and Persian from that of his mother, was one of the greatest rulers of mankind. The Mongol empire was established by Chinggiz Khan (1155-1227): he was a ruthless conqueror, absolutely merciless and

without scruples in war, but he in his primitive way, actuated by his innate Shamanistic good sense and sense of fairplay, promulgated and enforced through the machinery of his administration his Laws—the *Yasag* or Customary Laws of the Mongols and the *Bilik* or Sayings and Orders of himself, and these took some decades to grow and develop. On the basis of the *Yasag* and the *Bilik*, the vast empire of Chinggiz and his descendants, extending from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea, and the Persian Gulf, was held together as it was scrupulously adhered to, for over two centuries and a half, gradually giving place (outside of the Buddhist Mongol tracts, among Turks and others) to Muslim law and usage. But when it was operative, and the Mongols had their political unity and their military strength, it gave to the almost entire world of Siberian Central Asia, Russia, China and Iran a veritable *Pax Cingiscanica* or *Pax Mongolica,* comparable to the *Pax Persica* of the Achaemenian emperors, the *Pax Romanica,* and in the 19th and 20th centuries and *Pax Britannica,* as a great unifying force among nations, ensuring them some sort of sure protection and justice and peace.

One might say, the third phase of Hindu-Turk contacts and relations began during this period, and it was in the above two ways, in Central Asia in the first instance, and then almost alongside of that in India. Indian Buddhist teachers and scholars began to visit Central Asian peoples and the Chinese from the 1st century A. D. onwards, and after that the Koreans and the Japanese from the middle of the 7th century A. D. They came with the message of Buddha and of the sages of India for high thinking, seeking to delve into the

mystery of being, and for the good life ; and they were welcomed by these peoples of Central Asia and China, both simple people who had spiritual hunger, and sophisticated or highly advanced peoples who wanted to know. Hindus were welcomed by the Turks, and other Central Asian peoples as honoured teachers, who had no meaterial or political axe to grind, who brought knowledge and faith, and who in most cases made the countries and the people they came to their very own by settling down among them and laying their bones in the land of their adoption. The Turks and others (including the Mongols in later times) were actuated by a spirit of reverence and humility towards their Hindu teachers and also for the Hindu people of India who brought so much for them in the domains of the intellect and the spirit and also in the arts and crafts and material civilisation. An idealisation of India as the land of the Buddhas and the Brāhmaṇas, whose people were actuated by plain living and high thinking, characterised the attitude of the Central Asian and other peoples. The Mongols learned from the Tibetans to hold the country and the people of India—*Rgya-gar* or *Jagar* as they called India, in highest respect. India the land of Buddha and the Brāhmaṇas, *Fo-Kuo* and *Fan-Kuo* (**Bhyuwat-Kwok* and **Bhywam-Kwok*, in Old Chinese) was a veritable kingdom of Heaven—*Thien-Chu* in Chinese, *Ten-jiku* in Japanese (**Thien-dyuk* in Old Chinese, a modification of the geographical name **Sin-duk* i.e. *Sindhuka-deśa*). This attitude of the Turks and other Altaic (and other peoples) of Asia towards the Hindus later suffered a complete transformation after the Turks abandoned Buddhism and their old Shamanistic religion and adopted Islam.

The Expansion of the Turko-Mongols to the East, West and South, including India.

The Turks as the Hiung-nu-Hunni or Hūṇas—and then as the Uigurs, pushed beyond the frontiers of their original homeland and established their power in Europe (as the Hunni under Attila) and in Asia, penetrating down into India. Various sections of the Huns and the Ephthalites, or the descendants of Hephtha, one of their powerful heroes, and others began to harass Iran and India under the Sassanian and Gupta emperors. These Huns from Central Asia were much mixed with Sakas and other Iranians, and latterly bore Iranian names like *Mihiragula* (*Mihr-qul* = 'Sun-Flower'). Many of them began to settle down in India from the second half of the 1st millennium A. D. They accepted Brahmanical Hinduism and were transformed into good Hindus. As good fighters who became champions of the Hindu faith, they were accepted as Kshatriyas or members of the Warrior Caste, and they were described as belonging to the *Angi-kula*, or as offspring of the Fire-God, whose ancestors came out of a burning fire-altar to make them at par with the earlier and genuine Kshatriyas of ancient India who were classed as members of the *Sūrya-vaṁśa* and the *Candra-vaṁśa*—the Family of the Sun and the Family of the Moon. The *Gūjars*, the *Khīchīs* and a few other clans among these neo-Kshatriyas of Central Asian Turki or Turko-Iranian origin bear non-Indo-Aryan names, probably to be connected with Turki (Hunnic or Hunnish) clan names.

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AN ETYMOLOGICAL NOTE ON THE WORD ŚMAN!

BRIJ BIHARI CHAUBEY

Punjab University, Hoshiarpur

The word' *śman*' often occurs in the Vedas with the components of *-śā*, *-śāna*, *-śayana* and *-śru* forming the compounds such as *śmaśā śmaśāna*, *śmaśayana*, *śmaśru* etc. These derivative words of *śman* have been differently interpreted by different scholars. An attempt has been made therefore in this paper to discuss the exact etymological meanings of *śman* as attested by the Vedic texts. For our discussion here, we have selected only three words, viz., *śmaśā*, *śmaśāna*, and *śmaśru*.

In ṚV. X. 105. 1 : '*Kadā vaso stotraṁ haryata āva śmaśā rudhad vāḥ|dīrghaṁ sutaṁ vātapyāya||*, Veṅkaṭa Mādhava, on the authority of Yāska takes *śmaśā* to mean wind[1], and says that the wind is so called because it pervades the space quickly. But it may be seen from the text which he quotes that he has taken no notice of the derivation of *śmaśā*[2] < *śma* + √*aś* as given by Yāska. Moreover, the text referring to the meaning of *śmaśā* as wind, which he quotes in the name of Yāska, is not found in the *Nirukta*, that is available to us to-day.

1. कदा वासयित : ! इन्द्र तव स्तुतिं कामयमानाय मत्यं श्मशा वायु : उदकम् अव रुणद्धि दिवः । दीर्घकालमिदं सुतं भवति उदकाय क्रियमाणमिति । 'शु अश्नुत इति श्मशा वायुः' इति यास्कः (तु० निरु०५.१२)। तथा वाताप्यम् उदकं भवति । वात एतदाप्याययति (निरु.६.२८) ।

   Veṅkaṭa. on ṚV. X 105.1

2. श्मशा शु अश्नुत इति वा श्माश्नुते इति वा । *Nir.* 5.12

Skandasvāmin takes *śmaśā* as a word of unknown derivation having many meanings. He, however, points out two meanings of *śmaśā*,[3] : canal or river. According to him, *śmaśā* is *śmāśinī* which is derived from *śma* (=body) + √*aś*, 'to pervade'. But he does not give reason as to why a canal or a river is called *śmaśā*. *Śma* meaning body has nothing to do with a canal or a river. While interpreting ṚV. X. 105.1, in the *Nirukta*, he says that the veins of the body also are called *śmaśā*,[4] because they carry the essence of food consumed to one's body. Here he seems to have taken no notice of Yāska's derivation of *śmaśā* from *śu* + √*aś*.

Durgācārya, while accepting the derivations of *śmaśā* as given by Yāska, regards *śmaśā* as identical to *śvāśinī* or *śmāśinī*.[5] The former, he derives from *śu* + √*aś* meaning a canal or a river,[6] and he adds that it is so called because it quickly pervades or irrigates the fields. The latter, he derives from *śma* (=body) + √*aś* meaning the veins (=nāḍī) of the body.[7]

Further, Durgācārya also takes *śmaśā* to mean mystic vein of spiritual power centred in one's own body (*-ādhyātmikī nāḍī-*) *Nir.* 5.12). So far as the second derivation is concerned, both Skandasvāmin and Durgācārya agree. They both take *śmaśā* as a word of unknown derivation and also having many meanings.[8]

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3. श्मशेत्यनवगतमनेकार्थं च । श्म शरीरं तस्य व्यापिनी श्माशिनीत्यवगम : । कुल्या नदी वाभिधेया । Skandasvāmin on *Nir.* 5.12
4. श्मशेव कुल्येव उदकानि । नाडीव वा शरीरी अन्नपानरसम् ! Ibid
5. 'श्वासिनी' इत्यवगम : श्माशिनीति वा । Durga. on *Nir* 5.12
6. श्वाशिनी शीघ्राशिनी शीघ्रव्यापिनी कुल्या नदी वा । Ibid
7. श्माशिनी पुननाडी । सा हि श्म शरीरं व्याप्नोति । Ibid
8. श्मशेत्यनवगतमनेकार्थं च । Skanda. ; श्मशा इत्यनवगतम्..... एवमेतद् इह विगृह्यमाणम् अनेकार्थम् अपि भवत्येव । Durga.

They, however, differ with regard to the derivation of *śmaśā* meaning canal or river, and vein. Skandasvāmin derives *śmaśā* meaning both canal or river and vein from *śma*+√*aś*, while Durgācārya derives differently : *śmaśā* meaning canal or river from *śu*+ √*as*, and *śmaśā* meaning vein from *śma* + √*aś*. May be, Durgācārya thought that *śma*, taken to mean body, has no relevence to the meaning of canal or river and hence he cited the derivation from *su* (=quick) + √*aś* which would imply river or canal.

Sāyaṇa, following Skandasvāmin and Durgācārya, takes *śmaśā* to mean a canal and accordingly he derives it from √*aś* 'to pervade.'[9] He has conveniently interpreted *śma*-as *kṣetra* here which means both field and body, so that it should be applicable in both the contexts to mean canal or vein.

While some of the Westren scholars like Wilson and others have followed Indian commentators, some others have struck altogether a different note in this connection. In his *Wörterbuch*, Grassmann takes *śmaśā* to mean the elevated ridge or basin or grave. In this sense Monier Williams conjectures it to be, probably, connected with *aśman* (=stone) and interprets it as the elevated ridge or edge of a trench or ditch, or channel for water or of a vessel. He takes *śmaśā*, *śmaśāna* and *smaśayana* as identical in meaning. - *śa*, -*śāna*, and -*śayana*, most probably, according to him, are derived from one common root: √*śī* 'to sleep' ! In both *śmaśā* and *śmaśāna* he takes *śma* as somewhat connected with *aśman*. According to him, *śmaśā*, *śmaśāna* and *śmaśayana* actually come from *aśmaśā*, *aśmaśāna* and *aśmaśayana* respectively, meaning an elevated

9. अश्नुते क्षेत्रमिति श्मशा कुल्या । Sāyaṇa on ṚV. X.105.1

place for burning the dead bodies,—a crematorium or a burial place for committing the bones of cremated corpses.

Geldner, while translating ṚV. X. 105.1, takes *śmaśā* to mean 'Beard' assuming *śmaśā* to have formed from *śmaśāru* by haplology. Further, he feels that *-śmaśāru* in *hariśmaśāruḥ* (ṚV. I. 96.8) and *śmaśruḥ* in *hiriśmaśruḥ* (ṚV. V.7.7) are two different forms of the same word. In his 'Ṛgveda Noten,' Oldenberg holds the same view. In ṚV. X. 105.1, he reads '*śmaśā rudhad vāḥ*' as *śmaśāru dhad vāḥ*' and translates accordingly: 'Wann möchte das loblied ihm den bart in das (soma) wässer hinabtauchen?'

We come across the etymology of *śmaśā*[10] in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* while the word *śmaśāna* is being explained. *Śmaśā* is said there to mean the deceased ancestors or manes who eat the oblations offered to them. According to the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, *śma* in *śmaśā* is an evolved form of *śava* (=dead body) and the word *śavānna* (*śava*+*anna* 'the oblation given to the deceased ancestors or manes) becomes *śavaśānna* by adding *śa* between *śava-* and *-anna*, further resulting into *śmaśānna*> *śmaśāna* (*śavānna*>*śavaśānna*>*śmaśānna*>*śmaśāna*).[11] Most probably, according to the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa śmaśā* meaning deceased ancestors, is formed from *śava*>*śma*+*aś* 'to eat'. *Śma*+*aś* = *śmāś* has changed into *śmaśā* by metathesis.

Yāska, however, does not seem to agree with the derivation of *śmaśā* given by the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*.

10. श्मशा उ हैव नाम पितॄणामत्तारः ŚB. 13.8.1.1

11. यो वै कश्च म्रियते स ँ शवस्तस्मा एतदन्नं करोति । तस्माच्छवान्नं ह वै तच्छ्मशान्नमित्याचक्षते परोक्षम् । श्मशा उ हैव नाम पितॄणामत्तारस्ते हामुस्मिन् लोकेऽ कृतश्मशानस्य साधुकृत्यामुपदम्भयन्ति तेभ्य एतदन्नं करोति तस्माच्छ्मशान्नं हैव तच्छ्मशान्नमित्याचक्षते परोक्षम् । ŚB. 13.8.1.1

According to him, *śma* is common in *śmaśāna* and *śmaśayana*, and *-śāna* is a short form of *śayana* (*śmaśānam śmaśayanam*- Nir. 3.5). Skandasvāmin suggests that by dropping *y* in *śayana* and subsequent lengthening of *a* in sandhi one gets *śāna*.[12] Siddheshwar Varma however does not agree with this derivation. He says : '*śmaśāna*-' "a place where the dead are disposed", is traced to *śma*+*śayana*-" lying of the body". But *śāna*- from *śayana* is not phonologically acceptable, for the elision of *y* before *ana* is impossible in old Indo-Aryan'.[13] In his *Vaidika Padānukramakoṣa* Vishva Bandhu takes *śma*- in *śmaśāna* as a form of *śava* as said in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, but he derives- *śana* from √*vaś* >√*vas* "to reside". According to him, *vaśanta*>*śanta*> *śāna* is similar to the Persian word *khānaḥ*, house. However, he does not find any connection between *śmaśā* and *śmaśāna*, and he says that *śmaśā* in ṚV.X. 105.1, is actully *vaśvaśā* which is derived from √*vaś* (=√*vac,vāś*, to speak).

The word *smaśru* (ṚV.X. 23.1; 26.7; 142.4), in which *śma*- forms the first component has been rendered as 'beard' by most of the Indian and Western commentators. Monier Williams takes it as a word of unknown derivation, but connects it with *śman*. Yāska, however, takes *śmaśru* to mean hair which grows on the body.[14] He derives *śman* from √ *sṛ* or √ *śam*.[15] According to Durgācārya, however, Yāska does not give the etymology of *śma* here, but he derives *śarīra*[16] from √*śṛ* or √ *śam*. If

12. यकारलोपेन सवर्णदीर्घत्वेन च । Skandasvāmin on *Nir*. 3.5
13. Siddheshwar Varma : *The Etymologies of Yāska*, p. 147
14. श्मश्रु लोम । श्मनि श्रूतं भवति । *Nir*. 3.5
15. श्म शरीरम् । श्रृणातेर्वा शम्नातेर्वा *Ibid*.
16. Durgācārya on *Nir*. 3.5

we accept this veiw of Durgācārya, the question would arise why did Yāska derive *śarīra* in this context, which he has already derived from √ *śṛ* or √ *śam* (Nir. 2.5). It is the well-known practice with Yāska that he never derives the same word again, and when a word once etymologised comes in some other context he expressly says that it has already been dealt with by him (vyākhyātam.) The reason why Durgācārya accepted √ *śṛ* and √ *śam* as referring to *śarīram,* not to *sma,* here seems to be that the text which he had before him was '*śma śarīram/śarīraṁ śṛṇāteḥ śamnātervā* (Nir.3.5). Durgācārya, was certainly not unaware of the fact that Yāska has already derived this word. Therefore, he gives a new argument for justification of this repetition. According to him, *śarīra* in the previous context was not a real corporeal body, since it is related to Vṛtra which being a cloud is bodyless, whereas, here *śarīra* is a real corporeal body. Hence according to Durgācārya, Yāska thought it proper to give the derivation of *śarīra* again. But the real fact is that in the text commented on by Durgācārya, the second *śarīram* is an interpolation not forming the part of the original text. What Yāska says here is that *śma* means *śarīram* (=body) and it is derived from √ *śṛ* or √ *śam.* Skandasvāmin has correctly explained this by taking *śṛṇāteḥ* and *śamnāteḥ* as referring to *śma,* not to *śarīram.* Siddeshwar Varma, though he has not included the word *śman* in 'The Etymologies of Yāska' while deriving *śmaśā,* points out that *śma* has not been noticed by Yāska for its derivation. It seems that Siddheshwar Varma made this remark relying on the text commented on by Durgācārya. Now it becomes clear that Yāska has given here the derivation of

śma, and not of *śarīram*.[17]

To sum up, we may give below the different meanings or the derivations of *śman* as given by different scholars :—

śman<√ *śṛ* or √*śam* (Yāska).
śmaśā<*śma*+√*aś* 'to pervade' (Skandasvāmin).
śmaśā < *śu* + √ *aś* or *śma* +√*aś* (Yāska & Durgācārya).
śmaśā < *śu* + √ *aś* (Veṅkaṭamādhava).
śmaśā<*śava*>*śma* +√*aś* 'to eat' (Śatapatha).
śmaśā < *aśman* (Monier Williams)
śmaśāna<*śava*>*śma*+(*śa*)+*anna* (Śatapatha).
śmaśāna<*śava*+√*vaś*>*vas* 'to reside (Vishva Bandhu)
śmaśā < *śmaśāru* > *śmaśru* (Geldner, Oldenberg)

Now we have four words before us, *śman, śu, śava* and *aśman,* which have been accepted by different scholars as the derivative basis, while deriving or explaining the words, *śmaśā, śmaśāna, śmaśru* and *śmaśāru.* Is there any phonetic or semantical relation among these four derivatives ? If *śman* is the form evolved either from *śu* 'quick' or *śava* 'dead body' or *aśman* 'stone', would it convey its sense? From the above discussion it is clear that *śman* is said to have been related to either *śu, śava* or *aśman* by the commentators. Though, *śman* meaning body has apparently nothing to do with *su,* yet it has been accepted by the commentators as one of the bases of *śman.* Therefore, we have to see how far this interpretation would be acceptable. Most probably, *śu* meaning quick indicates the perishable nature of our body. *Śava* meaning 'dead body' is derived from √ *śav* 'to go'.[18] The body is

17. श्म शरीरं तत् श्रृणातेरर्थपौष्कल्यात् । शम्नातेर्वा यदा कदाचित् शाम्यति हि तत् । Skandasvāmin on *Nir.* 3.5

18. cf. Dhātupāṭha, 725; शवतिर्गतिकर्मा कम्बोजेष्वेव भाष्यते । *Nir.* 3.5

so called because it undergoes decomposition and dissolves itself in course of time after death. Semantically there is no much contradiction in meaning between *śu* and *śava*. The former indicates the quickness of the departure of the soul from the body, while the latter indicates the departure of the soul from the body for ever. Both *śu* & *śava* are phonetically connected: *śu* > *śo* + *a* (by guṇa) > *śav*+*a*. *śu* meaning quick and *śava* meaning departure further support Yāska's derivation of *śma* from √ *śṛ* or √ *śam*. The word *śman* meaning body is derived from√*śṛ* or√*śam*, because it is the body which is destroyed by death.[19] Haplology has played an important role in the formation of *śman* from √*śṛ* or √*śam* (*śṛ* + *man*>*ś-ṛ—man* > *ś—man* > *śman; śam* + *man*>*ś- am-man*> *ś-man*>*śman*.[20]

Monier Williams, on the authority of some lexicon takes *śman* also to mean mouth. According to him, most probably, this meaning has been invented to explain *śmaśru* as beard, especially moustache. This should be taken as secondry meaning, because, primarily, *śman* means only body. *Śmaśru,* primarily meaning hair grown on the body, became prevalant in the sense of beard and again in the sense of moustache. When by usage *śmaśru* became confined to the sense of moustache, another meaning of *śman* was invented. Now it may be possible to derive *śman* in the sense of mouth from √ *aś* to eat √ *aś* + *man*>*ś-man*>*śman*.[21] But its derivation from *aśman* meaning stone is not in accordance with the Indian commentators nor with the texts of the *Ṛgveda*.

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19. .... न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे । *Gītā* 2

20. Vide Rajvade, *Nirukta Notes*.

21. cf. *Atharvaveda* xviii. 4.54.

DIFFERENT THEORIES OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKAS ON THE NUMBER OF QUALITIES (*GUṆA*) IN ĪŚVARA

GEORGE CHEMPARATHY
University of Utrecht, Holland

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas grouped the qualities of Īśvara under two classes, the general qualities (*sāmānya-guṇa*) and the specific qualities (*viśeṣaguṇa*). General qualities of substance are those qualities which it possesses in common with some other classes of substance than the one to which it belongs ; its specific qualities, on the other hand, are those which are possessed only by the class of substance to which it belongs. This classification of general and specific qualities is found for the first time in the list of diverse classifications of qualities given by Praśastapāda in his *Padārthadharmasaṁgarha*,[1] and hence a classification of the qualities of Īśvara under these two groups cannot be met with in the extant works of authors before him. Moreover, it is but to be expected that the Īśvara doctrine which had been a later addition to the system would take some time before it became fitted into and formulated in concepts as found in the category doctrine of the system.

As far as we know from the extent literature, there was no divergence of opinion among the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas as to the number of the general qualities of Īśvara. They ascribed to Him five of them, namely number (*saṁkhyā*), dimension (*parimāṇa*), individuality (*pṛthaktva*), conjunction (*saṁyoga*) and disjunction (*vibhāga*), in fact,

1. *PDS* p. 230, 4 - 231,3

qualities possessed by all substances. Thus Īśvara was conceived of as being one (*eka*), omnipresent (*vibhu*), distinguished from all other substances as an individual (*pṛthak*), and as having conjunction (*saṁyogavat*) and disjunction (*vibhāgavat*).[2] But there was no such agreement as to the number of specific qualities (*viśeṣaguṇa*) in Him. When we examine the Īśvara doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors from Pakṣilasvāmin to Udayana, we can trace at least four main groups of theories concerning the specific qualities of Īśvara, a brief consideration of which forms the subject-matter of this paper.

1. *The view of Pakṣilasvāmin and Praśastapāda* :

It is in his excursus at the close of his commentary on *NS* IV, 1,21 that Pakṣilasvāmin speaks of the qualities of Īśvara. Although he describes the nature of Īśvara in terms of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of categories, he makes use also of concepts that are foreign to it. Thus, while expressing the nature of Īśvara as an *Ātmā* endowed with special qualities,[3] he ascribes to Him qualities, some of which are not found among the qualities of the Ātmā as enumerated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. According to Pakṣilasvāmin there is in Īśvara the absence of the qualities of demerit, erroneous cognition and inattention, as well as the presence, in abundance, of the qualities opposed to these, namely merit, cognition and concentration.[4]

2. Ibid. p. 231,2-3 enumerate, besides the five qualities mentioned above, also *paratva, aparatva, gurutva, naimittika dravatva* and *vega* as *sāmānyaguṇāḥ*, but these are not applicable to Īśvara and hence they are left out of consideration here.

3. *NBH* p. 943,6: *guṇaviśiṣṭam ātmāntaram īśvaraḥ.*

4. Ibid. p. 943,7 : *adharma-mithyājñāna-pramādahānyā dharma-jñāna-samādhisampadā ca viśiṣṭam ātmāntaram īśvaraḥ.*

Moreover, he ascribes to Īśvara, as the fruit of His merit and concentration, the eightfold omnipotence.[5] If we look for the source of these four qualities—merit (*dharma*), cognition (*jñāna*), concentration (*samādhi*) and omnipotence (*aiśvarya*)—we notice that concentration and omnipotence are not mentioned among the qualities of Ātmā in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of categories. On the other hand, we find agroup of four qualities—*dharma*, *jñāna*, *virāga* and *aiśvarya*—enumerated in the Sāṁkhyakārikā *Kā*.23 as the Sattvic forms of the Buddhi.[6] Pakṣilasvāmin, however, substitutes for *virāga* (freedom from passion or attachment) the term *samādhi* taken from the Yoga, and thus we get the combination of the four qualities ascribed by him to Īśvara. Other terms such as *pramāda* and *prākāmya* occurring in his short excursus on Īśvara betray influence of Yoga.[7] Hence one is led to conclude that, in his description of the nature and qualities of Īśvara, Pakṣilasvāmin was strongly influenced by Sāṁkhya-Yoga concepts.

The view of Praśastapāda concerning the number of qualities in Īśvara cannot be determined with certanity, since all his works have not come down to us. We know that he exposes a rather developed form of

5. Ibid. p. 944,2 : *tasya ca dharmasamādhiphalam aṇimādy aṣṭavidham aiśvaryam.*

6. Vgl. also Sāṁkhyakārikās 43-45.

7. For the expressions *pramāda* and *prākāmya* see *NBh* p. 943,7 and 944,4 respectively. Both these are found in Yogic texts. *pramāda* is spoken of in Yogasūtra I,30, while *prākāmya* is one of the eight powers of the Yogin mentioned in the *Yogabhāṣya* to Yogasūtras I, 24 and III, 45. The term *samādhi* occurs in so many places of the *Yogasūtra* and *Yogabhāṣya* (see especially the first *Sūtras* and their *Bhāṣya*) that it hardly requires reference.

Īśvara doctrine, but neither in his extant work, the *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*, nor in the fragments available to us from his lost work(s) do we come across any enumeration of the qualities of Īśvara.[8] Among the fragments from the lost work(s) of Praśastapāda found in the *Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā* of Kamalaśīla and in the *Sanmatiṭīkā* of Abhayadevasūri are some that prove two qualities of Īśvara, namely omniscience (*sarvajñatva*) and one-ness (*ekatva*). Furthermore, in his account of the dissolution and creation of the universe found in the *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*, he speaks of the desire (*icchā*) of Īśvara.[9] Hence we know with certainty that Praśastapāda admitted in Īśvara the qualitles of cognition (*jñāna*), desire (*icchā*) and number (*saṁkhyā*) found in the list of the qualities ascribed to Him by later writers. Although he does not speak of the volition (*prayatna*) of Īśvara, it seems to me that it was implied in his notions of the *icchā* and *abhidhyāna* of Īśvara.[10] When one goes through the systematic classification of qualities found in his *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*, one is led to assume that, besides number, Praśastapāda must have ascribed to Īśvara also the other four general qualities of dimension, individuality, conjunction and disjunction since these five general qualities are found in all substa-

8. The present writer has made a brief study of the Īśvara doctrine of Praśastapāda making use also of the fragments of his that have come down to us. See *Vishweshwaranand Indological Journal*, Vol. VI (1968) pp. 65 - 87

9. Cf. *PDS* p. 125,2 (*maheśvarecchā*) ; 122,3 (*maheśvarasya sañjihīrṣā*); 127,2 (*maheśvarasisṛkṣā*).

10. Cf. *PDS* p.122,3 ff. : *maheśvarasya sañjihīrṣāsamakālam .... teṣāṁ ... vināśaḥ;* 127.2 ff. : *maheśvarasisṛkṣānantaram ... mahān vāyuḥ samutpanno ... tiṣṭhati;* 129.6 ff. : *maheśvarasyābhidhyānamātrāt ... mahad aṇḍam ārabhyate.*

nces. It is very probable that the work of Praśastapāda, from which the fragments found in the *Tattvasaṁgraha-pañjikā* and *Sanmatiṭīkā*are taken, contained more details about the qualities of Iśvara, but, as that work seems to be irretrievably lost to us, we have no possibility of ascertaining the exact number of the qualities that he ascribed to Īśvara.

It is interesting to note that, although Praśastapāda mentions the complete list of the qualities of the soul (*ātmā*), some of which are ascribed to Īśvara, nevertheless, he too does not seem to have got rid of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga influence which we come across in Pakṣilasvāmin's description of Īśvara. Thus in his account of the dissolution and creation of the universe found in the *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha* he makes Īśvara create Brahmā with an abundance of superior cognition, dispassionateness and omnipotence,[11] qualities which, as we saw, belong more properly to Sāṁkhya-Yoga than to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. And this Brahmā, in his turn, creates the four castes and all the elements endowed with merit, cognition, dispassionateness and omnipotence, each according to its latent results of Karma. About the qualities of Īśvara Himself who creates the Brahmā no mention whatever is made in this account, but it seems legitimate to assume that he ascribes to Īśvara the qualities of Brahmā in an eminent degree. As he does not mention merit (*dharma*) among the qualities of Brahmā, it can be supposed that he does not ascribe that quality to Īśvara.

From the time of Uddyotakara onwards, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas follow more closely the doctrine of substance and qualities described in the Vaiśeṣika works,

11. Ibid. p. 130,3-4

so that the qualities they ascribe to Īśvara can be traced among the qualities of the soul as taught by the school.

2. *The view of Īśvara as possessing six qualities (ṣaḍguṇādhikaraṇa)* :

Among the commentators of the Nyāya texts Uddyotakara, the author of the *Nyāyavārttikam* maintains that Īśvara possesses six qualities ; for he says in explicit terms that Īśvara has six qualities.[12] His statement *ṣaḍguṇa . . . īśvaraḥ* is to be interpreted as meaning that Īśvara possesses only six qualities ; for he compares Īśvara in this respect to the ether (*ākāśavat*) which, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, possesses only six qualities, the five general qualities which all substances possess and the specific quality of sound (*śabda*).[13] Moreover, a little further on he makes an enumeration of the qualities of Īśvara where only six qualities are mentioned : the five general qualities of number, dimension, individuality, conjunction and disjunction, as well as one specific quality of cognition (*jñāna*).[14]

Uddyotakara's description of the qualities of Īśvara poses certain problems. On the one hand, he maintains, as we saw, that Īśvara possesses only six qualities ; on the other hand, in other passages of his Īśvara-excursus he ascribes to Him two more qualities which are not found in his above-mentioned enumeration of the qualities of

12. *NV* p. 951,8 : *ṣaḍguṇa ākāśavad īśvaraḥ.*

13. Cf. *PDS* p. 143,4 : *tatrākāśasya guṇāḥ śabdasaṃkhyāparimāṇa-pṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgāḥ.*

14. Cf. *NV* p. 951, 8: *tatra (=īśvare) hi nityā buddhiḥ saṃkhyā-dayaś ca sāmānyaguṇāḥ.* Further p. 951,13-14: *saṃkhyāpari-māṇapṛtha-ktvasaṃyogavibhāgabuddhayas tasya (=īśvarasya) guṇāḥ.*

Īśvara. One of these is desire (*icchā*) which is one of the qualities of the soul and which has been recognised by the later Nāya-Vaiśeṣikas as a distinct quality of Īśvara. After enumerating some of the qualities of soul that are absent in Īśvara, Uddyotakara remarks : "On the other hand, there is [in Īśvara, the quality of] desire which is undisturbed and unimpeded with regard to all [its] objects, just as [His] cognition".[15] Such a clear statement as this, in the context in which it appears, allows no other interpretation than that he admits in Īśvara the quality of desire (*icchā*). The second quality which Uddyotakara admits in Īśvara, even though he does not mention it in his enumeration of the qualities of Īśvara is omnipotence (*aiśvarya*). In answer to an opponent who calls in question the omnipotence of Īśvara on the ground that, whether conceived of as eternal or non-eternal, it would imply undesirable consequences, Uddyotakara answers that Īśvara possesses omnipotence.[16] It is difficult to reconcile his acceptance of the qualities of *icchā* and *aiśvarya* in Īśvara with his statement that Īśvara has only six qualities. That he did not make an unconspious mistake in speaking of Īśvara as *ṣaḍguṇaḥ* is clear from the fact that, in his enumeration of His qualities, he mentions only six as well as from the fact that he brings forward ether as an example. Even if we make some concession regard to his omission of the quality of *aiśvarya* on the ground that it is not one of the qualities of soul accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the same cannot be done with

15. Cf. *NV* p. 952,13-14 : *icchā tu vidyate akliṣṭā 'vyāhatā sarvārthesu, yathā buddhiḥ.*

16. Cf. ibid. p. 950,17 : (*tad īsvarasya aisvaryam*) *nityam iti brūmaḥ.*

regard to the *icchā* of Īśvara. In any case, Uddyotakara's own statement and enumeration of the qualities Īśvara lead us to the conclusion that he admitted in Him only six qualities, not seven nor eight.

Such a conclusion seems to be confirmed by the following consideration. In a passage at the close of his Īśvara-excursus in *Nyāyakandalī*, Śrīdhara mentions two views concerning the qualities of Īśvara, namely the view of those who held that Īśvara possesses six qualities (*ṣaḍguṇādhikaraṇa*), namely cognition and the five general qualities, and that of those who ascribe to Him eight qualities (*aṣṭaguṇādhikaraṇa*), namely cognition, desire and volition as well as the five general qualities.[17] As Uddyotakara is the only author of whom we know, from his own explicit declaration, that he ascribed to Īśvara six qualities as they are mentioned by Śrīdhara, it seems legitimate to suppose that, while mentioning the view that Īśvara possesses only six qualities, he had in mind Uddyotakara.[18]

3. *The view of Īśvara as possessing eight qualities* (*aṣṭaguṇādhikaraṇa*) :

We know very little about the development of the

17. Cf. *KNand* p. 142,3-9. In both the theories, five of the qualities are the general qualities.

18. It my be pointed out here that in a recent article on the Īśvara doctrine of Śrīdhara published in the *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* (=Umeshamishra Commemoration Volume) Vol. XXIV (1968) pp. 25-38, I had stated (see pp. 35 and 37) that the author of the *Nyāyakandalī* followed the view of those who held that Īśvara possesses only six qualities. Later study, however, has made me change my view. I feel rather inclined to believe - as I have set down in a small article : "The number of qualities (*guṇa*) in Īśvara according to Śridhara: A reconsideration" (to be published) that Śrīdhara admitted eight qualities in Īśvara.

Īśvara doctrine during the period between Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra. By the time of Vācaspatimiśra, however, it was generally accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that Īśvara possesses eight qualities, namely the five general qualities : cognition (*jñāna*) desire (*icchā*) and volition (*prayatna*). This view was maintained by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers even later on with the sole exception, as far as I know, of Jayantabhaṭṭa whose view will be spoken of below. Thus Vācaspatimiśra, Bhāsarvajña, Udayana, Śrīdhara and probably Vyomaśiva held that Īśvara possessd eight qualities.[19]

4. The view of īśvara as possessing ten qualities (daśaguṇādhikaraṇa) :[20]

Among the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika writers whose works

19. Note that no strict chronological order is followed in this enumeration. For the relevant passages cf. *NVTT* p. 956,20-21 : *buddhivad icchā-prayatnāv api tasya (=īśvarasya) nityau . . . ; Nyāyabhūṣaṇam* (Nyāyasāra of Bhāsarvajña with his own commentary *Nyāyabhūsaṇam* (=Saḍdarśana-prakāśanagranthamālā, No. 1) Varanasi 1968 p. 464,2-3; *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (edited by Pt. Padmaprasada Upadhyaya and Pt. Dhundhiraja Sastri, Kashi Sanskrit Series, 30, Varanasi 1957) pp. 494,3-449,9; *NKand* p. 19,8-11; 138,10- 140,5. Vyomaśiva speaks of the *icchā* of Īśvara : cf. *Vyomavati* (edited by Pt. Gopinath Kaviraj, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 61, Benares 1930) p. 298,26; 305,15 ff. The silence of Vyomaśiva concerning Īśvara's *prayatna*, is, it seems to me, to be accounted for by the fact that in his excursus he does not deal with the topic of the qualities of Īśvara and because no occasion presented itself for its usage in the excursus he wrote on Īśvara (pp. 301,27 - 308,7). It should also be mentioned that none of these authors gives a list of the qualities of Īśvara, as Uddyotakara or Jayanta did and that consequently the conclusions we have arrived at are based on the analysis of passages in their works.

20. While the terms *ṣaḍguṇādhikaraṇa* and *aṣṭaguṇādhikaraṇa* as applied to Īśvara are found in Śrīdhara's *NKand*, the expression *daśaguṇādhikaraṇa* is coined by me.

have come down to us we know of only one author who holds the view that Īśvara possesses ten qualities, namely Jayantabhaṭṭa, the author of the *Nyāymañjarī*. In addition to the eight qualities of Īśvara, of which we spoke in the preceding theory, Jayanta ascribes to Īśvara also the qualities of merit (*dharma*) and pleasure (*sukha*).[21] In other words, he admits in Īśvara five general qualities and five specific qualities. It seems to me that Jayanta follows here older views current in an earlier period,[22] although in his own time the view generally accepted was that Īśvara possessed eight qualities.

It is striking that, while speaking of the number of qualities in Īśvara in his *Nyāyakandalī*, Śrīdhara mentions only two thories, namely the theory that Īśvara possesses

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21. cf. *NM* p. 185,2 ff. especially 185,14-15: *tad evaṁ navabhya ātmaguṇebhyaḥ pañca jñānasukhercchāprayatnadharmāḥ santīśvare.*

22. In one of his earlier publications on Nyāya authors, E. Frauwallner pointed out that the main sources of Jayanta are old Nyāya authors whose works have been lost to us and whom he refers to by the terms *ācāryāḥ* and *vyākhyātāraḥ*, he himself mostly following the view of the *ācāryāḥ*. Cf. E. Frauwallner : Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nyāya. I. Jayanta and seine Quellen in : *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, Vol. 43 (1936) pp. 273ff. See also B. Gupta : Die Wahrnehmungslehre in der Nyāyamañjarī (=*Beiträge zur Sprach-und Kulturgeschichte des Orients*, Heft 6), Walldorf-Hessen 1963, pp. 24 f.; 96 ff.

We know that Pakṣilasvāmin ascribed *dharma* to Īśvara (*NBh* p. 943,7). On the other hand, Uddyotakara denied it to Īśvara (*NV* p. 950,18-19) as did those who held that Īśvara possesses eight qualities (cf. *KNand* p. 142,5; *Nyāyakusumāñjali* p. 495,5; *Nyāyabhūsaṇam* p. 465,25-26). A Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika author other than Jayanta who explicitly held that Īśvara possesses *sukha* is not known to me. But we know from the *KNand* of Śrīdhara (p.142,5-6) that those who ascribed to Īśvara eight qualities denied *sukha* in Īśvara,

six qualities and that according to which He has eight qualities, without mentioning the view maintained by Jayanta. The omission of the theories of Pakṣilasvāmin and of Praśastapāda may be explained by the fact that they used sāṁkhya-Yoga terminology and also because no one followed them any more in their use of Sāṁkhya-Yoga terms to describe the qualities of Īśvara.[23] The theory that Īśvara has six qualities was represented, as we said earlier, by Uddyotakara. Whether others continued this theory even during the time of Śrīdhara is not known to us. For, although the fact that Śrīdhara mentions it among the two views on the number of qualities of Īśvara suggests the possibility that such a view was not yet fully given up; nevertheless, none of the extant Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works of the period testifies to its continuance. What is, indeed, striking is that, while the author of the *Nyāyakandalī* apparently refers to an old theory of six qualities in Īśvara, although it had, as we assume, gone out of date, he does not refer to the view of ten qualities in Īśvara held by Jayanta who was nearer to him in time than Uddyotakara.[24] Were we to assume

23. Here I would like to repeat that this statement may need some modification with regard to Praśastapāda, since our conclusion is based only on the available material. But I am inclined to think that his lost work, from where the fragments found in the *Tattvasamgrahapañjikā* and the *Sanmatiṭīkā* are taken, contained much more material on Īśvara than the *PDS*. Moreover, the *Sṛṣṭi-* and *Saṃhāra* section of the *PDS* contains also mythological material on creation and dissolution so that an evaluation of the philosophical Īśvara doctrine of Praśastpāda becomes rather difficult there.

24. According to his own testimony, Śrīdhara completed his *KNand* in 991 A.D. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa lived, in the view of Frauwallner, in the second half of the ninth century. cf. E. Frauwallner : loc. cit. pp. 267 f. See also his : *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, Vol. II, Salzburg 1956. p. 23.

that Śrīdhara knowingly and intentionally did not mention the view of Jayanta on the ground that the author of the Nyāyamañjarī was referring to older theories, then one cannot explain easily his mention of the view of Uddyotakara, unless we assume at the same time that this view was still maintained by some, a fact which, as we said earlier, cannot be established from the extent Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature.

A general survey of the four theories on the number of qualities in Īśvara which we have mentioned gives us some idea of the gradual development of this aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Īśvara doctrine. In the early stage, up to the time of Pakṣilasvāmin and Praśastapāda, the qualities of Īśvara were expressed in terminology which was influenced by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga school. The concepts relating to Īśvara had to be formulated in the terminology of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. By the time of Uddyotakara the qualities of Īśvara came to be described in terms of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of categories, although some of the old formulations (v.g. *aiśvarya*) also continued to be used side by side for a time. Uddyotakara himself seems to have held that Īśvara possesses eternal cognition and the five general qualities. The qualities of desire and volition of Īśvara may not have been clearly defined at that time, although it was implied in some manner in the concept of the cognition of Īśvara. It is possible that Uddyotakara's affirmation of the qualities of desire (*icchā*) and omnipotence (*āiśvarya*) in Īśvara was occasioned by his endeavour to meet other current views on the qualities of Īśvara and to accept what he found good in them, without, however, having properly integreted these theories into his own. The inconsistency of Uddyotakara's statements may be

thus accounted for. The desire (*icchā*) of Īśvara had already been spoken of by Praśastapāda and was slowly gaining ground, so that Uddyotakara probably accepted that quality, though he did not integrate it into the conception he had of Īśvara's qualities.

The development of the quality of volition (*prayatna*) as a distinct quality of Īśvara came a little later. Probably the *saṅkalpa* of Īśvara as used by Pakṣilasvāmin,[25] the *icchā* and *aiśvarya* as conceived by Uddyotakar[26] and the *abhidhyāna* as understood by Praśastapāda[27] designated the quality that later came to be specified as volition or *prayatna*. Thus by the time of Vācaspatimiśra, if not earlier, eight qualities came to be ascribed to Īśvara, the five general qualities of number, dimension, individuality, conjunction and disjunction and the three specific qualities of cognition, desire and volition. Although this was the generally accepted view of the school, there were individual thinkers who held slightly divergent views. From the literature that is available now we know only of Jayanta who, while dealing with the qualities of Iśvara, explicitly states that Īśvara possesses five of the nine specific qualities of the soul (*ātmā*), namely, cognition, desire, volition, merit and pleasure[28]. This means that he admits ten qualities in Iśvara, since the five general qualities that are possessed by all substances are also to be counted. What moved

25. cf. *BNh* p.944,2 : *saṅkalpānuvidhāyī cāsya dharmaḥ.*

26. cf. *NV* p. 950, 13-19;952,13-14. Naturally this statement is true only in case Uddyotakara really accepted, besides the six qualities enumerated by him, also these qualities.

27. cf. *PDS* p.129,6-7.

28. cf. *NM* p. 185,14-16 : *tad evaṃ navabhya ātmaguṇebhyaḥ pañca jñānasukhecchāprayatnadharmāḥ santīśvare.*

him to ascribe to Īśvara the two additional qualities of Merit (*dharma*) and pleasure (*sukha*) is not quite certain. To judge from his own declaration, he seems to have conceived of *dharma* as an essential quality flowing from the nature of one who favours the living beings,[29] and since Iśvara operates for the good of the living beings. He should necessarily possess this quality. In the same manner, he ascribes to Īśvara the quality of eternal pleasure because he identifies it with the *ānanda* spoken of in the Āgamas as a quality of the Supreme Being and also because, in his opinion, a being devoid of such pleasure will not be fit to create this universe of ours.[30] But, as we said, the view that prevailed among the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, at least from the of Vācaspati onwards, is that Iśvara possesses eight qualities, the five general qualities and the three specific qualities of cognition, desire and volition.

29. Ibid. p. 185,4 : *dharmas tu bhūtānugrahavato vastusvābhāvyād bhavan na vāryate.*

30. Ibid. p. 185, 5-6 : *sukham tasya nityam eva nityānandatvenāgamā pratīteh, asukhitasya caivaṃvidhakāryārambhayogyatā—bhāvāt.*

ABBREVIATION AND EDITIONS USED

NKand	:	Praśastapādabhāṣya (Padārthadharmasaṁgraha) with commentary *Nyāyakandali* of Śrīdharabhaṭṭa. Edited by Durgādhar Jhā Śarmā. Along with Hindi translation. Varanasi 1963.
NS	:	*Nyāyasūtra*
NBh	:	*Nyāyabhāṣya*
NV	:	*Nyāyavārttika*
NVTT	:	*Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*

The texts of *NS, NBh, NV and NVTT* are quoted from: *Nyāya-darśanam* with Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*, Uddyotakara's *Vārttika*, Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyaṭīkā* & Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*. Critically edited with Notes by Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha (=Calcutta Sanskrit Series, No. XXIX) Calcutta 1944.

NM : *Nyāyamañjari* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa edited with notes etc., by Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla (=Kashi Sanskrit Series, No. 106) Benares 1936.

PDS : See *NKand*

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BHAKTI—ITS ATTACHMENT TO SPECIFIC SACRED PLACE

J. W. CURTIS
University of Washington.

Bhakti is not exclusive to South India, although it took a specific form there. In point of fact, the roots of Bhakti can be seen in very early Āryan beginnings. Even though Vedic religion was largely aniconie, Rudra, an early religious figure which is later identified as Śiva, was mentioned in the *Ṛg Veda*. The following *Atharva Veda* describes wandering ascetics called Vrātyas who have been inferred to be devotees of Rudra or Śiva. They were generally austere and meditative, non-ritualistic, devoted to the attainment of ecstacy, and possessed little regard for caste. All of these are also characteristics of later bhaktins. The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* identifies Rudra-Śiva as a mechanism for the attainment of enlightenment and the *Mahābārata* contains a raphsodic description of Śiva and Mount Kailāsa, his sacred Himālayan abode. The *Mahābhārata* in fact leaves little doubt that by its time both Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism were well-established bhakti cults.[1] In a process of mutual accomodation between Āryans and indigenous inhabitants of India, iconic elements gradually made their way into Sanskrit traditions. The making of images and the building of temples for their installation and worship became a feature of North Indian Sanskritic religion by the turn of the Christian calendar.[2]

1. C. V. Narayana Ayyar, *Origin and Early History of Śaivism* (Madras, 1936) pp. 1-19 ; 37-8 ; 71-2.

2. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *Development of Religion in South India* (Madras, 1963) pp. 50, 54, 39.

We do not have historical evidence which provides us with a precise description of the connections between the Bhakti sects which developed in the pre-Buddhist periods in the North and those which began to rise in South India about the beginning of the 6th Century A. D. It is presumed, however, that the former provided the motivation for the latter. Records from the 1st Century A. D. indicate that anthropomorphic figures of gods are a feature of religion in the South, and there is mention of festivals involving the images and their temples which last for a number of days and involve specific rituals to be performed at certain times during the celebration. Information from the 3rd and 4th Centuries make note of images of deities which are either painted directly on the walls of their shrine, or are painted on wooden boards which are then leaned against the back wall, or in some instances, permanently fixed in place. This practice was still followed in Pallava times, for some early rock-cut Pallava shrines include no bas relief sculpture for freestanding cult images in their interior, but provide ashallow ledge in the back wall, apparently as a convenient support for the wooden slab.[3] Poems of the Śaṅgam age mention Śiva and the existence of Śaivite asceticsis noted.[4]

Like its northern predecessor, the Bhakti movement in the South following the 6th Century had two major divisions. Those devotees who worshipped Śiva were known as *Nāyanmārs* and those who worshipped Viṣṇu, as *Ālvārs*.

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3. K. R. Srinivasan, *Cave Temples of the Pallavas* (New Delhi, 1964) p. 34.

4. C. V. Narayana Ayyar, *op. cit.* p. 111.

The early northern Bhakti, while involving a personalized form of deity was heavily influenced by the aniconic nature of Vedic thought. It tended to be intellectual and detached in its manner of worship.[5] Literature with references to the northern Bhaktins indicates a cool, calculated mode of worship[6] and the northern Vaiṣṇava, for example contended that attainment of divine grace required a long and arduous period of training and preparation.[7] The southern Vaiṣṇava, as was also true of the Śaivite *Nāyanmārs*, placed much more emphasis on the person of God, and consequently upon His initiative to act spontaneously. In their scheme of Bhakti, it was conceived that surrender was itself sufficient to move God to an act of grace. Their Bhakti was an emotional, passionate surrender to a remarkably personalized deity.

In this respect, Bhakti represented a considerable departure from other schools of Hindu philosophy. Māṇikkavāśagar, author of the *Tiruvāśagam*, (C. 870 A. D.) outlined the core of Bhakti philosophy in a protest against *Advaita-Vedānta*. For him, the final purpose of devotion was not to lose one's identity in an Absolute which was impersonal and beyond experience, but was to attain to a personal god whose prescence would then be enjoyed for eternity. Rāmānuja, a Śrīvaiṣṇava saint of the 12th Century, affirmed that God

5. George Wooley Speneer, *Royal Leadership and Imperial Conquest in Medieval South India* (Berkeley, 1967) (Ph.D. Thesis) p. 60.

6. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *loc. cit.*

7. George Wooley Speneer, *loc. cit.*

is a personal being, and that Brahman (the Advaita-Vendāntic name for the Impersonal Absolute) is in fact Nārāyaṇ-Viṣṇu. The Śaiva Siddhānta works of Meykandar were categorical in their affirmation of three conceptual entities which could not be dissolved one in the other : God, bondage, and soul.[8]

Although the Bhakti movement was impelled by a complex set of inter-related influences in South Indian society, of which its reaction to the impersonal, intellectual quality of *Advaita-Vedānta* was only one, it was in large measure a response of Hinduism to the dangers of heretical creeds that claimed large numbers of adherents : Budhism and Jainism.[9] Nilakanta Sastri notes that it was the energetic devoted labors of the Nāyanār and Ālvār saints which reversed the tide of the protestant Buddhist and Jain creeds in the South.[10] Bhakti proved to be a capable adversary of Islam as well.[11] In the 14th Century, when much of the Deccan was under various degrees of Muslim control, the pressure of Islam provoked a strong Śaivite revival. This new form of Śaivism stressed equality among its adherents,[12] a Bhakti concept going back to its first mention among Śaivite asectics in the *Atharva Veda.*[13] This measure proved an effective counter against the

8. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *loc. cit.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. K. A. Nilkanta Sastri, *The Colas* (Madras, 1955) p. 129.

11. K. M. Panikkar, *A Survey of Indian History* (Bombay, 1962) p. 131.

12. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *A History of South India* (Madras, 958) pp. 226-227.

13. C. V. Naraṇana Ayyar, *op. cit.* pp. 17-19.

appeal of caste abolition which was one of the strong features of Islamic religion.

It cannot be overlooked, however, that Bhakti movements were also a reaction against Āryanization itself. This reaction is only, inpart, concerned with the orthodox tendency toward *Advaita-Vedānta* for there were additional factors which opened a gulf between Brāhmans and non-Brāhmans. The first group enjoyed royal patronage and provided service to rulers which reinforced their strong social position, while the latter were far removed from contact with their rulers, and moreover, often supported local village cults. Brāhmans tended to be strongly concerned with caste regulations, since they had much to lose by violation of ritual purity. Further, they used Sanskrit in their literature and this removed them completely from the possibility of communication with most of the population.[14]

Bhakti saints, on the other hand, used the language of the people to create poetry of intense devotion which set down their philosophy. Moreover, they used relatively simple tunes which were easily learned and sung by villagers throughout the countryside. Śaṇkarācārya, a Keraḷa Brahman, arose to face the challenge of the popular cult on behalf of organized Brāhmanism in an unparalleled exposition of Advaita philosophy, but in the South, he was effectively countered by the equally vigorous work of Rāmānuja.

While the Bhakti movement was successful in its struggle against the heterodoxies of Buddhism and

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14. Romila Thapar, *A History of India*, Baltimore, 1966, p. 188.

Jainism, it would appear that much of its success was achived by borrowing critical ideas from these sects and incorporating them in its own faith.

The virtual elimination of Buddhism in all of India by the 9th Century is in large measure explained by a process of mutual accomodation of ideas. Buddhism had revised its prohibition against representation of the Buddha, and in other ways, also had begun to resemble a Hindu sect. Brāhmanism, however, had also made marked changes. K. M. Panikkar observes that the accusation that Śaṅkara was a Pracchana Buddha (i.e. a covert Buddhist) had basis in real fact.[15] Bhakti devotees also made accomodations. Tamil devotional cults are often marked by a feeling of sin, worthlessness and inadequacy in the sight of God, which is closer to Buddhistic thought than to Vedic ideas.[16] This feeling was probably reinforced by the non-Buddhistic concept of a personalized God and the resulting aura of inferiority which this may engender in the individual devotee who is by definition eternally separate and distinct from Him.

A borrowing which proved to be critically important in the development of the temple was the grafting into Hinduism of a sense of place. It is extremely critical and highly significant that no Vedic monuments exist and that prior to the development of Buddhism attachment to place was virtually non-existent in the development of the Sanskritic religious tradition. Buddhism had itself adapted many items of popular

15. K. M. Panikkar, *op. cit.* p. 103.

16. Romula Thapar. *op. cit.* p. 188

belief in its formative years. One of these was devotional attachment to caityas, or sacred spots. This was a non-Brahmanical idea, outside of the framework of Vedic sacrifice, which involved the reverence of villagers for a particular place or thing, perhaps a tree, but often a tumuli or mound where the remains of an illustrious chief of the village had been interred. Sometime following the death of the Buddha, numbers of monks began to relinquish the practice of wandering and began to locate themselves permanently near the outskirts of sympathetic villages. Often they located themselves near the local caityas and over a period of time incorporated the caitya concept as an integral part of their religion. The Bodhi tree at Gayā where the Buddha had sat awaiting enlightenment acquired this feeling of sacredness, as did other spots associated with the Buddha's own life : the Deer Park at Vārāṇasī where he first preached the sermon of the Turning of the wheel of the Law, and the Lumbini Grove where he was reputed to have been born. From objects of veneration these became spots of pilgrimage, a practice to which Aśoka lent royal recognition by his own participation.[17]

That the Bhakti saints aodpted a similar affection for particular sacred spots is evident in their devotional literature. The Bhakti saints not only preached personal devotion, but wandered throughout the South, making visits to those temples believed to be especially sacred to their own particular God. Nilakanta Sastri notes that not only were their hymns of great lyric quality and literary merit, often exposing remarkable philosophical insights, but they *always* related the rapture that

17. A. L. Basham, *The Wonder That was India* (New York, 1959) pp. 262-263.

the devotee felt in worshipping at perticularly favorite shrines of the God to which they were devoted.[18]

The Śaivite shrine at Cidambaram is one of the more renowned shrines lauded in Bhakti poetry and song. So highly regarded is this particular spot that it is often referred to simply as "koyil," a Tamil word simply meaning "the temple." Its frequent mention by Śaivite hymnists played an important part in securing its position. During the region of the Cola King Kulottuṅga II (1133-1150 A. D.), the "Tirruttoṇḍarpurāṇam" is reputed to have been composed by a Tamil Bhakti saint, Sekkilār, in the thousand-pillared maṇḍapa of Cidambaram temple. The *Tirruttoṇḍarpurāṇam* is one of twelve major books of the Śaiva tradition. Māṇikkavāsagar, one of the last composers of the productive period of the great Bhakti hymns, devoted many of his works to describing the wonder of Cidambarm and to praising the splendors of Śiva's cosmic dance in Tillai. Both the "Tiruvāśakam" and "Tirusiṟṟambalam" composed by him are thought to have been created at Cidambaram.[19] Popular lengend asserts that a vault behind the Naṭarāja shrine once contained 103,000 hymns. When Nambi Āṇḍdār Nambi opened the vault he is supposed to have found that most of the palm leaves had been destroyed by termites and were irretreivably damaged. Only a small portion of the total number were salvageable and these he completed into the work known as the "*Tevāram.*"[20]

18. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *Development of Religion in South India*, op. cit. p. 39.

19. J. C. Harle, *Temple Gateways of South India*, (Oxford 1953), pp. 27-31.

20. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *op. cit.* p. 41.

This devotion to place was critical in the development of Śaivism. Even in the Epic age the average person tied to the soil or to a craft through economic necessity, could not adopt the austerities and ceaseless wandering practiced by yoga ascetics. They may have venerated the ideal, but any number of pressures, from personal desires to the pressure of social *dharma*, would have tended to tie them to their every day patterns. Periodic symbolic enactment of the ascetie ideal was possible however. Places where yogis performed their austerities and practised their disciplines became holy places called Tīrthas which provided benefit to even the non-yogi who visited there for worship. The benefits of pilgrimage to a Tīrtha were impressive. One might achieve the aunulment of *karma* and increase his eligibility for *mokṣa* and the enjoyment of divine union.[21]

The explicit grafting of a sense of place into Hinduism by the Bhakti poets and their fervid emotional praise of specific shrines as holy sites of personalized dieties provided the necessary idea to quicken the tradition of pilgrimage and make of it a significant religious institution. The thought that a God was particularly associated with one spot and that a spiritual ecstacy, as well as special merit, could be obtained there more redily than in other places[22] (an ideal explicit in Bhakti devotional hymns) was a powerful element in the development of a large number of shrines distinquished in this manner.

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21. George Wooley Spencer, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

22. Burton Stein, "The Economic Function of a Medieval South Indian Temple," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, (Ann Arbor, 1960) XIX, p. 163.

ATHARVA SAṀHITĀ AND ITS FORMS

H. R. DIVEKAR

Poona

The Vedic triad has only one form of *Saṁhitā*. But it is not so with *Atharvaveda*, which has more forms of its *Saṁhitā*, than one. One of them is called आचार्य-संहिता. This word is not found in any lexicon. Monier Williams does not give its under the words compounded with the word आचार्य. It is first used in पंचपटलिका which is a लक्षणग्रन्थ of *Atharvaveda*. It occurs in the first verse of its fifth or last paṭala.

But no explanation is given therein. Bhagavaddatta on p. 4 of his introduction to the published edition of पंचपटलिका quotes a portion of Dārila's commentary. He takes it from p. 27 of Bloomfield's edition of *Kauśika Sūtra*. In note No: 3 on that page, Dārila says:

पुनरुक्त प्रयोगः । पंचपटलिकायामेव कथितः । आर्षी संहितायाः कर्म संयोगात् । आचार्यसंहिताभ्यासार्था ।

But even here, the meaning of *Ācārya Saṁhitā* does not become clear. On page 6, Bhagavaddatta, infers from this quotation that आचार्यसंहिता is that in which the उक्तानुक्त विधि of पंचपटलिका or what is called पुनरुक्तप्रयोग by Dārila becomes applicable. He also says that *Ārṣī Saṁhita* is that which is used in rites. He thus thinks that there were two froms of *Atharva Saṁhitā*: आचार्यसंहिता and आर्षीसंहिता.

Bhagavaddatta did not have the ms. of Dārila Bhāṣya before him. He depended completely on Bloomfield,

who even when he had the commentary of Dārila before him, did not take the trouble of going through its introduction. He remained content simply by giving some easy extracts explaining the sūtras. But now when we possess Dārila's commentary as given in the Berlin codex, we are in a better position to explain the lines quoted above and point out that there were not only the two forms of *Atharva Saṁhitā* as given above but there was also a third from.

At the very outset of the introduction to his commentary, Dārila says:

त्रिविधा संहिता । आचार्यसंहिता, आर्षीसंहिता, विधिप्रयोगसंहिता च ।

Saṁhitā exists in three forms : आचार्यसंहिता, आर्षीसंहिता and विधिप्रयोगसंहिता. He further explains these three forms. About the first, he says:

येन उपनीय शिष्यं पाठयति सा आचार्यसंहिता ।

The form by which (the teacher) teaches his disciple, after initiating him is आचार्यसंहिता. The example given by him is पितरं मित्रं शतवृष्ण्यम् । These words are found in *Śaunaka Saṁhitā* I. 3.2. But there they are preceded by विद्मा शरस्य and followed by तेना ते. . . वहिष्टे अस्तु बालिति. About the second form, he says ऋषिणा दृष्टा ऋषिसंहिता–ऋषिसंहिता exists in the form in which it was seen by the seer (ऋषि). Here the example given is I. 3.2. in full i.e. as it is given in *Samhitā*. Does Dārila intend to say that there was a संहिता in which after I. 3.1, there were only the words पितरं मित्रं शतवृष्ण्यम् and the student only recited these words and not the whole मंत्र–विद्मा शरस्य पितरम् etc? If so there must have been a पोथी giving this abridged *Saṁhitā* But no such 'pothi' has been found up till now.

Bhagavaddatta has also mentined this fact on the last page of his introduction (p.14). He says that he

had no written *Saṁhitā* before him, in which the उक्तानुक्त-नियम–s i.e. rules about what has been said, need not be said, were exemplified. That is why he is not sure about his interpretation of the first paṭala of पंचपटलिका, which gives the rules about the abridgement of the आर्षीसंहिता. Fortunately when I had been to Gwalior in December 1970, I found a pothi giving the padas of such a *Saṁhitā*. This ms. gives the *padas* not of the whole संहिता, but only in their abridged form-i e. by dropping the words already used. Here I found the *padas* of I.3.2, only as पितरम् । मित्रम् । शत-वृष्ण्यम् । After वृष्ण्यम् the numeral 2 is written to denote that the second *mantra* ends and again writes: पितरम् । वरुणम् । शतवृष्ण्यम् ।।3।। and so on, till it comes to the 5th *mantra* which is given in full. In the following four *mantras*–6 to 9, the second hemistich एवा ते मूत्रं मुच्यतां बहि र्बालिति सर्वकम् is not given in pada–form in the verses 7 & 8, but is given in verses 6 & 9. All this seems to be done according to a *Saṁhitā*, giving the mantras in their abridged form. Here are thus seen the उक्तानुक्त rules, mentioned in पंचपटलिका and practised by the Ātharvaṇikas.

Not only are the rules of पंचपटलिका followed in this pothi, but even extracts are taken from it. Thus after the end of the first Anuvāka of the first kāṇḍa, i.e. at the end of the sixth Sūkta, is written आद्य प्रथम ऋचो नव स्युः Similarly at the end of the second Anuvāka which ends with Sūktā 11, is written पंच परे तु and at the end of the fifth Anuvāka, ending with 28th Sūkta are given the words पंचमेऽष्टौ. All these sentences occur in the beginning of the 4th paṭala, which reads in the published text as follows :—

आद्य प्रथम ऋचो नव स्युर्विद्यात् । पंच परे तु । पंचमेऽष्टौ । एकादश चोत्तरे परा : स्यु : । विंशत्या कुरुते । विंशकावतो ऽन्यौ । (p.13). A little thought

convinces us that these must be the prose sentences formed from a metrcial stance like.

आद्ये हि प्रथमे ऋचो नव स्युः
विद्यात् पंच परे तु पंचमेऽष्टौ ।
एकादश चोत्तरे पराः स्युः
विंशत्याः, कुरु विंशकावतोऽन्यौ ॥

In the first (अनुवाक) of the first (kāṇḍa), there are nine verses more than twenty; in the next after it, there are five more; in the fifth eight more; and in one after it, eleven more. In the two others there are twenty and twenty. Thus in the firsh kāṇḍa there are 29+25+20+20+28+31=153 verses. It is thus quite evident that these *padas* given in this pothi follow a *saṁhitā* exemplifying the rules of पंचपटलिका—an आचार्यसंहिता for study.

As regards आर्षीसंहिता, Dārila further says पार्षदे पूर्वं प्रोक्ता इति. Here he actually quotes पंचपटलिका, which at the commencement of its 3rd paṭala, reads:

आर्षी या पार्षदे पूर्वं : प्रोक्ता सूक्ताग्रसंख्यया ।
... ...
सूक्तानां परिमाणार्थमृचामग्रं प्रमाणितम् ।
ऋचाग्रेण तु सूक्ताग्रं सूक्ताग्रेण तु संहिताम् ॥
सूक्ताग्रपरिमाणेन ... ... ।
... ... संप्रदायादधीमहे ॥

From this it is clear that ऋषिसंहिता is that which is taught by the old seers traditionally according to the number of its hymns and verses. Thus the books of *Atharva Saṁhitā* as published in Kāṇḍas, Sūktas and mantrās is what is called ऋषिसंहिता.

We now come to the third form–विधिप्रयोगसंहिता–Dārila says: विधिप्रयोगसंहिता विधौ प्रयुज्यते. It is employed in

the performance of the rites. The first example given by Dārila is ऋतुभ्यस्त्वा यजे स्वाहा. The whole verse as recited in ऋषिसंहिता (III-10-10) runs thus :—

ऋतुभ्यष्ट्वाऽऽर्तवेभ्यो माद्र्यः संवत्सरेभ्यः ।
धात्रे विधात्रे समृधे भूतस्य पतये यजे ॥

Thus it has been said by the seers. But the socrificers do not employ it in this form. It is to be split in parts thus: ऋतुभ्यस्त्वा यजे स्वाहा । आर्तावेभ्यस्त्वा यजे स्वाहा । माद्र्यस्त्वा यजे स्वाहा etc. The one verse is divided in eight parts and oblations are given with each part.

The second example is given for using XI-3-2 which runs thus :—

ततश्चैनमन्येन शीर्ष्णा प्राशीः येन चैतं पूर्वं ऋषयः प्राश्नन् । ज्येष्ठस्ते प्रजा मरिष्यतीत्येनमाह ।

तं वो अंह नार्वाञ्चं न पराञ्चं न प्रत्यञ्चम् ।

बृहस्पतिना शीर्ष्णा । तेनैनं प्राशिषं तेनैनमजीगमम् ।

While exemplifying this Dārila says केन शीर्ष्णा प्राशी : येन..... i.e. before the words शीर्ष्णा प्राशीः etc., the word केन is to be employed to make it a question put by the sacrificer. The answer to which is to be given as तं वा अहं . . . बृहस्पतिना शीर्ष्णा . . . तेनैनं . . . He further says उत्तरयोगेष्वेवं प्रयोग : / While using the following *mantras* a similar procedure is to be followed. For instance in the following *mantra*, काभ्यां श्रोत्राभ्यां प्राशी : is to be used in the question and the answer then should be तं वा अहं . . . द्यावा पृथिवीभ्यां श्रोत्राभ्याम् . . . ताभ्यामेनं . . . Dārila thus shows how the *mantra* is to be used by puting some new words in it.

The third example is अग्निं ब्रूमो, यन्मातलीं रथक्रीतं ब्रूमो राजानं, यन्मातली इत्येवं सर्वासां द्वितीया । The hymn अग्निं ब्रूमो stands as XI.6. The first verse is अग्निं ब्रूमो, the second is ब्रूमो राजानम् and यन्मातली is the last i.e. 23rd. What Dārila means to

say, is that यन्मातली is the last to be used after each verse as its second that is to be repeated after every verse. षट् चत्वारिंशदचो विधिः विधिसंहिता. Thus says Dārila. The last verse being repeated after every other verse, even after itself, this becomes the rite of $23 \times 2 = 46$ verses and thus exemplifies विधिसंहिता.

Next example given by Dārila is आयमगन्, ऋतून् यज, इंद्रपुत्र, एकाष्टका, विधिसंहिता। Verses beginning with these words occur as the 8th, 9th, 13th and 12th of the hymn प्रथमा हव्युवास i.e. III-10. But Dārila says that in the विधिसंहिता, they are to be used in this order. The order of the verses is thus changed in विधिसंहिता,

Dārila gives now the last example. He says :— इंद्रस्यौज इत्यनयावपन्नां प्रक्षालयति। जिष्णवे योगाय इत्यपो युनक्ति। पुनरिंद्रस्यौज इति प्रक्षालयति। जिष्णवे योगायेत्यपो युनक्ति। एतद् न्यासेन न्यासेन प्रक्षालनयोगैः एताश्चैकावसाना युक्ता वक्तुमिति विधिप्रयोगसंहिताप्रदर्शनम्॥

इंद्रस्यौजः is the first hemistitch of X-5-1 and जिष्णवे योगाय the second. Kauśika sūtras mention their use in 49-3,4. The rite is to be performed on self-fallen sticks of अश्वत्थ. They are to be washed with the *mantra* इंद्रस्यौजः and water is to be poured on it by जिष्णवे योगाय. The procedure is to be followed again and again six times with the six verses of X-5-1. Each time, the first half is the same, but the second half is different. Dārila thus says that these are fit to be called एकावसाना i.e. having only one sentence in each. He gives this as his opinion, but पंचपटलिका does not do so. Thus end the explanation of विधिप्रयोगसंहिता.

By his five examples, Dārila illustrates the five different manners by which *mantras* of the ऋषिसंहिता are to be employed in the performance of the ritual. They are :—

(i) a verse is to be split in parts, as ऋतुभ्यष्ट्वा यजे.

(ii) New words are to be added in the *mantras* as केन शीर्ष्णा.

(iii) Number of verses are to be increased by repetition, as अग्नि ब्रूमो यन्मातली

(iv) change of order of the verses as इंद्रपुत्रे एकाष्टका

(v) A semiverse is to be taken separately as a मंत्र, as इंद्रस्यौजः जिष्णवे योगाय.

Any way, ऋषिसंहिता is the संहिता par excellence and stands between the आचार्यसंहिता and विधिप्रयोगसंहिता as the main stay. आचार्यसंहिता tries to avoid the repetitions and abridges it for study, while the विधिप्रयोगसंहिता amplifies it for ritual.

BUDDHISM IN A NEW PERSPECTIVE

U. DHAMMARATANA
Nalanda

[With the early Western writers on Buddhism it had become almost a fashion to represent the doctrine of Lord Buddha as a kind of pessimism. The obvious reason was the presentation of the four noble truths (cattāri ariya-saccāni) with *dukkha* or suffering as the first proposition. This method of presenting the four truths is quite logical. This doctrine as a whole could be appreciated only when all the four propositions are taken into consideration. Then it would be clear that it is neither pessimistic nor optimistic but realistic in nature. Another point they failed to appreciate was that the four truths represent only one approach to the Reality. In the discourses of the Buddha there are also other approches to it.

The Buddha did not deny the existence of the sensual pleasures which represent the only happiness for the common run of people. But then he pointed out that it does not exhaust all happiness for man. In the light of his own experience he taught that there are higher levels of happiness culminating in the eternal bliss of Nibbāna. There are discourses of the Buddha bearing on this point. This view point has been elucidated in the present article.]

Consciously or unconsciously all living beings are seeking after happiness. We can conceive of a scale of happiness. The gradation of the scale is not one of quantity alone but of quality also. It may be under-

stood in terms of various mental stages beginning with that of the animal and ending with that of the perfect saint.

Happiness at the lowest level may be presented in terms of what are called carnal pleasures which are common to men and lower animals. The carnal pleasures represent the crudest form of happiness. The people in general pursue after this kind of happiness. Egoism in its most unregenerate form manifests in relation to the enjoyment of carnal pleasures. The enjoyment of carnal pleasures gives rise to lustful desires. They, in their turn, give rise to grasping. This sets in motion a chain of actions and reactions. As a result, there is a hot pursuit after such pleasures. But the composite things being what they are, they elude the grasp of man. The moment they are touched, they are gone, there is nothing abiding. Therefore nothing is retained. This kind of pleasure-hunting proves to be a will-ó-the-wisp. When his desires are not fulfilled, man meets with disappointment. Bitterness of disappointment would be in proportion to the intensity of attachment. Hence it has been said : 'When a person given to the pursuit of carnal pleasures has obtained them, he is happy indeed; but the moment he loses them, he suffers like one struck with an arrow'.[1]

Without stopping to understand the nature of these painful experiences, most people would try to devise various ways and means of obtaining and enjoying such

1. Kāmaṁ Kāmyamānassa tassa ce taṁ samijjhati,
Addha pītimano hoti laddhā macco yadicchati.
Tassa ce kāmayānassa chandajātassa jantuno
te kāmā parihāyanti sallaviddho va ruppati.
Kāmasutta, *Suttanipāta*, p. 388.

pleasures. In the process they would be creating lot of complications for themselves and others. The Devatā of the *Saṁyuttanikāya*, who gave expression to this fact in the following words, must have been a keen observer of human affairs :

'Tangle within and tangle without. These people are entangled in a tangle. So I put this question to Gotama—who succeeds in disentangling this tangle ?'.[2]

It is the animal desires that are concerned with the enjoyment of carnal pleasures. Even in normal cases they give rise to mental agitations. In abnormal cases they give rise to emotional outbursts. Here it has to be noted that it is not so much the pleasures as such that are at fault. It is the self-centred desires, that are unregenerate in nature, that are at fault. All attempts at the illegitimate enjoyment of sensual pleasures lead to clash of interests and all the painful consequences they are heir to. It is their over-estimation that leads to this state of affairs. If they are estimated for what they are worth and treated as such, no ground would be left for inordinate desires, attachment and clash of interests. Therefore it has been said that the wise man understands the nature of these pleasures in terms of both *assāda* or joy and *ādīnava* or pain. In the enjoyment of such pleasures he follows the middle course. With mindfulness he keeps within the limits of the legitimate demands of nature, and avoids getting involved in complications.

At the second stage we have what are known as intellectual pleasures. A certain amount of detachment

2. Anto jaṭā bahi jaṭā jaṭāya jaṭitā pajā taṁ taṁ Gotama pucchāmi ko imaṁ vijaṭaye jaṭaṃ ? Devatāsaṁyutta, *Saṁyuttanikāya*. Vol I, p. 164

is required for the enjoyment of these pleasures. A lover of music would enjoy a sweet song on a beautiful theme. While listening to it, he would feel as if the very chords of his heart have been touched. They vibrate in response to the musical tunes. Unlike in the case of the enjoyment of carnal pleasures, here he is not carried away by crude emotions. Both head and heart play their part, and mental balance is maintained.

We can also speak of a gradation of intellectual pleasures in terms of a detached attitude of mind. The carnal pleasures have been characterised as crude in nature. Comparatively speaking intellectual pleasures are of a refined nature. The sense of egoism is still present. But it does not come to the forefront of mind. With a sense of civility it remains in the background. For the same reason, there is not much ground for clash of interests. In fact it is by cultivating an attitude of detachment that the highest pleasures of this category can best be enjoyed. As they rise higher and higher in the scale, they become more and more universal in nature. On the contrary, carnal pleasures remain individualistic in nature. Then again intellectual pleasures leave a healthy effect on a person. As such he or she feels refreshed and recreated after undergoing this kind of experience. Though carnal pleasures are crude and intellectual pleasures are refined in nature, in a wider sense they come under the common category of sensual pleasures.

When we read the discourses of the Buddha on the first noble truth (dukkha-ariya-sacca), at first sight it appears to us as if He ignored to recognise the very existence of sensual pleasures. It is true that while giving a logical exposition of the first truth He showed

how sensual pleasures end in pain, and that from the point of view of the Noble Ones (ariyas), who are on a higher mental plane. All the same He did not forget to refer to the existence of sensual pleasures. Thus in *assādasutta* He says, 'if there were no delights in the five sensual pleasures, the common people would not go after them'.[3] Here the special reference is to the carnal pleasures. The Buddha spoke these words in the light His own experience. Once in course of a discussion with Mahānāma Sākya, who expressed his difficulty in overcoming attachment for sensual pleasures in spite of his best efforts, the Buddha remarked that before Enlighenment He too experienced difficulty in weaning away the mind from running after sensual pleasures. It was only when He was able to direct His mind towards higher happiness that He was able to give up attachment for such pleasures.[4]

As regards the enjoyment of intellectual pleasures in the case of the Buddha and His disciples, we can form some idea on the basis of their descriptions of natural beauty as found in the *Theragāthā* and *Udāna*.

3. No ce daṁ, bhikkhave, rūpānaṁ assādo abhavissa, na yidaṁ sattā rūpesu sārajjeyyuṃ..... na phoṭṭhabbesu sārajjeyuṃ.

Saṁyuttanikāya, Vol. iv, p. 12.

4. Mayhaṃ pi kho, Mahānāma, pubbeva sambodhā, anabhisambuddhassa bodhi—sattasseva sato, 'appassādā kāmā bahudukkhā bahupāyāsā, ādhīnavo ettha btiyyo ti'—evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya na sudiṭṭhaṃ hoti ; so ca aññatreva kāmehi aññatra akusalehi dhammehi piti-sukhaṃ nājjhagamaṃ, aññaṃ vā tato santataraṃ ; atha khvāhaṃ neva tāva anāvaṭṭi kāmesu paccaññāsiṃ. yato ca kho me, Mahānāma, 'appassādā kāmā...ādinavo ettha bhīyyo' ti—evame- taṃ...sudiṭṭhaṃ ahosi, so aññatreva kāmehi aññatra akusalehi dhammehi pītisukhaṃ ajjhagamaṃ, aññaṃ vā tato santataraṃ ; athāhaṃ anāvaṭṭi kāmesu paccaññāsiṃ.

Cūḷadukkhakkhandha-sutta, *Majjhimanikāya* Vol. I, p. 127.

In this world we always have exponents of sensual pleasures both at the lower and the higher levels. The special mission of the Tathāgata was to direct the mind of people towards the highest happiness of *Nibbāna*, which He had realised after a life of great *sādhanā*. This means that sensual pleasures do not exhaust all happiness. In other words there are pleasures other than those of the sensual plane.

With reference to the above fact the Buddha says, 'if somebody were to say that the five kinds of sensual pleasures exhaust all happiness, I do not agree with him. There are pleasures other than these which are of a higher and sweeter nature'. Here the reference is to the pleasures of the *Jhānic* plane which may be characterised as super-sensual. There are eight stages in the *Jhānic* plane—four *rūpa-Jhānas* and four *arūpa-Jhānas*. Again the happiness that is enjoyed in a higher *Jhāna* is sweeter than that of a lower *Jhāna*. *Paṭhamajjhāna* stands at the lowest level and *Nevasaññānāsaññāyatana* at the highest level. While elaborating the point the Buddha refers to this fact in terms of the *Jhānas* in a progressive order.[5]

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5. Yaṃ kho, Ānanda, ime pañca kāmaguṇe paṭicca uppajjati sukhaṃ somamassaṃ—idaṃ vuccati kāmasukhaṃ. ye kho, Ānanda, evaṃ vadeyyuṃ—etaṃ paramaṃ santaṃ sukhaṃ somanassaṃ paṭisaṃvedentī ti—idaṃ nesāhaṃ nānujānāmi. taṃ kissa hetu ? atthānanda, etamhā sukhā aññaṃ sukhaṃ abhikkantataraṃ ca paṇītataraṃ ca.

Katamaṃ cānanda, etamhā sukhā aññaṃ sukhaṃ abhikkantataraṃ ca paṇītataraṃ ca? Idhānanda, bhikkhu vivicceva kāmehi... vivakajaṃ pītsukhaṃ paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. Idaṃ kho, Ānanda, etamhā sukhā aññam sukhaṃ abhikkantataraṃ ca paṇītataraṃ...atthanandā, etamhā sukha aññaṃ sukhaṃ abhikkantataraṃ ca Panītataraṃ ca...Idhānanda, bhikkhu sabbaso ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ samatikkamma nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharati. Pañcakaṅgasutta, *Saṃyuttanikāya*, Vol. iv, pp. 200-202.

In this connection it has to be noted that the sensual pleasures are dependent on the physical world represented by the five sense-objects—visual objects to tactual objects.[6] For the same reason they are derivative in nature. Further they are associated with *kilesas* or defilements which may be gross or subtle as the case may be. On the contrary the *Yogāvacara* enjoys the *Jhānic* happiness by withdrawing into the mental world. By attaining different stages of *Jhāna* he taps higher sources of happiness sweeter and sweeter in nature. Unlike the sensual pleasures which are derivative in nature, *Jhānic* happiness is intrinsic in nature. In *Jhānas* being aloof from defilements, which are but so may hindrances, mind has free play. In the case of the sensual plane, under the influence of *kilesas*, mind remains in a state of bondage (yoga) and agitation (vikkhepa). In the super-sensual plane, it is in a state of freedom (vimutti) and tranquillity (samatha). Conventionally speaking, it may be said that while the pleasures of the sensual plane are momentary in nature, those of the super-sensual plane are more durable in that a *yogāvacara* can remain in a *Jhānic* state for a long time. This has been beautifully explained in *Abhidhamma* with reference to the *appanāvīthi-citta*. One of the relevant passages on the point is as follows: 'On all occasions, in a state of *Jhāna*, consciousness flows on like the *bhavaṅga* without any interruption. Hence here *javana*, continues

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6. pañca kāmaguṇā-cakkhuviññeyyā rūpā iṭṭhā kantā manāpā piyarūpā kāmūpasaṃhitā rajanīyā ... kāyaviññeyyā phoṭṭhabbā iṭṭhā kantā manāpā piyarūpā kāmūpasaṃhitā rajaniyā.

Sangītisutta, *Dīghnikāya*, Vol. iii, P. 182.

for numerious thought-moments.[7] Both the sensual plane (kāma-bhūmi) and super-sensual plane (mahaggata-bhūmi) come under the common category of the mundane plane (lokiya-bhūmi). This is true of their happiness also.

Even *Jhāna-sukha* or super-sensual pleasures do not exhaust all happiness. *Nibbāna* is the ultimate goal of life. It represents the highest happiness.[8] It can be attained only in the supra-mundane plane (lokuttara-bhūmi). Happiness of lower planes is relative in nature, whereas that of the highest plane is absolute in nature.[9] The *yogāvacara* has a foretaste of *Nibbāna* when he attains *Nirodhasamāpatti* where there is the cessation of both perception (saññā) and feeling (vedanā). The world of relativity is understood and experienced in terms of *saññā* and *vedanā*. They have no excess to the ultimate truth and for that matter happiness absolute. It is only on the temporary cessation of the function of this mental apparatus that the saint enters into the last *samāpatti*, where he becomes one with reality (dhammabhúto). He is truth itself, happiness itself. As *Nibbāna* is beyond concepts and words, it is indescribable and inexpressible (anakkhāta). It is a matter for self-realisation of the wise (paccattaṁ veditabbo viññūhi).

Though *Nibbāna* is incomparable, there are certain expressions which refer to its excellent nature. Theras and Theris in their *udānas* refer to the fact that

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7. Sabbathāpi samāpattivīthiyaṃ bhavaṅgasote viya vīthinyamo natthī ti katvā bahūni pi labbhantī ti.

Abhidamma Philosophy, p. 140.

8. nibbānaṃ paramaṃ sukhaṃ. *Dhammapada*, 257.

9. ekantasukhaṃ nibbānaṃ. *Milindapañha*, (Bombay edition) p. 253.

they alwyas take delight in *Nibbāna* (nibbāna-ratā sadā). While referring to his experience of the matter Kulla Thera says : 'Delight one experiences on relising the truth in a state of *samādhi* is not to be had even from the five-fold music.[10] On one occasion in course of a discussion with a *brahmin* named Magandiya the Buddha remarked that he took delight in happiness surpassing even that of the Devas.[11]

These similes have been used just to direct the mind of the aspirant towards *Nibbāna*. He is not to rest satisfied with lesser achievements on the way. He has to tread the noble path to the end until the final goal is reached.

For one who has realised Nibbāna, happiness of lower planes appears as illusory. *Nibbāna* is *the* happiness. Mundane happiness is but a shadow when compared with the supra-mundane happiness which is the substance. But then it cannot be gain said that for those who are still in the lower planes that happiness is real. Children build houses. For them they are real, and not just playthings. So they take great care of them. When they are damaged they feel aggrieved. For the matured they are but make-believe. But then this kind of make-believe is essential for the healthy growth of the child. When he has outgrown his childhood, he

10. pañcañgikena turiyena na ratī hoti tādisi, yathā ekaggacittassa sammā dhammaṃ vipassato.

Theragāthā, 328

11. yā hayaṃ Magandiya, ratī aññatreva kāmehi aññatra akusalehi dhammehi– api dibbaṃ sukhaṃ samadhigayha tiṭṭhatitāya ratiyā ramamāṇo hīnassa na pihemi, na tattha abhiramāmi.

Māgandhiyasutta, *Majjhimanikāya*, Vol. II, p. 203.

understands how childish it was of him to have treated the playthings as real. Now he understands the world around him. Him mind is occupied with things of greater importance. So he is no more in a position to attach importance to playthings of his childhood days.[12]

So far as the spiritual happiness is concerned, *Puthujjana* or the average man of the world is a child. He is occupied with his playthings. Let him be happy with his toys without creating complications for himself and others. But then he cannot remain in this state for long. A time will come when he will begin to outgrow this childish mentality. That is the point of disillusionment. *Bodhicitta* is within him. It is the jewel within the lotus,[13] which is waiting for the sun-shine of *Saddhamma* to bloom forth. When it has been touched by the sun-rays, the petals open one by one. In due course it is in full bloom. Then the jewel within shines forth in full effulgence. The awakening of the *Bodhicitta* is a gradual process.

Once the *Bodhicitta* has been tickled, it is not possible for the *yogāvacara* to remain in the lower plane. With his *dhamma-cakkhu* or the spiritual eye, which is stil dim, he has gained glimpses of higher levels of

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12. sdyyathā pi, Rādha, kumārakā vā kumārikāyo vā paṃsvāgarakehi kīlanti. yāvakīvañca tesu paṃsvāgārakesu avigatarāgā honti avigatacchandā avigatapemā avigatapipāsā avigatapariḷāhā avigatataṇhā tāva tāni paṃsvāgārakāni allīyanti kelāyānti dhanāyanti mamāyanti yato ca kho, Rādha, kumārakā vā kumarikāyo vā tesu paṃsvāgārakesu vigatarāgā honti... vigatataṇhā, atha kho tāni paṃsvāgārakāni hatthehi ca pādehi ca vikiranti vidhamanti vlddhaṃsenti vikilaniyaṃ karonti.

Saṃyuttanikāya, Vol. p. 403.

13. Om maṇi padme hum.

happiness. So he makes earnest efforts for their attainment. He attains them one by one. At every new stage he enjoys happiness sweeter than at the lower stage. This is the urge that sustains his efforts and keeps him on the path. Once he has attained the *ariya-bhūmi*, there is smooth sailing for him. He is destined to attain the final goal of *Nibbāna* in due course.[14]

With the realisation of *Nibbāna* all his efforts come to an end. It is the perfection and fulfilment of life. The mystery of the universe has been revealed. But the nature of *Nibbāna* which is also the supreme happiness is indescribable. It is a matter for self-realisation. Therefore when questions are put to him on it, the perfect saint observes noble silence (ariyo tuṇhibhāvo). The earnest seeker after truth understands the meaning of this silence. He too treads the path with full confidence waiting for the great moment.

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14. niyato sambodhi-parāyaṇo.

LAKṢAṆA, "GRAMMATICAL RULE"

SERGIU AL-GEORGE

The Sanskrit substantive *lakṣaṇa* has many semantic values, all of them being derived from the main meaning, "characteristic sign", "distinguishing mark", "indication". Thus, for instance, in ritual literature *lakṣaṇa* designates "catch-word", "lines drawn on the sacrificial area", in astrology "auspicious mark", in medicine "symptom of a disease", in iconography "indicative attribute of a divinity", in logic "definition" ; in the grammatical terminology, among other things, it designates "grammatical rule". The first occurrence of this technical meaning is to be found in *Ṛkprātiśākhya* XIII,31[1], being employed at large in the post-Pāṇinian literature. In contradistinction to the above mentioned technical employments of the word *lakṣaṇa*, the grammatical one requires some explanations, being not self-evident.

In attempting to solve the equation *lakṣaṇa*= grammatical rule, the modern exegesis quotes, without further explanations, the famous Patañjali's gloss in his introduction to *Mahābhāṣya* (after *vārttika* 14), where he states *śabdo lakṣyaḥ sūtraṁ lakṣaṇam*, "the word is the object of rule (lit. "the signified object"), the *sūtra* [of Pāṇini] is the rule (lit. "the sign")" ; this statement, however, does not provide the reasons of the semantic change by which the grammatical rule is assimilated to the significative structure which detains a central posi-

1. L. Renou, Les connexions entre le rituel et la grammaire en sanscrit, *Journal Asiatique*, 233, 1941-42 (1945), p. 128

tion in Indian logic. Two different logical operations-the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) and the inferential reasonment (*anumāna*)—are considered by Hindu logicians to belong to the significative relation. Both of them are viewed of being a mediate knowledge, a deductive cognition from antecedent to consequent ; the sign is the antecedent and its admittance entails that of the consequent—the signified. Thus the Indian definition, where the definiens is called *lakṣaṇa* (name which extended to the whole definitional process), is not a mere "characterisation", as usually given in Western translations, but a semiotic act. The definiens *lakṣaṇa* is synonymous with *liṅga* which qualifies the logical reason in *anumāna*, the inferential reasonment : e.g., the existence of the smoke is the "sign", *liṅga*, of the existence of the fire. "Pervasion" (*vyāpti*) is the common relation—according to Indian logic—at the basis of inferential reasoning and definition as well[2].

We are going to attempt an explanation of the fact that in grammatical terminology "grammatical rule" is

2. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* ; I, Leningrad, 1932, p. 146, points out that in Indian logic the definition is an "abridged" or a "defective" inference ; D.H.H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Nāvya-Nyāya Logic*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1951, p. 81, further remarks that the three fallacies of the definition in Nyāya (*ativyāpti*, "overpervasion", *avyāpti*, "non-pervasion" and *asaṁbhava*, "impossibility") "are essentially the same as the traditional *hetvābhāsa's* or fallacies of the *hetu*" ; cf. also B.K. Motilal, The intensional character of *lakṣaṇa* and *saṁkara* in Navya Nyāya, *Indo-Iranian Journal*, 1964, 2, p. 86 : <<In each case of a true definition, it will be possible to formulate a sort of miniature syllogistic inference, of the form : ' A (is) B, because C", where the definiendum will occupy the subject position (*pakṣa*), "distinct from others" will be the *sādhya*, and the definiens will be the *hetu*>>.

equated to "sign", by starting from the fact that Indian thought implicitly admits that the deductive relation between sign and signified may integrate distinct logical operations, being more comprehensive than them. According to the Indian point of view, the significative relation is the most general consequence they conceived along similar lines to those developed by the European Mediaeval Logic ; William of Ockham admitted as valid logical consequence (*consequentia bona*), and therefore as equivalent to conditional propositions, the consequence "from a definition to definiendum" (*a diffinitione ad diffinitum*)[3]. What is revelatory for our inquiry is the fact that the Indian traditional grammar is resorting to this general relation—anticipating the logicians—in analyzing the structural relations of the language.

Staal deserves the merit of having been the first to discuss the affinity and even the filiation existing between the grammatical rule and the logical definition in India,[4] but his inquiry—otherwise prefatory—does not make any reference to the general context of the significative relation. The Dutch scholar deals with only one of the three categories under which Pāṇini's *sūtras* fall, namely with definitional rules (*saṁjñāsūtras*) of the grammatical technical terms ; although he is referring, too, to the category of the *paribhāṣā sūtras,* metarules concerning the interpretative technique of the other rules (definitional

3. Cf. A. Dumitriu, *Istoria Logicii*, Bucharest, 1969, p. 405, where other types of valid consequences are quoted : "*A proprietate ad proprium*", "*Ab uno synonimo ad aliud*" etc. which have not been accepted by the mathematical logic.

4. The theory of definition in Indian logic, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 1961, 81, p. 122-124.

and descriptive rules concerning the formation of speech units), pointing out their logical value, he does not provide a direct explanation of the fact that not only the actual definitional rules but the other two kinds of rules are called *lakṣaṇa* ; Staal's paper remains, however, highly suggestive in this respect. Motilal, in referring to Staal's paper, adds that <<the scheme for a *saṁjñā* roughly corresponds to the notion "nominal or syntactical definition" of modern formal logicians. Such definitions are explained as "conventions which provide that certain symbols or expressions shall stand (as substitutes or abbreviations) for particular formulas of the system>>"[5].

Even if we were to retain only the denominative aspect of the *saṁjñā* rules, it must be admitted that the nominal definition itself, the same as a definition based on a distinguishing mark, contains an analytical relation ; the only difference is that in the denominative definition the analytical relation is conventionally established, whereas in the one based on a distinguishing mark it is pre-existent. The denominative definition implies a semiosis, since the technical term "stands for", being an indirect mark of a reality ; every proposition derived from such a definition is an analytical one or a "tautology". It is worth recalling here that, according to the greatest logician of India, Dignāga, the name may be viewed as a logical reason (*hetu, liṅga*) through which its object is cognized ; in summarizing Dignāga's doctrine, Stcherbatsky states that the respective relation "is founded on identity of objective reference, the deduction is analytical and the three aspects of the reason are realized ; e.g. : 1) This object is called a jar, 2) Wherever such objects are

5. *Ibid.*, p. 85, note 1

found they are called jars, 3) This name is never applied to a non-jar"[6]. The fact must be added that the *saṁjñā* rules beyond their purely nominal shape—as Vidya Niwas Misra minutely analyzed—are pointing at definite categories of hierarchical relations existing between the structural units of the language[7].

Reasons enabling to justify the qualification of *lakṣaṇa* not only for the definitional rules, but for other types of Pāṇini's *sūtra* may be provided by the various acceptations of the word *lakṣaṇa* in Pāṇini's own text. The great Indian grammarian uses the word *lakṣaṇa* when dealing with some infra-lexical (the unilateral dependence of a suffix on its function) and syntactical relations[8]. Among the devices of syntactically expressing the sign-signified relations, Pāṇini indicates some conditional subordinations (III, 3, 8-9), the absolute constructions of the locative (II, 3, 37) and the genitive (II, 3, 38), the present active and medium participle (III, 2, 126) ; by establishing syntactical equivalents, Pāṇini is assigning the same value to some units of the simple propositions, as for instance to certain propositions of the *karmapravacanīya* group (I, 4, 84 ; I, 4, 90-91), to some invariable compounds made up by some of them (II, 1, 14-16) and to the suffixes of the instrumental case (II, 3, 21). In all these subordinations the content of the protasis or its equivalent is called *lakṣaṇa*, "sign", because it is expressing

6. *Ibid.*, p. 459.

7. *The descriptive technique of Pāṇini*, The Hague-Paris, 1966, pp. 84-101.

8. This problem has been discussed more fully in our paper, Sign (*lakṣaṇa*) and propositional logic in Pāṇini, *East and West*, 1969, 19, pp. 176-193.

an antecedent of the content expressed by the main clause.

One of the above mentioned constructions, frequently present even in the framework of Aṣṭhādhyāī's *sūtras*, is that of the absolute locative. Because of the abridged style of the treatise, the absolute construction does not appear in its normal condition - a participle accompanying a name—but under an incomplete form ; either the name is missing, and only the participle is present (e. g., II, 3, 1) or the name alone is present, the participle to be supplied being *sati* (the present participle of the verb *AS*, "to be", e. g., I, 4, 23) ; at other times the two terms of the absolute locative construction are well-fused, the latter only being in the locative (e. g., III, 3, 144). The absolute value of the locative with Pāṇini is the same as in the nominal style of the technical texts[9], that of a conditional subordinate, and it expresses the conditions indicating a certain grammatical or metagrammatical operation. Patañjali calls this locative *viṣayasaptamī*, "field locative", "locative of the sphere (of validity)", in contradistinction to *parasaptamī*, "locative of the following one", which marks a word indicating that the preceding one is to be substituted, as stipulated in the metarule I, 1, 66.

The *viṣayasaptamī* of the grammatical operations is the most used, mainly in the operations leading to the generation of the expression units, when a transition is

9. H. Jacobi, Über den Nominalstil des wissenschaftlichen Sanskrit, *Indo-germanische Forschungen*, 14, 1903, p. 244 : "die Verwendung des Lokativus zur Umschreibung von Konditional und Konzessivsätzen von dem Gebrauch des Lokativus absolutus ausgegangen ist".

made from the abstract to concrete plane : the locative marks units of the content or grammatical functions, "terms of the higher strata",[10] for the expression of which concrete units in the expression chain are indicated. These rules have the general form, "When A is to be expressed, then A' is valid (or indicated)". The *viṣayasaptamī* of the metagrammatical operations, that of the *paribhāṣās*, marks the indication of an operation in interpreting and applying a grammatical rule. It is worth of notice the frequent occurrence of this syntactical construction in the oldest axiomatic syntax of the *paribhāṣās* : Over a third of the *paribhāṣās* list—as given by Nāgojibhaṭṭa—resort to this syntactic form. Both kinds of rules either grammatical or metagrammatical shaped with *viṣayasaptamī* are the best illustration of the rule II, 3, 37, (*yasya ca bhāvena bhāvalakṣaṇam*), where Pāṇini states that "[the seventh suffix (=the locative) is indicated when there is to be expressed] too, that by the action of which another action is signified". The fact that a grammatical rule may be illustrated even by the grammatical structure of a rule is but supporting the discovery of the transformational grammar that " a linguistic 'structure' is relative not just to the data or corpus, but also to grammatical theory describing the data".[11]) ; for Pāṇini, as well for the transformational grammar, grammar was a grammar of rules and language was confused with the language of rules.

The logical value of the locactive absolute—qualified as sign-becomes more evident when confronted with its

10. V.N. Misra, op. cit., p. 103.

11. E. Batch, *An introduction to transformational grammar*, New York, 1966, p. 29.

role in the syntax of the logical texts. This grammatical form is very frequently resorted to when definitions are formulated, and it expresses the definiens which, according to Indian logic, is a distinguishing mark (*lakṣaṇa*) ; this stylistic value of the locative was remarked by Indian logicians themselves[12]. The same, the locative absolute may express the logical antecedent in the rule stating the unilateral dependence (*vyāpti*) between the sign and the signified, dependence on which the inferential reasoning (*anumāna*) is based ; thus, the general rule "whenever there is no fire, there is no smoke" may be formulated either *yatra vahnir nāsti tatra dhūmo-'pi nāsti*—the protasis being a relative subordinate—or *agnyabhāve dhūmo'pi nāsti*—the protasis being a locative absolute. Accordingly, the locative absolute appears as a syntactical equivalent to the relative subordinate when expressing the protasis of a logical rule.

The above established comparisons between the syntactical structure of the grammatical rule and that of the two logical operations—viewed by Indian logicians as deductive operations based on a significative relation—as well as the logical value of the word *lakṣaṇa* in Pāṇini—are able to give the clue to the equation : *lakṣaṇa*=grammatical rule. Accordingly, the word *lakṣaṇa* when assigned to the grammatical rule must be taken in its

12. The *Nyāyabodhinī* in commenting on *Tarkasaṁgraha* 9, where the definition of the air is given (*rūparahitatve sati sparśavattvaṃ vāyor lakṣaṇam*, absence of colour existing, the fact of possessing a touch, this is the definition of the air') explains : *satisaptamyā viśiṣṭārthakatayā rūparahitatvaviśiṣṭasparśavattvaṃ vāyor lakṣaṇam*, "since the locative absolute has a qualifying meaning, the fact of possessing a touch qualified by the absence of colour, gives the definition of the air".

logical sense ; the most suitable translation is *indicium*, "indication", "criterion", instead of "characterisation" which is rather ambiguous, because it suggests a mere descriptive operation.

The same as the Stoics considered both the validity of the premiss and the revelation of the conclusion as being a derivation from sign to signified,[13] the Indian traditional grammar qualifies both the internal relations between the elements of a rule and the relation between the rule itself and the linguistic form it generates as a relation from sign to signified. The grammatical rule expresses relations of an analytical nature enabling operations of building correct language forms, in the same way as a logical rule can be the main premiss which enables the operation of deducting a valid conclusion.

The above discussion brings into foreground one important fact : in contrast with the Greeks, the Indians qualified as semiosis not only the application of the condition of validity in logical operations, but in the linguistic ones as well ; thus they opend the largest perspective in order to understand the oneness of the linguistic and logical structures. As for the antecedence of the grammatical rule against the logical rules or laws— as it is supported by some modern logicians, namely that logical laws are but instances of grammatical rules— the Indian cultural context is revelatory, because this antecedence is here historically attested.

13. *Sextus Empiricus*, transl. by R.G. Burry, Cambridge (Mass.), 1957, pp. 259 and 367.

काव्यकारणसमालोचनम्

गोपराजु राम

प्रयाग

सर्वस्यापि कार्यस्य कारणं किञ्चिन्निश्चितरूपेण भवत्येवेति सर्वशास्त्रसिद्धान्तः। कारणमन्तरा कार्यं नैवोत्पत्तुं शक्नोति नवोत्पादयितुमपि। अत एवोक्तम्—

[1]"कार्यनियतपूर्ववर्तिकारणमिति।

तच्च कारणं समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदेन त्रिविधम्। एतच्च कारणत्रयं सर्वस्यापि कार्यस्यावश्यमपेक्षितमिति तेनैव प्रकारेण काव्यरूपकार्यस्यापि कारणत्रयमेतदपेक्षते।

यथा घटे मृत्तिका समवायिकारणम्, मृत्पिण्डसंयोगोऽसमवायिकारणम्, दण्डचक्रसलिलानि च निमित्तकारणानि तथा काव्यरूपकार्यस्यापि किञ्चित् समवायिकारणम्, किञ्चिदसमवायिकारणम्, किञ्चिच्च निमित्तकारणं स्वीकर्तव्यमिति निश्चेतुं यद्यपि प्रकृतशास्त्रकारैः स्पष्टतया प्रकाशो न दत्तस्तथापि पुरा कार्यस्वरूपं निभालनीयं भवति। यथा प्रत्यक्षानुमानादिज्ञानरूपकार्याणां तादृश्येव कारणानि तथैव काव्यरूप (ज्ञानात्मक) कार्यस्य शब्दार्थसामग्रीज्ञानं समवायिकारणम् सामग्रीसंयोजनमसमवायिकारणम्, अदृष्टादिकञ्च निमित्तकारणमिति निर्धारयितुं शक्यत इति साम्प्रदायिकाः।

यद्यप्यनन्यपरतन्त्रामिति नियतिकृतेत्यादिकारिकास्थपदेन परमाण्वाद्युपादान कर्मादि-सहकारिकारणपरतंत्रामिति ब्रह्मनिर्मिते-रनौत्कृष्टय-सूचिकया वृत्त्या च काव्यस्यैतत्त्रितयकारणशून्यत्वं व्यज्यते। कवेरन्यस्य परतन्त्राधीना नेति तदर्थात् काव्याधीनत्वमागतमेव। एवंच कविगतानां तेषां तत्तत्कारणत्वस्वीकारे न काप्यनुपपत्तिः। सर्वथा समवाय्यादिलक्षणानाक्रान्तत्वेऽपि तथोपपादनमलौकिकत्वमभिव्यनक्ति। तच्च रसवद् भूषणमेव न दूषणम्। शक्तिर्निपुणतेत्यादि कारिकयापि कवित्वबीजरूपसंस्कारविशेषादीनां कारणत्वोक्तिरप्युभयमर्थं द्रढयति।

काव्यशास्त्रेऽस्मिन् काव्यस्य कारणानि प्रतिभा व्युत्पत्तिरभ्यासश्च स्वीकृतानि। प्रायः सर्वैरप्याचार्यैः प्रतिभाव्युत्पत्यभ्यासानां काव्यं प्रति कारणत्वमुक्तम्।

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1. तर्कसङ्ग्रहः प्र० ३, सू २४।

तत्रादौ भामहाचार्येण काव्यस्य कारणं ब्रुवता—
[2]"काव्यं तु जायते जातु कस्यचित् प्रतिभावतः"
[3]"शब्दाभिधेये विज्ञाय कृत्वा तद्विदुपासनाम् ।
विलोक्यान्यनिवन्धांश्च कार्यः काव्यक्रियादरः ॥"

इत्युक्तम् ।

एषां मते काव्यसंपदः प्रतिभा, शब्दार्थज्ञानं, काव्यज्ञोपासनं, काव्यपाठनं चेति कारणानि । एषु कारणेषु प्रतिभाया एव प्राधान्यम् । अन्येषां चाप्रधानकारणत्वम् । शब्दार्थज्ञानप्रतिभयोः सत्वे काव्यज्ञोपासनकाव्यपाठनासत्वे प्रकारान्तरेणाभ्याससत्वे च काव्यसमुद्भवदर्शनात ।

श्रीमद्दण्डयाचार्याणां मते नैसर्गिकी प्रतिभा, निर्मलं बहुश्रुतम्, अमन्दश्चाभियोगः इति त्रयं काव्यसंपदः कारणम् ।

अत एवोक्तम् —

[4]"नैसर्गिकी च प्रतिभा श्रुतं च बहुनिर्मलम् ।
अमन्दश्चाभियोगोऽस्याः कारणं काव्यसंपदः" इति ।

वागुपासना श्रुतेन यत्नेन च कर्तव्यताया कारणपाटवं साधयति । अत एवोक्तम्—

[5]"न विद्यते यद्यपि पूर्ववासना
गुणानुबन्धि प्रतिभानमद्भुतम् ।
श्रुतेन यत्नेन च वागुपासिता
ध्रुवं करोत्येव कमप्यनुग्रहम् ॥" इति

अत्र भामहाचार्येण यदुक्तं "प्रतिभावतः" इति तदेव दण्डिना नैसर्गिकीप्रतिभेति" प्रतिपादितम् । भामहेन काव्यज्ञोपासनं काव्यस्य पाठनं चेति ये द्वे कारणे उक्ते दण्डिना त एव "श्रुतेन यत्नेन च वागुपासिता" इत्यनेन प्रतिपादिते । शब्दार्थज्ञानमेव "निर्मलं बहुश्रुत" मिति प्रतिपादितम् ।

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2. भामहविरचितकाव्यालङ्कारः प्र० परि० श्लो ५ ।
3. ,, ,, प्र० परि० श्लो १० ।
4. काव्यादर्शः प्र० परि श्लो १०३ ।
5. ,, ,, ,, १०४ ।

भामहः	दण्डी
प्रतिभा	नैसर्गिकीप्रतिभा
शब्दार्थज्ञानम्	बहुनिर्मलं श्रुतम्
काव्यज्ञोपासनम् काव्यपाठनम्	श्रुतेन यत्नेन च वागुपासनम्

वामनाचार्येण स्वालङ्कारसूत्रवृत्तौ काव्यकारणान्येव काव्याङ्गत्वेन व्यवहृतानि। अत एवोक्तम्—

[6]"लोको विद्या प्रकीर्णं च काव्याङ्गानीति।"

भामहदण्डिभ्यामुपात्तकारणेभ्योऽतिरिक्तं लोकमित्याख्यं कारणं वामनेन नवीनतयोपात्तम्। विद्याया काव्यं प्रति कारणत्वं न स्वातन्त्र्येण वामन उक्तवान् अपि तु दण्डिना "बहुनिर्मलं श्रुतमिति यदुक्तं तदेव प्रकारान्तरेण वामनेन विद्याशब्देनोक्तम्।

[7]"शब्दस्मृत्यभिधानकोशच्छन्दोविचितिकलाकामशास्त्रदण्डनीतिपूर्वा विद्याः" इति

प्रकीर्णरूपं काव्यस्य कारणं "काव्यज्ञोपासन" मिति भामहोक्तमेव प्रकारान्तरेणोक्तम्। एवं च वामनाचार्यस्य तत्पूर्ववर्त्याचार्ययोः मतेषु च काव्यस्य कारणान्येवं वर्तन्ते। तथाहि।

भामहः	दण्डी	वामनः
प्रतिभा	नैसर्गिकीप्रतिभा	प्रतिभानम्
शब्दार्थज्ञानम्	बहुनिर्मलं श्रुतम्	विद्या
काव्यज्ञोपसनम् काव्यपाठनम्	श्रुतेन यत्नेन च वागुपासनम्	प्रकीर्णम्

वामनेन तु प्रतिभा काव्यकारणत्वेन नोपन्यस्ता।

[8]"कवित्वबीजं प्रतिभानमिति"।

रुद्रटाचार्येण भामहोक्तान्येव कारणानि संक्षिप्याभिहितानि अत एवोक्तम्—

[9]"त्रितयमिदं व्याप्रियते शक्तिर्व्युत्पत्तिरभ्यासः" इति।

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6. काव्यालङ्कारसूत्रवृत्तिः अधि० १, अध्या ३, सू १।
7. काव्यालङ्कारसूत्रवृत्तिः अधि० ३, अध्या ३, सू ३।
8. „ „ अधि १, अध्या ३, सू १६।
9. रुद्रटकृतकाव्यालङ्कारः प्र० अध्या, श्लो १४।

एभिः शक्तिव्युत्पत्यभ्यासानां काव्यं प्रति कारणत्वं व्यवस्थापितम् । भामहाचार्येण यदुक्तं प्रतिभेति तदेव शक्तिपदेनात्र व्यवहृता । शब्दार्थज्ञानमिति यदुक्तं तदेवाभ्यासपदेन प्रतिपादितम् । एवं च रुद्रटाचार्येण किमपि नवीनं स्वोपज्ञं कारणं न प्रतिपादितमिति सिध्यति ।

भामहः	रुद्रटः	दण्डी
प्रतिभा	शक्तिः	नैसर्गिकी प्रतिभा
शब्दार्थज्ञानम्	व्युत्पत्तिः	बहुनिर्मलं श्रुतम्
काव्यज्ञोपासनम् काव्यस्य पाठनम्	अभ्यासः	श्रुतेन यत्नेन च वागुपासनम्

महिमभट्टेन प्रतिभैव काव्यं प्रति कारणमित्युक्तम् ।

[10]"रसानुगुणशब्दार्थचिन्तास्तिमितचेतसः ।
क्षणं स्वरूपस्पर्शोत्था प्रज्ञैव प्रतिभा कवेः ॥" इति ।

एवं स्थिते सति मम्मटः काव्यस्य कारणं प्रतिभा(शक्तिः) व्युत्पत्तिः (निपुणता) अभ्यासश्चेति प्रतिपादितवान् । अत एवोक्तम—

[11]"शक्तिर्निपुणतालोकशास्त्रकाव्याद्यवेक्षणात् ।
काव्यज्ञशिक्षयाभ्यास इति हेतुस्तदुद्भवे" ॥ इति ।

शक्तिर्निपुणता अभ्यासश्च काव्यं प्रति हेतुः । शक्त्यादीनां त्रित्वसंख्याविशिष्टत्वेऽपि "हेतु" रित्येकवचनोपादानं कार्योत्पादप्रयोजकतावच्छेदकसमुदायत्वावच्छिन्नपरम् । हेतुपदमिति बोधनायाः । अन्यथा विशेष्यविशेषणवाचकपदयोरसति विशेषानुशासने समानवाचकत्व-नियमादिति बलेन "हेतव" इति भाष्यम् ।

कारणान्येतानि भामहरुद्रटोक्तान्येव । तथाहि

भामहेन यत् प्रतिभेत्युक्तं तदेव रुद्रटेन शक्तिरिति मम्मटेनापि सैव शक्तिरिति कारणत्वेन स्वीकृता ।

भामहेन शब्दार्थज्ञानं यत् कारणमुक्तम् तदेव मम्मटेन निपुणता पदेनोक्तम् ।

काव्यज्ञोपदेशः काव्यस्य पाठनमिति यदुक्तं भामहेन, तदेव रुद्रटेनाभ्यास पदेनोक्तम् । मम्मटेन तु "काव्यज्ञक्षियाभ्यास' इति ।

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10. व्यक्तिविवेकः द्वि० वि० श्लो ११७–१८ (उद्धरणम्) ।

11. काव्यप्रकाशः का० ३ ।

भामहः	रुद्रटः	मम्मटः
प्रतिभा	शक्तिः	शक्तिः
शब्दार्थज्ञानम्	व्युत्पत्तिः	लोकशास्त्रकाव्याद्यवेक्षणान्निपुणता
काव्यज्ञोपासनम् काव्यपाठनम्	अभ्यासः	काव्यज्ञशिक्षयाभ्यासः

लोकशास्त्रकाव्याद्यवेक्षणान्निपुणतैव व्युत्पत्तिपदपर्यायः । अत एवोक्तं काव्यप्रकाशविवेके श्रीधरेण—

[12]"निपुणता युक्तायुक्तविवेक" इत्यर्थः । सैवात्र व्युत्पत्तिपदेनोक्ता" इति । एवञ्च मम्मटाचार्येण भामहरुद्रटोक्तानि कारणानि कारिकयोपनिबद्धानि । रुद्रटोक्तानि तान्येव वृत्तावुपनिबद्धानीति सिद्धम् ।

[13]वामनेन "कवित्वबीजं प्रतिभानमिति यदुक्तं तदेव मम्मटेन शक्तिपदेन स्वीकृतम् । अत एवोक्तम्—[14]"शक्तिः कवित्वबीजरूपः संस्कारविशेष" इति ।

ध्वन्यालोके यदुक्तं शक्तिरेव व्युत्पत्तिरूपात् कारणात् प्रधानमिति तदपि वृत्तावुपनिबद्धम् । तथाहि ।

[15]"अव्युत्पत्तिकृतो दोषः शक्तया संव्रियते कवेः ।

यस्त्वशक्तिकृतस्तस्य स झटित्येव भासते ।। "इति ध्वन्यालोके यदुक्तं तदेव मम्मटेन[16]"यां विना काव्यं न प्रसरेत् प्रसृतं वोपहसनीयं स्यादित्युक्तम् ।

वामनेन यदुक्तं "लोको विद्या प्रकीर्णञ्च काव्याङ्गानीति तदत्र निपुणता-पदव्याख्यावसरे स्वीकृतम् ।

वामनेन "लोकवृत्तं लोकः" इति यदुक्तं तदेव मम्मटेन "लोकस्य स्थावर जङ्गमात्मकलोकवृत्तस्येति स्वीकृतम् ।

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12. काव्यप्रकाशः (श्रीधरकृतविवेकटीकोपेतः) पृ० ७ ।
13. काव्यालङ्कारसूत्रवृत्तिः अधि० १, अध्या ३, सू १६ ।
14. काव्यप्रकाशः का ३ गतवृत्तिः ।
15. ध्वन्यालोकः पृ० २७१ ।
16. काव्यालङ्कारसूत्रवृत्तिः अधि० १, अध्या० ३, सू २ ।
17. ,, अधि० १, अध्या ३ सू १ ।
18. काव्यप्रकाशः का ३ गतवृत्तिः ।

वामनेन[19] छन्दोविचितिकलाकामशास्त्रदण्डनीतिपूर्वा विद्या' इति यदुक्तं तदेव मम्मटेन [20] "छन्दोव्याकरणाभिधानकोशकलाचतुर्वर्गगजतुरगखड्गादिलक्षणग्रन्थानां काव्यानां च महाकविसंबन्धिनां आदिग्रहणादितिहासादीनां च व्युपत्तिरित्युक्तम् ।

वामनेन यदुक्तं "लक्ष्यज्ञत्वमभियोगो वृद्धसेवावेक्षणं प्रतिभानमवधानंच प्रकीर्णमिति तदेव मम्मटेन "काव्यं कर्तुं विचारयितुं च ये जानन्ति तदुपदेशेन करणे योजने च पौनःपुन्येन प्रवृत्तिरिति वाक्येन प्रतिपादितम् ।

एवञ्च वामनोक्तामपि कारणसामग्रीं मम्मटः स्वीकृतवान् । तथाहि ।

मम्मटः	वामनः आनन्दवर्धनश्च
शक्तिः, कवित्वबीजरूपः	कवित्वबीजं प्रतिभानम्
यां विना काव्यं न प्रसरेत् प्रसृतं वोपहसनीयं स्यात्	अव्युत्पत्तिकृतोदोषः शक्तत्या संव्रियते कवेः । यस्त्वशक्तिकृतस्तस्य स झटित्येव भासते ।।
लोकस्य स्थावरजङ्गमात्मक लोकवृत्तस्य	लोकवृत्तं लोकः
छन्दोव्याकरणाभिधानकोश कलाचतुर्वर्गगजतुरगादि लक्षणग्रन्थानां विमर्शनाद् व्युत्पत्तिः	छन्दोविचितिकलाकाम-शास्त्रदण्डनीतिपूर्वाः विद्याः

आनन्दवर्धनाचार्येणापि प्रतिभा एव कारणमित्युक्तम् । उक्तञ्च व्यत्पत्तेस्तु काव्यं प्रति कारणत्वं परन्तु सर्वथा अप्राधान्येन । अत एवोक्तम् ।

[21] "अव्युत्पत्तिकृतो दोषः शक्तया संव्रियते कवेः ।
यस्त्वशक्तिकृतस्तस्य स झटित्येव भासते ।।" इति ।

कवेः प्रतिभा यदि स्यात् तदा स्वेच्छानुसारेण काव्यरचनापि सम्पद्यते । अत एवोक्तमानन्दवर्धनाचार्येण ध्वन्यालोके–

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19. काव्यालङ्कारसूत्रवृत्तिः अधि १, अध्या ३, सू ३ ।

20. काव्यप्रकाशः का० ३ गतवृत्तिः ।

21. ध्वन्यालोकः पृ २७१ ।

[22]'अपारे काव्यसंसारे कविरेकः प्रजापतिः ।
यथास्मै रोचते विश्वं तथेदं परिवर्तते ॥
शृङ्गारी चेत् कविः काव्यं सर्वं रसमयं जगत् ।
स चेत् कविर्वीतरागः नीरसं सर्वमेव तत् ॥" इति ।

एतदेव व्याख्यातं चाभिनवगुप्ताचार्यपादैर्लोचने "प्रतिभा अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्माणक्षमा प्रज्ञा तस्य विशेषो रसावेशवैशद्यसौन्दर्यकाव्यनिर्माणक्षमत्वम् । शक्तिः प्रतिभानम्, वर्णनीयवस्तुविषयभूतनोल्लेखशालित्वम्" इति ।

यायावरीयमतेऽपि प्रतिभाया एव काव्यस्य कारणत्वं व्यवस्थापितम् । अत एव राजशेखरेण काव्यमीमांसायामुक्तम्—

[23]"सा (शक्तिः) केवलं काव्ये हेतुरिति यायावरीयः । शक्तिकर्तृके हि प्रतिभाव्युत्पत्तिकर्मणी । शक्तस्य प्रतिभाति । शक्तश्चव्युत्पद्यत"' इति ।

एवञ्च केवलैककारणवादिनो वाग्भटः, आनन्दवर्धनः, भट्टनायकः, महिमभट्टः, यायावरीयश्च सन्ति ।

शक्तिः	व्यत्पत्तिः	अभ्यासः
भामहः	भामहः	भामहः
दण्डी	दण्डी	दण्डी
रुद्रटः	रुद्रटः	रुद्रटः
वामनः	वामनः	वामनः
राजशेखरः	.....	.....
आनन्दवर्धनः	.....	.....
भट्टनायकः	.....	.....
वाग्भटः	.....	.....
महिमभट्टः	.....	.....
मम्मटः	मम्मटः	मम्मटः

भामहादारभ्य मम्मटाचार्यपर्यन्तं शक्तिव्युत्पत्यभ्यासानां काव्यं प्रति कारणत्वं प्रायः सर्वैः स्वीकृतम् । परन्तु त्रयाणां मिलित्वा कारणत्वमुत पृथक्त्वेनेति संशये दण्डिनं

22. ,, पृ. ५५१ ।
23. काव्यमीमांसा पृ० ४ ।

विना न कोऽपि मम्मटात्प्राक्तनाचार्यः निगदितवान् । अत एवोक्तं दण्डिना—[24]"कारणं काव्यसंपदः "इति ।

व्याख्यातश्च एतद्विवृतौ जीवानन्दभट्टाचार्यैः–[25]एतत्त्रयमस्याः काव्यसंपदः काव्यरूपायाः संपत्तेः कारणं हेतुः कारणमित्येकवचननिर्देशने समस्तस्यैव कारणता न तु व्यस्तस्येति सूचितम् ।

मम्मटेनापि तदेव मतमनुसरता प्रतिपादितम्—[26]"इति हेतुस्तदुद्भवे" इति ।

मम्मटः	दण्डी
इति हेतुस्तदुद्भवे	कारणं काव्यसंपदः

भीमसेनदीक्षितैरत्र त्रयाणां मिलित्वा काव्यं प्रति कारणत्वं स्वप्रतिभया प्रकारान्तरेण समर्थितम् । तैः यथा घटनिर्माणे कारणान्येकदैवापेक्षितानि न तथा काव्यनिर्माण इति व्यवस्थापितमिति प्रतीयते । अतएवोक्तम्—

[27]"एवं स्वरूपादीनां स्वरूपत्वप्रयोजकत्वयोः पार्थक्यमपि रसोद्बोधजनक ज्ञानविषयतावच्छिन्नकाव्यस्य मिलितानामेव फलोपहितत्वमिति प्रतिभावद्भिः सूक्ष्मदृशावधातव्यम् ।

देवदत्तेन बाल्यावस्थायां कृतं काव्यं सहृदयेतरानुपहसनीयम् । निपुणतावशाद्यौवनावस्थायां कृतं काव्यं साधारणैः श्लाध्यं जातम् । इदानीं प्रौढावस्थायां शक्तिनिपुणताभ्यासवशात् सहृदयव्यहरणीयं रसोद्बोधसमर्थं क्रियत इति व्यवहारेण त्रयाणां कारणतायाः सिद्धत्वात्" इति ।

श्रीधरेणापि शक्तिव्युत्पत्त्यभ्यासाः गोमयवृश्चिकवन्निमित्तभूतानि न भवन्ति, अपि तु मिलित्वैवेति व्यवस्थापितम्, किञ्च सूत्रे हेतुरिति एकवचनपदोपादानं मिलित्वा कारणं सूचयति । अत एवोक्तं तैः ।

[28]"तत्र किमेते शक्तयादयो गोमयवृश्चिकवन्निमित्तभूयं भजन्ते नेत्याह । इति त्रयः संवलिता इति । अमुमेवार्थमाविर्भावयितुं हेतुरित्येकवचनम् " । इति ।

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24. काव्यादर्शः प्र० परि० श्लो १०३ ।
25. ,, पृ० ५४ ।
26. काव्यप्रकाशः का० ३ ।
27. काव्यप्रकाशः (सुधासागरीटीकासहितः) पृ० १६ ।
28. काव्यप्रकाशः (श्रीधरकृतविवेकटीकोपेतः) पृ० १० ।

सम्प्रदायप्रकाशिनीकारेण पुनः कारिकावृत्तिग्रन्थयोः सारांश एव निगदितः। मम्मटोक्तकारिकाग्रन्थवृत्तिग्रन्थयोः सारांशोऽयमेव वर्तते यत् शक्तिव्युत्पत्त्यभ्यासाः मिलित्वैव काव्यं प्रति कारणत्वं भजन्ते। अत एवोक्तं तैः–

[29]"शक्तिर्निपुणता अभ्यासः इति त्रयमेतत् सङ्घातवृत्ति। काव्यस्य हेतुरिति पिण्डितार्थः।

महेश्वरन्यायालङ्कारभट्टाचार्येण तु शक्तिः काव्यजनकपरं नेति व्याख्यातम्। शक्तिः काव्यनिर्माण-काव्यबोधोभयपरतया फलोपधायिका भवतीति तेषां तात्पर्यम्। अनेन शक्तेरुभयकारणत्वं व्यवस्थापितम्। अपि च हेतुरित्यत्र स्वरूपयोग्यत्वेन नैव व्याख्यातम्। किन्तु फलोपधायकपरत्वेन। अत एवोक्तं तैः–

[30]"इति त्रयः समुदिता इति। समुदायाश्रयैकवचनात् समुदायलाभः इति भावार्थः तदुद्भवपदं तन्निमणितदर्थबोधोभयपरतया व्याचष्टे। तस्य काव्यस्येति। उल्लासः तदर्थज्ञानम्। एवं च त्रयान्तर्गतायाः शक्तेरप्युभयकारणत्वमुक्तम्। तथा च शक्तिपदं न जनकशक्तिमात्रपरम्। हेतुः फलोपधायकः। न तु हेतवः प्रत्येकं फलोपधायका इत्यर्थः। अत्र तु न तु व्यस्ता इत्यत्र हेतव इत्यन्वये न तु हेतव इत्यत्र हेतुपदमधिकं स्यादतो न तु व्यस्ता इत्यत्र कारिकास्थेन इति शब्देन परामृष्टा इत्यध्याहृत्य तेनान्वये वाक्यभेदः संपद्यते। तथाच समुदिता एवेति शब्देन परामृष्टः, न तु व्यस्ताः प्रत्येकं परामृष्टाः। एतादृशपरामर्शफलमाह हेतुर्नतु हेतव "इति।

प्रदीपकारेणोद्भवपदं उत्कृष्टोत्पत्तिपरतया व्याख्यातम्। एभिर्यथा घटं प्रति दण्डचक्रसलिलानि मिलितानि कारणत्वं भजन्ते तथा काव्यं प्रति शक्तिव्युत्पत्त्यभ्यासाः मिलिताः सन्तः काव्यस्योत्कृष्टोत्पत्तौ कारणतां भजन्ते। अत एवोक्तम् तैः–

[31]"इति शब्दो मिलितोपस्थापनाय। अन्यथा तद्वैयर्थ्यमेव स्यात्। तथा च काव्यस्योद्भवः उत्कृष्टोत्पत्तिः, तया कार्येण मिलितानामुपाधानम्। दण्डचक्रादीनामिव घटेन। न तु मिलितत्वेन कारणतैवेति भ्रमः कार्यः।" इति उद्योतकारेणापीदमेव समर्थितम्।

[32]"मिलितस्य दण्डचक्रादीनामिव कारणत्वं, न तु तृणारणिमणिन्यायेनेति ध्वनयितुमेव हेतुरित्येकवचनम्।" इति।

एवं प्रकारेण काव्यकारणसामग्रीं संपाद्य तत एव कविः काव्यं कर्तुं प्रयत्नं कुर्यात्।

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29. काव्यप्रकाशः (सम्प्रदायप्रकाशिनी टीका सहितः पृ० ७।
30. काव्यप्रकाशः (महेश्वरन्यायालङ्कारकृतादर्शटीकोपेतः) पृ० १६।
31. काव्यप्रकाशः (प्रदीपोद्योतसमेतः) पृ. १६।
32. " " पृ. ८।

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

THE KUSHAN LEVELS AT SOME EXCAVATED SITES IN NORTH INDIA *

A. GHOSH
Simla

It is well-known that during Kushan times an immense number of Buddhist establishments sprang up in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, not to speak of Afghanistan and other regions comprised in the vast kushan empire. In the heart of the Gangetic velley the notable centres were Mathurā, Ahicchatrā, Śrāvastī Kauśāmbī, Sāranātha, Kuśīnagara, etc., where either new monastic complexes came into being or existing ones were renovated and enlarged. They have already been adequately reported upon and will not be dealt with in this paper. The aim here is to examine the date from some selected city-sites in present-day India, which have been excavated within the last twenty-five to thirty years, omitting religious architecture etc., and concentrating on secular relics.

In order to decide which sites may be selected for the purpose, it is necessary to discuss in brief the probable extent of the Kushan empire in India. Mathurā was doubtless an important centre of the empire and it is reasonable to hold that the whole stretch of

* Read at the International Conference on the History, Archaeology and Culture of the Kushans held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, U. S. S. R. in September-October 1968 and published here as the proceedings of the Conference are not likely to be out.

land from Taxila to Mathurā formed an important part of the empire without a wedge thrust in between by any independent principality. The Yaudheyas, an important tribe in east Panjab till the first century *B. C.*, as shown by their coins, might have had to shift themselves before the Kushan aggression to Rajasthan, where we probably find them by *A. D.* 150, at the time of the campaigns of Rudradāman, and again in *circa* 350, when Samudragupta was expanding his empire. The same temporary eclipse or annihilation was suffered by other Panjab tribes, such as the Audumbaras, Ārjunāyanas and Kuṇindas.[1]

East of Mathurā, the find of a sealing of Kaniṣka at Kauśāmbī makes the inclusion of the central Gangetic basin within his empire highly probable. Down the river, Pātaliputra may be given the benefit of doubt, as according to a confused Chinese tradition Kaniṣka defeated the ruler of the Kingdom of which Pāṭaliputra was the capital end obtained from him the poet-philoso. pher Aśvaghoṣa as ransom. The extent of that Kingdom at the time is not known.

I shall confine myself in this paper to some city-sites in the region thus defined. It is widely known that coins of the Kushans have been found beyond this region—in West Bengal and Orissa—but to me, and others

1. In the late second century *A. D.* the Yaudheyas issued a poor currency—Classes 3 and 4 of Allan—and established themselves again in the third and fourth centuries, John Allan, *Catalogue of coins of Ancient India* (British Museum, London, 1936), p. cliii. The Ārjunāyanas, Audumbaras and Kuṇindas issued coins towards the end of the first century *B. C.*, and the first and last reappear in the third and early fourth century *A. D.*, *ibid.*, pp. lxxxiii, lxxxiv and ci.

have said it before, such finds do not prove the spread of Kushan rule over such tracts : coins of the powerful Kushan dynasty must have had a wide circulation to augment the local currency or to fill the vacuum created by the absence of any such currency. Nor are sculptures produced in the workshops of Mathurā, dated in Kushan years and transported to different places, any sure indication that these places were under Kushan domination. For this reason Sānchī in central India, with its two Buddhist images dated in the times of Vaskuṣāṇa and Vāsaska should be left out of account. Other such places, viz. Kauśāmbī, Sāranātha, Śrāvastī and Ahicchatrā, are already covered by the above definition of the Kushan empire.

Also excluded should be the regions held by the Western Kṣatrapas, who, even if owing formal allegiance to the Kushans, led a viable existence and followed their own career of conquests and vicissitudes.

Even thus delimited, the Kushan empire comprised many cities in Panjab and the Gangetic basin. A few of them have been excavated, and out of them this paper will deal with Hastināpura in District Meerut and Ahicchatrā in District Bareilly, both in the upper Gangetic basin, Kauśāmbī in District Allahabad and Rājghāṭ, the site of ancient Vārāṇasī, both in the central Gangetic basin, and Kumrāhār, one of the sites of ancient Pāṭaliputra, in the lower Gangetic basin. Rūpaṛ in Distric Ambala, on the Sutlej, will be referred to only casually in the absence of a detailed published report on the excavation there.

Let it be said at once that none of these cites was exclusively Kushan in character. All of them had started much earlier and continued to be in occupation

till later than Kushan times. But each had levels contemporary with the Kushans, which for brevity's sake may be called the Kushan levels, without the implication that everything found therein owed its origin or was associated directly with the Kushans.

A supreme difficulty in the study of the Kushan levels of some of these cities arises out of the fact that the levels have not been isolated in the excavations there but have been included in wider Periods, with the result that the distinctive elements of the Kushan age may be hard to identify. Thus, at Rūpaṛ the Kushan level has been included in period IV of the site, which has been dated from 200 *B. C.* to *A. D.* 600 ; so also at Hastināpura, Period IV of which, inclusive of the Kushan level, has been dated from the early second century *B. C.* to the end of the third century *A. D.* At the other sites, however, the Kushan levels have been treated more or less as a distinct entity. At Ahicchatrā Stratum IV, mainly Kushan, has been placed from *A. D.* 100 to 300-350 ; at Kauśāmbī the corresponding level is Sub-period V and partly Sub-period VI of Period III, respectively dated from *A. D.* 25 to 100 and 100 to 175 ; at Rājghāṭ it is Period III, second to fourth century, but the latter part of the preceding period, II, *circa* second century *B. C.* to first century *A. D.*, may have to be taken into consideration.[2] At kumrāhār it is again Period III, *A. D.* 100 to 300. Everywhere the respective Period is marked by the occurrence of Kushan coins.

Of these sites, the structural evidence from Ahicchatrā seems to be very distinctive. In the main excava-

2. The periodization of Kauśāmbī and Rājghāṭ were later on revised in view of the discovery of earlier levels, but to avoid confusion I have followed here what has been given in the published reports.

ted area of the site Stratum IV was characterized by fine brickwork usually resting on a bed of rammed concrete and marked the most prosperous period of buildindg-activity in the city. At Kauśāmbī again, Sub-period V was marked by a great building-activity in the city-area, not to speak of the area of the Ghoṣitārāma monastery. At Kumrāhār, well within the *milieu* of secular buildings were two monasteries. A general feature of the structures of the Kushan levels was the use of large-sized bricks, the dimensions being : at Ahicchatrā, 18×12×2 in. ; at Kauśāmbī, 18 to 17.5×12×2.5 in. ; at Rājghāṭ, 19×11×2 in. ; and at Kumrāhār 18×12×2.5 in. Thus, there was a close uniformity brick-dimensions over a widely-dispersed area. The comprehensive Period IV of Hastināpura had as many as seven structural Sub-period, but it is not clear which of them was contemporary with the Kushans ; if it was the third one, which had the largest number of walls to its credit, it would conform to the evidence from Ahicchatrā and Kauśāmbī that the Kushan level was prosperous at least so far as buildings were concerned. The same uncertainty exists at Rūpaṛ as well.

The duration of the Kushan occupation of these cities is ill-defined. At Kauśāmbī, we are told, Sub-period VII, *A. D.* 175-250, was noted by the absence of Kushan coins and the exclusive occurrence of the coins of the Maghas, who succeeded the Kushans in this region. In the area of the defences of the same site, SP. IV. 19, *circa A. D.* 95 to 165, is stated to have ended in extensive conflagration and destruction, in which all the buildings were razed to the ground. SP IV. 20, 165 to 235, perhaps coinciding with the advent of the Maghas, seemed to represent a very important epoch in the life

of the city, when the height of the rampart was raised, the ground levelled and guard-rooms rebuilt. All the dates given by the excavator seem to be based on *A. D.* 78 as the starting-point of Kaniṣka's reign—a matter which has been discussed at length at this Conference.

Elsewhere the terminal date of the Kushan rule is not as clear even stratigraphically. The succeeding Period at Ahicchatrā is marked by the appearance of the coins of Acyu, one of the Ārayāvarta princes defeated by Samudragupta in *circa* 350, and at Kumrāhār by the occurrence of Gupta coins and sealings. It is not unlikely, however, that at both the places there were some local chiefs between the withdrawal of the Kushan power and the advent of the Guptas and their contemporaries.

To turn to the ceramics of the Kushan levels. According to the excavator of Kauśāmbī, the post-Mauryan period saw in north India a regional diversity in pottery, but with Sub-periods V and VI of Kauśāmbī a unity is noticed again. He has no hesitation in ascribing this unity to the Śaka-Parthians and Kushan and traces the inspiration of some new pottery-types that were introduced during the Sub-periods to Taxila. At Achicchatrā Stratum IV (Kushan) was 'marked by strongly individual features, in pottery and showed 'more innovations in types and decoration than any single one of the preceding and succeeding levels.' There was now a predilection for a stable base in pots by making them flat-based or ring-based, which was certainly a feature of Taxila II (Sirkap) pottery. Some of the new types that were introduced were : the carinated and waisted vase ; the Knobbed lid ; the lid with an inkpot-like central cup ; the conical bowl ; the

sprinkler ; and the bottle-necked jar in various shapes. The pottery was generally unpainted, though painted sherds were sparingly found at Hastināpura—evidently under the inspiration of contemporary sites in north Rajasthan, where painted pottery occurs profusely in the early Christian age.

A feature of the pottery of the age was the use of stamps with symbols on the surface of pots. The symbols were, however, invariable Indian in character and cannot therefore be traced to foreign origin.

An unrecorded fact about the ceramics of the period is the limited occurrence of glazed pottery, as evidenced at Maholi near Mathurā and at Ahicchatrā according to my personal observation. Glaizng of pots was unkonwn in India in historical times before and after the Kushans, till the practice was restarted in medieval times under Muslim influence.

A type of terracotta objects that became common in the Śaka-Parthian-Kushan period was what is commonly called 'votive tanks' in Indian archaeology but what was in reality portable shrines perhaps dedicated to the mother-goddess. It has been pointed out that Parthian inspiration lay behind the practice of using such shrines.[3]

But more than in any class of objects is foreign influence pronounced in the terracotta figurines of the period. The change from the earlier indigenous terracottas to the less stylized, less sophisticated but more forceful ones was violent and widespread but only temporary, for after the end of foreign occupation there was a reversion to native traditions. The similarity of

3. D. H. Gordon, 'The Mother Godess of Gandhāra' *Antiquity*, March 1937, pp. 74-76.

terracottas of the age with those from the Parthian sites of west Asia is as striking as it is telling, and it is very likely that the Parthian tradition was brought to the heart of India by the Kushans. An abundance of terracotta human figurines with non-Indian features, head-dresses and costumes shows how the local people reacted to the appearance of foreigners who must have visited the Gangetic cities in large or small numbers—as officials or merchants or casual visitors. The iconography of some of the figurines show how, while the Kushan rulers patronized the 'official' Indian religions, the common people, for whom mainly terracottas have always been manufactured in India, adopted foreign popular cults.

Having reached the end of the review of the Kushan levels of some Gangetic cities, I must say that we should be circumspect about the extent of the foreignization of these and other cities. As has been said above, none of them was established by the Kushans but had a much earlier and later history. The Kushans might have occupied them as invaders, but foreign invasions were not a new incident in the annals of India. The Indians got used to the foreigners and were influenced by their beliefs, customs and secular practices, but it is equally true that the foreigners got absorbed in the local population. Such synthesis characterized Indian history till medieval times.

We should now excavate a real Kushan city in the subcontinent, to know the town-planning of the Kushans and its antecedents, their beliefs and practices, their mode of living and other allied matters. Mathurā may have had such a settlement, but it is now virtually closed for excavation owing to bad operations done in

the past and to the sealing off of most parts of it by modern habitations. We must therefore look outside the western borders of present-day India. Chārsada in the north-west, in spite of great hopes, has produced nothing significant in the last excavation. Sirkap, the second city of Taxila, is now known to have been inhabited by the Kushans during its last phases ; but in the main it was a Śaka-Parthian city over an earlier Indo-Greek nucleus. On the other hand, the only city reasonably believed to have been established by the Kushans in the subcontinent is the enormous third city of Taxila, Sirsukh, where, apart from an insigificant part of its defences, no excavation has been carried out, and the tale it has to tell remains unkown. Let us hope that as a part of the present campaign of knowing more about Kushan art, archaeology and history a large-scale excavation will be undeataken there.

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*THE ADJECTIVES OF EARLY AND MIDDLE ORIYĀ

S. HOTA

3—IV-00:—General Observations :—The adjectives, in Early Oriyā, are employed in a verv restricted number; and the number of adjectives is being gradually increased from the 12th Century onward. Consequently Oriyā like other NIA Languages possesses a large variety of adjectives remarkably increased in numerical strength throughout. Thus these adjectives are placed before substantives without any changes in their bodies whether employed for gender or number or case. In a sentence of Early or Middle or Modern Oriyā, the common case-endings function for both the substantives and adjectives.

3—IV-01:—The Caṇḍi Purāṇa and the Mahābhārata, of Sarala Das, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Bramhāṇḍa Bhugoḷa of Balarama Das, the Ṇdramāḷikā and the Mahābharāta of Jagannath Das, the Kalaṅki Bhāgavata of Sisu Das etc-all the works as mentioned are in MSS-and also the printed works of their successors are rich enough with such adjectives, showing Qualitative and Quantitative categories. These are broadly divided, as (a) Uninflected, and (b) Inflected. There are some being radically affected in their original forms strictly according to the gender of substantives; but most of

* A sub chapter of "Origin and Development of Oriyā" Doctoral Thesis of Dr. Siddheswar Hota.

them have deviated in their Ts., STs. and Tbh. forms of OIA origin from the principles of changes as observed with cases of substantives like other NIA in Oriyā. The discussion contains mostly the adjectives of Tbh. forms used in the Early, Early Middle and Middle Oriyā works including the Loan-Words of foreign Origins satisfying the necessary changes under different circumstances.

3—IV—02:—(I) Uninflected Adjectival Forms :—The illustrations are, "Choṭa: Pua, Little son"; "Choṭa jhia, Little daughter"; "Dhaḷa: dhoti, white cloth"; "Dhaḷa: sa:ḍhi, white saree", "Phalanta: gaccha, fruitburden tree", "Phalanta:(nti) Latā, blossomed creeper"; "Baṛḍā Raja:, the great king"; Baṛḍa rāṇi: the chief queen"; [1]"Tuchcha:ha:tha (dei), empty hands" etc.

The qualitative forms of adjectives are least affected according to the number and gender of the qualifying nouns; and some of them from the Early and Middle Oriyā periods I have illustrated hereunder, and similar specimens have been referred to other NIA Languages.

Masculine.	*Feminine.*	*Neuter.*
Kaḷa: Maṇiṣa, blackman	Kaḷa: bira:ḍi. . . black cat.	Kaḷa: ha:ṇḍi. black earthern pot.
[2]Kararḍa:mauḷa: loka.	Pāṭaḍoria: suta:[3].	Sandhya: Kaḷa.[4]
A man of karaḍa-ma:la.	Silkenstrips	Evening time.

1. Nitya:nigurubāra Kathā (N. K.-MSS) Sāraḷā Das.

2. Ghumusara Vaṁśa:vaḷi (MSS of 1707 A. D)...G. V.

3 & 4. Puruṣottama Devāḷaya Kāryavidhi (MSS) ;- P. D. K.

Suna: garia:,

Golden Jar.

*Subarṇa cha:yēṇi Śankha.	Ca:cika: Camanda:,*	...Daśinārḍa*
The conch covered with gold.	Sakti of Carcika:	a kind of vein

Avadha: Kurupāṇ-Yeka: gha:nti.* ...Chadramarupa* ḍva*		
The undestructable Kuru Pandavas.	One wound.	Deceitful appearance.

and so on.

(*II*) *Inflected Adjectival Forms.*:—The relevant examples are

Tbh...Masculine.	*Feminine.*
Sihaṇa: rasika, Clever lover. (P. K.)	...Siha:ṇi: rasika:, Clever beloved. (P. K.)
Gua:ra nara, Grave man. (P. K.)	...Gua:ri: na:ri., Clever beloved (P. K.)
Kheḷa:uḷla Raghunātha.···	Khelāulī Sitā, The Sportive Sitā.
The sportive Raghunath.	...Chaṭaki a:i, Clever Grand-mother
Chataka Aja:, Clever grandfather.	
Dakhala sattwa, Possessed Land...	Dakhalī Jamī, The occupied land.
Kaḷa: baḷadablack,bullock...	Ka:ḷi ga:i, Black cow.

*. Sarala Dasa's Mahābhārata. (MSS).

Jhalamala ma:ḷa, Luxurious necklace.	Jhilimili ma:ḷi, Lustrous necklace.
Causaṭhī Pa:khuṛḍa:, Sixty-four petals.	Cauṣaṭhi Pākhuṛḍi: Sixtyfour petals. (**) Candramābadani:rāmā (P. K.) Lotus-faced lady.
TS. : Duṣṭa nara, wicked man.	...Duṣṭa: nari:, wicked lady.
Bēgaba:n nada, swift river	...Bēgabati nadi, swift river.

etc.

Gender

3-IV-03 :—Adjectives in Oriyā from the aspect of different sources, may be classified as Ts., STs., Tbh., Desi, and Loans from the Indo-Aryan and Non-Indo-Aryan Languages and dialects such as English, Dutch, Arabic, Persian and so on.

3—IV.—04:—Oriyā has two genders of adjectives and adjectival forms. These are masculine and feminine and generally the feminine adjective is used with the feminine noun as "Guâ:ri nāri" but this is not strictly observed in the Late Middle and Modern Oriyā as in OIA and Nepāli.

Most of the adjectives undergo no inflection. As evidenced in Oriyā of all periods, the adjectives in "-a", and "-a:", changed from masculine to feminine, take suffixes "-a:" and "-i:" respectively with an elongated sound of the preceeding vowel of "i-a:" as in "Kaḷa: ghoṛḍa: "Ka:ḷi ghoṛḍi". Further examples are, "Bagaṛḍa:

(**) Caryāpada...Kanhupa:. P. K...Parimaḷa Kāvya by Narasinha Sena...

bhāta, course rice" as in "Bagaṛḍābha:-ta aṇichi bagaṛḍa: mahālakṣhmi ki na cha:ṛḍiba"—N.K.SsD"[5]. "Puṇa mahārājā ka *aṅgila: haṁsapura*. .(Mādalāpañji, 19 Khanda) i.e. Again the preceeding inner apartment of the Emperor". "*Upa:ṅgia: sevaka* dākahākaku..Anaṅgabhīmadevankara rājaswa (Mâdalâpāñji, 5th. Khanda) i.e. body-guards" : "*Ujāṇipavana* jé chchedila: mahamudrā, i. e. The wind having opposite direction cut off the great seal...)Gorekha-Maṭsyēndra Saṁbāda)" etc.

Adjectives with inflexions according to gender of substantives as in, (i) - a: suffix, 'Sapanacetia : bāṇi' 'Olaṭa: patha', 'Olaṭa: Kathā, opposite story' ; 'Sukhila: luga:, dried cloth; 'Basanta: sua:nga, (Vaisnava Pani, P 25), "Nithara Priya", Nithara : Priya : " etc.

(ii) "-i : " suffix, as in, Pa: kua: buṛdha, Pa:koi burdhi, toothless old man, and Toothless old lady" ; "Padhāni bhuim (L7. M. Sananda, A. P. & P. P. 51) . . . Kaḷasā cautiśa:, "Khicingeswari ṭha: kurāṇi, ... (L 7 M. Śanada)" Masc. Khicingeswara ṭha:kura. "Parabāsi : ramaṇi : , as in *Parabāsi: ramaṇi:* avadhirēkha: gaṇi, i. e. Counting the line of demarcation by the foreign-soujourned lady . . . (Ushābhilāṣa of Siśuśankara, Chanda, 3,P44)" ; Kala: ghoṛda: > Kāli ghoṛḍi, black mare", etc.

3-IV.-05 :—The words."—andira:", and "-ma:i" are used before the substantive to express masculine and feminine genders distinctly. Similar parallelisms are found in Telegu which has, "-Mahat" and "Amahat" before substantives to distinguish masculine from feminine. The examples are, "Aṇḍira: pua (pila :), boy";

5. N. K. (Nityari Gambaru Kathā) = S. D. (Sarala Das)

" Ma:i pila:, girl " or "Ma:i jhia". Such usages are extended to animals as in as in "Aṇdira: cheli, Ma:i Cheli: Aṇdira: bāchuri, meaning, "he goat, she-goat ; Calf, she-calf" respectively. In some examples the genders are in use being reduplicated unconsciously in Oriyā specially with the case of masculine gender as evidenced in, "Andira: Pila:, he boy" in which, "he and boy" both are denoting masculine gender. Further evidences are in, "Aṇdira: balada, He-bullock, Aṇdira: bāchuri, He-calf ; Aṇdira: pua, he-son" etc. Again, in some examples the words used are of opposite sexes, but ultimate result rests in the feminine gender. The relevant examples are, Ma:i pilā, she-boy, or she-child ; Ma:i balada. she-bullock ; Ma:i chēḷi, she-goat ; Ma:i mēṇdha:, she-ram etc. This denotes the uncertain tendency of masculine to the feminine gender ; and this feature is further corroborated by the understated examples of another variety showing dissimmilarities between the adjective and the substantive, as in baṛdasāāntāṇi (Masc- Sàânta. Lord. King. or husband). the great queen, or lady, or house-wife etc ; "Supṇritēṇdeāta sa:heba, Masc.> Fem. Supāritēndēṇṭa sa:heba:," "Vìparita buddhi", and "Eṛdēka saṁpradhi" as in "Nisataka:larē kalu *viparīta buddhi.* Adbhutē hara:ilu *eṛdéka sàmpradhi.*" S.D.- M Bh. meaning, "At the ṭime of danger, you had antagonistic mind and lost such great riches wonderfully". and so on.

3-IV- 06 :--Oriya like Awadhi, Assamese, Maithili, Bhojapuri, Nepāḷi, etc does not rigorously observe also the distinctions of two genders applied to both the adjectives and substantives and in other words a substative of feminine gender has its adjective of masculine

gender and vice-versa. This is a natural tendency of doing away with feminine affixes, "-a : ,- i " etc of OIA, relics in Middle and Modern Oriya including the dialectal speeeh-patterns. The examples are, "Sundara nara, E. Or. Sandari Na:rì (in some works), Mid & Mod Or. Sundara na:ri:, beautiful lady" ; "Sabuja lata:, green creeper " ; "Janha ra:ti, moonlit-night", "Raṇdi Pua or Rāṇdi jhia, widowcd son or widowed daughter etc".

Adjectives of different kinds like Qualitatives, Quantitatives, Adverbials, Pronominals etc do not introduce changes according to the gender of substantives. Thus *Mid. Or:*—"Nika Luga: a good or clean cloth." ; "Sana dēī, yougest sister", "Barda na:ni:, elder sister" ; "Choṭa jhia. Small daughter" "Gariba bhaṇḍa: ruṇī, poor barbar's wife" etc. *Mid.* & *E. Or:*—The examples are "Diṛḍha śakti na:ṛḍi (C. K.-11-1) stable and vigourous vein" ; "Acinta dha:ma, as in 'Saraha bhaṇati *acinta* so *dha:ma*—([6]C. K.-22-5)' Unthinkable abode or religion" ; "Cauṭha: caraṇa, as in *Cauṭha: caraṇa* bicāri ekka-([7]P. Ping. Vol I. PP 112), 1/4 foot to be considered as one" ; "Ca:ri tha:in. in four places, (P. ping. VOL.I...112P) as in 'Caumatta karahagana *ca:ri ṭha:in" ;* "Vinjha:ba:ḷi: na:gēṇī ([8]S.D.-M. Bh.), the Lady of the Vindhyas is Nageni:" ; "Pālata: śa:ḍi, used saree, as in 'Basra phēṛḍi dēkhābanti dutikāra *palata: sāḍi* (*ri*)—S.D. M/Bh. " "Lajusi ja:ga, (S.D.-M. Bh.)"; "Parama sadhebi:, Vâiraba ba:seli: etc" *Vāiraba basēḷi:*go aṭu ugratārâ, etc···(S 3/4 D.-M. Bh. Udg. Parva)" ;

6. Caryā-Giti Koṣa (Viswabharati Edition) CK.
7. Prākruta Pingaḷam (P. Ping.)...Ed by Dr. Bholanath Vyasa.
8. Sarala Dasa-Mahabharata...(S. D.- -M. Bh.)

"Causaṭhi pākhuṛḍī dombi: ba:puṛḍi (C. K.-10, st. 2-P33)" and so on.

Thus the feminine is formed by

(a) Changing "-a">"-a:", as in "A:mbiḷa tiaṇa, fuṛmented curry, A:mbiḷa: dahi, sour-curd" ; "Lamba ha:ta, long hand; Lamba: tḥēnga:, Long stick"; "Pa:tala Ka:gaja, thin paper: Pāta(Pa:ta)la: Luga:, thin or fine cloth" ; Chotṭa pua, Little son, Chhoṭta: jhia, little daughter" ; and so on.

(b) Changing, "-a:"> "-i", with an introduction of elongated sound just preceeding "-i"; as in, "Kaḷa: baḷada, black-bullock", "Ka:ḷi ga:i, black cow"; "Kaṇa: ma:mu, One-eyed maternal uncle", "Ka:ṇi ma:i, One-eyed maternal aunt."; "Pa:kua: buḍha:, toothless oldman, Pākōi buḍhi:, toothless old lady" ; "Ṭēra: akhi, is used denoting to a boy", but when denotes a girl, the expression becomes, "Ṭēri ākhi", and so on.

(c) Changing, "-a:"> "-i:", as in "Laṅgaḷa: pua (Masc.) naked or a male with loose character." ; "Languli: bohu, daughter-in-law with bad character" or naked daughter-in-law"; "Chchoṭi goṛḍi, short-legged lady" ; (the meaning refers to the noun understood here) (Masc. Bapuṛda: dama), (Fem. Bāpuṛdi dombi, or Bapuṛḍa: domi); "Pāṣaṇḍa nara, sinful male or man; Pāṣaṇḍi na:ri, sinful lady" and also "Pāṣaṇḍa>Pa:khaṇḍ, Fem. Pa:khaṇḍī used in Early and Middle Oriyā". Middle and Late Middle Oriyā has such usages abundantly, as in "Jaḷaki:, Ka:ṇi:, ṭeri:, na:kapēci: (Na;ri)... ([9]C. V...B,J.) <Masc, Jalaka:, Kàna:, tera:,...na:kapeca: etc.

9. Catura Vinoda (C. V.) of Utkal University.

(d) Changing "a">"i:",as in Mohini: byāghra:ṇi:, enchanted tigress<Masc. Mohana byāghra; Fem. Muṇḍi; chcha:ñcuṇi: shaven-headed broomstick etc.

Declension of Adjectives.

3-IV-07:—Early Oriyā:—The Oriyā adjectives have no normal change with regard to the gender and number of the noun; but still there are some survivals of the inflected adjective as found in the so-called standard Oriyā of the Middle and Modern periods. These inflected adjectives have double inflections, the first of which is "he, Ka, Kai, ai,, La, a, ua:, and anta:", while the latter has he, hi, a:,ia, etc" are "Swa:rthe" affixes. The examples are "*Duhila*: dudha, milched milk (Carya. 33)"; *Ba:habake* Pa:raa (Carya. 8), able to carry"; "Pāṇḍu *arjila:ra* se aṭai Pancura:ai," (S.D.-M. Bh) ; "Aneka binaya hoila: *yevaṇēka* bidhi" (S.D.-M. Bh); with "anta" "Śukamuniṅka vacane: hasila: sahasra:kṣha,

E *nrutyakaranta:*	munihē aṭai bibhatsa. Vana Parva, M. Bh Udjoga Parva.
Kēvaṇahi	tḥa: varē tha: vare achanti padmalata:. B. R. (Kevaṇahi banē, Kevaṇa vanē, referring to place... B. R.[10]."

Thus the adjectives are of broadly three kinds, namely (i) Adjective to noun, (ii) adjective to an adjective and (iii) adjective to a verb.

3-IV-07 (a) :—*Adjective of a noun* :—Oriyā has generally no use of case-affixes, gender, and number as a part like Bengali, Assamese and other NIA.

10. Bilanka Ramayaṇa. . . of Saraḷa Das. (B. R.) Sahitya Prabesa...of Bara Jena (B. J.)

But the adjectives in Oriya are being used as a noun and have got the necessary case affixes, as in "Mohara baḷē tahū nēi nuhai cina : ē (Cina:ē bhumiku) Second case-ending (S. D. M. Bh-S. P.[11]) : Even a small plot of land can not be occupied only for my strength".

"Bamana bolai mu *yētēku* bha:jana, Sakti anukrame ghenain Muhi da:na. B. D.-R[12] (Yètēku-Yētē janaku), Vamana has said that he will accept the grants according to his capacity."

"Yama niti ba:ṛḍi ta:ṭi mohora khaṭai,

Kubēra devata:mora *maala* ka : cai... ... ... B. R. S.-D.[13].

Durjaya kaṭaka soṇita pura ; *Agamita* sura-nara-asura. U. Bhi. 1 Chchanda. 26"[14].

From the above examples it may be remarked that the adjectives in Oriyā are sometimes declined when used attributively.

3.-IV-07 (b) :—*Adjective to adjective* :—Some illustrations are, "Ghañca sañca dantapanti-kānti binu pra:ē...G. V.-V. Bi[15]" the lusture of the strongly studded teeth resembles the lightening" "Asthi kuṛḍḥa kuṛḍḥa hela:mánsaa gala:bahi...Bi. R. S. D., The bones are being piled up ; but the meat was melted away."

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11. Sarala Dasa Maḥābhārata, Swarga Parva.
12. Balarama Dasa-Rāmāyaṇa.
13. Bi. (B). R. Bilanka Rāmayana of Sarala Dasa.
14. Usha:bhila:sa (U. Bhi). P 4. Ch. I, 26....Sisu Sankara Das (Si. D).
15. Govina Bhañja (G.V.)-Bhakta Vinoda.

3.-IV-07 (c) :—*Adjective to verb* :—Some of them have been very appropriate and reveal the connection with verb. They are, "Swapane mote *vidaṁbaṇa* kalā se ru:pe na gachche koṭikāmā" U Bhi. Si. D, Ch. V. 8"

"Suṇiṇa ṭahaṭaha hasai nrupamaṇi. D. R....BD.[16]"

Kahuṁkahuṁ vaikula huanti puṇapuṇa...C. P....S.D.; By utterance he becomes agitated again and again"... C. P. - S.D.[17]"

These examples comprising (ii) and (iii) serve as examples of adjectives used predicatively.

3-IV-08 :—*Late Middle and Modern Oriya* :—Illustrations are remarkably evidenced quite unlikely to Maìthili, in Oriya of the Late Middle and Modern Periods; but the number of adjectives as used pradicatively is gradually increasing more and more than those of attributives.

(*i*) *Adjectives of predicative use* :—"Kramē kharḍi chua:i lē, Sakaḷapāṭha paṛḍhilè: (Sulocana: Pariṇaya of Bharata Seṇa of 1860 A. D.) i. e. His study was begun ; and he read all lessons." "Ehi ma:phikē kandala nivarta kalē...(Cakarda: Vasa: na, P 25,' Thus he was dissuaded from struggle." "*Ehila*: *gē* ghaṭiba katha: bhulila kipari ?, How did you forget the incident just occured ?" "Udeśya guṛḍika *jhaṭpat* ha: sala hoijāē, (Gopal candra Praharaj, Utkal Sāhitya, Jyēṣṭha 1323, No. 2, PP 99-PP 104'), The purpose was realised immediately", and so on.

16. Dāndi Ramayana (D. R.). . . Balarama Das (B. D.)
17. Candi Puṛāna (C. P.)—Sarala Das (S. D.) . . ./

(*ii*) *Adjective of qualitative use* :—The examples are, "*Nika pa:itijogu* gharaṭi sundara. The house looks beautiful for cleaned or good work.", "Adaḷa : snēha, unturned love"—Utkala Sāhitya, Jyēṣṭha 1323, No. 2, PP 99—PP104"; "Maphasalia: caṣa:, Village peasant. Utkal Sāhitya, VOL. XXII, Baisākha, 1325, PP 28-PP 35" etc.

3 - IV - 09 :—Oriyā has still retained to a large extent the uncompounded adjectives either of attributive or predicative nature as prevalent in OIA; but has not strictly observed the radical changes in either of them according to number, gender and case. In OIA, the loss of affix or affixes of the Karmadhā:raya compounds has been generally more significant ; and such evolutionary process has been gradually adopted to both the compounded and uncompounded Oriyā words of nouns and ajectives through MIA. Consequently the Middle NIA has practically introduced such loss of affix or affixes and method of declension as a permanent feature, which has ultimately reached to the NIA. in general and Oriyā in particular.

Degrees of Comparison

3-IV-10 :—Oriyā, as in other NIA, has no such inflexions for comparative and superlative terms of adjectives. The sense of comparative is expressed by (a) putting the compared (standard) thing in the ablative, e. g. "Udayaṭha : ru Hari kala :, Hari is darker than Udaya." ; "Śua : kua : thāru sundara. The parrot is more beautiful than the crow"; and (b) by putting in use words like-"Kama" and "bēsi" ; "-Sa:na," and "Baṛḍa"; "Adhika" and " Uṇa " : " Jia:da:" and " Kam " ; "Aḷpa and Bahuta" ; "-hina,-tuchcha

baḷi, etc. and some words used as affixes expressing indirectly the sense of comparison, such as, "Sundara", "Asundara" , " Deṇga: " , " Geṛda: " , "- Moṭa:", " -Saru " ; "-Tiṃpa: (S. Oriya Dial.)" etc, any one of which is put before the adjective with which the comparison is made by putting ablative case-affix with post-positions. These are very common in both the recorded and literary Oriyā daily speech-patterns, as illustrated below.

> "Rāmaṭha:ru Shya:ma dhanarē kam, Shyam is less rich than Rama", "Raṁbha : Urvaśiṭha:ru uparē Uṇa:, Rambha is less beautiful than Urvasi by appearance." "Vindhya ucarē Hima:ḷayaṭha:ru sāna, The Vindhya is smaller in height than the Himalayas".

The sense of comparison is expressed also by putting the noun or pronoun with which the comprison is made in the Locative case-affix suffixed to "-madhya, majhi,-bhitara," etc the usages of which are in vogue in the Modern Oriyā. The exemples are, "Rāma Rāvaṇa madhyarē (Madhya+rē), bhitare (bhitarae) Rāma baḷabān. Rama is stronger than Rāvaṇa in prowess." "Rādhu O Sādhu majhirē Sādhu Āgua:, sadhu is faster than Rādhu". The origins of the words are attested as Bhitarate <OIA. Abhyantarasṁin. Loc. Case-affix." "Majhire <OIA. Madhya asṁin" and so on.

The sense of comparison is evidenced clearly in the illustrations from Middle Oriya, and it is expressed by the ablative Case-affix. The examples are. E sēbāku kuruma Na:ekatahū kereba (S. No. 48 of Pratāparudra Inscriptios, L9-10), The service of tortoise Kuruma)

(is more than the Lord (Na:katahû-Na:ekathāru). Thus "-Tahuñ" is a pronominal suffix with literal meaning "from him" <Tahim, (Literary meaning,-in him). Mid. Or. <Old. Or. Tahmī <Tasmin. in Locative of the OIA Tad.

"-Tahum", as in "Vajrahum āṇṭa jāra hia:, whose heart is stronger than the thunderbolt" ; "Khēpahum, C. 4" ; "[18]Raṇahûm", Mid. Or "Gitagovindahūm, from Gitagovinda" ; Further examples in E. Oriya and Middle Oriya reveal the affix, "Tahūm", "Hum"-"U,-Um" etc. But the question naturally arises in this "U" ;-"Um" ; etc. Naturally the question arises about the origin of "-hum" and "-Tahum". Scholars are in doubt about the origin of "hum." While Dr. S. K. Chatterji remarks about the origin of "hum" -as obscure inspite of its presence as a living form in Bengali to the present day, on the otherhand he has suggested some possibility of its composite origin, along the line indicated below, :— dha-dhi> -ha,-hi ; Putra + dhatah>*Puttahao>Puttahau pùtahu? (*Vide. Ukti- Vyakti-Prakaraṇa, Introduction, P. 42*).

Further suggestions have been made by Dr. Sukumar Sen about "-hum", and "hu" as current in Avahaṭṭa through Apabhraṁśa. (*Vide. Baṅgalābha:-sār Ittivṛtta in Baṇgalāpadabicāra, P 157.*) But the form"-hu" is used in Apabhraṁśa work "Sanatkumarakathā Caritaṃ, 444.1, as quoted by way of discussion of "Dative-Genitive-Ablative Singular case-affixes" ; and this one belongs to Eastern Apabhraṁśa Form, developed by the 12th Century A.D. (*Vide, Historical Grammar*

18. Bhakta Vinoda of Govinda Bhanj of (S. D) Cena AKT.

of Apabhraṁśa-P 187 by Dr. G. V. Tagare). There is no doubt that the "hu,hum"-as suggetsed by Dr. Sen is undoubtedly of Avahaṭṭa origin through Apabhraṁś. But there will be no falsity of saying that these two terms are nothing but further simplification of the so-called terms, "-ēhu.-tahu.-ēhum,:tahum," as prevalent in Early and Early Middle Oriyā. Such examples are, "Tuṁbhatahum sakha: na: hiñ a mahāsamsa : ra(The Mahābhārata of Jaganath Das, P 46") There is no friend in this great world other than you." ; "Abhyya: sahu gya:na śreṣṭha gyānaum śrēṣṭha dhyāna, knowledge is better than the habit, and meditation iś superior than the knowledge ...Srimad Gita:, of Matta-Balarama Das". Such type of examples are so much common in works of "Visnu-Purāṇa, Sūrya Purāṇa, Caṇdipurāṇa, Sarala Dasa's Mahābhārata and others in this sense as the case-affix of Ablative case. In view of consideration of these examples, it will not be unjustifiable to trace out the origin of,,-"hu,-hum" as "tahum" etc. as further simplification of-tahim >-tahum>-hum>-hu These affixes are not used in Mod. Oriyā except "-u<-hum".

3-IV-11 :—The superlative degree is expressed by some case-affixes of the Ablative-case, as "-hu",-"ru", "ṭha: ru" etc. "-hu,-ru,-ṭhāru" etc, as in ; "Baṛḍahūṇti baṛḍa sē go sānahūṇti sāna...Bh. VI of G. V. of 15th. Cent. A. D." meaning thereby" Srikrsna is the greatest of the greats ; and smallest of the smalls". This idea is also being expressed by the word or words used as affix or affies with Nominal or Pronominal base in Locative case-endings. The words are, "Madhyarē, Majhirē, Bhitarē, Yāka or Yākarē etc." and these may be analysed as, "Bhitara ē, Madha-rē, Majhitrē, Yakarē etc". ; which

are illustrated as, Kalidāśa *kabimadhyarē* or *bhitarē Yākarē* śreṣṭha. Kalidasa is the greatest of all poets. Rājya *yākarē* Kashmira sundara. The country Kashmir is the most beautiful of all countries etc."

3-IV-12 :—*Comparative and Superlative degrees with foreign or Loan-words used as affix or affixes: or suffix or suffixes:*—Comparative and superlative degrees are denoted by prefixing words like, ":adhika, more or excess" ; "bēśi, more" ; "kam, less" ; Mod. Or. "Jia:da: <Mid. Or. Jiya:de <Pers- Ziyada, more, excess" to the adjective, as in English and other Languages. There are other words like "bahuta", very, much ; "ati", very ; "atyanta", extremely, "Khub", much "are words used to express the qualitative degree or the intending comparisions as stated. The sense of the comparison with the help of these words as prefixes to the qualifying adjective is significantly expressed by putting the ablative and locative case-affixes,-"ṭhuñ,-uñ,-ru,-ṭha : ru, rē,-ē, etc." with the noun of comparison. Some of the appropriate examples are, "Dahi bāsipakhāḷaṭhuñ, or bāsipakhaḷaṭha: ru or ru adhika (ka:), bēśi, Jia:da bahuta, khub, ati, atyanta etc. a:ṁbiḷa:. The curd is more sour than the formented rice". "Tula: ṭhāru Luhā bha:ri ojania:, The iron is heavier than the cotton", Nirmaḷa:Syāma:ṭha:ru atisundara, or atyanta sundara, or khub sundara, baḷi sundara, or bhāri sundara etc. Nirmala is more beautiful than Shya:mā." The locative case-endings are added to words like,"-madhya,-bhitara etc "as discussed under (3-IV-11) in addition to the word",- tuḷana:-rē-apekṣhya:-rē etc." to express the degree of comparison. The examples are, "Dhana tuḥaṇa rē ma:n baṛḍa. The prestige is greater

than the wealth." Ta : nkari guṇa apēkṣhya : doṣa bēśi. His faults are more than the merits." etc.

Ts and Sts. affixes for comparative and Superlative Degrees as in Oriyā :—Oriyā of the standard or chaste variety has comparative and superlative suffixes of OIA to express the Degrees of Comparisions as in other NIA. The suffixes are, "tara, tama," added to the adjectives, such as "Punyatara, Priyatara, Punyatama, Priyatma, etc ; and "iṣṭha" added to the adjectives, such as Pa:pi, Papiṣṭha, most sinful ;" Srēṣṭha, most excellent etc. The Oriyā expressions mostly follow the idiomatic expressions of Sanskrit with or without a slight change in structural method of sentences, as exemplified, "Kruṣna Kaṅsa apēkṣhya: or madhyarē or tuḷaṇarē or (ablative affix,-ṭha : ru, added with Kaṅsa) caturatara., krusna is more cunning than kansa," "Bilua: prāṇimadhyarē, or prāniṭha:ru, prā:ṅibitarē caturatama. The jackal is the cunnung animal of all", "Mata : svargaṭha:ru gariyasī. Mother is greater than the heaven.," Dhanāt vidya:geriyasī :,...OIA., but in Oriya, Vidhya: dhanaṭha:ru baṛaḍa. Learning is greter than riches. Comparing these sentences, the sense of comparison is being expressed by indeclinibles by Oriya and Sanskrit, while the same idea is expressed in English by prepositions.

3-IV-13 :—From this it may be concluded that the adjectives are of three kinds, namely (i) adjective to a noun, as in, "Gaganarē ghanamēgha ghoṭi rahichi. The dense clouds have shrouded the sky", (ii) Adjective to adjective, as in "Ghanaghora andhaka:ra ja:uchi ghoti, The darkness of greater density is covering the sky." ; and (iii) adjective to a verb, as in "Camaka :

uchi bijuli ghanaghana, lightening is being flashened more and more".

3-IV-14. :—History :—The origin of Oriya adjectives is syntactically related to that of nouns. In OIA and MIA the adjectives without compounds with nouns had generally the same gender, number, and case as the noun qualified. But the Early and Early Middle Oriyā have maintained to some extent the modifications of gender, but not the number and case of the noun as qualified. The adjectives are normally placed before the substantive and one case-ending does for both. The distinction of gender has been retained by introducing "-a,-i" forms in adjective and such retention of distinction of gender in adjectives by addition of "-a:" forms is evidenced in Eastern Awadhi.[19]

Gradually the Late Middle and Modern Oriyā have not significantly observed such distinctions even in modifications of gender in adjective to noun. Bengali is quite akin to Oriyā in this respect.

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19. Evolution of Awadhi: . . . P 145. . . . . Dr. Baburama Saksena.

FRESH LIGHT ON PĀṆINI'S SUTRA—'TASYĀDITA UDĀTTAMARDHAHRASVAM'—(I.2.32)

A. N. JANI

M. S. University of Baroda

After describing the *svarita* accent as a combination of *udātta* and *anudātta*[1] (I.2.31), Pāṇini specifies in the succeeding *sūtra* (I.2.32) as to which part of a *svarita* consists of *udātta* element and which one of *anudātta*. He says - *Tasyādita udāttamardhahrasvam* (I.2.32) - Here the pronoun *tasya* refers to the noun *svarita* of the preceding *sūtra*. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita while interpreting this *sūtra* remarks that the word "*hrasva*" in the *sūtra* is unscientific or not serving any purpose. In other words it is redundant.[2] Thus omitting this word he interprets the *sūtra* as follows:—

The first half of a *svarita* should be known as *udātta*, while the latter half is by the rule of remainder, *anudātta*.[3]

Thus according to Bhaṭṭoji, a *hrasva svarita* has first half *mātrā udātta* and the latter half *anudātta;* a *dīrgha svarita* consists of first one *udātta mātrā* and the latter one *anudātta mātrā*. Similarly the *pluta svarita* is a combination of first one-and-a half *udātta mātrā* and of the latter one-and-a-half *anudātta mātrā*. Represented by a diagram it stands thus—

Svarita

hrasva	*dīrgha*	*pluta*
½ *Udātta* + ½ *anudātta*	1 *udātta* + 1 *anudātta*	1½ *udātta* + 1½ *anudātta*

1. समाहारः स्वरितः (१.२.३१)
2. ह्रस्वग्रहणमतन्त्रम् ।
3. स्वरितस्यादितोऽर्धमुदात्तं बोध्यम्, उत्तरार्धं तु पारिशेष्यादनुदात्तम्

Above interpretation of Bhaṭṭoji is intended to get rid of one difficulty. If the word *hrasva* is retained, it can be explained in two ways: (1) *hrasvasya ardham* or (2) '*ardham ca tad hrasvam*' The First explanation means 'half of a *hrasva*'. Thus according to this interpretation the first half of a *hrasva svarita* will be *udātta* and the remaining half *anudātta*. Thus the scope of the *sūtra* will be restricted to the *hrasva* variety of a *svarita* only. If the second explanation is accepted it will mean that *hrasva* which is half i.e. it will refer only to the *dīrgha* variety of a *svarita* of which the first half portion is made up of a *hrasva mātrā*. Thus the first explanation excludes the *dīrgha* and *pluta* varieties and the second explanation excludes the *hrasva* and *pluta* varieties. In other words the *sūtra* will not refer to all the three varieties of a *svarita* which is actually intended by Pāṇini, who by using the pronoun *tasya* indicates that he speaks of the divisions of *svarita* (i.e. all the three varieties of it) in general and not a particular variety thereof. To make the *sūtra* applicable to all the three varieties, *Bhaṭṭoji* advises safely to omit the word *hrasvam* from the *sūtra* i.e. according to him the *sūtra* should better have been framed as '*tasyādita udāttamardham*'. Keeping this in mind, he shows the division of the three varieties of a *svarita* as illustrated above.

As in many cases *Bhaṭṭoji* has taken the expression '*hrasvagrahaṇamatantram*' directly from the *Kāśikāvṛtti*. But there is a clear difference of opinion between these two authorities. *Vāmana* says that *ardhahrasvam* is intended to indicate the *ardhamātrā* only[4] i.e. the word *hrasva* here does not refer to the *hrasva* variety which is

4. अर्धं 'ह्रस्वम्' इति चार्धमात्रोपलक्ष्यते ।

its primary meaning but is used here secondarily to refer to one *mātrā* of which it consists. Thus *hrasva* = one *mātrā;* hence *ardhahrasvam* = ½ of one *mātrā* i.e. half the *mātrā*. It is only if the word *hrasva* is taken in the secondary sense of one *mātrā* which is its measure, that the *sūtra* will be applicable to all the three varieties of a *svarita*. Thus according to *Vāmana* the word *hrasva* is not redundant, but is used in its secondary sense, whereas *Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita* considers it as wholly redundant. Consequently, the first half *mātrā* of any variety of a *svarita* is *udātta* and the remaining *mātrās* are *anudātta*.[5] Thus:—

Svarita

hrasva	*dīrgha*	*pluta*
½ *udātta* + ½ *anudātta*	½ *udātta* + 1½ *anudātta*	½ *udātta* + 2½ *anudātta*

The interpretation of *Vāmana* tends to come nearer to *Pāṇini* than that of Bhaṭṭoji. Firstly because *Vāmana* follows the view of the *Bhāṣyakāra* who remarks that *ardhahrasvam* should be understood as *ardhahrasvamātram*[6] and that this *mātrac* termination should be taken as dropped.[7] Secondly because if *Pāṇini* had intended equal distribution of mātrās in the two parts of a *svarita* as taken by Bhaṭṭoji, he would have preferred to drop the word *hrasva* from the *sūtra*. His use of the word *hrasva* in the *sūtra* is an indication that here *ardhahrasvam* is either a contraction of *ardhahrasvamātram* or *ardhahrasva-*

5. सर्वेषामेव ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतानां स्वरितानामेष स्वरविभागः ॥ शिक्यम् इत्यत्राऽर्धा मात्रा आदित उदात्ता, अपराऽर्धमात्रा अनुदात्ता, एकश्रुतिर्वा । कन्या इत्यत्राऽर्धमात्राऽऽदित उदात्ता, अध्यर्ध (१½) मात्रा अनुदात्ता । 'माणवका ३ माणवक' इत्यत्रार्धमात्राऽऽदित उदात्ता, अर्धतृतीय (२½) मात्रा अनुदात्ता ।

6. अर्धह्रस्वमात्रम् अर्धह्रस्वम् इति ।

7. मात्रचोऽत्र लोपो द्रष्टव्यः ।

dīrghaplutam i.e. the word *hrasva* either stands for one *mātrā* or it is a representative *upalakṣaṇam* of the other two varieties also.

Thirdly Pāṇini has given these divisions according to the Prātiśākhyas, which were the direct precursors of Sanskrit grammar. The Ṛkprātiśākhya, while discussing this matter, says that the first half *mātrā* of a *svarita* is more *udātta* (udāttatarā) than a regular *udātta;* or the half of (the whole quantity of) a *svarita* consisting of two *mātrās* is like a half *mātrā;* the remaining part is *anudātta.*[8]

The Taittirīya Prātiśākhya, on the other hand, lays down that "of this circumflex, in case it immediately follows an acute, the first part to the extent of half a short vowel, is uttered in a yet higher tone" (whitney, p. 31-32.)[9] The wording of the Taittirīya Prātiśākhya, especially the expression '*yāvad ardham hrasvasya*' at once makes it clear that Pāṇini has before him the tradition preserved in the Taittirīya Prātiśākhya and that the expression '*ardham hrasvasya*' is contracted by him as *ardhahrasvam.* Thus the word *hrasva* certainly denotes one *mātrā* and not the *hrasva* variety of a *svarita.*[10] As such the word '*hrasva*' in the *sūtra* is not at all redundant as *Bhaṭṭoji* observes. However he seems to follow the alternative view recorded by the Ṛkprātiśākhya which recommends equal distribution of the two halves of a *svarita.*

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8. तस्योदात्ततरोदात्तात् अर्धमात्राऽर्धमेव वा । RP III.4.
9. तस्यादिरुच्चैस्तरामुदात्तात् अनन्तरे यावदर्धं ह्रस्वस्य । TP.I-41.
10. अर्धस्वशब्द : प्रमाणवाची रूढिशब्द : । व्युत्पत्त्यर्थं तु ह्रस्वस्योपादानम् अर्धमात्रात्वेनाभिधीयते ततः प्रमेये मात्रचं विधाय, तस्य 'प्रमाणेलः' इति लोपः क्रियते । तत्र यथा ह्रस्वे बुद्ध्या अर्धमात्रा विभज्यते, एवं दीर्घप्लुतयोरपि ॥ प्रदीप on the महाभाष्य.

न्यायभाष्ये प्रावादुकमतानि

किशोरनाथ झा, प्रयाग

न्यायभाष्यस्याध्येतॄणामन्तेवासिनां समक्षं प्रेत्यभावपदार्थपरीक्षानन्तरं व्यक्तादेव व्यक्तमुत्पद्यत इति स्वमतमुपोद्बलयितुं पृथिव्याद्युत्पत्तिविषये विभिन्नदार्शनिकाणां कानिचन मतानि प्रायशो न्यायसूत्रकारकालप्रसिद्धानि तत्र खण्डनार्थं प्रस्तुतानि सन्ति। अत्र स्वाभाविकी जिज्ञासा समुदेति किंमूलकान्येतानि कुत्र चेदानीन्तनेषु दर्शनेषु विकासमागतानि नैयायिकस्यैतदपाकरणं सयुक्तिकं वर्तते न वेति।

न्यायभाष्यकृद् वात्स्यायनस्तु मतानामेषां विवेचनाय भूमिकामारचयनभिलपति "अतः परं प्रावादुकानां दृष्टयः प्रदर्श्यन्त[1]" इति। अत्र प्रावादुकाः नैयायिकेतरदार्शनिकाः दृष्टिपदं च दर्शनपर्यायम्। तानि यथा (१) शून्यतोपादानवादः (२) ईश्वरकारणतावादः (३) आकस्मिकत्ववादः (४) सर्वानित्यत्ववादः (५) सर्वनित्यत्ववादः (६) सर्वनानात्ववादः (७) सर्वशून्यत्ववादः (८) संख्यैकान्तवादश्चेति। एषु च मतेषु केवलमीश्वरकारणतावादः नैयायिकानां सम्मतोऽस्ति। अन्यानि मतानि तु नैवानुमतानि प्रत्युत निरसनीयानि सन्तीति तत्रत्यभाष्याध्ययनतः परिज्ञायते। स्वकीयायां खद्योतव्याख्यायां डा० गङ्गानाथ झा महोदयस्तु ईश्वरवादस्थापनार्थमेतस्य प्रकरणस्यारम्भ इति वार्तिककृदुद्योतकराचार्याभिप्राय इति प्रत्यपादयत्[2]।

तत्र प्रथमं शून्यतोपादानप्रकरणं दृष्टिगोचरं भवति। अयमाशयोऽस्य मृत्पिण्डसलिलादिसंयोगे सति बीजे नष्टे सत्येवाङ्कुरा उत्पद्यन्ते। तस्माज् ज्ञायते अभावाद् नाभावानां पदार्थानामुत्पत्तिर्भवतीति। एतन्मतमेव पूर्वपक्षतया सूत्रयति भगवान् गौतमः- "अभावाद् भावोत्पत्तिर्नानुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात्' ४। १। १४। इति। छान्दोग्योपनिषदि पूर्वपक्षतयाभिहिता वागस्य मूलमिति मनुते जनोऽयम्। तथा च तत्र "तद्धैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्, तस्मादसतः सज्जायत[3]" इति। एवं तैत्तिरीयोपनिषदि असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् ततो वै सदजायत इति विलोक्यते।

पश्चादेतन्मतरक्षा तु बौद्धदर्शनस्य माध्यमिकसंप्रदाये सविस्तरमालोकिता भवति। माध्यमिकश्च शून्यतोपादानवादीति धीधनेषु प्रथितम्।

परन्त्वेतन्मतं "व्याघातादप्रयोग" ४।१।१५। इत्युक्त्या निराकरोत् सूत्रकारः। तथा हि उपमृद्येत्यत्र क्त्वाप्रत्ययान्तार्थस्यासमाप्ताकांक्षतया "उपमृद्य

प्रादुर्भाव" इत्यनेनाङ्कुरादेः कार्यस्योपमर्दप्रादुर्भावयोः कर्तृत्वं प्राप्तम् । यतो हि य एवाङ्कुरः प्रादुर्भवति स एव तस्मात् पूर्वमुपमृद्नाति बीजम् । तच्च न संभवति उपमर्दानन्तरं जायमानस्याङ्कुरस्योपमर्दकर्तृत्वासंभवात् ।

(२) अतः परमीश्वरकारणतावादः समायाति "ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकर्मा-फल्यदर्शनात्' ४।१।१९। इति हि नैयायिकस्य पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् । एतत् सूत्रव्याख्याने वार्तिकतात्पर्यटीकयोर्मतभेदः परिलक्ष्यते । वार्तिककृदुद्योतकरमतेन कर्मनिरपेक्ष-केवलेश्वरकारणतावादपरमिदं सूत्रम् । भाष्यकृद्वात्स्यायनस्याप्यत्रैव सहमतिः । अत एव समीहमानोऽपि पुरुषः समीहाफलं न प्राप्नोति । तेनानुमीयते पराधीनं पुरुषस्य कर्मफलाराधनमिति । यदधीनं स ईश्वर इति भाष्यं[5] सङ्गच्छते । यथाब्भक्षो वायुभक्ष इत्यत्राप एव भक्षयति वायुमेव भक्षयतीत्येवकारार्थः प्रतीयते एवमत्रापीश्वरः कारणमित्यस्येश्वर एव केवलं कारणं न कर्मादि किञ्चिदन्यदिति तात्पर्यम् । मतमेतत् प्राचीनतमे नकुलीशपाशुपतदर्शने मिलति । तथा च सर्वदर्शन-संग्रहकारः पाशुपतसूत्राभिप्रायं परिष्कुर्वदीश्वरे शिवापरपर्याये सृष्टिसंहारकर्तृत्वं प्रसाध्य तत्र दर्शनश्रवणमननविज्ञानसर्वज्ञत्वमनोजवित्वकामरूपित्वविकरण धर्मत्वरूपाष्टविधैश्वर्याणि साधयति । तत्र कामरूपित्वं कर्मादिनिरपेक्षस्येश्वरस्येच्छ यैवानन्तकर्तृत्वाधिष्ठातृत्वमिति व्याख्याय कर्मादिनिरपेक्षमीश्वरं जगतः कारणतया निर्दिशति । [6]तथा च तत्रोक्तम्—

"कर्मादिनिरपेक्षस्तु स्वेच्छाचारी यतो ह्ययम् ।
अतः कारणतः शास्त्रे सर्वकारणकारणम्" ॥

महाबोधिजातकेऽपि कथेयं मिलति —

इस्सरो सव्वलोकस्स सचे कप्पेति जीवितं
इद्धिव्यसनभावंच कम्मं कल्याणपापकं ॥
निद्देशकारी पुरिसो इस्सरो तेन लिम्पति[7] ।

महाकविरश्वघोषोऽपि बुद्धचरितेऽभिलपति—

सर्गं वदन्तीश्वरतस्तथान्ये
तत्र प्रयत्ने पुरुषस्य कोऽर्थः ।
य एव हेतुर्जगतः प्रवृत्तौ
हेतुर्निवृत्तौ नियतः स एव[8] ॥

परं तात्पर्यटीकाकृद्वाचस्पतिस्तु पूर्वपक्षतयेह वेदान्त्यभिमतमीश्वरोपादान-कारणतावादं प्रस्तौति । तथा च तदुक्तिः—

"मा भूदयं नामरूपप्रपञ्चः शून्यतोपादानोऽपि तु ब्रह्मोपादानो भविष्यति। ब्रह्मैव हि प्रपञ्चरूपेण परिणमते मृत्तिकेव घटशरावोदञ्चनादिभावेन।... अपरं च ब्रह्मैवानिर्वचनीयानाद्यविद्योपधानान्नामरूपप्रपञ्चभेदेन विवर्तते मुखमिवानेकमणिकृपाणादिभेदान्नैकविधप्रतिबिम्बभेदेनेति। तदेतद्दर्शनद्वयमनेन सूचितम्। ईश्वरो ब्रह्म ईशनायोगात्"[9]। अत्र च प्रमाणम्—"तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय"[10] इति छान्दोग्योपनिषदः वाक्। इहाचार्य उदयनः परिशुद्धौ कथयति यद्यपि कारणपदं सामान्यपरं किन्तूक्तश्रुतिबलादिहोपादानपरमिति नासङ्गतिर्वाचस्पतेर्वचसि संभावनीया[11] एतावतेह विषये आचार्योदयनः वाचस्पतिमिश्रमनुगच्छति न वार्तिककारमुद्योतकरम्। वृत्तिकृद् विश्वनाथस्तु वाचस्पतिमनुवदति किन्तु स्वकीयपक्षपातस्तु वार्तिकोक्तावेव दर्शयति। तथा च तत्पङ्क्तिः—"वस्तुतस्तु केवलेश्वरकारणता परंप्रकरणम्; तदुपादानता परत्वे तु न मानमाकलयामः"[12]।

यद्वा भवतु एतत्तु निश्चितं यन्न्यायसूत्रकारः मतमिदं पूर्वपक्षतयोपस्थाप्याग्रिमसूत्रेण खण्डयति—"न पुरुषकर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः" ४।१।२०। न केवलमीश्वरः जगतः कारणम्, न वा ब्रह्मोपादानोऽयं संसारः। यतो हि पुरुषः कर्म कृत्वैव फलमुपभुङ्क्ते। अनन्तरं "तत्कारित्वादहेतु"रिति ४।१।२१। सूत्रेण स्वसिद्धान्तं दीपयति सूत्रकृदित्यत्र न लेशमात्रमपि विमतिः। तथा हि सूत्रव्याख्यानभूमिकायां लिखति वाचस्पतिः—"तदेवमीश्वरोपादानत्वं ब्रह्मविवर्तत्वं निरपेक्षेश्वरनिमित्तत्वं च प्रत्याख्यायाभिमतं पक्षं गृह्णाति—तत् कारित्वादहेतुरिति"[13]। तत्पदेनेह ईश्वरस्य परामर्शः। तथा चेश्वरकारितत्वात् पुरुषकारस्य तत्सहाय एवेश्वरो जगतो निमित्तकारणमिति। अस्य निराकरणे पुरुषकर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेरित्यहेतुरिति सूत्रनिर्यासः।

अत्र वार्तिककारः मुख्यतया द्वाभ्यां हेतुभ्यां जगतः कर्तृतया अदृष्टस्य चाधिष्ठातृतयेश्वरं साधयति। तथा चानुमानप्रकारः

—(१) प्रधानपरमाणुकर्माणि प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः बुद्धिमत्कारणाधिष्ठितानि प्रवर्तन्ते अचेतनत्वात् वास्यादिवदिति। (२) धर्माधर्मौ बुद्धिमत्कारणाधिष्ठितौ पुरुषस्योपभोगं कुरुतः करणत्वात् वास्यादिवदिति। अत्र चेतरबाधसहकारात्मकेन हेतुना बुद्धिमत्पदमीश्वरं वक्ति। वाचस्पतिस्तु तृतीयेनैतद्व्यतिरिक्तेनापि हेतुना साधयतीश्वरम्। स च हेतुः वेदस्य कर्तृत्वात्मकः। तथा च तात्पर्यटीकापङ्क्तिः"तस्माद् यो वर्णाश्रमाचारव्यवस्थापक आगमो महाजनपरिगृहीतः स तत्प्रणीतः आप्तोक्तत्वात् प्रमाणं मन्त्रायुर्वेदवाक्यवदिति संप्रधार्यते।..... वेदा एव सकललोकयात्रामुद्वहन्तो हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारोपायमुपादिशन्तः ईश्वरप्रणीता इत्यवगच्छामः"[14]। पश्चाद्भवास्तु नैयायिकाः एतद्धेतुत्रितयमेव नवीनदृष्टान्तादिप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं पल्लवयन्ति।

(३) आकस्मिकत्ववादस्तृतीयः । एतन्मतस्य प्रवर्तकस्तु चार्वाकः । तथा चात्रत्या तात्पर्यपरिशुद्धिः—"इदानीं व्यक्ताद्व्यक्तनिष्पत्तिं निराकर्तुमाकस्मिकत्ववादं गुडजिह्विकया शरीरादौ निमित्तकारणनिराकरणमुखेन चार्वाक उपतिष्ठते[15]"। कारणमात्रनिरासार्थकमेतन्मतमिति वर्धमानोपाध्यायः । स्वभावादेव सर्वं कार्यजातं भवतीत्येतन्मताभिप्रायः। "अनिमित्ततो भावोत्पत्तिः कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिदर्शनात्" ४।१।२२ । इति सूत्रेण मतमिदमुपस्थापयति भगवान् गौतमः। यथा कण्टकस्य तैक्ष्ण्यं विना कारणेन स्वभावादेव जायते तथा कृत्स्नः पदार्थ अकस्मादेव भविष्यतीति सूत्रार्थः। मतस्यास्य मूलं श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषदः—"कालः स्वभावो नियतिर्यदृच्छेति" वाक्यमिति[16] प्रत्येति जनः। सुश्रुतसंहितापि—

"स्वभावमीश्वरं कालं यदृच्छां नियतिं तथा ।
परिणामं च मन्यन्ते प्रकृतिं पृथुदर्शिनः[17] ॥"

इत्येवंरीत्यानुवक्ति । मध्ययुगस्य न्यायशास्त्रजनकतया प्रसिद्ध आचार्य दिङ्नागः मतमिदं निर्दिशति—

"नित्यसत्वाः भवन्त्येके नित्यासत्वाश्च केचन ।
विचित्राः केचिदित्यत्र तत्स्वभावो नियामकः ॥
अग्निरुष्णो जलं शीतं समस्पर्शस्तथानिलः ।
केनेदं रचितं तस्मात् स्वभावात्तत् व्यवस्थितिः[18] ॥ इति ।

बुद्धचरितमपि मतमिदमभिलपति—

"कः कण्टकस्य प्रकरोति तैक्ष्ण्यं
विचित्रभावं मृगपक्षिणां वा ।
स्वभावतः सर्वमिदं प्रवृत्तं
न कामकारोऽस्ति कुतः प्रयत्नः[19]" ॥

चार्वाकदर्शनस्य मण्डनमुखग्रन्थस्य वैरल्येऽपि खण्डनमुखप्रचारस्य बहुत्र दर्शनग्रन्थजातेषु समुपलब्धिं पश्यामः। यथा कुसुमाञ्जलौ "हेतुभूतिनिषेधो न स्वानुपाख्यविधिर्न चे[20]" ति कारिकयैतन्मतनिरासोऽथ च —

"सापेक्षत्वादनादित्वाद् वैचित्र्याद् विश्ववृत्तितः ।
प्रत्यात्मनियमाद्भुक्तेरस्ति हेतुरलौकिकः[21] ॥"

इति कारिकया कार्यकारणभावस्थापना च जायते ।

मतस्यास्य विश्लेषणावसरे "वदतो व्याघात" इति दोषो लगति । तथा हि विना निमित्तेन कार्योत्पत्तौ निमित्तत्वमनिमित्तस्यैवायाति । यतोऽनिमित्तरूपनिमित्ततः कार्योत्पत्तिरुच्यते । यद्युच्यते निमित्तानिमित्तयोः परस्परं भेद इति । अतएव "निमि-

त्तानिमित्तयोरर्थान्तरभावादप्रतिषेधः" इति ४ । १ । २४ । सूत्रं न्यायस्यैकदेशिमत-खण्डनपरमाकस्मिकत्ववादसमर्थनपरं च तदा प्रत्येति जन एतन्मतप्रत्याख्यानपरं सूत्रं भाष्यकृतः प्रागेव विलुप्तमभवदिति ।

वाचस्पतिस्तु प्रश्नममुं समाधातुमभिदधाति—"कस्मात्पुनः पूर्वपक्षः स्वयं न निराकृत इत्यत आह—सा खल्विति भाष्यम् स खल्वयं वादः अकर्मनिमित्तशरीरादिसर्ग इत्येतस्मान्न भिद्यत इत्यभेदात् तत्प्रतिषेधेनैव प्रतिषिद्धो वेदितव्य इति हि तत्रत्यं भाष्यम्"[22]

एतदधिकृत्य पूर्वपक्षयति सूत्रकारः—"भूतेभ्यः मूर्त्युपादानवत् तदुपादानम्" - ३ । २ । ६१ । कर्म निरपेक्षेभ्य एव भूतेभ्यः मूतर्यः पाषाणाद्यवयविन उत्पद्यन्ते । यतस्तेषां कर्म न संभवति एवं भूतेभ्यस्तस्य शरीरस्योत्पत्तिर्भविष्यतीति तत्र न कर्मणां करणत्वम् । उत्तरं त्वस्य पाषाणाद्युत्पत्तिरपि कर्मनिरपेक्षभूतेभ्यो न संभवति । तदुत्पत्तिरपि जीवकर्मसापेक्षेभ्यः भूतेभ्य एव जायते । पाषाणादिपदार्थमात्र-स्य जीवार्थतया तद्दृष्टाधीनत्वात् । एवं च पाषाणाद्युत्पत्तिः कर्मनिरपेक्षभूतकृतेति दृष्टान्तः साध्यसमः । तस्मादस्य जात्युत्तरत्वादसङ्गतमेवमाकस्मिकत्ववादं निरसितुं शन्कोति कश्चिदिति सूत्रकृता पूर्वमेव मतमेतदपाकृतमिति वाचस्पतेराशयः ।[23]

(४)कारणसामग्री किमनित्यानां पदार्थानां समुच्चयोऽथवा नित्यानामाहोस्वित् नित्यानित्यानामिति विचारार्थमधुना सर्वानित्यत्ववादः प्रस्तुतोऽस्ति । समेषां पदार्थ-जातानामुत्पत्तिप्राक्कालाधिकरणिकायाः सत्तायाः अभावेनोत्पत्त्यनन्तरभाविकालमात्र-भावित्वेन कादाचित्कत्वं प्राप्तं तेनानित्यता सिद्ध्यति । विनाशानन्तरमसत्त्वेनाप्यनि-त्यतैव सिद्ध्यति तेषाम् । एवञ्च पृथिव्यादिपरमाणवो अनित्याः भौतिकत्वात् शरीरवत् । आत्मा चानित्या अभौतिकत्वात् बुद्धिवदित्यनुमानेन सिद्ध्यति यत् कारणसामग्री अनित्यपदार्थानामेव समुच्चय इति मतस्यामुष्याभिप्रायः । एतच्च पूर्वपक्षयति सूत्रकारः— "सर्वमनित्यमुत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वात्" ४ । १ । २५ । एतन्मतप्रतिपादिका श्रुतिरपि पूर्वपक्षतयैव विद्यते निर्दिष्टा—"एतास्मादाकाशः संभूतः" इति ।

महाभारतमपि कथयति—

विद्धि नारद पञ्चैतान् शाश्वतानचलान् ध्रुवान् ।
महतस्तेजसो राशीन् कालषष्ठान् स्वभावतः ॥
आपश्चैवान्तरिक्षं च पृथिवी वायुपावकौ ।
नासीद्धि परमं तेभ्यो भूतेभ्यो मुक्तसंशयः ।
नोपपत्या न वा युक्त्या तदसद् ब्रूयादसंशयम्[24]

एतन्मतमधिकृत्यैव वात्स्यायनकृतन्यायभाष्यतोऽर्वाग्वर्तिषु बौद्धदर्शनेषु क्षणिकवादप्रचारः प्राचुर्येण सञ्जात इति शङ्कते जनोऽयम् । यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकमिति क्षणभङ्गवादः बौद्धस्य योगाचारसंप्रदायसिद्धान्त इति विद्वत्सु प्रथितम् ।

यथाग्निर्दाह्यं काष्ठादिकं दग्ध्वा पश्चात् स्वयमपि विनष्टो भवति तथैव सर्वस्य विनाशं विधाय स्वयमपि नश्यत्यनित्यतेति निर्यासोऽत्र ।

एतेनानित्यता सा नित्यानित्या वा, यदि नित्वा तदा तस्या एव नित्यतया सर्वमनित्यमिति प्रतिज्ञाभङ्गः । यद्यनित्या तदा तस्वामविद्यमानायां कार्यजातमेव सकलं प्रपञ्चं जगतः नित्यतां प्राप्नुयादिति वदतो मुखं पिहितम् ।

परं नैतत् श्रद्धेयम् । प्रमाणतो यस्योत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वमुपलभ्यते तदवश्यमनित्यम्, किन्तु येषां तन्नोपलभ्यते यथा भूतपरमाणूनामाकाशदिक्कालात्ममनसामिति तन्नित्यमिति सर्वमनित्यमिति सुतरां न सिद्ध्यति ।

(५) सर्वनित्यत्ववादस्य तूत्पत्तिः कापिलकीति निश्चप्रचम् ।

"असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्यम्"[25]

इतीश्वरकृष्णकारिकोर्ध्वनिर्दिष्टवादं पुष्णाति । स्वोत्पत्तिप्राक्कालावच्छेदेन कार्यं सन्नवेति विप्रतिपत्तौ विधिकोटिः कपिलानुयायिनाम् निषेधकोटिरन्येषां नैयायिकादीनाम् । साङ्ख्याचार्याः स्वोत्पत्तिप्राक्काले कारणे सूक्ष्मरूपेण वर्तमानं कार्यं सदेव भवति क्रियमाणत्वात्, यत् क्रियमाणं तत्सदिति राद्धान्तमङ्गीकुर्वन्ति । अत एव यदसत् तदकारणकं दृष्टम्, यथाश्वशृङ्गम् । तथा चैतत् सत्त्वव्याप्यक्रियमाणत्ववत् कार्यं तस्मात् सत्कार्यमिति पञ्चावयववाक्यात्मकं न्यायमारचयन्ति । मतेऽस्मिन् कार्यस्याविर्भावतिरोभावौ भवतः न तूत्पत्तिविनाशौ । यथा कूर्मस्याङ्गानि कूर्मशरीरे निविशमानानि तिरोभवन्ति न तु नश्यन्ति तथा बहिर्भूतानि तानि नोत्पद्यन्त अपि त्वाविर्भवन्ति । एवं कार्यजातं यदा स्वकारणेऽवतिष्ठते तदा तिरोभवति । यदा च स्वकीयं स्थूलरूपमाधाय संतिष्ठते तदाविर्भवति । तैलं स्वकारणे तिले पूर्वत एव सन्तिष्ठमाणं सामग्रीत आविर्भवति । चेत् कारणे कार्यसत्तानङ्गीकारस्तदा तिलादेव तैलं न सिकताभ्य इत्यत्र नियामकमार्गणप्रयासः स्यात् नचोपलभ्यते । व्यासभाष्यमुपोद्बलयतीमां कथाम् । तथा हि "उभयप्रत्याख्याने च शाश्वतवाद इत्येतत् सम्यक्"इति[16] । अत्रोभयपदेन हेतूच्छेदवादौ गृह्येते ।

अत एव पूर्वपक्षतया सूत्रयति भगवान् गौतमः—"सर्वं नित्यं पञ्चभूतनित्यत्वात्" (४।१।२९।) ।

(६) सर्वनानात्ववादे कृत्स्नं भावपदार्थजातं नाना भवति । न कश्चिदेको भावो विद्यते । कुतः भावलक्षणपृथक्त्वात् । भावस्य पदार्थस्य लक्षणे स्वरूपे पार्थक्यमित्यन्वर्थसंज्ञको हेतुः । यथा घटः गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शसमूहे तिष्ठतीत्येतन्मताभिप्रायः । एतस्य मूलं नितरां प्राचीनम् । महाभाष्ये पतञ्जलिः कथयति— "गुणसमवायो द्रव्यमिति" । अत्र समवायपदं समूहवाचकम् । पश्चादेतन्मतं बौद्धस्य पुञ्जवादे परिणतम् । बौद्धानामिदं मतमिति तात्पर्यटीकाकाराः कण्ठतः कथयन्ति[27] । सौत्रान्तिकवैभाषिकसंप्रदायौ बौद्धदर्शनस्य मतमिदं पुष्णत इति खद्योतव्याख्याकृद् गङ्गानाथझामहाभागः[23]। न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावल्यामवयविपरीक्षाप्रकरणे परमाणुपुञ्जवादतया मतमिदमुल्लिखितम् । एकस्य धर्मिणः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् तस्य च चाक्षुषत्वरासनत्वादिविरुद्धधर्माध्यस्तरूपरसाद्यात्मकत्वाभावात् अवयवानां च कारणत्वात्, कार्यकारणयोरभेदासंभवाच्च न तत्तदात्मकत्वं घटादेः संभवतीति" विश्वनाथस्य वृत्त्युक्त्या खण्डितं भवति बौद्धस्य पुञ्जवादराद्धान्तः इति ।

(७) अथ सर्वशून्यत्वसिद्धान्तः । सर्वं भावपदार्थजातंमभावरूपेणात्मसत्तां लभमानमस्ति यथा घटः पटाभावरूपेणैव वर्तते । एवमेव सर्वेषु भावात्मकपदार्थजातेषु परस्पराभावस्य सिद्धिर्जायते । तथा च सूत्रयति भगवान् गौतमः—सर्वमभावः भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेः ४।१।३७। । नैतन्मतं सम्यक् । यतो हि भावत्वरूपस्वकीयधर्मेण भावानां सद्भाव एव भवति ।

तथा हि द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां सदादिसामान्यं द्रव्याणां क्रियावदित्येवमादि विशेषः, स्पर्शपर्यन्ताः पृथिव्याः विशेषाः । प्रत्येकस्य चानन्तो भेदः । सामान्य विशेषसमवायानां च विशिष्टाः धर्मा गृह्यन्ते । सोऽयमभावस्य निरूपाख्यतया संप्रत्यायकोऽर्थभेदो न स्यात् अस्ति चार्थभेदस्तस्मान्नैव सर्वमभावेऽन्तर्भवितुमर्हति ।

(८) अथोपसंहारे संख्यैकान्तवादमधिकृत्य विचारः प्रचलति । एकः अन्तो निर्णय इति एकान्तः संख्याभिरेकान्तो यस्मिन् वादे भवति स सङ्ख्यैकान्तवाद इति ।

संख्या एकान्ता येषु वादेषु ते तथोक्ता इति तात्पर्यटीकायां वाचस्पतिमिश्राः । इह खल्वनेकानि मतानि नयनपथमवतरन्ति । सर्वमेकं सदविशेषादित्यद्वैतवादः । सर्वं द्वेधा नित्यानित्यभेदादिति द्वितीयः । सर्वं त्रेधा ज्ञातृज्ञेयज्ञानभेदादिति तृतीयः । सर्वं चतुर्धा प्रमाणप्रमेयप्रमितिप्रमातृभेदादिति तुरीयः ।

अत्र प्रथमवाद; एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म नेह नानास्ति किञ्चनेति श्रुतिमुपजीव्यतया संगृह्य शाङ्करवेदान्तरूपेणेदानीं पुष्पति फलतीति मनुते जनोऽयम् । गरुडपुराणमपि मतमिदमुल्लिखति—

विष्णुमानन्दमद्वैतं विज्ञानं सर्वगं प्रभुम् ।
प्रणमामि सदा भक्त्या चेतसा हृदयालयम् ॥

शब्दकल्पद्रुमोऽपि कस्माच्चित् प्राचीनग्रन्थात् निम्ननिर्दिष्टश्लोकं समुद्धरति

"नित्यानन्दो भक्तरूपो ब्रजे यः श्रीहलायुधः ।
भक्तावतार आचार्योऽद्वैतो यः श्री सदाशिवः ॥

द्विधा + ईतः=द्वीतस्तस्मात् स्वार्थेऽणि बृद्धौ द्वैत इति निष्पद्यते । एतस्य नञा संबन्धे सति अद्वैतपदनिष्पत्तिर्भवति । द्वैतवादोऽपि वेदान्तस्यापरप्रस्थानेषु प्रसिद्ध्यति तृतीयवादमप्यपलपितुमशक्यम् । चतुःपदार्थवादं तु न्यायभाष्यकृदप्यनुसरति । अत एव न्यायदर्शनस्य प्रथमसूत्राव्याख्यायामयं कथयति–प्रमाणप्रमेयप्रमितिप्रमातृणां लक्षणं विधाय दुःखं तत्कारणं तद्धानं तदुपायं च प्रदर्श्य चतसृषु चैवंविधासु अर्थतत्त्वं परिसमाप्यत इति" ।[29]

सन्दर्भसूत्राणि

१– द्र. न्यायभाष्यम् ४।१।१४।
२– खद्योतटीका पृ० २४६ [पूना प्रकाशनम्]
३– छान्दोग्योपनिषत् ६।२।१।
४– तैत्तिरीयोपनिषत् ब्रह्मवल्ली ७।१।
५– न्यायभाष्यम् ४।१।१९।
६– सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहःनकुलीश पाशुपतदर्शनम् पृ० ६५. आनन्दाश्रम प्रकाशनम् ।
७– महाबोधिजातकं का० १४२
८– बुद्धचरितम् ९।६३।
९– न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका ४।१।१९।
१०– छान्दोग्योपनिषत् ६।२।३।
११– तात्पर्यपरिशुद्धिः ४।१।१९। पृ० २५ [प्रा० श्री अनन्तलाल ठक्कुरकृतपाण्डुलिपितः]
१२– न्यायसूत्रवृत्तिः ४।१।१९।
१३– न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका ४।१।२१।
१४– ,, ,,
१५– तात्पर्यपरिशुद्धिः ४।१।२२। पृ० २६
१६– श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषत् १।२
१७– सुश्रुतसंहिता शारीरस्थानम् का० ७
१८– प्रमाणसमुच्चयः

१९– बुद्धचरितम् ९।६२।
२०– न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलिः १।५।
२१– ,, १।४।
२२– न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका ४।१।२४।
२३– ,,
२४– महाभारतम् १२।२६७।६–७ ।
२५– सांख्यकारिका ९।
२६– व्यासभाष्यम् २।१५।
२७– न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका ४।१।३४।
२८– खद्योतटीका पृ० २५९ [पूना प्रकाशनम्]
२९– न्यायभाष्यम् १।१।१।

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ON THE GALITAPRADĪPA OF LAKṢMĪDHARASURI

K. P. JOG,
University of Poona.

1. The *Galitapradīpa*[1] (=Gp) is a Vedāṅga work that deals with a certain aspect of the Ṛgvedapadapāṭha (=Pp), viz, its method of occasionaly dropping certain repeated passages of the Saṁhitā in the place(s) of repetition. Such a dropping is known in the Vedic tradition, since the days of *Prātiśākhyas* by the name *samaya*.[2] The Gp calls it *galita*[3] and this paper will also call it so. The meaning of *galita* was forgotten in course of time and it became necessary for some two ancient commentators of the Ṛgveda-Samhitā, viz. Mādhava and Veṅkaṭa Mādhava, to clucidate the principles involved there in.[4] According to these commentators, the *galita* indicated Śākalya's acceptance of the repetition not only

1. Ed. ShriKrishna Deva, Varanasi (Saṁvat 2016), together with a *pariśiṣṭa*.

2. Cf. *Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya*, 10.12; the Appendix IV (of Mādhava) in the *Ṛgvedānukramaṇī* ed. C. K. Raja, Madras (1932), p. cix; read :

alakṣyatvād anūhyatvād adṛṣṭānuvidhānataḥ|
apy eṣām prātiśākhyādyair ataḥ Samayanāmatā||

in Gp, Op. Cit, p.2 and cf. verse 12 in the *pariśiṣṭa* p. 44.

3. Cf. Gp, Op. cit., verses 1 (P.1); 6 (P.3); 7 (P.4); 70 (P.3) and verse 1 in the *pariśiṣṭa*, P. 43.

4. Cf. in the Appendix IV in the *Ṛgvedānukramaṇī*, Op. Cit; the *kārikās* of Veṅkaṭa Mādhava in *Ṛgveda-with Commentaries*, Part IV, V.V.R.I., Hoshiarpur (1965-66), PP. 2136-37.

of words but also of their meaning;[5] and *vice versa* the absence of the *galita* in the place(s), where the same words occured again, meant that he saw a different meaning in them.[6] It is noticed that Mādhava has taken his cue from the presence and the absence of such a *galita* while interpreting many a Ṛgvedic passage[7] but it is a matter of regret that later commentators have not taken cognisance of these important observations of Mādhava. Not only that ! A modern Vedist, C. G. Kashika, has questioned the validity of the alleged principle involved in the *galita* and argued that :—

(i) There is no method in the *galita*;
(ii) The Pp reveals a mechanical dropping of repeated passages only in some places; and
(iii) many repeated passages have escaped Śākalya 's attention.[8]

This evoked C. K. Raja's rejoinder which is unfortunately not available even now - it is in the form of a summary.[9] It was in this rejoinder of Raja that one first heard of the Gp as a work which explains the method of the *galita*.

5. The nature of this meaning, acceptable to Śākalya needs to be fully ascertained by interpreting all *galitas* in the manner of Mādhava.

6. I have tried to illustrate this; Cf. On the Galitas in the Padapaṭha as a means of Ṛgvedic interpretition", *Indin Antiquary* Vol. III 1-4, Bombay (1969), pp.56-82.

7. Cf. his *Ṛgvedavyākhyā*, Parts 1 and 2, ed. C. K. Raja, Adyar (1937, 1947), under 1.140.11;21.3;25, 12; 35.4;37.5; 44.14; 81. 8; 117.25 etc.

8. cf. PAIOC XIII, Nagpur (1946), published in 1951, pp. 39 ff and ABORI *XXVIII*, Poona (1948), pp. 302-5.

9. Cf. PAIOC *XIV*, Darbhanga (1948)-*Summary of papers*, pp. 3-4.

However, the Gp remained shrouded in the Mss Libraries till Saṁvat 2016 (about March 1960) when it was first published by Shrikrishna Deva, together with his own commentary on it and[9] a *pariśiṣṭa*. The book consists of two parts : the first enumerates the *paribhāṣās* i.e. the rules which govern the system of the *galitas* and those which help the understanding of the second part; the second enumerates those *galitas* in the eight Aṣṭakas which are not covered by the *paribhāṣās* in the first part. The pariśiṣṭa does not differ from the first part materially.[10]

The editor of the Gp has explained in his commentory the various rules and specified the places of the *galitas* in the whole of the Pp. Nevertheless, he made no attempt to see how far Gp has succeeded in establishing the method of the *galitas*. And this left scope for the present paper.

2. At the outset, the following observations have to be made about the Gp:

(i) It does not refer to the meaning of the *galita* anywhere.

(ii) No information is available about its author and the date of it's composition. Consequently, the Gp may be expected to give a set of such rules as regulate the system of the *galitas* only on the formal level. This renders the following examination of the Gp a mere pursuit of academic pleasure.

10. The editor has added a third part (this is his own) which enumerates the *galitas* which are not given in the second part of the Gp. These, he has arranged in groups following the rules enunciated in the Gp.

Also such *paribhāṣās* in the Gp as help the understanding of its text are overlooked, for obvious reason.

Again, with a view to avoiding lengthiness, attention is focussed mostly on the first *Aṣṭaka* while discussing rules 3 and 5. It is hoped that the results which arise from that data may be further corroborated by a scrutiny of the remaining data.

3. There are, in all, five rules of the *galita* as enumerated by the Gp. I turn to these, one by one.

Rule 1 :

Full verses, when repeated in the Saṁhitā, are dropped by the Pp in the place(s) of repetition.[11]

This rule is well observed in the Pp of the whole Saṁhitā, except in a few places—and this fact is noticed by the Gp itself.[12] These few places can be legtimately treated as the exceptions to the general rule.

Rule 2 :

A hemistich or a verse-foot which occurs in one (and the same) varga three (or more) times is dropped by the Pp in the places of repetition.[13]

It is clearly understood from this rule that—

(i) hemistich or a verse-foot which occurs in one (and the same) *varga* only twice is dropped by the Pp in the place of repetition.

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11. *ṛco' Khitā galanty eva yathāpūrvaṁ punar gatāḥ* Verse 3, p. 2.

12. *nū me brahmāṇi* (7.1.20; 25), *yajñena* (1.164.50, 10.90.19) *Vinaitābhyām iti sthitiḥ*, ibid. Also cf. the *pariśiṣṭa* verses 8—11 which refer to the unscanned text of 7.59.12; 10.20.1,121 10; 190. 1—3 (the whole hymn).

13. *trir ādigata ekasmin varge' rdharco'ṅghrir eva vā galet Sarvatra*, verse 4, p.3.

(This is set aside by rule 4, to some extent); and

(ii) a hemistich or a verse-foot which occurs in two or more different *vargas* is not dropped by the Pp in the place(s) of repetition.

(This is set aside by the rule 3, to some extent). A corollary of this is: if a hemistich or a verse-foot from some *varga* is repeated thrice in another *varga,* the Pp drops it only in the last two places in the latter *varga*—it would scan it fully in the first place of repetition there.

In connection with hemistiches, it has to be pointed out that quite a large number of repeated hemistiches are composed in *triṣṭup* and *jagatī* metres (in the first, more of them) and they are quite rightly covered by rule 4 below. Now, of the remaining hemistiches, only a few conform to this rule (viz rule 2)—rather, one would say that the rule finds more exceptions than examples.

As examples, one could cite the following :

1.28.1 cd = 1.28.2 cd, 3 cd, 4 cd (*Anuṣṭup*)
1.29.1 cd = 1.29.2 cd, 3 cd, ... 7 cd (*Paṅkti*)[14]
4.48.1 cd = 4.48.2 cd, 3 cd, 4 cd (*Anuṣṭup*)
6.44.1 cd = 6.44.2 cd, 3 cd, (*Anuṣṭup*)
8.31.15 cd = 8.31.16 cd, 17 cd, 18 cd (*Virāṭpaṅkti*)
8.36.1 cd ef= 8.36.2 cd ef, 3 cd ef, 6 cd ef. (*Śākvarī*)
8.42.4 cd = 8.42.5 cd, 6 cd (*Anuṣṭup*)
And this last,
8.34.1 cd = 8.34.2 cd, 3 cd,—15 cd (*Anuṣṭup*)

Here, it is to be noted that the hemistich under question is repeated in three different *vargas* (of the same

14. I may point out here that the hymns 1.28 and 29 are composed by Śunaḥśepa Āgigarti and both of them show a stylistic pecularity in repeating their words with intention.

hymn) and the Pp has dropped it everywhere from verse 2 and onwards. Thus, the idea of one *varga* does not appear to be accepted by the Pp.

Now, the exceptions to the rule as regards the hemistiches :

1.36.7 ab =	8.69.17 ab	(*Bṛhatī*)
1.105.8 ab =	10.33.2 ab	(—"—)[15]
1.105.8 cd =	10.33.3 ab	(*Bṛhati*)[15]
4. 47.4 ab =	6.60.8 ab	(*Anuṣṭup*, in 6.60.8, *Gāyatrī*)
4.55.10 ab =	8.18.3 ab	(*Gāyatrī*, in 8.18.3 *Uṣṇik*)
5.40. 3 ab =	8.13.3 ab	(*Uṣṇik*)
6.45. 3 ab =	8.12.21 ab	(*Gāyatrī*, in 8.-12.21 *Uṣṇik*)
8. 8.18 ab =	8.87.3 ab	(*Anuṣṭup*, in 8.87.3 *Bṛhatī*)
8.13.15 ab =	8.97.4 ab	(*Uṣṇik*, in 8.97.4 *Bṛhatī*)
8.38. 9 ab =	8.42.6 ab	(*Gāyatrī*, in 8.42.6 *Anuṣṭup*)
8.93. 6 ab =	9.65.22 ab	(*Gāyatrī*)
10.60. 8 cd =	10.60.9 cd	(*Nicṛtpaṅpti*)

Attention may be drawn to following peculiar case where two consecutive verses have their second himistiches wholly identical-these verses are 1.191.10 and 11 (*Nicṛdbrāhmyanuṣṭup*), However, the Pp renders the original word *sò* in the 10th as *sáḥ* (mas.) and in the 11th as *sò iti* (fem.); the entire remaining part of 11th is dropped by the Pp. The Pp thus gives a clear evidence that mere verbal identity does not form the basis of *galita*.[16]

15. Verse 1.105.8 is in *Svarāṭpaṅkti* and 10.33.2, also *Nicṛdbṛhatī* 10.33.3. in *Bhuṅgbṛhaṭī* (*So Anukramaṇī*)

16. The second hemistich of 1.191.12 (*Virāḍbrāhmyanuṣṭup*) differs very little from that in 10th and 11th, viz. the word *So* is replaced by *tāh* and *marāti* by *maranti*, and yet the Pp drops the rest of the words and appears to show mechanical dropping of the repetitions. This necessitates the ascertaining of the relation between the meaning and the *galita*.

As for the verse foot, this rule may be said to hold good more in the case of those which conclude the verses—and these are governed by rule 3—than in the case of others. Or rather, this rule is more disproved than it holds good.

The following few examples of the rule may, therefore, be cited before the exceptions are given:

8.35.4 b	=	8.38.5 b,	6 b
8.35.7 b	=	8.35.8 b,	9 b
8.35.10 b	=	8.35.11 b,	12 b
8.35.13 b	=	8.35.14 b,	15 b
8.35.16 b	=	8.35.17 b,	18 b
8.35.19 b	=	8.35.20 b,	21 b

All these examples are from a single hymn whose pecularity consists in purposeful repetition in each triad (*tṛca*).

1.97.1a = 1.97.1c, 2c.....8c

In this example, there is an additional factor, viz. the first foot of the first verse is also the last foot of it, and also of all the following 7 verses; and thus rule 3 also may be said to be operative.

10.58.1 b = 10.58, 2 b, 3 b—12 b

Here verses 1—6 from one *varga* and verses 7—12 from another. Therefore, from the foot in 7 b should not have been dropped in the Pp as the corollary above would

indicate, but this is not so done. Now the exceptions:—

1.12.3 a/10b[17]	=	1.15.14 a
1.13.6 a	=	1.142.6 a
1.15.2 c	=	3.10 .7 c
1.16.4 a	=	3.42 .1 a
1.25.15 b	=	10.22.2 d
1.34.14 b	=	1.36.20 d
1.92. 7 a	=	1.113.4 a
1.103.2 a	=	2. 15.2 c
1.136.1 d	=	2. 41.6 a
1.136.3 c	=	2. 41.6 b
3.37.11 a	=	3. 40.8 a
4. 6.11 c	=	5. 3.4 c
7.57. 4 b	=	10.15.6 d

In all these instances, the earlier verse—foot is repeated only once and in a different *varga* yet the Pp has dropped it.

1.18.6 b	=	9.98.6 c; 100.1 b
1.92.6 a	=	1.183.6 a; 7.73.1 a
2.11.5 a	=	3. 39.6 c; 10.148.2 c

In these three instances, an earlier verse—foot is repeated twice and in two *vargas*; all the three are again different from one another.

17. Though 1.12.3 a and 10 b are identical, the Pp does not drop the latter. The Gp might very well hold that the dropping was precluded by two different *vargas* in which the two occur, yet the problem would remain about the dropping of 1.15.4 a which also is in quite a differnt *varga*. Further, it would be necessary to determine as to whose repetition is 1.15.4 a; and this could be decided with the help of meaning—not only with that of verbal identity.

Rule 3 :

If the last foot of any verse occurs four times or more any where in the Saṁhitā, the Pp drops it in the places of repetition.[18]

It may be observed that this rule does not hold good in so far as repetition alone is concerned. The requirement that it should repeat three or more times is not correct. Instances can be cited where the relevent foot is repeated only once or twice and yet the Pp has dropped it in the places of repetition. In these instances of the *galita*, the verse foot is repeated only once :

1. 4.10 c	=	1. 5.4 c
1. 7.10 c	=	1.13.10 c
1.14.11 c	=	1.26. 1 c
1.23.21 c	=	10.57.4 c
1.37.4 c	=	8.32.27 c
1.37.8 d	=	9.69.10 d
1.110.7 c	=	7.59.2 a
1.162.6 d	=	1.162.12 d
3.37.11 d	=	3. 40. 9 c
4.16.21 d	=	4. 56. 4 d
5.16. 5 c	=	5. 17. 5 c
5.26. 1 c	=	8.102.16 c
6.71. 3 d	=	6. 75.10 d
8.10. 1 d	=	8. 10. 6 d

18. *(galet sarvatra) yo³ nte³ ṅghriś caturādigataḥ sa ca* verse 4 P. 3.

In the following instances of the *galita*, the verse foot is repeated only twice, and in different vargas :

1.84.10 c	=	1.84.11 e; 12 c
1.162.8 d	=	1.162.9 d, 14 d
8.9.3 d	=	8.9. 9 d, 10.2 b[19]

For the purpose of this paper, I have left out other instances in which the verse—foot in the earlier place(s) is final while that in the later is not final—and *vice versa* the verse—foot in the earlier place(s) is not final while that in the later is final.

Rule 4 :

A hemistich in Jagatī or triṣṭup metre is ever dropped by the Pp in the place(s) of it's repetition.[20]

This rule is wholly valid in the entire portion of the Pp. However, attention has to be drawn to those hemistiches in other metres which also are dropped likewise in the Pp—this is observed earlier under *rule 2*.

Rule 5 :

A group of three (or more)[21] *words occurring (atl east)*[21] *four times in the same Varga, is dropped by the Pp in the places of repetition.*[22]

This rule rightly lays down the minimum number of words that forms the basis of the *galita*.[23] However, the two conditions which are mentioned in it are not

19. In 8.10.2, the verse—foot is not at the end of the Verse—it is at the end of the first hemistich.

20. *galec ca jāgato' rdharcas traiṣṭubhaṣ ca punar gataḥ*, Verse 5, p.3.

21. Brackets mine.

22. (*galec ca*). . . *caturādigataṁ varge yac caikasmin padatrayam*, verse 5, p.3.

23. Read "*galet padatrayādyeva*", verse 3 in the *pariśiṣṭa*, p. 43.

(always) warranted as is clear from many instances. The following are few of them :

sémáni naḥ in 1.16.5 a and 9. a, in two different *vargas*, not elsewhere.[24]

yác ciddh hì in 1.25a 1 a; 26.6a; 29.1;

obviously in three different *vargas*

yuṣmākam astu táviṣī in 1.39.2 c, 4 c;

though in the same *varga*, repeated only once.

trìr ā diváh 3.56.6a; 7a; 8d—though repeated in the same *varga*, repeated only twice.

evén nú kam 7.33.3a; 3b; 3c—in the same verse, but repeated only twice.

etāni vām aśvinā in 1.117.25a and 2.39.8a;

Obviously in two different *vargas* (even *Aṣṭakas*), and repeated only once.

úd u ṣyád evóḥ savitā in 2.38.1 a; 6.71.1a; 4á; 7.38.1—in three different *vargas*.

ná tam aṁho nú in 2.23.5a and 7.82.7a, in two different *vargas* and *Aṣṭakas*.[25]

stená īśata māghāśaṁsaḥ in 2.42.3c and 6. 28.7c, in two different *vargas* and *Aṣṭakas*.

Many more such instances can be given; yet I refrain from giving them here, since these (given here) suffice to show that the rule is incorrect.

Argument is adduced that the repetition of two words is dropped by the Pp, as execption to this rule, in the following cases: [26]

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24. These three words first occur in 1.14.11 c, as a part of foot which is wholly identical with 1.26.1c—this latter is dropped by the Pp. It is worthwhile to note that the Pp does not omit the three words in 1.16. 5 a, as a repetition from 1.14.11 c.

25. cf. "On the galitas in the Padapāṭha as a means of Ṛgvedic interpretition," Op. cit., pp. 67—68,

26. cf. the *pariśiṣṭa* in the Gp, verses 4—6; p.43.

(i) *yád indrāgnī* in 1.108.9 and 10.

(ii) *úta sthâḥ* ——"——

(iii) *pṛthivyām madhyamâsyām* ——"——

(iv) *nūtanāsaḥ sát* in 6.27.1 and 2.

(v) *Sùjāte áśvasūnṛte* 5.79.4, 5 . . . 10 repeated from 5.79.1.

(vi) *agním Samudrávāsam* in 8.102. 5, 6 . . . . repeated from 8.102.4.

(vii) *īndrāgnī sómapītaye* in 8.38.7, 9.

As regards the first three (i.e.i,ii and iii), it may be observed that the Pp has kept in view the total meaning of two verses 1.108.9 and 10 which remains the same despite the interchange of the places of the words *avamásyām* and *paramásyām* and has, therefore, dropped the whole of 1.108.10. This is another clear evidence to show that Pp does not adopt mere mechanical repetition as the basis for *galita*.

The fourth (i.e. iv) is not correctly pointed out. In fact, the Pp of the whole of 6.27.2 is highly exceptionable; it is certainly not in the case of the words *nūtanāsah sát* in their changed order that there is an exception as the *pariśiṣṭa* points out. This case is indeed very difficult to explain.

The remaining cases are governed by the rule 3, since each is a full verse-foot. The unit of an iden-verse-foot thus preponders over that of a group of words; this may be owing to the generally observed fact that a verse-foot (normally) expresses one full unit of meaning.

4. Thus far is discussed the validity of the rules which the Gp has formulated after observing the actual droppings (*galitas*) in the Pp. It may then be observed

that only the 1st and 4th rules are wholly true and the 3rd is only partially true. It may also be pointed out that the full verse (rule 1), half verse (rule 4) and verse-foot (rule 3), each expresses one full unit of meaning and the Pp must have kept this fact in view, while it dropped the repetitions. On the whole, the Gp has not succeeded in satisfactorily formulating the rules of droppings in the Pp, on the mechanical observation alone. And this becomes clearer owing to the fact that the Gp enumerated in it's second part such *galitas* as did not conform to the rules, it formulated in the first. Therefore, the Gp does not really serve a useful purpose which is expressed from a Vedāṅga work. Consequently, it follows that the significance of the *galitas* has to be understood under the lead of the principle enunciated by Mādhava and Veṅkaṭa Mādhava.

TRUTH : A BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE

L. M. JOSHI
Patiala University

Vastutastu paramārtha eva ekam satyam.

What others call Buddhism is called *saddharma*, ('the True Doctrine') by the Buddhists. One of the most celebrated scriptures of Buddhism bears the title *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, 'the discourse on the True Doctrine called the white lotus'. A medieval Pāli text, treating of the history of Buddhism, styles itself *Saddhammasaṃgaho*, 'the compendium of the True Doctrine'. Many other sacred texts of the Buddhists bear the term saddharma as a prefix to their captions, e. g. *Saddharmalaṃkāvatāra sūtra*, *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra*, etc. For the Buddhist the Dharma is the Ultimate Truth revealed by an Omniscient Being for the weal and welfare of living beings. Many Buddhist and non-Buddhist writers remember the Buddha as the teacher of 'four holy truths'. Some Buddhist Sanskrit texts such as the *Āryasatyadvayāvatāra* seem to deal chiefly with the doctrine of 'two truths'. The 'four truths' and the 'two truths' are finally reduced to one ultimate Truth (*satya*).

It will be seen that we use the English term *truth* in this paper in place of two Buddhist terms : *satya* or *sacca* and *dharma* or *dhamma*.[1] Our purpose is not to explain the Buddhist theory in an epistemological sense; we are concerned here with human and religious meaning

1. For different meanings of *dhamma* (or *dharma*), see *Pāli-English Dictionary*, pp 335-7, London, 1966; W. Geiger, *Pāli-Dhamma*, Munich, 1921: P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol II. Pt. 1 pp. 2-11, Poona, 1941, and others.

of the Dharma as understood in Buddhism. We view Truth not as a philosophical problem but as the core of Buddhist vision which has been the foundation and norm of human ideals and ideas, hopes and aspirations, in a large area of the globe for about two and a half millennia now.

One of the first thoughts the Buddha entertained immediately after His Enlightenment is reported thus : "This Truth (*dharma*) that I have realized is profound, difficult to see, difficult to comprehend, excellent, supreme, transcendental to discursive thought, subtle, and to be known by the sages alone".[2] This description refers to the highest Truth the realisation of which constituted the Buddhahood of the Buddha. The fact that the Truth is hard to comprehend is emphasized here. In fact, the Truth that can be comprehended is not the Truth.[3] The contents of Buddha's Enlightenment are known to the world of men only to the extent He revealed them to his disciples. Only to this extent can we say that something of Enlightenment experience (*bodhi-lābha*) consisted of communicable ideas concerning the real nature of things as they are as well as concerning human ideals and practices. These ideas and ideals expressed and expounded by the knower of the Truth, in historically and linguistically conditioned context, are also called truths in human sense. It is by practising these truths that one can realise the supreme Truth; this is the chief concern of the Dharma in human history that it offers us a true soteriology. The Buddha said, addressing the monks around

2. *Mahāvastu*, p. 6, Ed. Bhikkhu J. Kasyap, 1956.

3. C p. *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, p. 139, Princeton, 1969.

Him for the last time on earth, "O brethren—Ye to whom the truths I have perceived have been made known by me—having thoroughly made yourselves masters of them, practise them, meditate upon them, and spread them abroad; in order that the holy culture may last long and be perpetuated, in order that it may continue to be for the good and happiness of the great multitudes, out of compassion for the world, to the good and the gain and the weal of the gods and men. Which then, O brethren, are the truths.....? They are these; The four foundations of the mindfulness; the fourfold right struggle against evil; the four roads to saintship; the five faculties; the five cardinal virtues; the seven essentials of illumination; and the holy eightfold path."[4] These truths are otherwise called thirty-seven truths conducive to Enlightenment (*bodhipākṣika dharma*). It will be noticed that Bodhi or Nirvāṇa is called in the first statement the *dhammo* that passeth understanding; the elements of holy culture the perfect cultivation of which leads to the realisation of this *dhamma*, are also called *dhammā*. We have rendered the first as the ultimate Truth and the second as the truths. We can even say that Dharma is the end as well as the means; the word Dharma symbolises both the Goal as well as the path to reach it.[5] In Buddhist terminology, the first is called *Nirvāṇadharma*, the second *Mārgadharma*. The first is the Absolute Truth, transcendental and ineffable; the second is what we call Buddhist culture, practical religious truth, the teachings of the Buddha and of Buddhist sages.

4. *Dīghanikāya* II. p. 94 (Eng. Tr. by T. W. Rhys Davids, S B B III. 127-8, London, 1966.

5. See Bhikshu Sangharakshita *A Survey of Buddhism*, pp. 120-1, Bangalore, 1966.

Mention may be made here of two standpoints or two types of speech well known in Buddhist tradition. The one is our practical phenomnal or phenomenological standpoint, the other is the "wholly other", the standpoint of the transcendental Reality. This is the doctrine of two levels of statement or two truths that runs through the entire Buddhist tradition. According to Nāgārjuna (100 A.D.) "the religious instruction by the Buddhas has recourse to two truths; phenomenal truth and the absolute truth. Those who do not know this distinction between these two truths are incapable of knowing the profound Reality (*tattva*) in Buddha's teachings."[6] Nāgārjuna holds the same esteemed and authentic position in Buddhist tradition as does Śaṃkara (cir. 788 A. D.) in Brahmanical tradition. It is known that Śaṃkara's commentaries on *Upaniṣads* had more in common with Nāgārjuna's on Buddhist *sūtras* than either with Upanisadic contents or with any of the Brahmanical systems. This tenet of two truths was accepted by Śāṃkara-Vedānta and became vital to that system.[7] Students of European philosophy have noted a parallel to this doctrine of two standpoints also in the system of Spinoza (1634-77). The commentators of Pāli texts are in agreement on this point with their Mahāyāna brothers. Buddhaghoṣa observes that "The Perfectly Awakened One, the best of speakers, spoke two truths, namely, conventional truth and absolute truth, one does not come

6. *Mādhyamika-śāstra* of Nāgārjuna, *Buddhist Sanskrit Text* [B. S. T.] No. 10 (1960) XXIV. 8-9: also T. R. V. Murti, *Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 241 f f., London, 1960.

7. cp. S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol I. pp. 422 ff., Cambridge, 1926. Also th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol I pp. 22 etc., New York, 1962.

across a third; a conventional speech is true because of the convention and an absolute speech is true as (disclosing) the real marks of things."[8] All conditioned things are suffering, impermanent and not-self, this is an example of absolute speech (*paramattha*), a discourse of direct meaning called *nītārtha* (*nītattha*). A discourse of indirect meaning, the meaning of which has to be inferred, and which is spoken in accordance with convention and usage, is called *neyārtha* (*neyyattha*) or *sammuti*. For instance, as Nāgasena says, "It is mere commonly received opinion, O King, that 'This is I', or "This is mine', it is not a transcendental truth."[9] Because, truly speaking, the notion of 'I' is false. Likewise, when the Buddha says, 'there is one individual', he says this merely from the worldly standpoint since in reality there is no such thing as an 'individual'. *Saṃvṛti* (*sammuti*) is relative and conventional truth; *paramārtha* (*paramattha*) is absolute and final truth. There is some difference of opinion among modern Theravāda Buddhist writers regarding relative position of *sammuti* or conventional and *paramattha* or absolute truth in the Pāli Canon.[10] But the generally accepted view is that the conventional truth is so called truth, provisional and ultimately unreal, whereas the absolute truth is the truth as it is, the really true (*amosadhamma*) and transcendental (*lokottara*).

It will be a grave error to imagine that Buddhist view of truth is dualistic, that Truth is divisible into

8. *Manorathaparūṇī*, Ed. M. Walleser-Kopp, Vol I. 95, London.

9. *Milindapañho*, Ed. R. D. Vadekar, p. 161, Bombay. 1940.

10. Ledi Sadaw, "Some Points in Buddhist Doctrine, *Journal P T S* (1914) pp. 115-63: also K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 364, London, 1962.

unreality and reality. Kumārila's criticism of Buddhist thought was founded on this error.[11] The Buddhists do not say that there are two degrees of truth and that one is false and another real. The Buddhist view is that *Nirvāṇa* is the only Truth which is real in the ultimate sense. There is no other truth. The *sammuti* is called truth only conventionally. This has been repeatedly taught in Buddhist scriptures in Pāli and Sanskrit. We read in the *Suttanipāta :*

ekam hi saccam, na dutiyamatthi. 'The Truth is one, there is not a second.[12] The force of this *ipse dixit* is felt and admitted in the Sanskrit *Vibhāṣā* of the *Sarvāstivāda* as well.[13] But Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda are not the only schools to report this *Buddhavacana*. The *Saddharmalamkāvatārasūtra* records almost the same thing in these words :

ekam eva bhavet satyam nirvāṇam manavarjitam "There is only one Truth, which is *Nirvāṇa*; it has nothing to do with thought."[14] Yet another saying of the Buddha, affirming the sole reality of the Truth, reads thus :

ekam eva bhikṣavaḥ paramam satyam yadut apramoṣadharma nirvānaṁ, "There is only one supreme Truth, O monks, and this is *Nirvāṇa*, the infallible Dharma."[15] A similar passage in the *Majjhimanikāya* reports the

11. See L. M. Joshi, *Studies is Buddhist Culture* of India, pp. 268-86, Delhi, 1967.

12. *Suttanipāta* IV. 12. 11 9, Nalanda, 1959.

13. Louis de La Vallee Poussian, 'Doceuments D' Abhidharma les Deux, Saṃghabhadra", *Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* V. 161, Bru x elles, 1937.

14. *Saddharmalaṃkāvatārasūtra*, Ed. B. S. T., No. 3 (1963) III. 18: Eng. Tr. D. T. Suzuki, Landon, 1968.

15. Quoted from a *Mahāyānasūtra* (now lost) in the *Bodhi Caryāvatārapañjikā*, Ed. B. S. T. No. 12 (1960) on IX. 2 p. 175.

Buddha's saying thus : *tam hi bhikkhu musā yam mosa dhammam, taṁ saccam yam amosadhammam. etam hi bhikhhu paramam ariyasaccam yadidam amosadhammam nibbānam.* This means : "Monk, that is falsehood which is liable to falsity. Monk, *Nirvāṇa* is the ultimate holy Truth, the infallible Reality."[16] From the standpoint of ultimate Reality all that is conventional is unreal and false. Conventional concepts and words relate to the conventional things and not to the supreme Truth. Of the 'four holy truths' first, second and fourth belong to the category of conventional truth (*saṁvṛtisatye-antarbhavanti*), the third, 'truth of extinction (*nirodha*), is the only ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*).[16]a

This Truth or *Nirvāṇa* is wholly indescribable and unthinkable (*acintya*).[17] The Buddhist scriptures have given some attempted descriptions of it, a few positive but most of them negative. For instance, it is called the 'Supreme Goal' (*paramatthapattiyā*),[18] and the Buddha is called the 'seer of the Supreme Reality' (*paramatthadassi*).[19] It is the Eternal (*amata, amṛta*) and incomparable (*atulya*); it is the Thusness of Being (*bhūtatathatā*), where there is neither truth nor falsehood (*na tatra satyam na mṛṣā*);[20] it is the emptiness *śūnyatā*), that is empty of everything, devoid of all duality and plurality. It is the state of Being so (*tatthya*), the state of suchness (*tathatā*): the Reality of realities (*dharmāṇām dharmatā*): it is called the Climax of Wisdom (*prajñā pāramitā*); it is also called the

16. *Majjhimanikāya* Nalanda III. p. 330.
16a. *Bodhicariyāvatārapañjikā*. p. 175.
17. *Aṅguttaranikāya* (Nalanda) II. p. 84.
18. *Suttanipāta*, Verse 68.
19. *Ibid.* verse 22
20. *Majjhimanikāya*, p. 217.

Non-Dual (*advaya*).[21] Yet every conceivable name we may give to it is essentially false, because it is beyond names and concepts.[22] It is only conventionally that we name it and seek to describe it. In reality it is the absolute cessation, the utter extinction (*nirodha*) of all that we here know, see, and say. The Buddha is described as one who has spent up all perception and thought construction. *Nirvāṇa* is utterly inconceivable. Therefore, "all conceptions of *Nirvāṇa* are misconceptions."[23] Only a Buddha 'sees' and 'knows' what Bodhi is. But even he cannot describe it. All description is a limitation, a condition, whereas the ultimate Truth is Limitless (*ananta*), and Unconditioned (*asaṁskṛita*). Its likeness exists nowhere.[24] A Buddha is a Buddha because he is a Buddha, the Awakened one. Those living in darkness cannot measure or describe him who is Awakened. The scripture says, "There is no measure to him who has gone to rest; he keeps nothing that could be named. When all *dharmas* are abolished, all paths of speech are also abolished."[25] Our mundane words cannot express that which is supramundane; speech is not a way to the Truth;"[6] philosophy is not a road to Deathlessness; therefore, he describes the Truth most eloquently who does not describe it. Here if anywhere else, silence is eloquence; because the ultimate *Dharma* is the calm, it has only one

21. *Madhyamakasāstra* I. 2

22. *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, Ed. and Tr. by E. Conze, Vol. XXVI. p. 24. Rome, 1962

23. Vide *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, Ed. B. S. T. No. 4 (1960) pp. 20-2.

24. E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought*, p. 57

25. *Suttanipāta*, Verse 1148 (PTS)

26. *Ibid* (Nalanda) V-7.

mark, and that is, that it has no mark.[27] This is the Absolute Truth,[28] the ultimate Reality, the incomprehensible "Comprehensive".[29] It is not, however, the *mysterium tremendum*,[30] an Aweful Mystery; it is called *śivam*, 'auspicious', *śāntam*' 'Peace', *sukham* 'Bliss' and *amṛtam* 'Immortality'.[31]

We have seen that there is only one ultimate Truth, that is *paramārthasatya;* we have also noticed that what is called *samvṛti* or conventional truth is ultimately unreal. The question may now be raised; why talk of that which is unreal and false ? The Buddhist answer is that which is unreal is also conventional and is a means to the absolute and the ultimately real; *Vyavahārasatya* is the means, *paramārtha satya* is the Goal.[32] Otherwise how can we obtain the state of purification while living in an impure world ? Nāgārjuna says that "the Absolute Truth is not taught apart from the conventional behaviour; and without reaching the Absolute Truth, one cannot obtain peace."[33] As we said earlier, in order to reach *Nirvāṇadharma* we have to tread the *Mārgadharma. Samvṛti* is to be rejected only on reaching *paramārtha;* the practical *dharma* is the ladder to rise to the summit of

27. *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, p. 150.

28. Ibid: p. 162.

29. cp. W. Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught,* pp. 35-45, New York, 1962

30. On the use of the word "the Comprehensive", see K. Jaspers, *Way to Wisdom . . .* Eng. Tr. by R. Manheim, p. 30. New Haven, 1967

31. Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy,* Tr. by J. W. Harvey, pp. 25 ff. London, 1969.

32. On *Nirvāṇa,* see *Udāna* VIII. 1-2 Verse 80-81.

33. *Madhyamakāvatāra*, VI. 80.

Reality.[34] The Buddha compares his teaching (*dharma*) with a raft which is to be used only to cross over the stream of miserable existence (*saṃsāra*).[35] As soon as one reaches the other shore, one is freed and delivered from bondage and the raft is no longer useful. Likewise all our thought-forms and paths of speech cease to have any meaning and disappear altogether as soon as we discover the Absolute Truth. The utility of holy life, of religious culture, lies in this that it is a means to attain perfect Holiness (*visuddhi*) or Freedom (*vimutti*).

The teachings of the Buddha are a means to reach the Truth.[36] They are true in so far as they serve this final aim; they become true when they are put to practice in accordance with their spirit. It needs no demonstration to say that they have been true in the history of Buddhist religiousness; they have been the inexhaustible source of supreme moral excellence, of universal loving kindness, of an unparalleled spirit of unselfishness, of the liberation of man from the self-system, in a word, of a most remarkable culture known to human history which has inspired and begotton a whole range of higher human values and sacred ideals. Who knows how many beings have been awakened since the days of Gautama ? It is these that constitute the human side of the truth in Buddhist history; it is these that will continue to make Buddhism true; it is these that prove or disprove the truth of Buddhism; whether Buddhism has been a true religion or a false one is to be judged by its fruits in terms of its

34, *Madhyamakaśāstra* XXIV. 10.

35 *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-Ālokavyākhyā*, Ed. B. S. T. No. 4. 346

36 *Majjihimanikāya* I. pp. 179-80

contribution to the religiousness and civilized growth of mankind.[37] It is only by living up to the truths proclaimed by the knower of the Truth that one becomes worthy of knowing the truth of those truths and then and then only can one hasten to make a judgement about their truth and falsity. Otherwise, one will only be adding arrogance to one's ignorance. As we said in the beginning of th's essay, Buddhist religious culture is founded on the revelation of the Truth[38] by the Buddha. The Buddhists also appeal to the spiritual intuitions of the Arhats and saints (*bodhisattvas*). The scriptures have preserved the statements of these awakened beings. The truth of these statements can be known and seen also by each one of us through self-realisation. The phrase 'self-realisation' in Buddhist context means that truth is *paccatam veditabbo viññūhi* or *pratyātmavedanīya* or *pratyātmagocara*, i.e., to be known and seen by oneself directly. It is from this standpoint of 'radical empiricism' in the sense of 'seeing' or 'penetrating' by means of 'insight' (*paññā, prajñā*) into the reality as it is (*yathābūta*) that *Nirvāṇa* is given cognitive attributes and is called *sandiṭṭhiko* or "visible here" and *ehipassiko* "inviting to come and see." A person of stilled thoughts is said to see, know things as they are. Moderation in conduct, watchfulness, mindfulness and contemplation are indispensable for grasping the meaning of such pregnant words as 'suffering' (*duḥkha*), 'impermanence' (*anitya*) 'not-self' (*anātma*), 'compassion' (*karuṇā*), 'emptiness' (*śūnyatā*) 'conditioned things' (*dharmas; saṃskāras*), 'dependent origination' (*pratītyasamutpāda*), 'quiescence' (*upaśama*),

37 cp. F. J. Streng, Emptiness—*A study in Religious meaning*, p. 177, Nashville, 1967.

38, See W. C. Smith, *Questions of Religious Truth*, p. 65, New York, 1967

and the like. In other words, these are soteriological terms and their meaning cannot be grasped apart from maditational and moral practices. No amount of logical, semantic, psychological, and analytical study would help us in 'seeing and experiencing' the truth of the Buddhist teaching.[39] The purpose of Buddhism is to train human beings according to the right views so that they can go beyond the realm of views and doctrines, decay and death. Everything else has to be subordinated to this supreme quest of the Truth. For, the Buddha has said that "the taste of Truth excels all the other tastes"[40] and that "the gift of truth excels all the other gifts."[41] The entire body of the sacred teaching has just one purpose: freedom from ignorance (*avidyā*) and its invariable concomitant, turmoil (*duḥkha*). "Just as the great ocean, monks, has one taste, the taste of salt, even so, monks, this Doctrine and Method has one taste, the taste of liberation (*vimutti-rasa*)."[42] This, then, is the matter of Buddhism, the truth of Buddhism, the truth about Buddhism, that it has the taste of Liberation, the taste of Truth. It is a true way to the Truth; a soteriology based on the teachings of a rightly Awakened Teacher. This side of Buddhism is practical empirical and can be "examined" or "seen" by the seeker. Its truth will be relative to the individual involved in prac-

39, E. Conze, op. c it., p. 30

40, Stcherbatsky, loc. cit. It should be noted here that Buddhims is essentially a soteriology, a path of Liberation.

41, *Saṃyuttanikāya* (Nalanda) I. p. 39.

42, *Dhammapada,* Verse 354-a.

43, *Cullavagga* (*Vinayapiṭaka*), Nalanda edn., p. 357. In the *Aṅguttaranikāya* (Nalanda) *I.* p. 37, *attharasa,* 'the taste of Reality', *dhammarasa,* 'the taste of Truth' are given as synonymns of *Vimuttirasa,* 'the taste of Liberation'.*

*Footnotes abridged by the Editorial Board.

tice, and in this process of growth on the path of truth, one may be more truthful than the other; one may succeed earlier than the other, and so on. All those who follow the way to the Truth are not equally gifted, nor identical in all respects. But the way is open to everyone without any discrimination, and the Goal is devoid of all discriminations whatsoever. Those with faith and zealous practice will succeed in their endeavours. The moral law of *karma,* which is fundamental to Buddhist system of faith, teaches that the Truth can be reached only by pursuing the true or right path to the Truth. For the Buddhists the true or right path is the one expounded by the Buddha. The question whether the paths expounded by others are true or false does not arise here; this question may be interesting to a modern student of Comparative Religion or the History of Religions, but is of no consequence to a man of *faith.* A person will have to verify for himself the truthfulness of a particular path of religiousness he chooses. At the initial stage, one needs faith (*śraddhā*). This brings us to the foundation of Buddhist religiousness; *faith in the Buddha and the Dharma.* Without this there is no Buddhist perspective of the Truth nor a Buddhist way to it. While the Truth does not need our faith in it and does not depend on our knowing it, a way to it, however, has been the hallmark of the history of *homo religiosus.* Buddhist life and culture have been the result of faith of those whom we call Buddhists. The "Torchbearer of Mankind" (*ukkādhāro manussānaṁ*) out of compassion for the suffering beings, has shown the way to Truth; by following that way we will reach the Truth. It is with this conviction, in an act of supreme faith, out of a sense of ultimacy and total commitment that the Buddhists have been taking "refuge" in the Buddha and the

Dharma, with a view to grow in holiness; with a view to live up to the truths, to master the truths, that pave the way, and to see that Truth which cannot be told of. That which is beyond all questions cannot be reduced to conformity with our mundane modes of thought and theorisation. In the ultimate analysis, this Truth is free from all labels; it is neither Buddhist nor Brahmanical, neither Christian nor Islamic. Buddhist quest concerns with the eradication of all obstacles on the road to Truth and with the cultivation of all those virtues that make this road. All that does not concern this quest is secondary and prolongs the round of birth and death.

A CRITICAL STUDY OF CH. V OF EPISTLE I OF MANUŠČIHR GŌŠN-JAMĀN

M. F. KANGA
Bombay

Introductory Remarks:

In this paper for Pt. K. Chattopadhyaya Felicitation Volume I have selected Chapter V, Epistle I of Manuščihr, one of the most difficult texts in Pahlavi Literature. I have based my transcription on the text "Nāmakīhā ī Manuščihr" edited by Ervad B.N. Dhabhar, Bombay 1912 as well as the variants given in the footnotes to the text. Ervad Dhabhar has relied on the Mss W and BK for his edition instead of the important Mss MR, MR_1, and J as can be seen from the footnotes given by me to the Transcription. The text edited by Dhabhar lacks marks of punctuations, which I have shown in my Transcription. I have not followed the numbering of paragraphas as given by Ervad Dhabhar, but I have divided the text of this chapter into paragraphs and sentences according to the best of my judgment and have added marks of punctuations. I have divided the text into two paragraphs, where as Ervad Dhabhar has assigned eight paragraphs to this chapter. Dr. E. W. West translated these Epistles of Manuščihr into English in the S. B. E. Vol. XVIII. Oxford, 1882. Ervad Dhabhar translated these three Epistles into Gujarati with notes wherever he deemed necessary in 1921 A. C. I have differed from these learned authorities and the points of difference have been shown by me in the foot-notes to the text in Transcription and Translation.

I have dealt with the words hitherto not understood or deciphered properly in the Notes.

Manuščihr Gōšn-jamān wrote three Epistles (nāmakīhā) on the subject-matter of the Barašnūm Ceremony to be undergone by a person coming in contact with the dead. From the Epistles it follows that Zātsparam wanted to do away with the law of the Barašnūm purification as described in Vīdēvdāt IX. 1–36. and to utilise in its stead a simple fifteen-fold ablution for all kinds of contamination as mentioned in Vīdēvdāt VIII. 99-103. As gleaned from these Epistles Manuščihr Gōšn-jamān, the Pontiff, solved the problem by well-balanced arguments, tact, exhortation and persuation. In this chapter the commentaries of Aparaγ, Mētyōkmāh and Šōšāns are explained by Zātsparam in such a manner as to carry out ultimately his own viewpoint. Here Zātsparam seems to maintain some solitary opinion of one of the above-mentioned commentators in order to enforce his opinion on the question at issue. But he should understand that the solitary teaching of that commentator is not the whole statement on the subject-matter in dispute.

Signs

( ) indicate words inserted by the writer to round off the grammatical structure of the English translation or to make clear the sense.

+ + indicate that the word is corrupt.

* indicate the theoretical form.

< > indicate insertion in the text as required by the context.

Transcription.

1. Uskārisn ut cāstak[1] ān ī[2] nipistak ī-tān miyān nipistak ī nāmak frēstīt druvist bōzisnīh-ē andar nēst, ī Patis ān ī frārōn dārisnīhā kartak vartēnītan[3] sacēt; cē hakar ō-c ān ī-s hac gōβisn ī Mētyōmāh ut Aparaγ ut-Sōsāns nipist ēstēt yut yut gōβisn cāstak ī[4] ham dastōβar-ān hast, aδak-ic passācisn <ut> paδtākīh ī hac-is nē ōγōn cēγōn ān ī-s pat frāc passācisnīh fravastak; ut-as paδtāk sahist pargast ku ōy maγūγān[5] hac rāstīh-ic[6] pat, aivāp-as maγūγān ō kāmak vicērīh raft,[7] aivāp-as ākāsīhā ān aδvēnak ī *nipist[8] ī cēγōn-as pat oxᵛ varravist ku nikēz ī dēn, cāstak ī dastōβarān hast, bē tā rasisn ī a-brātarōt Sōsāns kas pat bavandak dānisn a-vaxr andar axᵛān[9] nē vaxt <cē> nāmcist druj pat mēnisn ī dēn dastōβarān anzamānīktar Kōxsēt[10] vicēr ī Dēn, ut, patis-ic (ptas-c) brātarōtōmandīh ī hērān; ān hast ka apēcak mēnisnān satxak[11]-nikīrīt purrgōβtārān tēz vīrīh ut dēnīk-cīhrān hu-casmīh apar bōzisn apar-nikīrisnīk[12] ham maγūγ (mywwy) a-frēβtārīh ī xᵛat saxtak[13]-nikīrisnīh kām ī-s apar purr-vistrisnīh ī dēnīk hamōk[14] rāδ tēz vīrīh vihān[15] ī-s*ōy (WL) bōzisn ī dēn *nīrang (ayrwy) ī yut-patkārān vīnārtan rāδ, hu-casmīh apar xᵛat bozisn ī hacis[16] xōk hast.

2. Ān-ic ī-s hac ān bōzisnīhā fravastak, passāxtak, paδtākēnītak mēnēt, hac ēn[17] sī cēm apērtar sahom :ān[18] ī-s saxtak-nikīrisnīh[19] ī Mētyōkmāh pat cāstak ī Mēt-yōkmāhīk, ut ān ī Aparaγ ut Sosāns har ēvak pat

čāstak-ē mēnīt[20], ut-aš tēz *brīnīhā[21] (brynn gās) har čē ēvak hač ōyšān gūft pat paδtākīh ī hač čāstak[22] vičēr apar kart, ut-aš hū-čašmīhā pat bōzīšn [23] i xᵛēš ōspurrīk mēnīt, ut-aš nē mat ēstēt passačak ham-uškār[24]<ut> apāč-nimūtār rāδ, an-ētōnīh aβiš nē *drōtīhist, [25] ut ka passoxᵛ ī rāst apāč-nimūtārān āšnōβēt, pat bavandak-mēnišnīh ūzvārēt, xᵛat ōstōkīhēt ku čāstak <ī> Mētyōmāh nē hamāk gōβišn i Mētyōkmāh; čē vas dātistān hast ī Mētyōkmāh aδvēnak-ē gūft, pat mātakvar čāstak[26] i Mētyōkmāhīk hān aδvēnak vičērēnīt[27] ēstēt; nē har čē Mētyōkmāh gūft nē xᵛap pat čāstak ī Mētyōkmāhīk; ēvar ku nē šāyēt čē vas ī pat šāyistakīh gūft ēstēt.

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1. Dhabhar has retained these two words at the end of Ch. IV: rightly they begin Ch. V as done by me.

2. Following Ms MR.

3. ut after vartēnītan as given by Dhabhar is omitted as per Mss. MR, MR_1,

4. So Mss. MR, MR_1. and J.

5. So MR; the rest mēnōk gām. Dhabhar suggests kām for gām which is not proper.

6. Following Mss MR, MR_1, and J: Mss. W and BK ī instead of ič. Dhabhar in f. n. 5 p. 25 suggests that the letter č should be read with the next word pat as 'Jaft', Comparing Persian 'Jaftan', "to be inclined, to be bent".

7. Following Mss MR, MR_1, and J; text gives ideog. Sātūnēt =Ir rōβēt.

8. Corrected by me; reading of the Mss. *WKWŠTW*, which is read by Dhabhar as "vukušt" and translated "Contrary".

9. So Mss MR, MR_1, and J: Mss W and BK give axv.

10. Test gives WD=Ir tā, tāk as per Ms. W: Ms. BK WZ: J WŽ; MR omits and I have omitted if following MR.

11. Text gives the reading sāt whereas Mss MR, MR_1, and J give saxtak, past part of inf. saxtan, to weigh: Besides I have taken, saxtak-nikīrīt as a compound word.

12. So MR and BK; MR_1, omits letter n of nikīrisnīk.

13. So MR; the rest Wystkw

14. Corrected; text gives hamak

15. So Mss. MR. and J; text gives hār

16. Following Mss MR, MR_1, and J: MNŠ: text gives MWN-s=kē-s

17. So MR, MR_1, ; the rest MNYWM=Ir cis as given in the text.

18. So MR, MR_1, and J ; text omits it.

19. Dhabhar commences para 6 with the words saxtak-nikī-risnīh, which is a repetition and is deleted by me

20. So MR manītan; I have corrected it into mēnītan. Dhabhar gives manīt nimūt as per Mss Wand BK.

21. Corrected; all mss. BRYNN yh S=brīn gās

22. Thus MR; the rest cāstak-ē

23. So MR and J; the rest WZŠNN=vicisn

24. Thus MR and MR_1; rest ham-uskārisn.

25. Corrected on the basis of the ms. MR ŠLMWYH stn; text gives a-Xūmbīhist... ŠLM-ideog. Ir drōt; hence drōtīhist.

26. Added as per Mss MR, MR_1, and J

27. Thus MR, MR_1, ; the rest vicērēnītan

Translation

1. There is no sound explanation[1] in the deliberation and doctrine of the writing which you sent along with the writing of the Epistle, whereby with lawful preservation usage ought to be uttered; for even if what he has written from the statements of Mëtyōmāh,[2] Aparaγ[2] and Sōšāns are each separately the statements and teachings of these Dasturs, even then his composition and publication (are) not such as what he evidently felt comprised[3] in the composition. Perhaps (it may be) that he is the chieftain[4] of the Magi (maγūγān) even[5] owing to truthfulness or that the Magi went to him for a desirable decision or that his informations (include) such type of writing[6] as he believed with zeal[7] (aXᵛ) that they are the exegesis of the Religion and the teachings of the Dasturs; but until the advent of the unrivalled[8] Sōšāns there is no person destined (vaxt)[10] in the existences with perfect and flawless[9] knowledge; specially the Drūj strives for in the minds of the Dasturs of the Religion most unopportune decrees of the Religion and thereby (patiš-iš) too it becomes the rivalry of the riches, when owing to the sharp intelligence of the voluminous speakers having pure thoughts and balanced observation, friendliness of these having a religious temperament as regards explanations to be noticed (apar-nikīrišnīk), lack of deceit of the weighty observations of this '*magu*' himself, and the desire of his for a full dissemination of religious instruction and owing to sharp intellect of which the apparent cause (vihān) (was) to establish (vīnārtan) the explanation of religious ritual[11] (nīrang) for the disputants there is a good regard for his own explanation which (arises) from his temperament (xōk).

2. Also that which he considers encompassed, consistent (passaxtak) and manifested by these explanations I feel very particularly owing to these three reasons: that which he considered to be the balanced observation of Mētyōkmāh from the teachings pertaining to Mētyōkmāh and those of Aparaγ and Sōsāns from a decree of each one and he set up (apar kart) a decision with proof from a teaching with sharp divisions of whatever each of those said; and he considered it perfect with a good regard with his own explanation and he has not come across a suitable consultant and remonstrator; the state of its not being such[12] was not welcome[13] by him : And when he listens to the reply of the just remonstrators and expounds it with perfect mind, he himself will feel confident that (the said) teaching of Mētyōkmāh is not the entire statement of Mētyōkmāh, for there are many decrees which Mētyōkmāh stated in one way and which the followers of Mētyōkmāh have decided in another way with an important decree. It is not that all what Mētyōkmāh said is not properly in consonance with the Mētyōkmāhīk decree, it is certain that even many a thing is mentioned as being proper is not proper.

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1. *bozisnīh* : abst. n from inf. boxtan (i) to explain (2) to deliver, to save, to release, meaning (i) explanation, elucidation, proof, argument (ii) release, rescue, escape, salvation, deliverance. This word is generally known for the second meaning in Pahlavi. Particularly in the Epistles of Manuscihr this meaning 'explantion, proof, argument' suits the context better. Cf D. N. Mackenzie, An Early Jewish Persian Argument in BSOAS XXX. 1968 p.253. Inf. boxtan may be compared with Av √ bunj, buj, Skt मुच्, मुंच्; Sassan. Inscs. būkhtakī, Pāz. boxtan (P. Horn, NP Ety. 270). cf.

bōzisn Ep. I. ch 5. para 7: Ch. 3, para 3; Ep. II Ch. 2, para 1: bōxtēt Ep. II. Ch. 2 para 3. See my paper on 'chapter II of Epistle II of Manuscihr in the Proceedings and Transactions of the All-India oriental Conference, Srinagar, Kashmir Vol. II Part II p. 6 and p. 8. See Henning, Das Verbum des Mittelpersischen der Turfanfragmente, Z11, IX. p. 197.

2. Names of the Commentators of the Sassanian Age. Their teaching and doctrines are quoted by the authors in the Pahlavi texts Sāyist-Nē-Sāyist, Nīrangistān, Pahvali Vīdēvdāt in support of their statements.

3. *fravastak :* Comprised, contained, encompassed (Zaehner, Zurvān p. 468) from inf fravastan, Av fra+√band, to surround, to encompass, to comprise. Cf. fravast Ep. I. Ch. 1.1; fravast ēstēt Ep. I, Ch. 1.2; fravastan Ep. II. Ch. 9.7; a-fravast Ep. II. Ch. II. 1. See Dātistān ī Dēnīk 38.14 : ut-as fravast pat fravand vīspān rōsnān cēγōn fravand ān ī har visp-ākās Xrat fravast bavēt vispān-ākās yazdān, i.e., and it encompasses all the luminaries as with a girdle and omniscient wisdom is encompassed by the omniscient god

4. I have adopted the reading of the Ms. MR maγūγān, pl. of maγūγ. av. moγu. Dhabhar has given in the text maγūγ gām or dām and in the fn 4 he remarks: "Thus all for kām" and translates "the desire of the Mōbed". But the word is correctly maγūγān as given in the Ms. MR.

5. In the text Dhabhar gives ī as per Mss W and BK and suggests in the fn. 5: "better c for ī as in the rest to be read with the next word as capt, P. cafdan, to be inclined, to be bent." But this emendation of Dhabhar is not proper as can be seen from my reading and tranaslation of the sentence in question : ōy maγūγān hac rāstīh-ic pat = he is the chieftain of the magi even owing to truthfulness. It will now be seen that there is no need to change the text at all.

6. **Nipist* - corrected by me. The word means 'writing' from inf nipistan, ideog. YKTYBWNTNN; Old Persian pis, Av ni+√paēs, Skt निपिश् N Pers. nivisdan, to write, to depict. See

R. G. Kent, Old Persian Inscriptions Glossary p. 194 S. V. paiθ. All Mss give the text WKWŠTW. Dhabhar reads "wukusht" and compares with N Pers bagashtan and translates "twisted, turned, down. But really, speaking the letters KW can be amended to read letter p. and hence my suggestion nipišt, which gives the sense of the sentence properly as can be seen from my translation.

7. *Pat axv* = with zeal, with will-power. There are various meanings of the word aXv: (1) existence, av. aṅhu; (2) lord Av. ahu-; (3) zeal, will power, will, Av aṅhvā. For further details see Zaehner, Zurvān p. 53 fn. 1. Dhabhar has left out this phrase untranslated.

8. *a-brātarōt* : without a rival, without antagonism; derived, from a neg. part, not+brātarōt rival, adversary, antagonist. See BSOS. X. p. 311 and Zachner, Zurvān, A Zoroastrian Dilemma p. 193. Prof Menasce (Škand Gumānīk Vicār p. 30) translates 'bratarōt' "semblable et apparente", i.e., similar or alike and related. The word brātarōtīh is associated with 'hamīstār' in Pahlavi literature The word originated from the name *Tur ī Brātarot, Tur ī Brātarokres*, who was the bitter enemy of the prophet zartōšt and who eventually killed him. Cf. Pahl. Riv Dd. p. 141.4: Tur ī Brātarōxš pat gurg aδvēnak bē būt, ut-aš zartōšt bē aβzat, i.e., Tur Brātarōxš was in the form of a wolf and he killed Zartōšt. See Zand ī Vohuman yasn Ch. III. 4; Dēnkart ed. by Madon 334.11 and 17 and Vicītakīhā ī Zātsparam Ch. X. 20.

9. *a-vaxr* : without detraction, flawless, from inf vaxrītan, to detract Cf Dātistān ī Dēnīk Pursišn 47 : a-vaxr ut a-zīfān. See Menasce, ŠGV XVI. 76, 101 and XV. 39 where we find vāhar in Pāzand. Prof. Menasce translates "errone, absurde", i.e. erroneous, false, mistaken. Hence a-vaxr would mean "without flaws, without mistakes". See Zaehner, Zurvān p. 394-396. See my notes in Prof Henning Memor'al Volume edited by M. Boyce and Ibya Gershevitch, London. 1970. p. 227.

10. *vaxt* ∠ *baxt*, past part. of baxtan, to destine, to allot, to ordain; cf. Dd I. 11: vaxt; III: ān xrat kē-š kām mēnōkān yazdān

apar snāsēt nē *vaxt* bē dēn ī rāst ī apēcak, ī hast mēnōkān dānisn, ī frahangān frahang ut ustātihān ustātīh, tōxmakīh ī visp dānisnān, i.e., that wisdom by which one understands about the desire of the spiritual yazats is not *ordained* (to be) but the true and pure religion, which is the knowledge of the Spirits, the science of sciences, the teaching of teachings and the source of all knowledge. For Dātistān ī Dēnīk, Pursisn I, see my paper in Professor Morgenstierne Commemoration Volume-Indo-Iranica, Wiesbaden. 1964.

11. *AyRND :* I have corrected this word *erang into 'nīrang'* as required in the Context—Pāz. nīrang, Skt transcription nīranga, N Pers. nīrang, Arab nairanj-meaning, ceremonial, ritual On the word nīrang see Bailey, Iranian Studies III in BSOS Vol. VII part 2, 1934 pp. 276-279. Dhabhar reads the word in question "a-darūγ" and translates "free from falsehood." Alternatively he suggests "dēn-aērang" and translates "destruction of the religion." But neither the word ērang or a-drōγ is proper and suitable here in the context. See Epistle I, Ch. II. S: dēn ērang (MR nīrang, MR_1, and J NAYRND) ī yīd-patkārisn. Better nīrang as per Ms. MR: cf. also para *ibid.* dēnīk ērangīhā instead of the correct dēnīk-nīrangīhā. Here I may quote an instance of the problem of Pahlavi decipherment which I have come across in this chapter in the word written ērang-AYRND. The problem is : how to read the letter a. The writers of the Pahlavi Mss. being well-conversant with New Persian have often whole words, parts of words or a single letter of a word in New Persian characters, and in some places we find that the copyists of Pahlavi Mss. have misread the Pahlavi letter n as New Persian alif and written a in its stead. Here the copyist has written ērang for the correct nīrang. cf asrust for nasrust and arm for varm, narm. Hence I have suggested the word nīrang instead of ērang of the text on this hypothesis.

12. *an-etonīh :* lit. not suchness, not exactness, derived from an-neg part. not+ētōnīh, abst n. from ētōn, thus, meaning suchness, exactness. cf the form Anc. Ind. tathātvam—meaning lit. "being thus," actuality, exactness. A passive verbal formation from ētōn. 'thus' is ētōnīhēt, it is being thus, it comes true, See Bartholomae, WZKM. 29.44 ff. and Miran M. I. 38. See Zaehner, Zurvān p. 208:

ōγōn dātōβar Xrat nihuftak čis pat ētōnīh aivāp *an-etonīh* hač ākāsīh ī ān dēn patgrēt, i.e. "Wisdom is represented as a Judge who knows the truth or untruth of hidden things by the knowledge of Religion." cf. Mātīkān ī Hazār Dātistān 6.4f: pat nē ētōnīh ī ān hamāk čis ētōnīh ī ān ī xvēš apāč apāyēt guftan.

13. Text gives *a-hūmbīhist.* Dhabhar reads a-khumbīhēt and derives it from inf. khūmbīdan, to cover, to close, But he translates quite differently "he could not understand. "Both his reading and meaning are not correct. Ms. MR gives a reading *ŠLMWyh Stnn*; ŠLM=Ir. drōt, drūt, praise, mercy, benediction, greetings, vide Junker, Fr p. 1955 edition, p. 6 and 1912 Edition p. 82. Hence the word should be read *drotīhist,* is greeted, is blessed, is welcome. The sentence an-ētōnīh aβix nē drōtīhist, i.e, inexactitude of it was not welcome by him.

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निर्ग्रन्थ का चातुर्याम–'सर्ववारिवारितो' का अर्थ

दलसुख मालवणिया

पालिपिटक में दीघनिकाय-सामञ्ञफलसुत्त में और अन्यत्र भगवान् बुद्ध के समकालीन अनेक तीर्थंकरों के मतका निर्देश है । उनमें जैनधर्म के प्रवर्तक भगवान् महावीर के मतका भी निर्देश मिलता है । वहाँ भगवान् महावीर को 'निगंठ नात-पुत्त' (इसके पाठान्तर भी मिलते हैं) कहा गया है । जैन आगम में भी भगवान् महावीर के लिए अनेक वार 'नायपुत्त' (ज्ञातृपुत्र) नाम मिलता है । अतएव विद्वानों ने भगवान् महावीर का ही मत पालिपिटकों में नातपुत्त के नाम से दिया गया है—इसे स्वीकृत किया है । यहाँ जो उनका विशिष्ट मत सामञ्ञफलसुत्त में बताया गया है, उसी की चर्चा करनी है । उसमें जो पाठ है वह इस प्रकार है—

निगण्ठो नातपुत्तो मं एतदवोच–'इध महाराज, निगण्ठो चातुयामसंवुतो होति । कथं च महाराज निगण्ठो चातुयामसंवरसंवुत्तो होति ? इध महाराज निगण्ठो सव्ववारिवारितो च होति, सब्बवारियुत्तो च सव्बवारिधुतो च होति, सव्ववारिफुरो च । एवं खो महाराज निगण्ठो एवं चातुयामसंवरसंवुतो होति अयं वुच्चति महाराज निगण्ठो गतत्तो च यतत्तो च ठितत्तो चाति ।"

इस उल्लेख में जो 'सव्ववारिवारितो' इत्यादि पाठ है उससे क्या अभिप्रेत है, इसीकी विशेष चर्चा यहाँ करनी है । टीकाकार बुद्धघोष का आश्रय लेकर सर्वप्रथम डा० याकोबी ने इसका अनुवाद करने का प्रयत्न किया है । उन्होने 'सव्ववारिवारितो' गत 'वारि' शब्द का अर्थ पानी समझा है और तात्पर्य निकाला कि—Nigantha abstains from all (Cold) water. किन्तु 'सव्ववारियुत्तो' आदि पदों में जो 'वारि' शब्द आता है उसका अर्थ निषिद्ध या निषेधयोग्य समझा है । अतएव अर्थ किया कि—

he abstains from all bad deeds, by abstinance from all bad deeds he is free from sins, he realises abstinance from all bad deeds, (S.B.E.vol. XLV, Intro. p. XX). उसके बाद इस उल्लेख के जितने भी अनु-

1 Canon Bouddhique, Pali; Suttapiṭaka Dīghanikāya, tome I, p. 51.

वाद हुए, उन सब में प्रथम 'वारि' शब्द का सर्वत्र 'पानी' अर्थ ही दिखाई देता है– (R. Davids: S, B. B. II, p 74; श्री कश्यप कृत हिन्दी पृ० २१; डा० नगराज अनुशीलन, पृ० ४५४ इत्यादि)। अपवाह केवल फ्रेन्च भाषा में जो डा० रेनू ने अनुवाद किया (1949) उसमें दिखाई देता है। उन्होंने 'वारि' शब्द का 'वारणयोग्य' ऐसा स्पष्ट अर्थ किया है। अतएव सर्वत्र 'वारि' शब्द का एक अर्थ उन्होंने किया है। आश्चर्य है कि इस उल्लेख में पालिकोष भी 'वारि' शब्द का अर्थ 'पानी' ही देता है।

डा० याकोबी को भी 'पानी' अर्थ करने में असंगति तो दिखती ही थी। अतएव उन्होने कोष्टक में (Cold) जोड़ दिया, क्योंकि यह तो संभव हो ही नहीं सकता है कि कोई भी सब प्रकार के 'जल' का त्याग कर सके। जैन निर्ग्रन्थों ने केवल ठंडे जल का ही त्याग किया था, अतएव याकोबी को भी जोड़ना पड़ा। किन्तु वहाँ 'वारि' शब्द का अर्थ 'पानी' है भी नहीं, यह तो उनके भी ध्यान में नहीं आया। वे केवल बुद्धघोषका ही अनुसरण करके रह गये।

वस्तुतः यहाँ 'वारि' शब्द का अर्थ 'वारणयोग्य' अर्थात् निषिद्ध=पाप ही है। इस बात का समर्थन जैन आगम सूत्रकृतांग से हो जाता है। जिन शब्दों का प्रयोग पालि में हैं उन्हीं शब्दों का प्रयोग हेर फेर से सूत्रकृतांग में भी देखा जाता है। आश्चर्य इस बात का अवश्य है कि जो प्रयोग पालि में लिया गया, वह उस काल में जैनों में विशिष्ट होगा; किन्तु प्राचीन आगमों में केवल एक ही वार यह देखा जाता है और वह भी भगवान् महावीर जी की स्तुति के प्रसंग में। संभव है कि आगे चलकर जब भगवान् महावीर के पांच महाव्रत की प्रसिद्धि विशेष हुई तब यह प्रयोग गौण हो गया, उसने अपना महत्व खो दिया; अतएव केवल एक ही बार यह प्रयोग जैनागम में देखा जाता है।

सूत्रकृतांग में महावीर की स्तुति में कहा गया है—

से वारिया इत्थि सराइभन्तं उपहाणवं दुक्खखयट्ठयाए। लोगं विदित्ता आरं परंच सव्वं पभू वारियसव्ववारी॥

६. २ ७ (P. T. S.)

पालिपिटक में भगवान् महावीर निगंठ नातपुत्त के विषय में कहा गया है 'सव्ववारिवारितो' और यहाँ महावीर के वर्णन में कहा गया है—

'पभू वारियसव्ववारी'*—दोनों का तात्पर्यार्थ ही नहीं; शब्द भी एक हैं।

अब इस सूत्रकृतांग की टीकाओं में इसका जो अर्थ किया गया है उसे देखें, जिससे स्पष्ट हो जायगा कि यहाँ 'वारि' शब्द का अर्थ 'पानी' है ही नहीं।

"सव्वं पभू वारिय प्रभवतीति प्रभुः। वशयित्वा इत्यर्थः। अथवा सव्वं पाणादिवादानि दव्वतो, प्रभुः ज्ञेयं प्रति, प्रधानत्वाच्च वारितवान् शिष्यान् हिंसा-अनृत-स्तेय-परिग्रहेभ्य इति, मैथुन-रात्रिभक्ते तु पूर्वोक्ते। सर्वस्मादकृत्यादात्मानं शिष्यांश्च वारितवान् इति सर्ववारी सर्ववारणशील इत्यर्थः।" चूर्णि।

"सर्वमेतत् प्रभुः भगवान् सर्ववारं बहुशो निवारितवान्। एतदुक्तं भवति प्राणातिपातनिषेधादिकं स्वतोऽनुष्ठाय परांश्च स्थापितवान्, नहि स्वतोऽस्थितः परांश्च स्थापयितुमलमित्यर्थः।" शीलाङ्ककृत टीका।

दोनों टीकाओं में भी समाधानकारक रीति से शब्दार्थ नहीं किया गया किन्तु तात्पर्यार्थ स्पष्ट ही हैं। शीलाङ्क का तो पाठ ही 'वार' है 'वारि' नहीं है।

यहाँ यह भी स्पष्ट करना जरूरी है कि भगवान् महावीर ने दीक्षा लेते समय जो प्रतिज्ञा की थी उससे भी स्पष्ट होता है कि उन्होंने सर्व पापों का वारण किया था–
"तओ णं समणे जाव लोयं करित्ता सिद्धाणों नमुक्कारं करेइ, सव्वं मे अकरणिज्जं पावकम्मं ति कट्टु सामाइयं चरितं पडिवज्जई"

आचारांग, द्वितीयश्रु० सू० १७९, पृ०, ४२४

यह सब देखते हुए 'वारि' शब्द का अर्थ 'वारणयोग्य' = पाप का ही होना उचित है न कि वारि = पानी।

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* यहाँ जो पाठ दिया है वह प्राकृत टेक्स्ट सोसायटी द्वारा सूत्रकृतांगचुर्णि जो छप रहा है उसीसे लिया गया है अन्य पाठान्तर इस प्रकार हैं—'पभू वारिय सव्ववारं' आगमोदयआवृत्ति और डा० वैद्यकी आवृत्ति।

MAGIC IN THE VEDAS

MAYA MALAVIYA
Allahabad.

The term 'magic' (Greek *mageia*, Latin *magia*) is derived from *Magi*—the priestly class in Babylonia and Assyria, who, in course of time, degenerated into soothsayers and magicians. By the use of spells and rites and observing certain conditions, the performer of magic mechanically obtains his desired ends by his own coercive power. According to Frazer (*Golden Bough*, abr. ed. 1923, p.11 f.) magic works on two principles : the Law of Similarity and the Law of Contiguity. One can produce any effect one desires merely by imitating it and whatever one does to a material object will effect equally the person with whom the object was once in contact whether it formed a part of his body or not. The desired effect though enacted on the symbol is transmitted to the real object. Things act on each other through a secret sympathy. In this way, one's broken tooth, cuttings of nails, hairs, blood, sweat, foot-prints, clothes, weapon etc. represent the very person to whom these things belong. These two types of magic are called Homoeopathic and Contagious. In contradistinction to magic, religion is to Frazer, "a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human being" (ibid., p. 50).

In Vedas, the words *Yātu* (*AV.* 2. 24), *mūlakriyā* (*RV.* 10. 145 ; *AV.* 1.34 ; 6.138), *kṛtyā* (*AV.* 5.14,31; 10.1), *Valaga* (*AV.* 10. 1. 18 ; *Vāj.S.* 5.23 ; *TS.* 1.3.2), *pratyabhicaraṇa* (*RV. 2.11.2*), *pratiharaṇa* (*AV.* 5.14.8), *pratisara*

and *pratīvarta* (*AV*. 8.5.1.4), *pratyak* and *pratīcīna* (*AV*. 10.1.6), *Cakṣurmantrasya* and *Cakṣuṣo ghorāḥ* (evil-eye *AV*. 2.7.5; 4.9.6), and *dūṣiḥ* (*AV*.1.23.4; 2.11.1) refer to magic and the words *yātudhāna* as well as *Yātu*, *kimīdin*, *kṛtyākṛt*, *Valagin*, *mūlin*, *śaptāra*, *śapatheyya* (*RV*. 1.35. 10; VII. 104. 15; *AV*. 1.28; 5.31.12 etc.) refer to magicians. In the Veda, the term *māyā* denoting mysterious power (*RV*. 1.160.3) occurs in both the senses—good and bad as applicable to gods and the asuras. Varuṇa is called *māyin* (*RV*. 6.48.14; 7.28.4; 10.99.10, 147.5). Indra is said as appearing in different forms by his mysterious power (*RV*. 3.53.8; 6,47.18). In *ŚB* 13.4.3.11 the word means *Indrajāla* or *asuravidyā*. In *RV*. 3.53, there is a reference to the throwing of a mūṭha over the enemy. Śakti—the son of Vasiṣṭha—uses magic against his rival Viśvāmitra and deprives him of his Vāk. Later, by the power of *Sasarparī* mantra Viśvāmitra regains his speech and curses his enemies. The Vedic people were very much afraid of the abhicāra or black magic and condemned it (*RV*. VII. 104. 15).

The *Atharvaveda* is said to be the repository of magical incantations, but in the other three Vedas, which are concerned with Śrauta sacrifices, the Ātharvaṇaic concepts of *śānti*, *puṣṭi* and *abhicāra* rites are not lacking. While dealing with Śrauta yāgas, the priests indulge in magical practices, which in nature and quality do not essentially differ from the Ātharvaṇaic concept of magic. It makes clear that the tradition of the *AV*. did not come out from a quite distinct stratum of the society.

The magic of the Vedas covers all possible spheres of desires such as attainment of property, offspring, husband, wife, cattle, long life, health, safe delivery,

superiority, victory, rain, averting of diseases, evil consequences of sins, ill-omens, serpents, poison and smitting away of the enemies, sorcerers and rival wives etc. In all the rites, it is possible to discern the working of the Law of Similarity and Contiguity. The desired result is brought about by imitating the end to be achieved. To gain the love of one's beloved, the heart of the beloved's image is pierced by an arrow (*AV.* 3.25; *SVdh. Br.* 2.5.3). Evil influences (*RV.*10.59—Nirṛti; *śB* 1.2.4.7—wooden sword; *śB* 7.2.1.12 -Nirṛti bricks) and diseases (*RV.* 1.50—Jaundice) are warded off and transferred to other distant places and beneficial substances, or powers are attracted by means of contact (skin of ajā for prosperity and progeny; tiger-skin for power). A crowd of priests conducts the complicated ritual, of which every detail is full of symbolic meaning, to serve the purpose of the sacrificer. Thus, at the sacrifice of *Darśapūrṇamāsa,* for the offering of a milk mess, a twig of Palāśa is cut to drive away the calves from the cows. This twig of a special tree serves the purpose other than the driving away of the calves, that is, the placing of food and strength in the sacrificer (*TS.* 1.1.1. इषे त्वोर्जे त्वा). If the adhvaryu wishes to make the sacrificer deprived of his cattle, he brings a branch without leaves and having its foremost part dry (*TS.* 3.2.1.2). By the *Stambayajurharaṇa* rite, the enemy and the rakṣasas are driven away (*TB.* 3.2.9.1-6). Vaṣaṭ with a harsh speech *khaṭ, phaṭ* etc. (*Tai. Ar.* 4.27) were used to slay the enemies (*Tai. Br.* 2.2.1.7). At the ceremony of the erection of the *sadas,* the Adhvaryu, by drawing a line around with the spade encompasses and cuts the rakṣasas and the enemies (*TS.* 1.3.1). The heating of the winnowing basket and the ladle symbolizes the burning of the rakṣasas (*TS.* 1.1.2).

The digging of the earth symbolizes the casting out of the spell (*TS.* 1.3.2). In the sacrifice everything e.g. mantras, order of words, stomas, metres, number of syllables, tone of recitation, representations of things and offerings (to quote *TS.* 2.1.1.1 वायव्यं श्वेतमालभेत भूतिकामो) etc. are meaningful from the magical point of view.

From the study of the Vedic magic one may contend that it relies upon worship. *Devatās* are prayed to and offerings are made unto them, but these magical prayers exert power even over the gods and can bring directly the desired things without the intervention of the *davatās*. Again, the Ātharvaṇaic magic was as a way of life to the Vedic people and was used in daily life to obtain material happiness. These practices constituted the religion of the common man.

SKT. VIŚIPRIYA-

M. A. MEHENDALE

Deccan College, Poona.

This vocable appears in a *mantra* which is used while drawing one of the five *grahas* which are prescribed specially for the Vājapeya sacrifice. Its meaning given by BR is : "*etwa ohne Backenstücke* d. h. *ohne Handhaben an den Seiten*, von Soma-Gefässen". Böhtlingk probably was not sure of this meaning and hence in his shorter dictionary he did not give it. There he simply says that the word has been variously interpreted by the commentators. Monier Williams only repeats this latter statement.

The mantra in question appears as follows in the Taittirīya Saṁhitā 1.7.12.1-2:

yé gráhāḥ pañcajanīnā yéṣāṁ tisráḥ paramojāḥ|daívyaḥ kóśaḥ|

sámubjitaḥ|tiṣāṁ veśipriyāṇām īṣam ūrjaṁ samagrabhīm eṣá te yónir īndrāya tvā| . . . (2)

Keith translates the above as :

"The cups of the five folk,

Of which three are of highest birth,

(And for which) the divine cask (1) has been forced out

Of these that have no handles

The food and strength have I seized;

This is thy birthplace; to Indra thee !"

Keith's foot-note 1 reads as : "*viśipriyāṇām* is apparently 'without *śiprās*', and *śiprā* denotes 'jars' or 'lips', i.e., vessels without mouths or handles, probably."[1]

In the Vājasaneyi-Saṁhitā (9.4), the mantra has the following text : *gráhā ūrjāhutayo vyánto víprāya matím t 'ṣāṁ viśipriyāṇāṁ vo 'hám íṣam ūrjaṁ sámagrabham|* This *mantra*, when it appears in the Śat. Br. (5.1.2.8),[2] has been translated by Eggeling as follows : "Ye cups, of strengthening libations, inspiring the sage with thought, I have gathered together the pith and sap of you, the handleless !"

Eggeling and Keith who interpret *viśipriya* to mean 'handleless' have obviously followed the lead given by BR in analysing the word as *vī-śipriya*. This analysis was already suggested by the Padapāṭha of the Taitt. Saṁ. Following it Sāyaṇa renders the word while commenting on the Taitt. Saṁṃ. as 'furnished with different kinds of rims'. He interprets *śipra* (neut.) as 'jaw' and thinks that with reference to the cups it is metaphorically used in the sense of 'rims'. Read : *vividhāni śiprāṇi hanusthānīyāni pātrāgrāṇi tair upetā viśipriyāḥ*. While commenting on the Śat. Br., Sāyaṇa refers to the Nirukta view (6.17) according to which *śīpre* (fem. dual) means 'jaws' (*hanū*) or 'nostrils' (*nāsike*), and says that in the word *vīśipriya* it means 'jaw'. His interpretation of the word is the same as above except that instead of '*tair upetam* he says here '*tatparyantam*'[3] i.e, 'filled upto the

1. One, however, does not understand how this meaning can be reached if *śiprā* means 'jars'. The Taitt. Br. 1.3.9.2 has no comment on this word.

2. The Śat. Br. also has no comment on it.

3. Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara also has the same interpretation ; *viśipriyāṅāṁ vividhahanuparyantānām.*

rims'.[4] But this is not all. He also gives an alternative interpretation which, since it is given first, he seems to prefer. According to this interpretation, *śipriya* means 'chewing', the action done by the jaws (śiprā). Since the Soma stalks are well pressed, the juice extracted from them is fine and needs no chewing at all while drinking. Hence the cups, i.e,, the Soma juices contained in them, are called *viśipriya* "containing well pressed Soma". Read : "*śipre hanū nāsikc vā*" *iti hi yāskavacanam| iha hi hanū gṛhyete| tatra bhavaṁ karma śipriyam| vigataṁ śipriyaṁ yeṣāṁ te| atra hanuvyāpārābhāvāt śobhanābhiṣavasaṁskṛtā ity arthaḥ*[5]*|*

Another way of explaining the word would be to analyse it differently as *vīśi-priya* 'loved, liked among the people'. This, as an attribute of the Soma cups, suits the context very well since these cups are also called *pañcajanīna* 'belonging to the five people' in the Taitt. Saṁ. and *viṣvajanīna* 'belonging to all the people' in the Maitr. Saṁ. (1.11.4) and the Kāṭh. Saṁ. (14.3). The *mantra* is used, as mentioned above, while drawing the Soma cup of the Vājapeya, a sacrifice which is characterized by certain features like the chariot race which must have been very popular among the people. Hence it is quite understandable that a Soma cup of the Vājapeya was called *víśi-priya* 'liked among the people'.

If *víśipriya* is analysed as *vīśi-priya*, the loc. sg. form of the first member of the compound is quite under-

4. There is also another minor difference. While commenting on the Taitt. Saṁ., he equates *śipra* with *pātrāgra;* in the Śat. Br. he equated *śipriya* with *pātrāgra.*

5. The explanation of the commentator Mahīdhara on the Vāj. Saṁ. (9.4) is the same. Read : *śiprayor hanvoḥ karma śipriyam hanucalanam| vigataṁ śipriyaṁ yeṣu graheṣu te viśipriyāḥ samyag abhiṣutāḥ supūtāś ca tatra hi hanvor vyāpāro nāsti supeyatvāt.*

standable. As Wackernagel (Alt. Gr. II, I, § 95c β, p. 234) puts it, "Bei solchem Verhältnis der Glieder ist Kasusform des Vordergliedes häufig". The adjective *priya* is again often used with the loc. case.[6] But it is difficult to explain the accent. As a rule, the compound then should have been accented as *viśípriya*. (cf. Wackernagel, op. cit., § 96, p. 238 f.) The shifting of the accent to the first syllable, as seen in the attested form, may be said to have occurred on the analogy of many compounds with prefix *ví* as the first member showing the accent on the first syllable. We have, of course, then to assume that the accent shift had occurred very early even before the Pada analysis of the Taitt. Saṁhitā.

The interpretation of the word *viśipriya* can be attempted also from a different direction. In the corresponding mantras, the Maitr. Saṁ (1.11.4) gives the reading *viśiśna* and the Kāṭhaka (14.3) *viśiśnya*. If the reading *víśiśna* is taken to be the original one, it is possible to understand it as the description of a Soma cup. The handle of a Soma cup, as something projecting from it, can be looked upon as its *śiśna* (organ or tail). *viśiśna* as applied to a Soma cup, can mean 'without a handle'. *śipra* in **vīśipra* may then be looked upon as a euphimistic substitute for *śiśna* in *víśiśna*. **víśiprya* would be a further deviative from **víśipra* as *viśiśnya* of the Kāṭhaka is from *vīśiśna* of the Maitr. This **vīśiprya* could be the basis of the attested *víśipriya*.[7]

If *śipra* can be considered as a euphimism or *śiśna*, then it would also be possible to understand better the

6. cf. *priyo vikṣu* RV 6.1.6: *priyaḥ sūrye priyo agnā bhavāti* RV 5.37.5 etc.

7. On the variation between *–ya* and *–iya* cf. *Alt. Gr.* II.2 § 228 b p. 359.

name of the demon (dāsa) Vṛṣa-śiprá (RV. 7.99.4). This has been rendered differently as 'die Lippen eines Stieres habend' (Grassmann), 'Bullengebiss' (Geldner), and 'bullcheeked' (MW). To name a demon as having the lips or cheeks of a bull does not seem to be very appropriate as these limbs are not known to be specially characteristic of a bull. Geldner's attempt to give it a better look by rendering *śipra* as 'Gebiss' (sets of teeth) does not help much. On the other hand, if *śipra* in this name is looked upon as standing for *śiśna*, then Vṛṣa-śipra 'having the organ of a bull' can give good meaning. A reference to *śiśna* while characterizing a bull is found in the *Mbh.* 14.10.29. In a certain context where some bulls are prescribed for different deities, a black bull with a moving organ is prescribed for Indra.[8]

At this stage it may be considered if the word *śipra* itself cannot have the meaning 'organ' besides the other meanings attributed to it.[9] In that case *śipra* can be related to *śépa* and also, perhaps, *śipi* in *śipiviṣṭá* (a name of Viṣṇu). They may be derived from a common root **śip* 'to project'.[10] In RV 5.45.6 appears another name of a demon Viśiśiprá. No attempt has been made to render the word in the lexicons. It is analysed as Viśi-

8. *nīlam cokṣāṇaṁ medhyam abhyālabhantāṁ calacchiśnaṁ matpradiṣṭaṁ dvijendrāḥ.*

9. Geldner on RV 1.101.10 has a note on *śipra*. According to him it means some part of the face or mouth and specially the one which comes into operation while drinking Soma. He mentions for consideration 'nostrils' (already given by Yāska (6.17) and referred to above), 'opened lips' and 'sets of teeth' .

10. In *Alt. Gr.* II 2 § 687, p. 858 the meaning assigned to the reconstructed root *śip* is 'to wag'.

śipra in the Padapāṭha, but it does not make it intelligible. Hence when Sāyaṇa renders it as *vigatahanu* he seems to favour the analysis *vi-śiśipra*. If, as suggested above, it is possible to isolate the root **śīp* then one may agree with Sāyaṇa in his analysis of the word and derive **śiśipra* from the reduplicated root **śip*. But instead of assigning the meaning *hanu* to **śiśipra*, it would be better to consider it either as a substitute for *śiśna* or connect it with *śepa* and give it the meaning 'organ'. Vi-śiśipra then would mean 'one having a distinct (*vi*) organ' and, as a name of a demon, it could be compared with the other name of the demon Vṛṣaśipra noticed above.

SANSKRIT ĀMNĀYA

H. K. MIRZA

Bombay University

The Sanskrit word *āmnāya*-is used to translate Pahlavi *patvand* in *Mēnōk ī Xrat* (*MX.*) 26.7 (ed. T. D. Anklesaria), and in *Shkand Gumānīk Vichār* (*SGV.*) 10.69 (ed. Hoshang Jamasp). The Pahlavi word *patvand*, Pazand *paēvand* generally means 'connection, lineage, succession'. Professor Sir Harold Bailey (*Zoroastrian Problems in the Ninth-Century Books,* by H. W. Bailey, Oxford 1943, p. 149) translates Pahlavi *patvand* : 'tradition', and Sanskrit translation *āmnāya* : 'tradition preserved by memory'. Although the Pahlavi and the Sanskrit words are used in this sense, as noted by Bailey, it appears that this meaning is not suitable in the context which in either case demands. a different meaning of the word.

MX. 26 is an inquiry about happiness allotted to men from the first man Gayomart downwards, and to the kings and rulers from Hoshang of the Pishdadian dynasty up to King Vishtasp of the Kayanian dynasty, many of them being thankful to God therefor, and an inquiry about some others being ungrateful and sinful. In reply it is stated (*MX.* 26.6-7) :

"During the different periods, as it is destined for every person, whatever ought to happen, happens ; since it is evident even from the successors (*hampatvand*) of those ancients, who have passed away, that in the end this happens : which ought to come from them to the creatures of Ohrmazd has come."

Then the text describes 'the benefit, advantage, usefulness' (Pahlavi *sūt*, Sanskrit tranalation *lābha-*) that came from Gayomart and his descendants and successors, Hōshang, Taxmurup, Yimshēt, Azh-ì-Dahāk, Frāsyāk, Frētōn, Manushchihr, Kaykavāt, Sām, Kayōs, Syāvash, Kaykhusro, Kay Lohrasp, and Kay Vishtāsp (*MX.* 26.8-28).

These names evidently represent Pahlavi *hampatvand*, Sanskrit translation *samasta āmnāya* occurring in *MX.* 26.7 ; and the Pahlavi word and its Sanskrit translation evidently refer to the descendants and successors of Gayomart. Hence both the words must mean the same, namely 'descendant, successor'.

The same Pahlavi word in its Pazand form *paēvand* with Sanskrit translation *āmnāya-* occurs in *SGV.* 10.69, and here also it is used in the same sense of 'descendant, successor'. *SGV.* 10.67-70 :

"And Kay *Spandyāt (written *spudākht*) and *Zarēr (Written *zargar*) and other countrymen accepted also many battles, commotions, and bloodsheds for the sake of this Religion. They travelled up to Rum and India (and) other countries for propagation of the Religion. Forth from them in succession (Pazand *paēvand*) it (i. e. the Religion) came to the (Sasanian) kings, rulers of the royal family, exalted ones, even up to (the confirmation by) the ordeal by pouring molten metal on the breast, which (ordeal) Saintly Adarbad son of Maraspand (underwent) during the sovereignty of His Majesty Emperor Shahpur (son) of Hormazd, in controvresy with many kinds (and) various kinds of heretics".

In this passage also Pazand *paēvand* and its Sanskrit translation *āmnāya* should mean 'descendant, lineage,

family, succession', rather than 'tradition, oral tradition'.

It is significant that elsewhere Pahlavi *patvand* is translated into Sanskrit by *vaṃśa* वंश (*MX*. 20.15,16; 34.3; 38.34). Further, in Yasna 65.7 Avesta *nāfō* 'family, lineage' is translated into Pahlavi by *nāf*, and explained in a gloss : *patvand*.

It is interesting to note further that in the ancient Sanskrit lexicons Sanskrit *āmnāya* occurs with this meaning ; *kula* 'family', *kulakrama* 'series of families'. See *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch* by Böthlingk und Roth, Vol. I, St. Petersburg 1852-1855, columns 672-673 :

"āmnāya 'die heilige Ueberlieferung, ein heiliger Text...Die Lexicographen : कुल Geschlect, कुलक्रम Aufeinanderfolge der Geschlechter (oder Ueberlieferung aus einem Geschlecht ins andere".

Similarly, Apte, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 223; and Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 147 :

·'āmnāya 'sacred tradition, sacred texts handed down by repetition; that which is remembered or studied or learnt by heart - - - a family, series of families L."

["L. : lexicographers (i. e. a word or meaning which although given in native lexicons, has not yet been met with in any published text.)"]

ŚRĪ HASTĀMALAKACĀRYA

SATYA DEVA MISHRA,
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur.

SHRI HASATĀMALAKA was one among those four devoted disciples of Sri Śaṅkarācārya, who have been considered as the Master Architects of Advaita Philosophy, and revered as the great souls for past eleven centuries. It is recorded in the *Saṁnyāsotpatti*, that Pṛthvīdharācārya was his another name and he was the first Ācārya of the fourth Maṭha i. e. Śringeri in the south.[1] *Hastāmalaka-stotra* is the only work ascribed to him. This is a small metrical work consisting of only 12 verses. The verses are so pregnant with metaphysical meaning and spiritual experience that, according to one tradition, Śrī Śaṅkara himself wrote a commentary on them.[2] Besides Śaṅkara's commentary, there are also two other commentaries on this *stotra*, one by Ānandaprakāśabhaṭṭāraka,[3] and the other by Svayamprakāśa Muni.[4] Ānandaprakāśa has also referred to some other unidentified commentator on the *Hastāmalakastotra* in his Hastāmalaka-ṭīkā-[5] Even a

1. *Sannyāsotpatti*, pp. 2 and 4 (The manuscript in my possession is one among 500 Sankrit manuscripts preserved in my family)

2. Cf. pp. 163 ff. Vol. XVI of the Works of Śri Śaṅkarācārya, Śrī Viṇī Vilās Edition.

3. *Hastāmalaka-ṭīkā*. Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, Manuscript No. R. 5187.)

4. *Hastāmalaka-śloka-vyākhyā* (Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, Ms. No. R 3324 (f))

5. Cf. pp. 4 and 10 of the *Hastāmalakaṭīkā*.

cursory glance at the *Hastāmalakastotra* and the commentaries thereon would show that it represents not only the quintessence of Hastāmalaka's immediate experience, but also set forth some of the fundamentals of Advaitic thought. The verses constituting the *Hastāmalakastotra* are also famous as *Hastāmalaka*, because they express as clearly the *Paramātma-tattva* (Absolute Principle) as if an *āmalaka* (myrobalan) on the palm of the hand.[6] Before we analyse these verses in the order given in the *Hastāmalakaṭīkā* of Ānandaprakāśa Bhaṭṭāraka, it is necessary to give in brief the few events associated with the life of Hastāmalaka as referred to in the *Śaṅkarvijayas* of Vyāsācala[7] and Ānandagiri,[8] *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* of Mādhavācārya[9] and the introduction of Ānandaprakāsa's gloss on the *Hastāmalakastotra*.[10]

Once the eminent sage, Śrī Śaṅkara, accompanied by his disciples reached Srī Bali, a village near Gokarṇa and inhabited by three thousand Brāhmaṇas. An affluent *Brāhamaṇa*, namely Prabhākara, together with his sick son, who was thirteen years old, approached Śaṅkara in the hope of getting him cured. The father bowed down at the feet of Śrī Śaṅkara and made his

6. *Prakāśayante paramātmatattvam karasthadhātrīphalavad yadekam. ślokāstu hastāmalakāḥ prasiddhāstatkarturākhyāpi tathaiva vṛthā. (Vyāsācala: Śāṅkaravijaya :* 12.24. (Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras Edition, p. 195).

7. Ibid. pp. 191 ff).

8. *Śaṅkaravijaya of* Ānandagiri, pp. 250 and 267.

9. *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* of Mādhavācārya, 12, 47-53.

10. Cf. *Hastāmalaka-ṭīkā,* p. 2. Lakṣmīnṛsiṁha has also mentioned Hastāmalaka in his *Viśvadeśika-kāvya :* cf S. Nārāyaṇsvāmī Śāstrī's Introductory page iv on Nṛsimhāśrama's *Vedānta-tattva-viveka,* Mysore Edn., 1955 A. D.

son to do the same. The latter like 'the fire hidden in the ashes' did not get up and remained prostrated before the lotus-feet of Śaṅkara. When the sage lifted up the boy, the father asked, "O Lord ! Let me know what is the cause of his inactivity (*jaḍavattā*). Thirteen years had so far passed without his *avabodha* (knowledge). He did not learn the Vedas. Somehow the investiture with the sacred thread had been performed. The playmates would abuse him but he would not come forward for playing. Even the physical harm inflicted on him would not evoke any kind of anger.[11] Sometimes he would take his meals, while at other times he would not do so. He acted always according to his own will, and did not abide by others' instructions. And thus he was growing up with his own *karman*."

Having thus listened to the words of that *Brāhmaṇa*, the supreme teacher, Śaṅkara, asked the boy "Who are you ? How do you behave as the possessed one ?" In reply to these questions, that great soul (*mahātmā*), dwelling in the body of that boy spoke twelve verses, which, as we have stated above, are known as the *Hastāmalaka* or *Hastāmalaka-stotra*. These verses deal with the nature of the *Ātman* and maintain the identity of the individual self with the supreme soul. 'I am that Self, which is eternally conscious (*Sa nityopalabdha-svarūpohamātmā*), is the refrain of the first eleven verses. The author pours forth his immediate experience of the Self in these verses, and explains in terms of similies and metaphors how the world of duality derives its existence and vitality from the non-dual Self.

11. *Krīdāparaḥ krośati bālavargaḥ tathāpi na krīditumeṣa dhāvati. bālam haṭhān mugdhamimam nirīkṣya, santāḍayanto' pi na roṣameti* (Vyāsācala : *Śaṅkaravijaya*, 12.19).

It is said in the first verse itself that the *Ātman*, which is devoid of all conditions (*nirastākhilopādhi*) like ether, is the source of the activities of the mind and sense-organs, just as the sun is the real cause of the activities of all human beings.[12] By the analogy of the sun, the author seeks to explain that as the sun is the casual factor of the activities of human beings merely through the presence of its proximity, the non-dual Self is also so in the case of the activities of the mind and sense-organs, simply because of its existent proximity.[13]

The second verse[14] points out that the mind, sense-organs and worldly objects are inert and hence they owe their respective functions to and depend on that one and immoveable Self, which is of the nature of the eternal consciousness. The Self is essentially different from the mind and sense-organs, and source of the latters' existence and manifestation. It is therefore said in the next verse[15] that Self is the mind of the mind and the eye of the eye. The existence of the mind, sense-organs and wordly objects cannot be different from the Self, in as much as they are superimposed on the latter. It is

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12. *nimittam manaścakṣurādipravṛttau nirastākhilopādhirākāśakalpaḥ. ravirlokaceṣṭānimittam yathā yaḥ sa nityopalabdhiśsvarūpo hamātmā.* (Hastāmalaka, v. 1.)

13. *yathā khalu savitā svasannidhisattāmātreṇa sakala-prāṇipravṛtti-hetuḥ tadādayamapi svasnnidhi sattāmātreṇa sakalamanścakṣurādi-pravṛt-tihetuḥ (Hastāmalaka-tīkā* on v. 1. p. 5.)

14. *(Hastāmalaka,* v. 2.)

15. *manascakṣurāderviyuktaḥ svayam yo manascakṣurā-dermanascak-ṣurādiḥ.* (ibid, v. 3).

an established fact that the superimposed objects have no separate existence and manifestation apart from the substratum. The self is transcendent and therefore it cannot be known through the empirical mind or any other means of empirical knowledge.[16]

The *jīva* or individual soul is the appearance of the Self in the mind, and it is not different from the Self, as the appearance of the face seen in the mirror is not different from the face on the neck. The Self permeating in the different minds is the one and the same and there is thus an underlying identity among all individuals.[17] The appearing distinction of the prototype (*biṁba*) and the reflection (*pratibiṁba*) between the *jiva* and the *Ātman* remains only till the existence of the mind. The soul attains its non-dual and ever conscious nature immediately after the fire of knowledge burns the mind, just as the real oneness of the face is restored on the removal of mirror.[18]

It has been said above that there is only one Self among all bodies. But it may be objected that when there is an empirically known difference among the individuals in the form of 'I' and 'You', how can be oneness of the Self? In reply to this objection, our author says that the Self which is self-established consciousness (*svataḥ-siddha-cetāḥ*) and luminous (*prakāśa-Svarūpa*) is, in fact, one, but appears to be many due to different minds, just like one and the same sun seems to have splintered

16. *manaścakṣurāderagmyasvarūpaḥ*.....(ibid) cf. *yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha* (Tai. u. 2. u. 1.)

17. *mukhābhāsako darpaṇe dṛśyamāno mukhatvātpṛthaktvena naivāsti vastu. cidābhāsako dhīṣu jīvo'pi tadvat*.....(*Hastāmalaka*, v. 4.)

18. *yathā darpaṇābhāva ābhāsahānau mukham vidyate kalpanāhīnamekam. tathā dhīviyoge nirābhāsako yaḥ.* (ibid v. 5.)

up into multiple forms because of the different platers full of water.[19]

When it is observed that the one very Self is among all bodies, why the Scriptures declare the Self to be the enjoyer of the fruits of this and other worlds ? This is illustrated again on the analogy of the sun. As the sun seems to be following both the moving and unmoving conditions of water, so also appears the non-duel Self to be the follower of the modifications of various minds.[20] It is the mind that undergoes changes, but because of the false identification of the Self with the mind, the modifications of the letter are wrongly ascribed to the former.[21]

Just as a single sun, which is the light of all eyes, illumines all objects without any sequence, so does the non-dual *Ātman* simultaneously illuminate the multitude of minds, and enables them to cognise the world of duality.[22] The self is not only the mind of the mind etc. but also the main stream of all lights. The sun illumines the sense-organs and makes them fit to perceive the objects, but this sun, too, cannot do so unless it is illumined by the *Ātman*.[23] In other words,

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19. *ya eko vibhāti svatassiddhacetāḥ prakāśasvarūpo'pi nānaiva dhīṣu. Sarāvodakastho yathā bhānurekaḥ saḥ*.....ibid v. 6.) cf. '*eko devaḥ sarvabhūteṣu guḍhaḥ*' (*Śvetāśvatara Up.* 6. 11) '*kṣetrajñam cāpi mām viddhi sarvakṣetreṣu bhārata*! (*Gītā* B. 2.) and (*avibhaktam ca bhūteṣu vibhaktamiva sthitam.*' (ibid 13. 15.)

20. *yathā sūrya eko'pyanekaścalāsu sthirāsvapyananvagvi-bhāvyasvarūpaḥ. Calāsu prabhinnāsu dhīṣveka evam* (*Hastāmalaka*, v. 7.)

21. '*dhyāyatīva lelāyatīva*' (*Br. Up.* U. 3. 7.).

22. *yathānekacakṣuprakāśo ravirn krameṇa prakāsī karoti prakāśyam. anekā dhiyo yastathaikaprabodhaḥ* (*Hastāmalaka* v. 8.)

23. *vivasvatprabhātam yathā rupamakṣam pragṛhṇāti nābhātmekam vivasvān. yathābhātamābhāsayatyakṣamekam* (ibid V. 9.).

the sun also owes its capacity of rendering wordly things manifest to the Self, which according to the Scriptures, is the light of all lights.[24] The *Gītā* also proclaims that the Self alone is the light of the sun, moon and fire.[25]

The nature of the relation between the Self and the objects is explained in the tenth verse. Though the Self with its existence and consciousness is present among all objects, the objects are not related to it, just as the other pervades worldly things without any relation.[26] That the Self is ever pure and unrelated to the mass of universal objects is also declared by the Scriptures.[27]

Why does the Self feel pleasure and pain, undergo bondage and transmigrate from the one to another body, if it is unconditioned and unrelated ? In answer to this question, Hastamalaka introduces the *ajñāna* (nescience) and says, as the ignorant one thinks of the sun without light when it is covered with the cluster of clouds, so also appears the Self in bondage to those, whose vision is overpowered by ignorance.[28] In other words, the *Ātman* is always free from bondage, but because of the *āvidyā* or ignorance, which has veiled its true nature,

24. *(tameva bhāntamanubhāti sarvam' (Kaṭha. Up.* 5.15) *(tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhāti (ibid) (tadeva jyotiṣām jyotiḥ' (Muṇḍaka Up.* 2. 2. 10.) *and 'yena sūryastapati tejaseddhaḥ'*

25. *yadādityagatam tejo jagadbhāsayete 'khilam. yaccandramasi yaccāgnau tattejo viddhi māmakam (Gītā* 15. 12*)* and *'jyotiṣāmapi tajjyotiḥ tamasaḥ paramucyate'.*

26. *samasteṣu vastuṣvanusyutamekam samastāni vastūni yanna spṛsanti. viyadvat sudā śuddhamacchasvarūpaḥ' (Hastāmalaka* V. 10).

27. *'asaṅgo na hi sajyet' (Bṛ. Up.* 3. 9. 2*)* and *asaṅgo hyayam puruṣaḥ'* ibid 4. 3. 15.)

28. *ghanacchannadṛṣṭirghanacchannamarkam yathā niṣprabham manyate cātimūḍhaḥ. tathā baddhavadbhāti yo mūḍhadṛṣteḥ (Hastāmalaka,* V. 11.).

and projected out and superimposed on it the characteristics of the mind i.e. *kartṛtva* (doership), *bhoktṛtva* (enjoyership) and *pramātṛtva* (knowership), it seems to be in bondage.[29]

The concluding verse reasserts the non-dual character of the *Ātman* and makes it clear that the plurality and inconstancy can be only figuratively applicable to the *Ātman,* because these, in fact, are the attributes of the limiting adjuncts and media of appearance.[30]

It is quite evident from these verses that their author was not an ordinary human being, but a sage who had realised the true nature of the Self because of the *sravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* practised in the previous births. He was a *jīvanmukta* like Vāmadeva, and inhabiting the body of the boy in order to exhaust the stored impressions of the past actions (*prārabdhakarmas*).[31] He had crossed the ocean of births and deaths, and was here to help others attain their immortal status. The wordly objects were unable to please or displease him, because he was aware of their illusory character.

Ānadaprakāśa Bhaṭṭāraka has raised some important questions in his commentary on the above verses. A brief reference to a few of them would show how these verses solve some of the complicated problems pertaining to the Advaita doctrines.

In the second verse it has been maintained that the mind and sense-organ depend for their activities on the

29. *moghāś'a moghakarmāṇo moghajñānavicetasaḥ. rākṣasīmāsurīm caiva prakṛtim mohinīm śritāḥ (Gitā,* 9. 12.)

30. *upādhau yathā bhedatāsanmaṇīnām tathā bhedatā buddhibhedeṣu te'pi. yathā candrikāṇām jale cacñcalatvam tathā' pīha viṣṇo (Hastāmalaka,* V. 12.)

31. *C.f* Ānandaprakāsa Bhaṭṭāraka : *Hastāmalakatīka,* p. 3.

Self. But the question is ; whether the self has any association with them or not? If the first alternative is accepted, there would be a contingence of *sansaragatva* (relatedness) and *sāvayavatva* (particleness) in the *Ātman.* And in admitting the second alternative of non-association, the Self cannot be held as the inspirer of objects. Thus the statement of the above verse is disputed in both of its alternatives. Ānandaprakāśa commenting on the third verse refutes these objections. He says : As the self, in fact, is unrelated to the said objects the defects, mentioned in the *samyogapakṣa* (the alternative of association) dash to the ground. Turning to the second alternative, he points out that the question of association arises only between the two different things. The minds and other objects are superimposed on the self, just as the snake on the rope, and as the snake has no status apart from the rope, the mind etc. also have no different existence apart from the self. The relation between the self and the objects is thus of identity and how can one assume any kind of relation within a thing itself ? The worldly things depend for their existence and functions on the appearance of the Self. In other words, the Self relates itself and imparts existence and energy to the manifold objects of this universe through its appearance pervading always the latter and hence the defects of non-association do also not arise.[32]

The Self, objects some opponent, can be either different or non-different from the mind and sense-organs.

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32. *manaścakṣurātmanyadhyastattvena tadvyattrekeṇa sattāpratiyorabhāvādadhyastatādātmyasambandhasya bhāvāccidābhāsavyāptimantareṇa manascakṣurādipravṛttyanupapattestatpravartakatvamupapadyate.* (ibid on V. 3, p. 8.)

If it is held different from them, it would become delimited (*paricchinna*), and if it is accepted identical with them, there would be no difference between the Self and the mind etc. Thus the absoluteness (*paramātmatva*) of the *Ātman* is impossible in both cases. This objection, says Ānandāprakāśa, can also be answered with the first two lines of the third verse which are as follows : *manaścakṣurāderviyuktaḥ svayam yo manaścakṣurādermanaḥ cakṣurādiḥ*. Here, Ānandaprakāśa interprets the word *viyukta* as *vyatirikta* (different) and maintains that as the Self is different from the mind etc, the defect pointed out in the case of identity would not arise. The defect of delimitation would also not occur, because the Self is the mind and so on. It means that though the Self is different from them, they are not different from the Self, because they are the display of the ignorance of the Self (*ātmajñānaparikalpita*) and so essentially the Self itself, as the nacre-silver is the silver in essence.[33] The great sage, Vyāsa also says that there is nothing different from the Self, but the latter is different from all.[34]

Commenting on the second verse, Ānandaprakāsa Bhaṭṭāraka has criticised, the views of the Cārvakas, Bauddhas, Mīmāmsakas and Vaiśeṣikas about the nature of the *bodha*(knowlege).[35] The Sāṁkhya view of the plurality of the Self has been refuted in the commentary on the 6th verse.[36] That the consciousness is the very nature of the Self is discussed in detail in the gloss

33. ibid, p. 9.

34. '*Vyatiriktam na yasyāsti vyatirkto' khilasya yaḥ*' (quoted by Ānandaprakāsa in his commentary on V. 3).

35. Cf. pp. 5 ff.

36. Cf. pp. 12-13.

on the second verse.[37] All these require a detailed and independent study which naturally falls beyond the scope of this paper.

While concluding, we may lay stress on this point, that whatever may be the fate of the historical datas describing the life and activities of Hastāmalaka, his work, the *Hastāmalaka-stotra*, itself gives an ample proof that he was a *jīvanmukta* and had come over this earth to lead us to the shore of Immortality, and abode of Eternal Bliss.

37. Cf. pp. 6-7.

THE OCHRE COLOURED POTTERY, THE COPPER HOARDS AND THE HARAPPANS.

V. D. MISRA

Allahabad University

The ochre coloured pottery has been collected from a good number of sites not only in western Uttar Pradesh but in Haryana, the Panjabi Suba and Rajasthan also. The mysterious Copper-Hoards have provisionally been associated with it. In the following pages an attempt has been made to analyse their position vis-a-vis the Harappan culture in the light of the recent archaeological findings.

I

The ochre coloured pottery, the O. C. P. of the popular usage, with its variants—ochre washed ware or ochre coloured ware—was first recognised by Sri B. B. Lal, the present Director General, Archaeological Survey of India, while excavating at Bisauli and Rajpur-Parsu in Badaun and Bijnor districts respectively as early as 1951 (Lal, 1951). Subsequently, the sherds of this ware were obtained from the lowest-cultural deposit at Hastinapur (Lal, 1954-55). In 1952, Dr. Y. D. Sharma collected this sort of pottery from Bahadarabad near Hardwar (Sharma, 1961). Recent excavations have brought to light this pottery from Atranji Khera in Etah (Ghosh, 1960-61 to 1963-64 and 1965-66 as well), Baragaon (Ghosh, 1963-64) and Ambakheri (Ghosh, 1963-64) in Saharanpur district and Ahichhatra in Bareilly district of Uttar

Pradesh (Ghosh, 1963-64 and 1964-65), Noh in Bharatpur district of Rajasthan (Ghosh, 1963-64, 1964-65) and Katpalaon in Jullundur of the Panjabi Suba (Dikshit, 1968a). A good number of sites pertaining to the O.C.P. have been located so far in the Upper Ganga Valley (in the districts of Meerut, Bulandashahar, Saharanpur and Muzaffarnagar) in Uttar Pradesh, Ambala district in Haryana, Jullundur in the Panjabi Suba and Bharatpur in Rajasthan. The area marked by the presence of the ochre coloured pottery would measure about 300 kms north-south from Bahadarabad to Noh and 450 kms. west-east from Kalpalaon to Ahichhatra (Krishnadeva-1968).

The ochre coloured pottery is generally supposed to have been inadequately fired and has a tendency of easily getting rubbed off. The pots were washed in ochre colour and hence the name 'The Ochre Coloured Pottery'. About the nature of ware, archaeologists are not unanimous. Dr. Sankalia thinks that the O. C. P. is not a ceramic industry but a condition—possibly due to water-logging in the areas under consideration, the pot-sherds have tended to become fragile and get easily rubbed off (Sankalia-1964). Dr. B. B. Lal (Lal-1968), the Archaeological Chemist of the Archaeological Survey of India, on the other hand, after a careful examination of the O. C. P. sherds from a number of sites contends that (I) the ware is not ill-fired, and its red colour indicates that the firing was done at a sufficiently high temperature in an oxidising atmosphere.

(II) To him the hypothesis of water logging is not clear. He fails to understand why at Baragaon, the effect of water-logging is exhibited only by the O. C. P. and not by the associated wares.

(III) Dr. Lal thinks that the weathering effect on the O. C. P. might have been due to the fact that the O. C. P. remained exposed to atmosphere for a considerable length of time.

Two views outlined above postulate two divergent climatic conditions for the Upper Ganga Valley in the time or after the O. C. P. culture. While the thesis of waterlogging would indicate considerable rainfall, the other would suggest an arid condition. As both the views can not be held correct for one and the same period, it is imperative that more and more material is examined for obtaining a correct picture.

As regard the shapes in the O. C. P., it may be said at the outset that previously on account of paucity of data, no typological study of the pottery could be done. But now the excavations at Bahadarabad, Baragaon, Ambakheri and Atranjikhera have brought a good number of shapes before the archaeologists. The fabric of the pottery though quite alike in general look, is not uniform at all the places and a closer scrutiny attests the existence of both thick and thin varieties. At Atranjikhera the noteworthy types in the thick fabric consist of large troughs, bowl-like lid with central knob, dish-on-stand, vase with flanged rim and oval body, ring-stand, basin with under-cut rim and vase with cord-design, mat-impressions and horizontally raised bands on the exterior. With the thin fabric are associated the long-necked flask, lid with central knob, bowl with slightly outturned rim and bulbous body, miniature cup and vase (Gaur-1964). At Baragaon, the O. C. P. shapes consist of dish on-stand, basins with beaded, beaked, everted or under-cut rim, storage jars with thick clubbed rim,

medium-sized vases with globular body and ring or disc base and bowl-shaped lids with central knob (Krishna-deva-1968). These types are also met with at Ambakheri.

Though previously, in the assemblage of the O.C.P. neither painted or incised sherds were found, the picture has changed and is changing fast in recent years. A few painted sherds from Atranjikhera and Lal-quila bearing painting in black pigment generally over a fine red-slipped surface are available. Gaur (Gaur-1968) reports the following painted designs from Atranjikhera ;

(1) Wide paintings over the shoulder of the vases below the rim.

(2) A thick band either on the lower part of the neck or on the body of vase or vessels.

(3) Parallel bands either on the neck or the body of a pot.

(4) Parallel bands and incised ribs alternately decorated, and

(5) Painting in criss-cross or checkered pattern on the body.

The incised sherds in the O. C. P. assemblage are reported from Atranjikhera, Lal-quila and Manpur in western Uttar Pradesh and Katpalaon in the Panjabi-Suba. From the first mentioned site Gaur (Gaur, 1968) enumerates the following incised designs :

I. Finger-Nail incision on the ribs or cords.

II. Incised ribs or cords with notches.

III. Simple ribs with notches or parallel lines, wavy or straight,

IV. Notches on one side of the rib.

V. Leaf or 'V' shaped pattern.

VI. Simple notches in a row or scattered.

VII. Simple or double grooves with notches.

VIII. Oblique parallel grooves with notches.

IX. Horizontal parallel multiple grooves with or without notches.

X. Grooved wavy lines on the neck.

XI. A row of oblique strokes on the neck.

XII. Zig-zag parallel dashes or straight lines.

XIII. Checked or compartmental patterns.

XIV. Parallel or oblique angular lines.

and

XV. Parallel ribs with incised mark.

From Ambakheri-2 and Bahadarabad only cord-impressed designs have been found.

About the associated finds, it may be mentioned that the data at our disposal are very meagre. From the majority of sites, only pot-sherds have been found. In this context, the site of Ambakheri represents an exception. The terra-cotta figurines of humped-bull, toy-cart and terracotta cakes have been obtained from this site. Recently a few Copper-grains struck to a sherd, probably a piece of crucible and a very small copper-piece have been found from the O. C. P. level at Atranjikhera, demonstrating thereby the copper-association of the Industry (Gaur, 1968).

II

The discovery of copper implements from the upper and central Ganga valley on the one hand and Haryana, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and west-Bengal on

the other, have been reported from time to time. As many of such objects were obtained in hoards, the name 'Copper-Hoards' has been given to them. The tools recovered so far consist of flat, shouldered and bar-celts, hatchet or Parsu, double edged axe, ring, anthropomorphic figure, harpoon, antennae sword, hooked spear-head and a new type of sword with grip recently obtained from Baharia in Shahajahanpur district. Of these, the flat celts and rings being very general types, are not of much technological value. The anthropomorphs, harpoons and antennae swords are confined to the Ganga valley alone. The types like bar and shouldered celts and double-edged axes are found from Plateau zone south of 24·N. latitude. The flat celts are common to both the groups. Heine Geldern is inclined to include the famous Trunion celt of Shalozan, the Fort Munro, sword, shaft hole axes from Chanhu-daro and Shahi-Tump and finally the axe-adze from Mohenjo-daro in assemblage of Copper Hoards (Geldern, 1936). B.B. Lal (Lal, 1951) has successfully controverted this contention of Heine Geldern mainly on three grounds : (I) the Copper-Hoards are Fashioned on Copper, while the aforesaid four objects are manufactured out of Bronze; (II) these types are not found in the Ganga valley; and, conversely, (III) the specialised weapons of the Copper Hoards are confined to the Ganga valley The force of Lal's arguments would exclude the types mentioned by Geldern from our perview of the Copper-Hoards.

Strangely enough, all the Copper-Hoards are chance-discoveries. As such, their stratigraphical horizon has been a disputed point in Indian Archaeology. In this connection, however, we have to keep in mind the

following points :

(I) Of the sites yielding the Copper-Hoards, Rajpur-Parsu, (Lal, 1951), Bisauli (Lal, 1951), Bahadarabad (Sharma, 1961), Nasirpur (Ghosh, 1965-66) and Baharia have also yielded the ochre coloured pottery.

(II) The above-mentioned sites are the single culture-sites with shallow deposits and yielding the O.C.P. sherds exclusively.

These two points considered together provide a strong circumstantial evidence for bracketing the O.C.P. and the Copper-Hoards as the work of one and the same people.

III

The authorship of the Copper-Hoards and along with them that of the O.C.P. is still in a melting pot. Heine Geldern (Geldern, 1936) and following him Stuart Piggott (Piggott, 1944) associated these with the Aryan immigration in India. Piggott subsequently changed his position (Piggott, 1950) and saw in these Hoards the hand of the refugees and the displaced persons of the Harappan empire. Dr. Y. D. Sharma (Sharma, 1961) is also inclined to associate the Copper-Hoards with the Harappans. B. B. Lal (Lal, 1951) on the other hand has associated these mysterious weapons and the O.C.P. with the indigenous people—the Muṇḍās, the Śabaras and the Niṣādas—who had inhabited the Ganga valley before the advent of the Aryans on the scene. S. P. Gupta (Gupta, 1963) has supported the indigenous origin theory of Lal. Dr. D. P. Agrawal (Agrawal, 1971) is also inclined to support the same

thesis but he does not rule out the possibility that the inspiration might have come from south-east Asia.

Heine Geldern claims to have found parallels of a few artefacts i. e. trunion axe, Axe-Adze, and Fort Munroe Sword distributed over a wide area—British Isles, Sardinia, Greece and Transcaucasia. According to him these reached India about 1200-1000 B. C. He traced back the antennae sword to the Koban culture and the harpoons to Transcancasia, Talish and Luristan. Since as pointed out earlier, the major artefacts compared by Geldern do not fall under the 'Copper-Hoards', the validity of his conclusion is considerably weakened. Lal has pointed out two fundamental differences in the antennae swords of the 'Copper-Hoards' and their counterparts in the Koban culture. The hilt and blade of the former are the result of the single cast. In the latter the two parts are made separately but joined together. Besides, the Koban specimen is fashioned on bronze, while its Indian parallel on copper. For harpoons the grounds adduced by Geldern are too flimsy to need comment. Even if the parallels cited by Geldern are proved to be the works of the Aryans, it would not establish the Aryan authorship of the 'Copper-Hoards'.

Lal (Lal. 1951) and following him S. P. Gupta (Gupta, 1963) have tried to establish the indigenous origin of the Copper-Hoards. Lal draws our attention to the fact that the typical implements of the Copper-Hoards assemblage—the anthropomorphs, antennal sword and the harpoon—are not found outside the Ganga valley. Bar-celts and Harpoons could have been developed out of their stone proto-types. No Harappan object has been found in association with the Copper-Hoards. The hilly tracts of southern Uttar Pradesh, north-eastern Madhya

Pradesh, southern Bihar, western portion of west Bengal and northern Orissa are at present occupied by the Mundas, the Santhals and other tribes belonging to the proto-Austroloid group. Lal points out that it is not unlikely that the ancestors of these people might have been the Śabaras and the Niṣādas of the Vedic literature whom the Aryans encountered in the Ganga valley. As these aborigines were the earliest settlers and the Copper-Hoards are the earliest archaeological relics of the region, both might have been inter-related. Dr. D. P. agrawal (Agrawal, 1971), on the authorities of Dani and Worman, points out that in neolithic times the eastern India and south-east Asia were culturally related. In the light of the recent researches, the beginnings of the Copper-technology can be traced back to 2300 B. C. in Thailand. As such, he does not rule out the possibility of a south-east Asian inspiration for the Copper-Hoards.

Before commenting on the hypotheses of Lal and Agrawal, one has to viewt he problem in its entirety. The Copper-Hoards culture complex has two aspects—the pottery and copper-implements. If we solve the riddle of one, more than half of the battle is over. Let us first engage ourselves with the pottery. Any discussion pertaining to a ceramic industry has to take four points into consideration—the extent, fabric, typology and decorative motifs, i. e. paintings and incisions, etc. Of these, the fabric depends on local factor—the soil of the area in question—and as such it is not of much importance. The extent of the O. C. P. sites indicates their concentration in western Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana and Panjabi Suba. Alamgirpur in Meerut marks the Eastern limit of the Harappan culture. Viewed against this

background, marginal territonial overlap is discernible between the Harappan and that of the O. C. P. cultures. Hence a Harappan parentage or inspiration for the O. C. P. can not be held as absurdity. But candidly speaking mere proximity is not enough. We have to scrutinize the other factors also.

Typological consideration of the O. C. P. has already been done in the present paper. Strangely enough, the excavations conducted so far in the Upper Ganga valley and the adjoining regions have not brought to light the survivals of the O. C. P. shapes in the subsequent cultures, but the same statement is not valid for its precedents also. In this context, it may be pointed out that a comparative typological consideration of the Mature Harappan and the O. C. P. shapes would be disappointing as two are separated both geographically and chronologically. The present archaeological findings, however, indicate a gradual modification in the Harappan pottery types. The picture can be well understood by a typological study of the Harappa, Rupar and Bara materials. Under the circumstances, the O. C. P. shapes, if traceable at all, can be traced in the Late Harappan assemblage of western Uttar Pradesh and the adjoining regions. In this context, the following points deserve due attention :

(I) Alamgirpur shares some typical shapes, i. e. the Indus goblet, the cylindrical beaker with slightly flaring rim, the perforated brazier, the bell-shaped beaker with disc base, the ring-stand and the large carinated dish-on-stand with the Harappan sites (Ghosh, 1958-59).

(II) The O. C. P. is conspicuous by its absence at Alamgirpur.

(III) At Ambakheri in Saharanpur district, though typical Harappan shapes are absent, their derivatives such as the short-stemed dish-on-stand are encountered at. The majority of the Ambakheri pottery types in the O. C. P. can be traced back to the Late Harappan assemblage of Alamgirpur (Krishnadeva-1968).

(IV) Geographical situation of Alamgirpur in Meerut district of western Uttar Pradesh suggests that it would have derived Harappan influence earlier than the sites lying to the east of it.

(V) A majority of Bara types can be seen in the Late Harappan and ochre coloured Pottery complex of the Ganga-Yamuna Doab. The vase with splayed out rim, dish-on-stand with drooping rim, basin, hollow lid with central knob and large storage jars with rusticated surface recovered from the excavations at Ambakheri have parallels at Bara and also at Late Harappan sites in Saharanpur (Dikshit-1968a).

The ochre coloured pottery shares many a type with the Late Harappan ware of Rupar, Bara, Alamgirpur and Baragaon, etc. such as dish-on-stand, lid with central knob and cord impressed designs.

Regarding the painting and incisions, in the O.C.P. it may be admitted that evidence at our disposal is too scanty to encourage a discussion. Presence of painting has lately been recognised in the O. C. P. assemblage and motifs are few and far between. The incised designs like sigmas, chevrons, compartmental designs and wavy lines from Atranjikhera have a remote resemblance with the similar pattern at Bara (Dikshit, 1968a).

In the light of the aforesaid discussion it may be observed that as the Rubar IB represents the continuation of the Rupar-IA, the emergence of the O. C. P. may

suggest the emergence of a still new phase of the Late Harappan pottery. It is not unlikely if the O. C. P. represents the last flicker of the Harappan culture.

Coming to the 'Copper-Hoards' it may be said even at the risk of repetition that the types collected so far include the flat, bar and shouldered celt, hatchet or Parsu, double-edged axe, ring, anthropomorphic figure harpoon, antennae sword, hooked spearhead and the Baharia type of sword.

On technological consideration, it has been found that barring the anthropomorph and the ring, all the specimens are cast. 'The authors of the 'Hoards' were familiar with open mould and closed or double mould techniques and probably did not know alloying or annealing and cold work for hardening the tools'. The presence of a strong medial rib in harpoon, hooked spearhead and antennae sword is a marked feature of the Doab Hoards.

Gupta, on account of the simple nature of the tools and availability of copper-ores in the area, thinks that the tools of the eastern or Plateau zone might be earlier than those of the Doab in point of time. But for the Plateau zone as it would have been, the shouldered and the flat celts would have been excellent cutting tools and the bar-celt a good mining tool (Agrawal-71). As such it is not unlikely that the nature of the Plateau tools would have been decided by ecological factor alone. In the present state of knowledge, it would be extremely a difficult task to point out the chronological priority of any group of the Copper-Hoards.

Till now the following four types of the Copper-Hoards have been claimed to have been found in the Late

Harappan contexts :

(I) A copper-ring of the type familiar from Pondi and Bahadarabad has been found from Baragaon in the Late Harappan context.

(II) A broken anthropomorph has been found in excavation from the upper most deposit of Lothal.

(III) The flat celts of the Copper-Hoards and Harappan-culture are alike.

(IV) A harpoon with broken blade and a ring were found at Mitathal at a depth of 0.30 m. from the surface, presumably in a Late Harappan context (Dikshit, 1968b).

Of these Dr. Agrawal does not accept the suggested identification of (II) while to him the rings and celts are too simple to comment. But still their occurrence in a Late Harappan context is noteworthy.

The absence of mid-ribbed weapons in the toolknit of the Harappan culture has not got unnoticed by Marshall (Marshall-1931), but Mackay in course of his excavations at Mohenjodaro (Mackay, 1937) found six implements—daggers, knives and dishes—from the Upper-levels. At Harappa too (Vats, 1940) two spearheads with mid-rib from strata II and IV with a depth of 0.90 m. and 3.00 m. respectively from the surface were obtained. Do these occurrences suggest the introduction of the mid-rib technique in the late phase of the Harappan culture ? If the answer be affirmative, we may trace back the copper.Hoard specimens with mid-rib to the Harappan inspiration, since the implements cited

from Mohenjo-daro and Harappa are the earliest representatives of this class on Indian soil.

It is concluded that for the specialised weapons of the Doab Copper-Hoards—the anthropomorphs, the hooked spearheads, the antennae sword and the harpoons, the Harappan parentage has not been traced out but simply on this account their emergence from the Late Harappan meleau can not be ruled out. The nature and variety of the tools and weapons of the ancient communities have always to be viewed against ecology. The Harappan culture zone was an arid zone, but so was not the Ganga-valley. The implements of the 'Copper-Hoards' of the Doab were meant for the people living in the densely forested country of the Ganga valley. The refugees and the displaced persons of the Harappa culture had to face a new situation in this area. Urge of survival would have compelled these new settlers to adjust themselves with their new surroundings. The Harappan refugees accepted the challenge of their new set-up and perhaps in imitation to the tool-knit of the aboriginal people, the copper copies were brought forth. Contrary to this if we associate these implements with aborigines of the Ganga valley before the coming of the Aryans, as Lal and Gupta have done, we have to account for the developed tools like harpoons and antennae sword which presuppose the years of exercises in copper—metallurgy with which these aborigines can not be credited in the present state of our knowledge. It is, of course, a difficult task to peep into the past of the Ganga valley at the crucial time when the hordes of the homeless Harappans were knocking at its gate. The archaeological record is very dismal. No relic has so for been obtained from the Upper Ganga valley which can be dated to a period

earlier than the introduction of the Late Harappan or the O. C. P. on the scene. As such, it would be a rather bold endeavour to ascribe the authroship of the antennae sword and harpoons to the aborgines. If on the other hand we introduce the Harappans on the scene, many of our tangles are solved. The Harappans were familiar with cooper-metallurgy and various techniques involved therein, i. e. the open mould and double mould techniques etc. . New weapons were in response to the challenge posed by the new situation. The old tools, not suited to new environment, would have been discarded. If copper used by the Harappans and the 'Copper-Hoard' people differ in composition, it might be due to the reason that the old supply—line would have been disrupted and consequently the Copper-Hoard people would have discovered fresh source for obtaining their raw material.

The hypothetical south-east Asian inspiration theory of Dr. Agrawal (Agrawal-1971) has no chronological draw-back since the discovery of Copper-technology in Thailand as early as 2300 B. C. But mere presence of Copper-implements in two separate areas is not enough to suggest their interrelation. The techniques involved in the manufacture of the tools have also to be studied carefully. Absence of Copper-implements in the intervening areas, i. e. Burma, Assam and Bangladesh has also to be accounted for.

To sum up, the recent archaeological findings of the Upper Ganga valley suggest that the Copper-Hoards and the O. C. P. may be related with the last phase of the Harappan culture. But in the present state of our knowledge this problem is still open for debate and

discussion and it would be premature to pass the final judgment.

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RELEVANCE OF THE INDIAN CONCEPT OF CIVILISATION IN THE MODERN CONTEXT

VIDYA NIWAS MISRA

Sanskrit University, Varanasi

The standard scales by which we measure a civilization differ from culture to culture, because howsoever abstract and ideal they be, they are dependent on the structure of the particular language in which they are expressed, as Baghy aptly remarks, 'Our own ideas and values are embedded in language, and yet our language is the only tool we have with which to describe alien ideas and Values'[1]. Let us take for example the word *civilization* itself. *Civilization* as a Western concept is essentially the culture of cities; in other words it is 'a process of refinement of the individual with perhaps more emphasis on the social graces.'[2] Thus the very concept of civilization is derived from the cities. The counterpart of this concept in Indian languages is *Sabhyatā*, a word derived from *Sabhā*, etymologically meaning, shining together, later meaning an *assembly of men* or even more precisely an assembly of men in harmony. *Sabhā* and *Samiti* are called upon as the twin daughters of the creator.[3] Sabhā is invoked

1. Philip Baghy, *Culture and History*, p. 191.

2. Ibid., p. 74

3. Sabhā ca mā samitiscāvatām prajāpater duhitarau saṃvidane /
Yenā saṅgacchā upa mā sa śikṣāccāru vadāmi pitaraḥ saṅgateṣu //
A. V. VII. 12·1

The twin daughters of the Prajāpati (creator), Sabhā and Samiti (Assembly and Council), full of understanding may protect us so that He may educate us in the art of learning together and we may address the elders in a sweet manner.

to be producer of a congenial atmosphere.[4] As such the basis of the concept of *Sabhyatā* is living together in harmony. Harmony of mind, action and speech is an oft-repeated Vedic *prayer*.

The very layout of a Vedic village (*grāma*) was based on harmony; every thing emanated from the centre in the same way as the *ṛta* (the cosmic order) emanates from *satya* (the Eternal Truth), the centre holds the circle and the circle holds the centre. It is not a one way movement from 'outwards into the unity of a nation and into a single term of fixed, closed border lines'; it is simultaneously an expansion from an intensive nucleus into vague unlimited forms of growth and uncertain periphery'[5] and an inversion into the inner soul of existence. The Indian concept of *Sabhyatā* is not so much refinement, as it is an attempt to reseek the rhythm of existence. The minimal Social unit is *family* and not the individual and the minimal political unit is *grāma*, where a group of family resides as one big family, in other words *grāma* concept is an expansion of the family-concept[6] and as such it underlies perfect internal harmony; this is why this term was borrowed in music to denote *harmony*.

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4. Vidma te sabhe nāma nariṣṭā nāma vā asi /
ye te ke ca sabhāsadaste me santu savacasaḥ //
A. V. VII. 12.2

We know you, Sabhā, you are auspicious by very name. May your members converse with me.

5. B. Heimann, *Facets of Indian Thought*, p. 29.

6. Yathā Kuṭumbinaḥ sarva ekī bhūtā vasanti hi /
sarvalokasya sa grāmo yatrā nityaṃ vyavasthitiḥ //
Verse ascribed to Mataṇga in the Saṅgīta Sudhākara, Commentary of Siṅha bhūpāla on *Saṅgīta Ratnākara* I.4.5.

Urban sophistication is rather an essential trait of a dandy (nāgara) than of a civilized person, who may even be *uncouth* in appearance but endowed with understanding of the inherent harmony in things sentient as well as nonsentient. It is not that urbanity is an alien element in Indian culture; on the contrary urbanity is indigenous to the Soil, history of cities going far back to the Indus Valley Civilization, but urbanity was subjugated to higher values of cultural growth and did not remain as the sole measure of civilization.

These higher values emphasize the simultaneous coexistence of many worlds and deny uniqueness or absolute value of any one of them, every appearance being just a fact of a crystal, none of them alone being able to give a whole picture. This emphasis obviously implies an innate toterance towards other viewpoints and a ready acceptance, not a repulsion of new ideas[7] and a clear conception of interrelatedness of things is gradually developed; this extends to chemistry, astronomy and civil engineering on one side and to art and literature on the other. This is the reason why a Westerner cannot grasp the dynamic rhythm of intertwined congruent or divergent bodies of Man, animal and plant in Indian Sculpture and cannot relish the seemingly repetitious nature—poetry in Sanskrit. He fails to appreciate this rhythm because his notion of aesthetic order is static and unique. Man stands at the top in his universe and the rest existence is subservient to him. Furthermore Man Stands in Time and space, they are real dimensions of Man in the West, his achievements are distanced landmarks in history, they are not one *string* so to say. On the contrary Time by itself is not

7. B. Heimann, op. cit., p. 22.

the driving force behind the creature process (in fact creation itself did not take place within time) and it is just a *modal* appearance of the creature process. According to Abhinavagupta, the main exponent of Indian Aesthetics, Being is 'neither merely an atemporal visualization of itself nor an absolute separation from time and space, but is the realization of itself as a separable on one plane and the potentiality of being involved in Time and space on the other.[8] The Indian view does not reject history, it transcends, it differs from the primitive cyclic notion of Time in as much as it is not confined to a mere process of *periodic* abolition of the creature and of going back to the atemporal instant of the beginning and it differs from the Western presumption with the notion that life and reality are history and history alone in as much as it rejects the notion of a final and irreducible human destiny. In short, whereas in Indian thought human existence is at the same time atemporal or timeless and temporal or placed in Time, in Western thought man is historically situated and Time (or in other words the historical aspect of human existence), is charged with significance for men because human life is lived under the shadow of Time.[9] The relevance of this aspect of Indian thought is particularly in the modern predicament when confronted with the depersonated aspect of technology. Modern man "has received the impression of losing his footing, of finding himself without support, and has known a panic, terror and believed himself to be sinking, making shipwork in the void."[10] If a solution of this

8. V.N. Misra, "Time in Modern Hindi Poetry", *Proceedings of the 26th International Congress of Orientalists.*

9. Ibid.

10. Jose Ortega of Gasset, *History as a system*, pp. 182-3

predicament is to be found, it is not in reassertion of freedom from the physical or the natural approach to the human element[11], as this is likely to lead to further chaos and confusion, for neither the pace of Science cannot be stopped nor human mind can be restrained from searching new horizons and denial of this hard reality will take us nowhere ; this solution is to be found in a system of thought which can adjust itself to both intellectual as well as emotional needs, to growth of science and to furtherance of universal humanism, to infinite Time and to segmented Time and finally on the metaphysical plane to the Macro-cosmos and to the Micro-cosmos. Such a system of thought could only emanate from the Indian material. The Western thinker can find it hard to reconcile that Christ is the son of God and at the same time a historical figure, he is the very personification of the fulfilment of a great historical purpose, and he is the very cessation of history[12] ; but for an Indian thinker it is a very simple matter, the Christ as saviour is an atemporal reality and the christ as an individual is a historical event more relevent to the recorder of facts than to mankind in general. Rāma and Kṛṣṇa are real as living reality, a reality which is ever evolving, a reality which is happening within Man (and not a chosen people) and within universe simultaneously and they are completely unreal as historical events, as historical figures they are mere shadows and are no concern of the people. The corresponding word for history, *itihāsa* means 'so it has been' and not

11. Ibid.

12. For detailed discussion, see "Earliest Chirstianity", *The Idea of History in the Ancient Near East*, pp. 205—214

'so it was', for the 'so it was' aspect is neither relevant nor real, utmost it can be a reconstructed point in a continuum, but the 'so it has been' is relevant and real. This attitude towards history makes the Indian Society a tradition-bound but free Society, free from *inhibitions* of race (race declared as indeterminable and therefore irrelevent in a human context), creed, nationality and subsequently historical obligations. Obligations there are, but they are to the Cosmic Being at one end and to the immediate ancestors at the other, the seekers of Truth and the dynamic aspects of the Cosmic Being intervening between the two.[13] This is the reason why there is a great feeling for home, for the cosy and the warm hearth, for Fire-god the embodiment of concreteness and intimacy[14] on one hand and a great reverence for the nebulous universe, for the immeasurable infinite, for the great substratum of the seed of creation[15]—the cosmic Waters—for the unseen Vāk, the embodiment of abstraction and awe-inspiring distance on the other. Fire and water therefore play an important role in the Indian ritual, home and altar standing as manifestations of the known and the unknown aspects of the great Being[16], lotus and

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13. V. N. Misra, "The Social Aspect of the Bhakti Movement", *Mankind*, Vol.X—2 p. 27

14. Sūnṛtāvantaḥ subhagā irāvanto hasāmudāḥ /
Atṛṣyā akṣudhyasta gṛhā māsmad bibhītana //
A.V. VII 60.6

"O homes endowed with Sweet speech, splendour wisdom and rejoicings, be emancipated from thirst and from hunger and do not apprehend any danger when we return to you, we are what you want in us."

15. mama yonirapsvantaḥ samudre. RV X. 125-7 (My cradle is in the waters of the ocean).

16. F. D. K. Bosct, *The Golden Germ*, p. 59.

swan motif in Indian painting or sculptural design is their presentation of interweaving of seemingly two extremes. There is no incongruity in Indian thought on this account that the Brahman is a single Being with two natures (*dvaibhāvaḥ*) ; as these two natures do not stand in opposition to each other they serve as mutually complements and are in complementary distribution, so to say. It is not Man (*nara*) alone who is dependent on *Nārāyaṇa,* the Universal Being, for his existence, but the universal Being (*Nārāyaṇa*) himself has to descend as Man (*Nara*) in order to fulfill his obligation to Man in his service.[17] Emancipation from bondage of the cycle of life and death is a lesser reward in comparison to the reward sought for by the saint—the pleasure of working with god for the emancipation of human suffering.[18] This two-way movement reconciles all contradictions and apparent divergences.

From the very beginning of Indian civilization, we find this two-way process of interaction at various levels. At the level of language we find that Sanskrit borrows freely from the Dravidian and Munda langauges, and vice versa the Dravidian and the Munda languages enrich their vocabulary with loan words from Sanskrit. Within its own group of languages Sanskrit clearly manifests influences of Prākrits, words like *jyoti*, *vikaṭa*, *nirjhara* are

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17. "Avatareu apane bhagata hita nijatantra nita raghukulamanī "——Tulsidas-Ram Carit Manas I/57

18. Na tvahaṃ kāmaye rājyam na svargam na punarbhavaṃ /
Kāmaye duḥkhataptānāṃ kevalamārtināśanam" //

I do not aspire for earthly kingdom, nor for Heavenly kingdom and nor for cessation of birth. I aspire only for my usefulness in dispelling misery. *Bhāgavata Purāṇa.*

definite evidence of Prakritisms[19] within Sanskrit and the Middle Indian and Modern Indo-Aryan dialects have always freely borrowed from Sanskrit from time to time, whenever a necessity of cultural re-integration arose. At the literary level we find clear evidence (right from the age of Kālidāsa) of interaction of the Shastric and the folk traditions and of equal respectability given to each of them.[20] At the artistic level we find both mārgī (classical) and deśī trends working in music[21] and *nāṭyadharmī* (suggestive) and *lokadharmī* (realistic) conventions given equal importance in the field of performing arts.[22] At the socio-religious level we find an interplay between the Great and the Little traditions, the Little tradition being elevated to the position of Great tradition by giving a Scholastic formulation of its ideas, gods and rituals and not by being absorbed in the Great tradition; and the Great tradition by becoming diffused so as to invoke emotional response from the populace and subsequently

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19. S. M. Katre, *Prakṛt languages and Their contribution to Indian culture*, pp. 66.67

20. Dvīdhā prayuktena ca vāṅmayena Sarasvatī tanmithunaṃ nunāva / Saṃskārapūtena varaṃ vareṇyaṃ vadhūṃ sukhagrāhya nibandhanena // *Kumāra Sambhavam* Canto VII

"The Goddess of speech sang in praise of the couple (Śiva and Pārvatī) in a twofold medium ; she sang the glory of the revered bridegroom in Sanskrit, purified and delicate, bride in Prakrit—a medium easy to grasp."

21. Mārgo deśīti tad dvedhā tathā mārgaḥ sa ucyate /
yo mārgito Viriñcyādyaiḥ prayukto Bharatādibhiḥ //
Devasya purataḥ Śaṁbhorniyatābhyudayapradaḥ /
deśe deśe janānām yadrucyā hṛdayarañjakaṃ //
Saṅgīta Ratnākara I. 1.22—23

22. K. Vatsyayan, *Classical Indian Dance in Literature and the Arts*, p. 9.

by coming at par with the Little tradition.[23] The emphasis on elaboration of the message of the Vedas through the popular Purāṇas and Itihāsa stands in complementation of that on search of a Vedic source for every form of worship, every legend and every socio- religious concept. This particular trait in Indian thought has a special relevance in the modern context, where we find an irreconcilable conflict raging between the urban and the rural, the industrial and the agricultural societies, the mass and the individual cults, the technological knowledge and humanities, every conflict aiming at the complete annihilation of the weaker adversary. The Indian mind would not like to juxtapose these pairs as opposites, it would rearrange them on two different levels and resolve the conflict. In fact early Indian history has been misread as a history of conflict between the invaders and the inhabitants, but what has happened in India is rather a two-way process of 'interchange and acculturation' than a process of complete extinction or absorption and I am in total agreement with the premise of S. C. Malik that "We can eliminate such possiblities as the biological extinction or dispersion of the Harappans into obscurity, or the absorption of the nature society into the conquering Aryan hordes or even that of war of all non-Aryans against all Aryans until extinction."[24] ! The wide gulf between

23. V. N. Misra, Loc. cit. The great tradition properly so called is and was always constantly reshaped by the process of elevation of a mass cult to a prestige cult. Now this recognition by the traditionalistic elite of popular religious movements is not motivated by a desire to stoop to conquer. Thus it did not result in absorption of the identity of the folk movements (as Srinvias assumes). Such movements, on the contrary, have given more than received in terms of change, which they brought in the total structure of values.

24. S. C. Malik, *Indian Civitization—The Formative Period*, pp. 142—143.

India and the West is not due to India's unawareness of the West but due to the West's misreading of India. India does not reject history, it nearely transcends it and builds a superstructure of tradition, a two-way process of acceptance of new ideas and revaluation of the old ones; history is linear and uni-directional. While tradition is curvilinear and multi-directional going back and forth and slowly raising itself a little higher. Hence (to quote Malik again) it is tradition that educates and governs the values, atititudes and behaviour of this basic Individual (*the commoner in India*), and despite the beginnings of incipient industrial urbanization in India, we are far from being termed as a 'transitional' Society ! [25] If India has never been concerned with national feelings, it is her strength and not weakness. The focus of the Indian Social concept as mentioned earlier is either the whole Cosmos or the small well-knit organization of family. The Indian insistence on the 'Universal' rather than on the 'general' and on the very very particular at the sametime can contribute to a better understanding of diverse cultures, and instead of bringing the World under the aegis of one culture as aspired by historians like Toynbee, it can do better by inculcating respect for truth, humility, toleration;[26] by encouraging far more accurate and objective scholarship going beyond national considerations, without being conscions of doing so.

To sum up, the Indian concept of civilization is wide enough to include urbanity and to go much beyond urban refinement in search of inherent harmony.

25. Ibid, p. *174*.

26. Sri Isaiah Berlin's letter quoted in *The Problems of Civilizations*, p. 48.

Indian attitude towards history is that of compassion rather than either of rejection or total surrender and as such is far more useful in bridging the gulf between narrow national and racial outlooks. Indian society has always been undergoing a two-way proces of interplay of the shastric (scholastic) or the Great and the folk or the Little tradtions, so that a balance has always been maintained. Indian mind has long since been freed of fear of external forces or forces created by Man himself, because it has sought highest pleasure in identifying oneself with misery and bondage of others even after attaining highest bliss and emancipation. Indian ethics are built upon this concept of total identification and not on equality, which is a superficial aim compared to it.

These viewpoints are relevant in the modern context when there is a pressing need for one World. The Indian solution would resolve the world-conflict without levelling the differences between various modes and aspirations through a broader understanding and tolerance and a deeper quest for truth yet to be achieved.

'*Ahamanṛtād Satyamupaimi.*' From the direction of falsehood, I come closer to Truth.

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LIMITATION ON KING'S LEGISLATIVE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE KAUṬILĪYA ARTHAŚĀSTRA

SURENDRA NATH MITAL,
Allahabad University

While stating the general provisions for the settlement of disputes, kauṭlya speaks of four kinds of *vivāda pādas*, *-dharma*, *vyavarhāra*, *caritra* and *rājaśāsana*, and says that each latter one supersedes the former (III. 1.39-40). The conclusion that is often drawn from this passage is that, according to kauṭilya the King is authorised to make laws superseding ever *dharma*, *uyavahāra* and *caritra*. But it does not seem to be a correct interpretation of what kauṭilya says. It would be better to consider here exactly what is the actual meaning of Kauṭilya.

In the passage referred to above the meaning of the latter two kinds of *vivādapādas* (which may be translated as types of rules for the settlement of disputes), i.e. *caritra* and *rājaśāsana*, is quite clear, and, there seems to be no difference of opinion about their meaning. There seems no such general agreement about what the first two kinds of rules signify. However, on a proper consideration, the meaning of these two kinds of laws also becomes clear. *Vyavahāra* seems to mean the *vyavahāra* rules viz., rules connected with the eighteen kinds of *vyavahārapādas* (matters of dispute) and dealt with by Kauṭilya in this *adhikaraṇa*. (III) or by the Manusmṛti in the eighth and the major part of the

ninth chapter, or by yājñavalkya in the *Vyavahārakāṇḍa* of his *smṛti* or in the Nāradasmṛti. The rest of the subject-matter of the Dharmaśāstras, which is termed as '*ācāra*' (and *prāyaścitta* may also be included within it) can be understood as rules of '*dharma*'. Kauṭilya has, of course, used the word '*dharmastha*' for the judges who apply the law described in the third *adhikaraṇa*, the *adhikaraṇa* itself having been entitled as the '*dharmasthīya*' The above-mentioned verses occur in the first chapter of this *adhikaraṇa*. Therefore, it is natural to think that the word '*dharma*' probably refers to the laws described in this *adhikarṇa*. 'Dharma', however, in this passage cannot be connected to the law applied by the *Dharmasthas*. It is used in the sense in which it also occurs in the subsequent ślokas, which have been discussed below (III. 1.43-45) i.e. in the sense of *ācāra* rules laid down by the Dharmaśāstras as contrasted with the rules of the *vyāvahārika śāstra*. The next *śloka* (verse) seems to confirm this interpretation. It says "of them *dharma* is based on *satya* (truth), *vyavahāra* on witnesses, *caritra* on the conglomeration of men and *śasana* (*rājaśāsana*) is order of the king." This seems to mean that rules of *dharma* can be enforced only on the basis of the acceptance by the individuals as to whether they have truly behaved according to them or not, as much of the *dharma* law is self-enforceable; the enforcement of the *vyavahāra* laws is to be done mostly on the evidence of the witnesses (though, of course, there are other means of proof also), and *caritra* can be enforced on the basis of the collective idea and information that a particular group of people, who accept that custom have obout that particular matter; whereas śāsana is the order of the king, and it depends on him, whether in the then prevailing circumstance it is to

be enforeed or not, or, if it is to be enforced, how far that is to be done. The śloka may be interpreted in another way also" of them *dharma* is rooted in truth (eternal principles), *vyavahāra* in witnesses (i.e. vyavahāra rules can be applied according to the evidence of the witnesses), *caritra* in the coming together of men (i.e. the living of persons together as a group results in the emergence of customs among them) and the king's order is *śāsana* (i.e. *śāsana* is rooted in the command of the king)." Now *dharma* laws are considerably more difficult to follow as they demand a greater discipline in the individual than the other types of laws. There are lesser restraints in the *vyavahāra* laws as compared to *dharma* laws, because they are mainly related to the disputes arising between individuals and groups. Some regions, castes, families etc. have their own customs, which are different from the *vyavahāra* rules. It is easier for these groups to follow these customs rather than the *vyavahāra* laws, for these groups are accustomed to such customs, which are also suited to their way of life. The disputes among the people belonging to those region, castes etc. are to be decided in accordance with these customs and not according to *vyavahāra* rules. The directives and orders of the king are to be either of a temporary nature or relating to certain peculiar circumtances or in furtherance of his own duties as laid down in the *śāstras*. This becomes clear on a perusal of the eight types of *śāsanas* about which Kauṭilya has spoken at another place (II.10.38.46). As the *śāsanas* deal with particular sitiations the enforement of those directives is essential in these situations, even if, in exceptional cases they are contrary to *dharma, vyavahāra* and *caritra*. Thus, though the *dharma* rules are superior in content to the

other three kinds of rules, and, it would be better if one were able to follow them, while, on the other hand the śāsanas of the king may be of comparatively far less importance than the other there kinds of laws, still, in matters of their application because of the above-mentioned reasons, the *rājaśāsanas* are to be applied first and, then *caritra, vyavahāra* and *dharma* respectively. In short, the reason for this is that in particular situations or for particular groups or individuals it will not be proper to apply a higher type of rule, which may be difficult for them to follow or more difficult to be put into practice in these circumstances. This is what is meant by saying that each latter one supersedes the former.

Not only this, Kauṭilya, on the other hand, seems to be of the opinion that the king's orders mud enforce *dharma, vyavahāra* and *caritra,* because he repeatedly insists that the king should promulgate rules of (the *varaṇāśramadharma*) I. 3. 17 ; I. 4.16 ; III. 1.18 ; III. 7. 38; III. 16.42; V. 6.35; XIII. 4.62 ; XIV. 1.1), that justice ought to be meted out by the courts of the *dharmasthīyas* (judge) according to the *vyavahāra* rules described in details by him, and that the customs of regions, villages, castes, families and associations etc. must be enforced by the king (III. 7.40 ; III.10.45). It can never be presumed to be the intention of Kauṭilya, that the king can, as and when he wishes issue laws over-riding *caritra, vyavahāra* and *dharma.*

In the *vyavahāra* portions of various digests (Kṛtyakalpataru, Vīramitrodaya, Dharmatattvakalānidhi, Vyavahārakalpataru, Smṛticandrikā, Parāśaramādhavīya, Madanaratnapradīpa, Nṛsiṁhaprasāda, Vyavahārarthasamuecaya, Vyavahāracintāmaṇi and Vivādatāṇḍava)

some verses, said to be from the smṛtis of Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana, have been quoted. In these verses the terms *dharma*, *vyavahāra*, *caritra* and *rājaśāsana* have been explained, and it has also been described how each one of the latter supersedes the former. The four are said to be the means of deciding disputes (*catuṣprakāro' bhihitaḥ sandigdhe'rthe vinirṇayaḥ*). Now, this can mean one of the two things. Either it may mean that these *vyavahāra-pādās* are methods through which a decision can be arrived at, such as ordeals (*dharma*), various means of proof e. g. witnesses (vyavahāra), inference (*anumānena nirṇītam caritramiti kathyate*, -Bṛhaspati) and the order of the king probably issued not on the above grounds, but on the basis of the personal knowledge of the case through spies etc.). The verses quoted as Bṛhaspati's and one verse as that of kātyāyana give the above meanings as the alternative meanings of these words. The *vyavahārapādās* may also mean different kinds of rules, as has been stated above. However, where the verses quoted as Bṛhaspati's and Kātyāyana's describe how each one of the latter supersedes the former it becomes clear that by *vyavahārapādās* they, at this place, mean the different kinds of rules and not the different methods of arriving at a decision. Here they say that *vyavahāra* i. e. decisions arrived at after a careful or logical consideration of the rules laid down in the śāstras for resolving disputes should override *dharma* (i. e. rules wherein acceptance of the guilt by the person concered is a means of giving a decision which may mean the rules known as the *ācāra* rules). Again, the practices prevalent in a region or amongst a group of people should form the basis of decisions regarding disputes among them and that *vyavahāra* rules should not be applied there. Lastly, if

the king makes an order which is not in consonance with *caritra* (or with the above three) the king's order should be applied in preference to *caritra* (or the above three). The examples of the last two given in some digests are very clear on this issue. If a person commits adultery, and this is proved on the basis of the evidence of the witnesses, he ought to be punished according to *vyavahāra*. But if this adultery was committed with an ābhīra woman amongst whom adultery is prevalent, then the person who is accused of committing adultery ought not to be punished because of this custom. Here *caritra* has overridden *vyavahāra*. Again, though the practice prevalent amongst the people may be that the king's servants are not to enter family residences, but if the king comes to know that a culprit is hiding in such a house, he may issue an order to his men to enter the house and arrest the culprit. Here *rājaśāsan* overrides *caritra*. No example of *vyavahāra* overriding *dharma* is clear. But it can be taken to be something like this. If a person has committed guilt involving capital punishment and does not admit it, while the witnesses, relying on yājñavalkya's words, "if a person belonging to any of the four varṇas is likely to receive capital punishment, the witnesses may speak a lie" (II.83), do not speak the truth and the person is acquitted *vyavahāra* may be said to have superseded *dharma*. From the above two things are clear. Firstly, *paścimo pūrvabādhakaḥ*, according to these verses does not simply mean that *rājaśāsana* supersedes the other three. It means that each latter one supersedes the former one or ones. Secondly, that orders of the king, which go against *dharma*, *vyavahāra* or *caritra*, are either of a temporary nature or deal with particular matters.

After the two verses quoted above Kauṭilya speaks again of "governing or (controlling) (the people) by *dharma, vyavahāra, saṁsthā,* (custom), and fourthly by *nyāya* (equity), and adds, that by acting thus the king "conquers the earth bounded by the four quarters." He says further, "If there is a difference of meaning (interpretation i.e. arthe between *dharmaśāstra*(on the one hand), and *saṁsthā* or *vyvahāra* (on the other hand), the interpretation is to be made according to *dharma.* If on a point of *dharma śāstra* comes in conflict with equity, equity is to be considered authoritative there, and there the written text loses its validity." (III. 1.43-45). The second *śloka* can also be translated in the following manner, "If there is a conflict between *samsthā* or *vyāvahārika śāstra,* (on the one hand) *dharmaśāstra* (on the other hand) in a matter in dispute (*arthe*), the dispute is to be decided according to *dharma.*" This translation cannot, however be accepted for two reasons, Firstly, it will mean that kauṭilya is thereby contradicting his own opinion expressed earlier. Secondly, these verses as has been discussed below, deal with the interpretation of the different kinds of laws, rather than with the method of resolving conflict between them.

In these verses, *saṁthā* can, of course, be considered synonyonous to '*caritra*', but it would be wrong to equate the word '*nyāya*' with '*rājaśāsana*'. It is true that the first of the three ślokas, where *dharma, vyavahāra, saṁsthā* and *nyāya* have been placed together, can create the impression that the word '*nyāya,* has been used in place of '*rājaśāsana*'. It is also true that the *śāsanas* (king's orders) must be based on *nyāya* (equity), and, therefore anyone can think that '*nyāya,* is synonymous to *rājaśāsana* (though even this would be a far-

fetched equation), yet, when Kauṭilya says "*nyāyastatra pramāṇaṃ syāt tatra pāṭho hi naśyati*", the words here used in opposition to each other are not *dharmaśāstra*' and '*nyāya*' but '*pāṭha*, and '*nyāya*', and therefore, '*nyāya*' can here mean equity only, and cannot be said to be used in placed of '*rājaśāsana*'. Again, these three verses, as is clear particularly after going through third verse (as explained above) refer to the interpretation of laws, and, therefore, though it was considered essential that *dharmaśāstra*, *vyavahāra* and *saṁsthā* (or custom) must be referred to at this place, there was felt no such necessity to refer to *rājaśāsana* as they were not meant to be permanent laws for the governance of the place. Therefore, what these verses mean is that if there is difference in the interpretation of similar rules found both in the *dharmaśāstra* and in *vyavahāra śāstra* or *saṁsthā*, interpretation to the *dharmaśāstra* rule should be considered more authoritative, while the *dharmaśāstra* rules should themselves be interpreted on the basis of equity. Thus here also the conclusion cannot be drawn that kauṭilya considers the king's laws to be more authoritative than the *dharmaśāstras*.

PHILOSOPHY AND ITS PLACE IN HUMAN LIFE

SATKARI MUKERJEE

Varanasi

I am choosing a subject for discussion in this paper which is by its very nature bound to be beset with formidable difficulties. Philosophy is "something intermediate between theology and science. Like theology it consists of speculation on matters as to which definite knowledge lies, so far been unascertainable ; but like science it appears to human reason rather than to authority, whether that of tradition or that of revelation. All definite knowledge—so I should contend—belongs to science ; all dogma as to what surpasses definite knowledge belongs to theology. But between theology and science there is a No Man's Land exposed to attack from both sides ; this No Man's Land is philosophy." (See Introduction to the *History of Western Philosophy* by Bertrand Russel).

Philosophy deals with questions which cannot be proved with mathematical certainty. The problem of after life, immortality, the nature of the soul whether it is personal or impersonal, man's relation to his fellow beings and to society and state and above all to his ultimate destiny, and the assumption of God as the author and controller of the Universe ; these are questions which have exercised speculative minds from the very beginning of civilization. Though no definite answers have been found and the differences of philoso-

phers have aggravated the uncertainty, a thinking man who refuses to be satisfied with creature comforts cannot shelve or dismiss them. These questions have been answered by theology, that is so by a religion. But these answers are too definite and their definiteness causes suspicions. A thinking mind cannot accept any religious dogma without reasoned examination. Here he is condemned by the custodian of religion. Further more, he is attacked by the scientists. Science carries on its enquiry into the nature of the facts with the help of observation and experiment. Science has made wonderful discoveries and changed the face of the world. The findings of science are definite and unambigous. Philosophy on the other hand finds itself at a disadvantage because the problems which it seeks to solve are not amenable to experiments in the laboratory. Of course, the interpretation of subtle super-sensible facts of scientists and laws are not always unanimous, but science carries on experiment further and further and the doubts of yesterday are cleared by the finding of the next day. This is the advantage of science over philosophy.

One may ask why then should the philosopher waste the time on such insoluble problems. The Logical Positivists have voiced powerful objections against philosophical speculation which they think as futile as the chase of the Will-O-the-Wisp. To this indictment Bertrand Russel has given an interesting answer: "Science tells us what we can know, but what we can know is little, and if we forget how much we cannot know we become insensitive to many things of very great importance". It is not good either to forget the

questions that philosophy asks, or to persuade ourselves that we have found indubitable answers to them."

Russell's attitude is pragmatic but one cannot flippantly dismiss it as worthless. But I think there are other weighty considerations. One must have certain conceptions regarding the world. These conceptions constitute his philosophy unless a man elects to guillotine his logical conscience, he cannot avoid being perplexed by the vexed questions. A man has hopes and aspirations and beliefs that there is truth in the world and this truth can be discovered. Besides, a man is painfully conscious of his limitations and infirmities which do not allow him to rest in thoughtless slumber. A thinking man is not satisfied with the dogmatic solutions offered by theology. These dogmas of religion my lull an unthinking person into a sense of security and self complacency. But there are thinking minds who though form a minority are the salt of earth. They are not fond of scepticism for its own sake, nor are they inclined to take refuge on blind faith. Scepticism and credulity are the two extreme attitudes of an unhealthy mind. To take anything and everything on trust as sacrosant truth is a symptom of intellectual lethargy which brings down a human being to the level of unthinking brutes. And to indulge in doubt of every proposition and parade one's intellectual supcriority is also a pit-fall. Philosophy teaches us to avoid these two extremes—the Scylla of Wanton Scepticism and the Charybdis of unashamed credulity.

The sceptics have tried to make enormous capital out of error and doubt. In out ordinary experience we make mistakes and till the correction of error we are

apt to misjudge things as what they are not. The stock examples of perceptual error such as the misperception of rope as snake or nacre as silver given in Indian Philosophy show that all our cognitions are not reliable. The example of dream has false experience from end to end and has been made the yard-stick for assessment of human experience. The subjective idealists e. g. the Buddhist Vijñānavādins and the Buddhist śūnyavādins maintain that what passes for normal experience is nothing better than dream experience in respect of their truth-claim. There can be no truth in our experience ; in other words, all our cognations give appearance and no truth. Truth is only a hope and a dream. But this is scepticism in excelsis. These sceptics do not accept logic as an instrument of discovery of truth or its attestation. They do not believe in the necessary relatian of any two facts which are styled in Aristolean logic as the middle term and major term, or *hetu* (probans) and *sādhya* (probandum) in Indian Nyāya. All the arguments depend for their validity on the major premises—the universal proposition which shows the necessary and universal relation between the middle term and major term (*vyāptivākya*). Nor are they inclined to endorse the truth of the minor premises (*pakṣadharmatā*) without these two premises no conclusion can be established. These sceptics may concede their pragmatic and provisional utility in our theoretical and practical transactions. The *śūnyavādin* has erected a respectable philosophy which delights in exposing the inconsistencies and self-contradictions in all statements and philosophial assertions.

These sceptics are not open to refutation, in as much as they will dismiss all counter-arguments as false

assumptions. The sceptic will plead that he does not maintain an independent position of his own, and so whatever inconsistency or contradiction the orthodox philosopher may expose as vitiating any proposition, he will simply ward it off by saying : "That is not what I believe to be my position. So your accusation is futile."

But this unqualified scepticism may strike a seeker of truth as a vain glorious pose. It is extremely doubtful whether a man can be satisfied with a negative position namely, there is no truth and everything encountered in experience or conceived in the mind is a false appearance, a pretence and a fraudulent show. To be consistent the sceptic must doubt his own existence, and so cannot pretend to take part in a philosophical debate. Furthermore, how can he denounce anything as error unless he is conscious of what is truth. Error is rather a relative term and is intelligible only in contradistinction to truth which stands unassailed and can be conceived as a self independent and self-contained principle, though one may honestly doubt whether such Absolute Truth is knowable as a fact. Whatever may be the reason for doubting absolute truth one cannot deny relative truth. Without a conception of such truth one cannot draw a line of demarcation between error and truth. The *Śūnyavādin* finds self-contradiction in the arguments of professional philosophers and self contradiction, unless it stems from objective truth, will only be a case of *argumentum ad hominem.* The negativist has no logic of his own and so his conception of falsity and invalidity can be borrowed from academic logic. If this logic is false and all its concepts are subjective, how can they be employed as

the yardstick of measuring truth or otherwise. So his confutation of professional philosophy, based on logical organs forget in the arsenal of the traditional logic, looses all value. The sceptic is debarred from pronouncing judgment on the truth or error when he has no original instrument for making such measurements. Either he must accept the logical tradition as true in conformity with the academic custom or he must desist from participation in philosophical disputes as he has no logical instrument of his own. It will not be far from intellectual honesty to observe that such scepticism is not immune from the change of deliberate pretence or employing a device of escapism. It is true that the assertion implicit of the śūnyauādin that nothing exists is not a case of self-contradiction like the assertion of a barren mother or a mare's nest or a square circle. But it is a contradiction of fact and factual contradiction ultimately amounts to self contradiction. As soon as the proposition nothing exists is contemplated, its falsity becomes obvious. The thought of it is a fact which cannot be denied. So such universal assertion is not capable of being accepted as a serious philosophical proposition.

Such is also the case with the subjectivist, who revels in the denial of external reality. The subjectivist does not believe in material facts, but believes in the existence of other knowing subjects, though equally external. This denial of the reality of anything other than one's own cognition is bound to extend to other minds. And this will entail solipsism, which makes nonsense of all our thought and activity.

The transition from subjectivism to individualism is a natural process. The subjectivist only thinks of

himself and does not care a brass farthing for other souls, which he repudiates as false appearance. This subjective attitude has its repurcussion on ethical conduct and religion.

Unfortunately, all the protestant religions in India namely Buddhism, Jainism and other smaller cults laid exclusive emphasis upon the interest of the individual after death and professed unreserved contempt for the values of the world. Family-life, which hinges upon marriage, was regarded as an aberration from spiritual life. Marriage was looked upon rather a sin, since it involves loss of celibacy. The birth of a son was considered to be a powerful rivet to the binding chain of worldly existence. Had these extremists had a free sway and all men and women followed their advice the human race would have come to total extinction. The world would have been left over to insect and birds and brutes. These philosophers, who practiced their tenets, set awesome example to the spiritually ambitious souls, who would sacrifice everything for achieving a quick salvation. The result was the ever expanding unwieldy monasteries teeming with shaven heads or naked ascetics. Even during the life-time of the Buddha the monastic institutions were bursting at their seams. Multiplication of converts only added to the number of idle hands and mouths and the society and the state, which were traduced as so many pitfalls and snares, had to feed them free of cost. The only return, which the pious donors received from them, was the counsell to practice asceticism in minor and truncated form. The votive-offerings were announced to be sure passports to heaven and progressive march to salvation. Buddhism in its latest developments

seceded farther and farther from the original tenets of the Buddha, the promulgater of the new faith. Though Buddhism differs from Jainism in vital matters and both of them denounced each other as false ways of life, they agreed on one point namely, the condemnation of Vedic religion, which sought to achieve prosperity, power, wealth and worldly happiness as the stepping stone to ultimate emancipation. Vedic religion held family-life in high esteem and the perservation of the race as a sacrosanct duty. Marriage was regulated by strict laws of eugenics and the procreation of excellent daughters and healthy, powerful intellectually superior, valiant sons of heroic mould, capable of protecting the nation from the ravages of anti-social elements within the community and inroads of foreign barbarians was held out before the nation as the noble ideal. Society was divided into four classes of men, 1. the intellectual, pious and morally superior individuals called Brāhmaṇa, 2. the class of valliant warriors, who were trained to protect the country and the nation, called Kṣatriya ; 3. the Vaiśyas, who followed the profession of merchants and agriculturists with the sole aim of augmenting the wealth of the country and thus securing the economic foundations of the nation ; 4. the class of labourers, skilled artisans, who facilitated the pursuit of the respective avocations of the three castes. Whether this had a spiritual foundation or not, the social organisation was maintained on a firm and stable basis. Each of them had to perform religious rites and ceremonies. This was called Varṇāśrama system. In course of time, snags and surges manifested themselves and the custodians of the state had to make necessary adjustments.

The protestant-creeds reviled the social organi-

sation by holding forth specious arguments preaching equality of all men, regardless of their intellectual, moral and physical differences. They strove for social revolution. The result was inordinate other-worldliness and the contempt for worldly prosperity and power. Though these protestant-creeds did not wage a war against the ruling caste, it was implicit in their philosophy and religion. It is a significant fact that when Sind was invaded by others in the beginning of 8th century, the Buddhists nobility refused to co-operate with king Dahir and rather welcomed the Arab invaders. They believed that change of kingship would not affect their economic, political and social interests.

Subjectivism in religion and philosophy tends to corrode social cohesion and political stability tending to produce anarchy. Social cohesion and individual liberty are apt to come into conflict, and it has been essayed to keep these two interests in compromise. The Brahmanical thinkers in India were always on the alert to curb irrational, selfish tendencies to break loose from society. But in India there was never a totally totelitarian regime and the State did not intefere with the legitimate exercises of individual liberty. It is rather curious that in philosophy there was censorship and all sects and communities could pursue their religions rites with impurity, provided their freedom was not abused to subvert the moral laws and the laws of the state. What however brought about the downfall of Hindu polity was the fissiparous tendencies of petty states and their rulers who asserted their individual supremacy after the break up of an empire. This individualism on the States was the remote consequence of subjectivism preached by the protestant creeds. The fundamental

principles of political science which was composed by Brahmins in the main were pooh-poohed as the fabrications of fraud, with the loss of national freedom by the foreign conquest, the whole country was in a state of hibernation, punctuated with sporadic religious movements preaching reward in the other world for their humility and weakness. The expression 'the mild Hindu' had become proverbial in the British period. The emancipation of the nation from this spiritual weakness can be secured only by the restoration of faith in personal and national enterprise for the economic and political amelioration of the people. The people must be taught to gain self confidence and belief that the major portion of our sufferings can be redressed by industry and preseverance. The creeds which foster individualism as opposed to pursuit of welfare of the whole state has to be rectified and put on the sound keel.

Individualism in philosophy has a tendency to create intolerance of other opinions. Its baneful effects are seen in religious intolerance. Fortunately, the philosophy of *Vedānta* which is inclulcated in the *Bhagavadgītā* has taught every Hindu that there is only one God and in whatever form and however varying liturgy the worship may be offered, it will reach the altar of God. When the Muslims perform their liturgical worship in the mosque and the Christian sings the glory of God in the Church, the Hindu does not feel disturbed. He is persuaded by his philosophy that they are engaged in pious duties. Unfortunately, the semitic creeds are pronounced in their vilification of the Hindus' religious observances and they regard the Hindus as worshipers of idols. But *Vedānta* philosophy tells us that God is infinite and all religious prayers and hymns necessarily

delineate His infinitude and Omnipresence. All external forms of worship including pilgrimages to holy places to Mecca, Jerusalem and Vārāṇasi are imperfect ways of approach. In this context I quote the utterance of Vyāsa in which he implores the forgiveness of God for triple offence : "O Master of the universe, may thou please condone the three offenses I have committed. I have meditated on thee with forms, though Thou art formless. I have uttered hymns of praise describing Thy Majesty though it eludes all speech : I have repudiated Thy Omnipresence by my visitation of holy places on account of my weakness."

One should ponder on the deep significance of this assertion. All worship, physical, verbal or mental necessarily delimits the limitless and thus makes an idol of God. There is an element of fetishism in all religions as shown by Max Mueller in his *Hibbert Lectures*.

I abjure all pretention to convert the sceptics and atheists and dogmatists and fanatics. Philosophy with all its logic has failed to bring about unanimity among men. Perhaps to enforce unanimity by regimentation of thoughts is bound to lead to ossification. The philosophy of *Vedānta* helps us to steer clear of extreme dogmatism and the extravagant liberty. To achieve progress, particularly intellectual and spiritual, one must subject himself to the drill and discipline of moral laws. Freedom is our goal. But this cannot be achieved without paying the price for it. *Vedānta* of all systems of thought has the courage of focussing our attention on the unity and universality of reality. Whereas plualistic philosophy magnifies the differences and thus paves the way for quarrel, fued, jealously and intolerance, *Vedānta*

gives us the opposite picture. One may complain that philosophy has may defects but this only proves that we have not yet found the last word in philosophy and religion and also in science. If we do not put too much emphasis upon the differences of philosophies and seek to catch hold of this sphere of agreement and harmony, we shall find that three is no reason to hold up philosophy to ridicule. A thinking person cannot get rid of philosophy which is expressed in his outlook on life. The angularities of philosophy have to be smoothened. And all rational men should be on the watch that neither philosophy nor religion gives a wrong twist to the tenor of thought and life. Our attitude should not be influenced by dogmatism or religions fanaticism. It is a wonder of wonders that India even in her hey-day of power did not ban atheistic movements. The thinkers and philosophers of India thought that arguments of atheists could be challenged by logical methods and there is no need to resort to violence. This is the philosophy of India which has saved the country from bloodshed on account of philosophical and religious differences.

BHARTṚHARI AND BUDDHISM

HAJIME NAKAMURA

University of Tokyo

Bhartṛhari's Criticism of the Buddhist Theory.

Our investigations in the *Śabdabrahmaparīkṣā* of the *Tattvasamgraha* clearly indicate that the Buddhist philosophers attacked the thought of Bhartṛhari as being heretical in nature and now it would be appropriate to look at the other side of the coin and see how Bhartṛhari regarded Buddhist doctrine. There is a great deal of controversy in academic circles about whither or not Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* is Buddhistic in content[1] and I made my investigation of the text with this in mind. The general conclusion was that, althought Bhartṛhari did not make a sweeping denunciation of Buddhist doctrine, he did attack it as being heretical. Let us now examine some of the passages of the *Vākyapadīya* which pertain to this problem, making use of the various commentaries.

In the *Vākyapadīya* there are passages which deals with the problem as to whether or not there is a fundamental distinction between the original meaning of a

1. Radhakrishnan, (*Indian Philosophy*,, vol. II, p. 465) maintains that the *Vākyapadīya* is Buddhistic in content, but W. Ruben (*Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik*, VIII, 1931, S. 53, Anm. 2) claims that there is no evidence to show that Bhartṛhari was a Buddhist.

word (mukhya—artha) and the secondary meaning of a word (the metaphorical meaning—gauṇa-artha). For example, if one sees a lion and says, "That is a lion," the word 'lion' is used in its original sense; whereas, when one says, "That man is a lion," the word 'lion' means something like 'a man who is fierce like a lion' and is thus used in its secondary or metaphorical sense.

However, someone who holds a philosophical position different from that of Bhartṛhari might say something like the following with regard to this point:

"When a (secondary) meaning (of a word) is alertained even though diametrically opposed (to the original meaning of the word) then the word following the conception (of the secondary meaning) functions as its original meaning.")

(atyantaviparīto 'pi yadā yo 'rtho' vadhāryate)
yathāsaṃpratyayaṃ śabdas tatra mukhyaḥ pravartate
(*Vākyapadīya* II. 287).

In other words, it is impossible to draw a hard and fast distinction between the primary and secondary (metaphorical) meanings of words. The meaning of words is established by us completely subjectively and there is no 'original meaning' which has an independent existence transcending our subjectivity. This is the claim that a word which is used in one sentence must be understood as expressing its original meaning within those limits.[2]

Bhartṛhari would, however, counter this claim, saying "Although the meaning of a word belongs to

2. bauddha eva śabdārtho nāsti kaścic chabdeṣu gauṇamukhyavibhāga iti . . . . vākye na śabdeṣu gauṇamukhyavibhāgaḥ kaścit. (Punyarāja ad *Vākyap.* II, 287)

subjectivity, the distinction of original and secondary meaning is fixed (from the very first".)[3] Further he is emphatic that the secondary meaning is based on the original meaning; it is established through postulating the original meaning.

"Truly metaphorical expression is established because of the existence of the original meaning."

Upacāro hi mukhyasya saṃbhavād avatiṣṭhate
(*Vākyap.* III, 8, 13. p. 313)

While attempting to prove that the distinction of these two meanings can be established, he first asserts the existence of a distinction of *satya* (truth) and *asatya* (untruth).[4]

"Although the ascertainment of the Truth of the real meaning (of a word) depends on (our subjective) notions, none of the notions arises (unrestrictedly) with this (word) as something arbitrary."

Yady api pratyayādhīnam arthatattvāvadhāraṇam
Na sarvaḥ pratyayas tasminn asiddha iva jāyate
(*Vākyap.* II, 288)

There is no explanation of this passage in the commentaries but I think the following would be an adequate interpretation. Given the word 'lion', for example, aside from the original meaning (something like-'carnivorous, ferocious feline with a main') we can distinguish various metaphorical meanings such as ferocious person' or 'kingly individual'. These are all formed in our subjectivity but there is clearly a distinction between

3. bauddhe 'pi śabdārthe vyavasthita eva gauṇamukhyavibhāgam iti. (Puṇyaraja ad *Vākyap.* II, 299)

4. idanīm atrāpi gauṇamukhyavibhāgaṃ samarthayituṃ satyāsatyavibhāgam tāvad upakramitum āha.———(Puṇyarāja)

the original meaning and the metaphorical meaning. Moreover, since there is a fixed relation between the two, the metaphorical meaning could not possibly be something which is established in a purely arbitrary manner. Pursuing this point in more detail, Bhartṛhari continues.

"The act of seeing with respect to water is identical with the seeing of a mirage (in both cases). Although the act of seeing is and the like are the same in both cases, water is not a mirage."

Darśanaṃ salile tulyaṃ mṛgatṛṣṇādidarśanaiḥ
Tulyatve darśanādīnāṃ na jalaṃ mṛgatṛṣṇikā
(*Vākyap.* II, 289)

It sometimes happens that a mirage, reflecting the water of an oasis, suddenly appears in the desert. The claim being made is that when one compares the seeing of the water of a mirage and the seeing of actual water one finds that the act of seeing is in both cases the same but the objects of our seeing are different i. e., actual water and the water of a mirage are not the same. This is clearly in opposition to Budhist doctrine, for the metaphor which compares all worldly phenomena to mirages is used quite extensively in Buddhist literature and in works influenced by this literature such as the *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* (2.31). With respect to attacking the explanation based on this metaphor at least, Bhartṛhari is in agreement with Bhartṛpranpañca and Śaṅkara.[5]

5. cf. Śaṅkara ad *Bṛhad. Up.* p. 731, l. 17 (See *The Development of Vedanta Philosophy*, p. 166 ff.). According to Śaṅkara's *Commentary on the Brahma Sūtra* (2.2.28) Śaṅkara rejected the Buddhists comparing even the experience of their waking hours to things like *gandharvanagara*. Moreover the metaphor of *mṛgatṛṣṇā* is referred to at *Vākyapadīya* III, 13, 8 (p. 434)

"Since it is universally well-known that there exists a function which is not common to both a rope and a snake, even though the seeing of both is the same, a distinction of the two must be clearly made."

Yad asādhāraṇaṃ kāryaṃ prasiddhaṃ rajjusarpayoḥ

Tena bhedaḥ paricchedyas tayos tulye 'pi darśane
(*Vākyap.* II, 290)

Just as a person may see a rope lying in the road at dusk, mistake it for a snake and become frightened, so too people become perplexed and troubled by mistaking the various aspects of the phenomenal world for reality. In Vijñaptimātratā philosophy the snake is explained as corresponding to Imagination and the rope as corresponding to Interdependence. Futher, this metaphor is found in the *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* (2.17;2. 18) and is often used by Śaṅkara.[6] Bhartṛhari, however, rejects this interpretation and claims that, both in the case of seeing and actual snake and also in the case of seeing what one mistakes for a snake, the act of seeing is identical but the rope and the snake are two completely different objects and the two must be clearly distinguished. On this point then, Bhatṛhari is at odds with the Vijñānavāda school.

"And when a cause (is a defect in the object or the sense organ) of the perverted view (error) concerning things well-known (the true thing)[7] is seen if the difference (e. g., two moons) from the true thing which is due to this cause and is recognized, then people call this (difference) 'untrue' (*asatya*)."

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6. P. Deussen, *System des Vedānta*, S. 290

7. prasiddhaḥ satyarūpo 'rthaḥ——Puṇyarāja

Prasiddhārthaviparyāsanimittaṃ yac ca dṛśyate
Yas tasmāl lakṣyate bhedas tam asatyaṃ pracakṣate
(*Vākyap.* II, 291)

Since errors in knowledge are due to defects in the objects or sense organs, for example, our mistake of a rope for a snake which is due to insufficient light and the existence of the two moon which is due to the eye-sickness, it is not right to regard everything as false by identifying it with its mistaken forms. This argument of Bhartrhari is also given in the beginning of the *Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* where people of other schools criticize the Vijñānavādins.

It reads, "Just as, though those who suffer *timira*-eye sickness see hairs, rope and the like, such cognition does not occur to those who are free from timira-eye-sickness."[8] Therefore, Bhartṛhari's argument comes from the views of opponents of the *Vijñānavādins*.

"Although a wall painting[9] with an uneven surface may resemble mountains and the like, these do not function as obstacles in the way that mountains do."

Yac ca nimnonnate citre sarūpaṃ parvatādibhiḥ
Na tatra pratighātādi kāryaṃ tadvat pravartate
(*Vākyap.* II, 292)

This means that actual mountains have the function of impeding our progress but painted mountains do not.

"If one touches a (real) wheel by hand the uninterruptedness of the tactile sensations continue to be but this is not the case with a wheel of fire-brand since if one touches if it is interrupted."

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8. yathā taimirikānāṃ samtāne deśādyābhāso nānyeṣām. (*Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 3, line (12)

9. citrabhitti—Puṇyarāja

sparśarabandho hastena yathā cakrasya saṃtatah
na tathā, alātacakrasya vicchinnaṃ spṛśyate hi tat
(*Vākyap* II,293)

This comparing the phenomenal world to a wheel of fire brand is found quite often in Buddhist texts. It is the central thought of the fourth chapter of the *Māṇḍūkhya-Kārikā*, but it is precisely this view which Bhartṛhari is attacking.[10]

"And in the cities the earthen embankment, the rampart, and the upper stories give rise to tactile sensations and covering, but in the case of 'Gandharva city, (=a mirage) there is nothing of the sort."

vapra-prākāra-talpaiś ca sparśanāvaraṇe yathā
nagareṣu tu te tadvad gandharvanagareṣv api
(*Vākyap* II, 294)

The likening of the phenomenal world to Gandharva city i.e., to a mirage is quite common in Buddhist works and is also found in the second chapter of the *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* (2.31). Bhartṛhari, however, staunchly opposes such a view, and it is of particular interest that an argument quite similar to Bhartṛhari's is given in the beginning of the *Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* as an example of the criticisms of the Vijñaptimātratā doctrine put forth by other schools. "Gandharva castle cannot be used as a castle."[11]

There do not exist in a thing made from clay so much efficiency as accomplished by true (*real, mukhya*) wild beasts, domestic animals, etc. Therefore these

10. The metaphor of the wheel of fire is referred to in other places as well.

11. gandharvanagareṇāsattvān nagarakriyā na kriyate. (*Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 3, line 15.)

beasts, domestic animals and the like are objects designated by the suffix-*ka*."

mṛgapaśvādibhir yāvān mukhyair arthaḥ prasādhhyate
tāvān na mṛnmaye 'py asti tasmāt te viṣayaḥ kanaḥ
(*Vākyap*. II, 295)

"A vast area is covered by well-known mountains but it is seen that their reflection (*pratibimba*) is located within a small area.

mahān āvriyate deśaḥ prasiddhaiḥ parvatādibhiḥ
alpadeśāntarāvasthaṃ pratibimbaṃ tu dṛśyate
(*Vākyap*. II, 296)

This also can be taken as a criticism of the comparison which is found in various Mahāyāna Sūfras[12] and the adoption of such doctrine by one of the Vedānta schools.[13] of everything to its reflection on the surface of a mirror or water.[14]

"Moreover, true (real *mukhya*) poison and the like are the cause of death but the poison and the like in a dream do not accomplish their own end."

maraṇādinimittaṃ ca yathā mukhyā visādayaḥ
na te svapnādiṣu svasya tadvad arthasya *sādhakāḥ*
(*Vākyap*. II, 297)

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12. For example : *Laṅkāvatāra*, pp. 20, ln. 15; 42, ln.9; 72, line 16; 94, ln.4; 106, ln. 6; 375, ln. 4.

13. cf. Śaṅkara ad BS. vol. II, pp. 85, ln. 3 ff.; 90, ln. 10. cf. BS. III, 2, 18.

14. The *pratibimbaka* metaphor is also used at *Vākyapadīya* I, 100, but since there an active manifestation (i.e.. nāda) opposed to a passive manifestation (i.e, sphoṭa) is compared to the water surface it must be considered separately from the present use. At *Vākyapadīya* I, 20 the fact that grammar manifests the nature of various words is compared to *pratibimba* but in this case the problem is completely different.

This metaphor which likens the phenomenal world to a dream is also one which appears quite frequently in Buddhist works and in the *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* after chapter 2.

As has been discussed before, this view is in sharp contrast to that of Bhartṛhari and is rather in agreement with the criticisms offered by other schools in the *Viṃśatikā-Vijñaptimātratā siddhi* ("i.e., The food, drink, swords, staffs, poisons, medicines, garments, etc. to be found in dreams cannot be used to assuage thirst and so forth.")[15]. Moreover, it is known that within the *Vedānta* school itself his position is quite similar to that of the *Brahma Sūtra* (2.2.29) and Bodhāyana.[16]

Bhartṛhari summarized the above argument in the following fashion. Anything which seen is untruly due to differences of place, time, and the sense organs are determined in the way that it is generally acknowledged by ordinary people." (*Vākyvp*. II, 298)

According to puṇyarāja's commentary, mistakes in cognition occur in the following instances : (1) Differences of place. That is to say that mistakes sometimes occur because of a difference of distance. (For example, mistakes which arise because the object seen is a great distance away). (2) Differences of time. For example, in summer one sees from a distance the haze caused by subterranean heat and mistakes it for water. (3) Differences relating to the sense organs. For example, one who has

15. *Taisho Tripiṭaka*, Vol 31, section 74 : yad annapānavastr-aviṣāyudhādi svapne dṛśyate tenānnādikriyā na kriyate (*Viṃśatikā-Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 3, 1n.14)

16. See *The Development of Vedanta philosophy* in Japanese, p. 91

a certain affliction of the eyes may see two moons in the sky. Since one must decide about such matters in the way that people acknowledge as being generally correct the distinction of truth and falsity with regard to cognition is clear cut. Thus, according to Punyarāja, it is a mistake to regard even true cognition as being false or illusory.

In addition there are arguments,[17] which we will investigate later, which can be interpreted as defending the Mādhyamika thesis that all is void, although it is not clear whether in these instances he had in the doctrine which interprets *śunyatā* purely negatively. At any rate, it is obvious that Bhartṛhari's assertions are diametrically opposed to the assertions of at least the *Vijñaptimātratā*, i.e. it is indisputable that he is in agreement with the claims of opposing schools. Moreover, when one turns to his relation to the other schools of Vedānta while keeping the above points in mind one finds that he attacked the doctrine expressed in the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* (chapter 2 ff.) and, in part at least, the thought of Śaṅkara. On the other hand, with regard to this particular point at least, he is in agreement with Bodhāyana, Bhaṛtprapanca, and chapter 1 of the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*.

According to Helārāja's commentry there are still more references to the *Vijñaptimātratā* in the *Vākyapadīya*. In the passages which discuss the 'meaning of words' (*padārtha*) the following statement succeeds the presentation of the argument of the *Vaiśeṣikas* :

"Certain people know that what is called form has pervasion as its nature and explain as a thing (*dravya*) (the form) which has separation (from others) as its

17. This will be discussed on another occasion.

nature.[18]

anupravṛttiūpāṃ yāṃ prakhyātām ākṛtim viduḥ
kecid vyāvṛttirūpāṃ tu dravyatvena pracakṣate
(*Vākyap.* III, 1, 19, p. 22)

Helārāja takes this passage to be an expression of the doctorine of the *Vijñānavāda.* After presenting this heresy Bhartṛhari proceeds to develop his own theory.

"It is different" is limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) of the highest Being. The same is true of 'It is not different.' Such expression (*prapañca*)[19] arises with reference to the various *ātman* of things which are connected (with the limiting adjunct)".

bhinnā iti paropādhir abhinnā iti vā punaḥ
bhāvātmasu prapañco 'yaṃ saṃsṛṣṭeṣveva jāyate
(*Vākyap.* III, 1, 20)

Thus, if one follows Helārāja's interpretation, one must understand Bhartṛhari as viewing Vijñānavāda philosophy as the heresy of 'certain people' not of his school on a par with Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which is to say that it occupies a position inferior to the Vedānta thought to which he subscribed. However, the Vijñaptimātratā thesis given here is not to be taken as the traditional thesis asserted by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. It is rather the thesis asserted by the later scholars of the Vijñanavāda who were primarily interested in logical investigations.

It is evident that he was not a Buddhist for he paid great reverence to the Vedas and followed the principles of Vedānta philosophy, but it is worth noting that he expounded a thesis which is in direct opposition to the statements and intentions of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

18. For an interpretation of this passage, consult *Vākyapadīya* III, 1, 14

19. In the annotation the word *vyavahāra* occurs.

PRĀKṚTS AND ASSAMESE

MAHESWAR NEOG

Gauhati University

To explain the Indo-Aryan linguistic phenomena in Assam we have, to begin with, two well-known theories.

In the first place we have the theory of Inner and Outer Indo-Aryan, initiated by A. F. R. Hoernle, much stressed on linguistic basis by Sir George Abraham Grierson. They hold that the present-day Indo- Aryan languages fall into two groups : the Inner Group including the Western Hindī dialects, surrounded by an Outer Group ring of languages and dialects like Panjābī and Lahndī, Marāṭhī, Oriyā, Bengali and Assamese, the Bihārī dialects and sub-Himalayan Pahāṛī languages. Ramāprasād Chanda gave partial anthropological support to this theory by postulating the difference between dolicocephals, represented by the Inner Aryans, and the mesocephals, represented by the people of Gujarat, Orissa, Bengal, etc.

Secondly, we have Grierson's view that the modern Indo-Aryan languages on north-eastern India are all derived from Magadhi Prākṛt through Magadhi Apabhraṁśa. He says : "Māgadhī was the principal dialect which corresponded to the Old Eastern Prākṛt. Māgadhī Apabhraṁśa, in fact, may be considered as spreading out eastwards and southwards in three directions. In the north-east it developed into Northern

Bengali and Assamese, to the south into Oriya, and between the two into Bengali. Each of these three descendants is equally and directly connected with the common immediate parent, and hence we find North-Bengali agreeing in some respects rather with Oriya spoken far away to the south than with Bengali of Bengal proper of which it is usually classed as a sub-dialect" (*Linguistic Survey of India*, I, i, pp. 125-26). He observes : "North Bengal and Assam did not get their language from Bengal proper but directly from the West" (*loc. cit.*). It is no wonder that north Bengal and Assam are thus grouped together, for they were one and the same kingdom till at least the 16th century and Koc Behār (Cooch Behar) was *a*, if not *the*, centre of Assamese culture under the hegemony of the Koces in the age of Śaṅkaradeva (1449-1569) who enjoyed the Koc king's munificence. It is from the 17th century that the language of Cooch Behar and other areas of North Bengal accepted the vassalage of Bengali, and has been considered to be its dialect. Otherwise, "The whole of North Bengal including Koch-Behār, Rangpur, Jalpāiguri and also perhaps Dinājpur, should have been included with Assam, if the territorial readjustments were to be made on the basis of linguistic homogeneity" (Banikanta Kakati, *Assam-Its Formation and Development*, 1940, p. 4)

Professor Suniti Kumar Chatterji groups the different modern Indo-Aryan dialects of Assam, Bengal and Orissa into four divisions, Rāḍha, Varendra, Kāmarūpa and Vaṅga, and puts them in a tabular form (*The Origin and Development of the Bengali Language*, Calcutta, 1926, p. 140), which is concisely reproduced

below.

Forms of Māgadhī Prākṛit and Apabhraṁśa as brought to Bengal, Assam and Orissa



Thus we consider Assamese conventionally as a Magadhan language to have emerged out of the Māgadhī Prākṛt. The Magadhan languages are said to have descended ultimately from the language of the outer Aryans. This ethnic classification of the Indo-Aryan immigrants into two broad groups does not establish the existence of two major OIA dialects ; nor can it be linguistically proved. The Magadhan NIA dialects had to pass through the successive stages of the linguistic history of the Indo-Aryan ; therefore, the grammatical features of the Magadhan NIA which are claimed by Grierson to be the linguistic peculiarities of the NIA languages descending down from the language of the Outer Aryans, are statistically unsound and historically inconclusive. The Hoernle-Grierson theory is not accepted by linguists, and Chanda's anthropological interpretation also runs

counter to it in some important respects.

The history of the Indo-Aryan is the history of changing morphemic features. The characteristics of the proto-Prākṛt dialects are not clearly known to us. In such a vast country as India the regional variations in the spoken dialects of the ancient Indo-Aryan people are very likely; but the phonological and morphological variants of the proto-Prākṛt dialects have not been exhaustively worked out. *i* which is a rare phoneme in the Indo-Iranian, has been noted by Pāṇini as a phonemic alternant of *r*. This Prakritism in Sanskrit is a proto-Prākṛt regional development as testified by the Aśokan language, where it occurs only in the East and East Central inscriptions. We do not exactly know whether the suffixes for the gerund *-tvāna* (found in Pali very frequently ; *chettvana marassa papphukani*),*-tuna* (attested from Aśokan, where we have *abhivādetūnam*, and Prākṛt *ghettuna*, *gantuna*, etc.) and *-una* in Mahārāṣṭrī are merely phonologically varying morphemes or are morphologically distinct. The passive past participle from √*dā* in MIA is in most cases *diṇṇa*, but *dita*| *ditae* (*dita ke*) is also noticed. *diṇṇa* takes the suffix *-na*, not the usual past participle suffix *-ta* of OIA- Secondly, the appearance of the reduplicating syllable with *i* is an unusual feature, the parallel development having been in Greek presents, i. e., *didōmi*. Similarly, √*dā*+ past participle>MIA *didā*+*na* (a weak grade form of the root in the past participle, giving *did-na*>*diṇṇa*.

Some other examples may also be assorted (e. g., the MIA development of *jh* from OIA *kṣ*, as in *jhīna* <*kṣīṇa*, besides *kkh*, *cch* and *śk*) to come to a probable suggestion of the proto-Prākṛt dialect divergence at a

very early stage. The MIA dialects were grammatically nearer to one another in the earlier stage, and the frequency and flexibility in sounds and forms are noticed in the Aśokan Inscriptional MIA. But the dialects were living languages of the people and were, therefore, subject to continual changes. The changes were however, activated by linguistic and non-linguistic factors. As the flux of the language begins from a common source which had a complex pattern and synthetic texture, the tendency was always at work to shelve out complexities. The various phonetic combinations and morphemic variants of OIA were gradually dying away, and in the very early stage one dialect had preference for one form while the other retained or developed another. The influence of the non-Aryans of India and, still earlier, the dissolution of the Indo-Iranian people into groups had probably contributed to the linguistic changes and dialectal divergences.

We do not have in our possession any MIA work which would refer itself specifically to modern Assam or ancient Kāmarūpa. No literary Prākṛt could, therefore, be said to have application to Assam. The earliest reference to the language of the people of Kāmarūpa is furnished by Yuan-Tsāng, the Chinese pilgrim who visited the kingdom of Bhāskara-varman (early 7th century) and was the king's guest for about a month. He records : "The language of Kāmarūpa differs a little from that of mid-India." But we do not have any recorded evidence worth the name to prove this statement. Professor Suniti Kumar Chatterji now (1954) takes this "differing a little" to mean "differing altogether", as he considers this to be

a reference to non-Sanskrit tongue, because Kāmarūpa then, much more than modern Assam, was inhabited by Mongoloid people of the Tibeto-Burman group. But if the pilgrim meant what the records have, we cannot altogether rule out the probability of the culture of Aryan languages in the land. We have the definite evidence of the different copperplate inscriptions of the Hindu kings, belonging to the Puṣyavarman, Sālastambha and Brahmapāla dynasties and ruling Kāmarūpa from the 4th to the 12th century. These inscriptions are all written in a high style of Sanskrit. They are the proof that a high Hindu culture and civilisation held the land. Yuan-Tsāng himself refers to the fine education and hundreds of deva temples that he saw. It is more probable that Kāmarūpa's 'differing a little' from the language of Magadha "refers to those modifications of Aryan sounds, which now characterise Assamese as well as North and East Bengali dialects" as Dr. Chatterji originally held (*ODBL*, p. 79).

What is of greater importance about these royal inscriptions than their professed Sanskrit is their departures from that language. When Mahāmahopādhyāya Padmanath Bhattacharya Vidyāvinod brought out the first collection of ten grants in his *Kāmarūpa-śāsanāvalī* (Rungpore, 1853 Śaka), he marked these departures, ascribed them to scribal ignorance and was at pains to "correct" them according to his scholarly idea of Sanskrit. Scholars, however, are now agreed that these forms not conforming to Sanskrit, instead of being taken as slips or lapses are to be considered as indications of local speech habits or "Prakritisms".

Professor Chatterji (*ODBL*, app. C, pp. 181-ff) studied some of the place-names occurring in the Nidhanpur inscription of Bhāskaravarman (7th cent.), the Tezpur rock-inscription of Harjaravarman (early 9th cent.), the Nowgong inscription of Balavarman (c. 975), the Gauhati inscription of Indrapāla (c. 1050), etc., with a view to finding modern forms. Kaliram Medhi (*Assamese Grammar and Origin of the Assamese Language*, Gauhati, 1936, pp. lxxiii-lxxx) finds "Assamese words" appearing in the copperplate inscriptions of Kāmarūpa. In a paper, 'Place and personal names in the early land grants of Assam,' Dr Banikanta Kakati connects some of these names with modern Assamese forms and Boḍo, Khasi, Mundaṁ Santoli words. Professor Dr. Beni Madhab Barua in a valuable note ('The scribe-engravers of Indrapāla's second copper-plate and Prākṛt of pre-Āhom times', *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XXIII, no. 3, September 1947, pp. 242-247) examined some of the non-Sanskrit forms in the inscriptions and regretted that Padmanath Bhattacharya "has done some amount of disservice by going to offer us a vulgate edition of the texts in Sanskrit". Barua sought to conclude : "The pre-Āhom inscriptions of Kāmarūpa contain a few other instances of Prakritism that may be taken to indicate the nature and form of the dialect as current in those times, say from the 6th to the 12th century A. D., I mean the Prākṛt language in the historical background of Assamese. The archaic forms crept in these records and held their rightful place through the inadvertence on the part of the local composers, or that of the local scribe-engraver, or that of both, in spite of the conscious attempt made for producing the legal

documents, the land-grants in authentic Sanskrit". Dimbeswar Neog (*The Origin and Growth of the Asamīyā Language,* Gauhati, 1964, pp. 43-56) makes exhaustive lists of instances of Prākritism available in the inscriptions and calls them "trails of Kāmarūpa Prākṛt since about the sixth century" as against "the illusion of Māgadhī Prākṛt as the parent of modern Asamīyā, so also of Bengali and Oriyā probably, for that matter." There is thus at least a case for attempting to reconstruct a picture of the Prākṛt as prevalent in Kāmarūpa in the second half of the first millenium in the historical background of Assamese which evolvc about the close of the period.

The literary Prākṛts do not record the actual spoken dialects of the various dialect areas ; but the literary specimens at least help us to characterise the process of change and simplification which were going on through the centuries. The comparative survey of all the MIA records beginning from the Proto-Prākṛt stage down to the emergence of the NIA is sure to give a vivid and descriptive account of the historical course of the Indo-Aryan. A student working on the growth and development of a modern Aryan language cannot overlook the history of the development of the MIA dialects. This does not mean, however, that each and every form and feature of our vernacular are traceable to the earlier period ; there are innovations, and in the event of falling into disuse and subsequent loss of a syntactic morpheme, a new one may be reconstructed, or a native form might have gained predominance. The future tense sign, *-b*, for example, did not come to the NIA from its OIA counterpart through MIA. The Magadhan future

sign, *-b*, is, however, based on an OIA gerundive (*-tavya*), which was not inherited directly, but through the process of change that had been operating in MIA; but this Magadhan tense sign is distinct from its Hindī counterpart. Assamese pluralising suffix *-hãt* might, as B. M. Barua suggests, be connected with *henta* as found in the Guwākuchi inscription of Indrapāla and this is probably derived from the present participle plural of √*as*. *si*=he, *si-hãt*=they. But the Ass. pluralising suffix *-bor* might not have come from *bahala* or *bhuri* as some authors would like to suggest. *-bor* might be same word as Khasi-*bhor*, as Dimbeswar Neog suggested. A comparable form of the other suffix *-bilāk* is found in Gāro (*polāk*, *bolāk*) (S. Biswas 'The number and function words, *Journal of the University of Gauhati*).

B. M. Barua classifies the instances of Prakritism to find out rules to generalise different formations. The phenomena he notes are[1] :

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1 The abbreviations used indicate the following copperplate inscriptions reproduced in *Kāmarūpa-śasanāvalī* except the Khanāmukh grant of Dharmapāla, which was edited by P. D. Chaudhury in the *Journal of the Assam Research Society*[c] VIII. 4, pp. 117ff.

B ... the Nowgong charter of Balavarman, 8th cent.

BhN ... the Nidhanpur charter of Bhāskaravarman, early 6th cent.

Dh$_1$ ... the Śubhaṅkarapāṭaka charter of Dharmapāla, 12th cent.

Dh$_2$ ... the Puṣpabhadrā charter of Dharmapāla, 12th cent.

DhKh ... the Khanāmukh charter of Dharmapala, 12th cent.

1. The shortening of long vowels :

a < ā	Vājasaneyi		Vājasaneyī	(BhN[106])
	Savitra	<	Sāvitra	(BhN[104])
	caturbhaga	<	caturbhāgaḥ	(BhN[108])
i < ī	Taittiriya	<	Taittirīya	(BhN[13])
	Gāyatripāla	<	Gāyatrīpāla	(BhN[119])
	Dhṛtīsvāmi	<	Dhṛtisvāmī	(BhN[82])
u < ū	mayura	<	mayūra	(BhN[50])
	sunu	<	sūnu	(BhN)
o < au	Kośiko	<	Kauśiko	(BhN[126])

2. The shortening of long vowels before conjoint consonants and anusvāra :

a < ā	Chandogya	<	Chāndogya	(BhN)
	Bhaggavo	<	Bhārgavo	(BhN[83])
i < ī	īśvara	<	īśvara	(BhN[67])
i < ai	Śaniścara	<	Śanaiścara	(BhN[129])
u < ū	bhutvā	<	bhūtvā	(BhN)
	murtte	<	mūrtte	(BhN[39])

3. The substitution of one vowel for another :

i < a	puṣkiriṇī	<	puṣkariṇī	(BhN[132] B[49], I, Dh_2)
a < i	upakalpatā	<	upakalpitā	(Bh N[39])
	racatā	<	racitā	(BhN[40])
	Taittarīya	<	Taittirīya	(BhN[113])
u < a	Vājasunayi	<	Vājasaneyī	(BhN[83])
	jagaduduya	<	jagadudaya	(BhN[26])

H ... the Hāyuṅgthul charter of Harjaravarman, 9th cent.

I_1 ... the Gauhati charter of Indrapala, 11th cent.

I_2 ... the Guwākuchi charter of Indrapāla, 11th cent.

Barua cites udupāna (Aśoka's R. E. I. for udapāna.

ai < e	daive	<	deve (BhN), Contrary to MIA; of śela (śaila) in *Vajjālagga*
a < ṛ	vaha	<	vṛha (BhN); cf. MIA, at least Aśokan magh (mṛga) as in the Girnār inscription
a < e	cehada	<	chedaḥ (BhN[129])
a < u	Sanayana	<	Sunayana (BhN[115])
a < o	Yaśabhuti	<	Yasobhuti (BhN[14]) (This last means dropping of the visarga in the sandhi,)

4. The dropping of *y* before *i* :

	śāsaitā	<	śasayitā (BhN), although we have lekhayitā and Prāpayitā in the same grant.
	dolāitam	<	dolāyi- (B) tam

There do not seem to be any sort of phonetic abbreviations.

R ... the Bargāon charter of Ratnapāla, 11th cent.

V ... the Tezpur charter of Vanamāla (Śālastambha dynasty), 9th cent.

5. The dropping of *y* in consonantal combinations :

mātsanyāya	<	mātsyanyāya	(BhN)
Lakṣmā	<	Lakṣmyā	(I_2)
Kāśapa	<	Kaśyapa	(BhN)

cf. Kalāṇa (kalyāṇa) as in the Girnar inscription.

6. The absence of sandhi :

-i+a = ia		Hariadbhuta	(BhN[81])
-o+a = oa		tebhyo aksarāṇi	(BhN[139])
-n+e = ne		asmineva	(I_1)

7. The dropping of the initial vowel of the second word in a sandhi :

i+e = i-		payanti va	(H)

8. The dropping of visarga in a sandhi :

Yaśabhūti

9. Samprasarana : siri < śrī (I_2)

Bāhavṛca < Bāhvṛcya (BhN[13])

10. Padmanath Bhattacharya observes that generally anusvāra and visarga had worn out in the inscriptions. Barua makes note of the following changes of anusvāra :

ṁ (followed by s, ś and h) > ṅ :

puṅsam	<	puṁsām	(BhN) ; Balavarman's Nowgong plates, 22)
yaśāṅsi	<	yaśāṁśi	(BhN)
mīmāṅsā	<	mīmāṁsā	(Dh_2)
aṅsa	<	aṁśa	(BhN)

ṁ (final) > n : amalaṁ > amalan

yauvanaṁ > yauvanan

ṁ (feminine genitive) dropped :

Dattadevyāṁ	>	Dattadevyā	(BhN)
ratnavatyāṁ	>	ratnavatyā	(BhN)

11. There is a tendency, Barua points out, to change *as* into an *o* as in Pāli :

nāgebhyo < nāgebhyaḥ

Chāndogo < Chāndogaḥ

This is a non-Magadhan trait.

12. Barua cites an instance of assimilation, which is the same as in Pāli : *Pradyunna* < *Pradyumna* (BhN), the Pāli being *Pajjunna*, and observes the tendency to do away with (*reph*) (r) in all cases of assimilation as in Pāli :

suvaṇṇa < suvarṇa (BhN)

puṇṇa < pūrṇa (BhN)

There are other assimilations :

rya > jja vījja < vīrya (I_1)

tsa > ccha vacchare < vatsare (Dhkh)

13. There are many instances of the substitution of one consonant for another :

g > k	abhikāmika	< abhigāmika	(BhN)
d > t	Bhaṭṭinanta	< Bhaṭṭinanda	(BhN)
t > d	Ananda	< Ananta	(BhN)
j > y	yāyeta	< jayeta	(R)

14. There is dropping of *t* or *ṭ* in a consonantal sandhi, in which it is followed by another consonant :

ujvalam	<	ujjvalam	(BhN)
sampatyu-pāta	<	sampat-tyupāta	(BhN)
satva	<	sattva	(BhN)
bhavatasya	<	bhavattasya	(BhN)
kuṭimam	<	kuṭṭimam	

15. There is doubling of *t*, as in *stitti* < *sthiti* (BhN)

16. There is the euphonic advent of consonants in the middle of words :

āmra > āmvra	(B)	
Lakṣmī-sama	Lakṣmī-s-sama	(BhN)
Kamalavāsinī-ni iva,	divākara-m-iva	(H)

17. One sibilant is at random subsituted for another as in Aśokan dialect of Kalsi, Mansehra and Shahbazgarhi" :

darṣita	<	darśita	(BhN)
śakala	<	sakala	(I_1)
jyotisā	<	jyotiṣā	(I_2)
duskara	<	duṣkara	(I_2)
vaṅsa	<	vaṁśa	(I_2)
Satakratu	<	Śatakratu	(Dh_1)
sasāsa	<	śaśāsa	(Dh_1)
saśvat	<	śaśvat	(Dh_1)
addhaśotaḥ	<	arddhasrotaḥ	(Dh_2)
Aslāyana	<	Āslāyana	

These instances go counter to the rule in Māgadhī of all sibilants converging on palatal *ś*. In Assamese the sibilants are distinguished as an unvoiced guttural spirant (X) except in combination. Dr. Chatterji takes *pravista* for *praviṣṭa* in the Tezpur rock inscription of Harjara-varman as "showing Assamese confusion of the cerebrals and dentals as early as the 9th century" (*ODBL,* p. 182).

B. M. Barua points out certain other peculiarities of the language of the Kāmarūpa inscriptions :

"*balavanto* in H for *balavān*, Pāli *valavā*, is a form which is very common in Assamese, cf. Pāli *mahanto*, Bengali *śrīmanta*, Assamese and Chittagong dialect

śirmanta, guṇavanta, buddhimanta, Lakkhimanta". Cf. Pāli *Theragāthā*, verse 1050 : gatimanto satimanto dhitimanto. ca yo isi."

dummarī (as in the original) or "*dumbarī*, for Sk. *udumbara*, Bengali *ḍumur* (a fig tree), too, is a local word." It is *ḍumaru, ḍimaru* in modern Assamese. Other non-Sanskrit names of trees pointed out by Barua are :

parali, parul Sanskrit patali ; cf. jatali (BhN) mod. Bg. jarul ākhoṭa (Dh_1)

odi-amma (Dh_1), which, Barua thinks, is a kind of margo, but is probably to be equated to mod. uriām, uḍiām, a kind of tree, kṇṭāvakkada.

D. Neog adds to the list of trees the following :

āmba < Sanskrit āmra (B, I_1)

suvarṇadāru (B, Dh) possibly a Sanskritisation of sonaru (B)

jati, (B), jhari pākaṭī (Dh_1), mod. As. jaḍī jarī and pākari.

hijjala, mod. As. hijal, hidal ($R_{1,2}$)

Bhallābhiṭhi (Dh^1) as the name of a plot of land is interesting, as in the Kamrup district *bhiṭhā, bhiṭhi* is still used to mean basti land (Sanskrit *bhitta, bhitti*) ; cf Porābhiṭhi (old name of Barpeṭā) *Pitṛbhiṭhā* (ancestral plot of land, the name of a novel),

jola (Dh2, I2, etc), joli (Dh2, etc.), 'a stream' are frequently seen in several inscriptions, and is the same as mod. Assamese *juli* (Dhekiyājuli) and *juri*. It is found in a later inscription (M. Neog, 'The Nīlacala inscription of a unknown kāmarūpa king, *J. U. G.*, vol. XXVII). Kakati cites *S*antali *jola*, 'a shallow or marsh.'

The scribe-engravers are called *sekyakāra* (BhN), which Barua considers to have been just a sanskritized form of a local word, and *taṭṭhakāra* (Dh2). "According to Prof. S. K. Chatterji *sekya-kāra* for **sekka-kāra-*, whence Bengali *sekrā* (through a spoken Prākṛt *sekka-ara,*)=goldsmith *sekka* is a borrowed word from Iran, meaning 'die', 'stamp for coining,' and then 'engraving,' on metal' : it is the same word as Arabic *sekkah* (*sikkathun*, to give the full form in Classical Arabic). Arabic *sikkah* (*sikkathun*) and Middle Persian * *sikka, sikka*, which we find borrowed in India by 630 A. D.. are both derived from the Aramaic, *sykt*= 'die'." "Prof. S. K. Chattterji suggests that here *taṭṭhakāra*, 'maker of tatthas' : *taṭṭha,* or *tattha,* is a Persian borrowing from Middle Persian (and Modern Persian) *tashṭ* = 'plate'. 'metal salve', This became Indianized as *taṭṭha, tattha,* whence modern Bengali *ṭāṭ*= 'copper-plate'. *taṭṭhakāra* gives Modern Indo-Aryan thathera, *ṭhāṭari* of *thāṭari-bāzār* in Dacca town and, *ṭhaṭherī-bāzār* in Benares town, where the metal workers congregate."

Barua asserts that the expression, samprāpte Bhagadatte Śrīmat-Prāgjyotiṣādhināthatvam (V), corrected by the Vidyavinod to samprāpto Bhagadatto....., had behind it such an oft-recurring Pali Jātaka idiom as *Brahmadatte rajjam karante*, which is a locative absolute.

The features as enumerated above must have been a reflection of the Aryan tongue prevalent in Kāmarūpa, which "differed a little" from the language of Magadha, as noted by Yuan-Tsang. It will have been seen that these features do not conform absolutely to Magadhi or any other formalised Prākṛt. Overlapping the period of the inscriptions we have the Buddist *Caryā,*

songs, written between the ninth and the twelfth century in Kāmarūpa or, at least in the eastern region. The language has been claimed by Bengal, Assam, Mithila, Orissa, etc. as their own. Dr Chatterji calls the langnage Old Bengali." "The language of the Caryās seems to be based on a West Bengal dialect" rather than on a East Bengal one (*ODBL*, p. 117). "The language is not 'Prākṛt' or 'Apabhramśa' as it has been urged by some, since it shows simplification of the MIA double consonants (dhama < dhamma < dharma, jāma < jamma < Janma, tāntī < tantī < tantri, bāṭa < * vaṭṭa vartma, ...) and has developed some genuine Bengali morphological forms. It is not 'Magadhi' i. e., Magahi, because no specifically Magahi characteristic is traceable, and the verb system is as yet primitive" (p. 118). "But the influence of the śaurasenī Apabhaṅsa was very great on it : and occasionally of Sanskrit and the literary Prākṛts of the second MIA period" (p. 115). The past in *-ia* (more probably *-ila* in these places) and sharingly in *-iu* and *-u*, pronominal forms like *jo*, *so*, *ko*, *jasu*, *tasu*, pronominal adverbs *jima*, *tima* and pronominal adjectives *jaisana*, *taisana*. *jaiso* are from Śaurasenī Apabhraṁśa. Echoes of the old literary Prākṛts of the West are also seen ; e. g. the *-o* affix ; stray instrumental feminine in *-ia* (*samahia* < *samādhya*); retention of double consonants in a few cases, and occasional form like *kim pi* < *kim api* (pp. 115-16).

On the other hand, as Dr. Banikanta Kakati observers, certain phonological and morphological peculiarities here have come down in an unbroken continuity to modern Assamese. The peculiar shortening of an anterior *-a-* before a following *-a-* in the next or a succeeding syllable appears in the *Caryās* for the first

time ; e. g., *pakhā* (pakṣa), *cakā* (*cakra*), *bhaṇḍāra* = mod. *bhãrāl* (*bhāṇḍāgāra*), in all these cases Bengali withstanding the shortening. Certain morphological characteristics are the same here as in modern Assamese ; viz., dative case-ending in *lai* (kula-lai, meru-śikharalai); locative ending in *-ta* (saṅkamata, bāṭata hāḍita); genitive ending in *-ra* (sasara, abidara). The present participle in *-ant-* (Early As. -ant-, mod. -ōt- ; e. g. paḍante, jāante, burante), conjunctions in *-i*, *ile* (suni, dekhi, carile) are also genuinely Assamese (*Assamese— Its Formation and Development*, § 15).

Morphemic variants, however, seem to compete with each other in the language of the *Caryās* and tend to indicate the dialect features of the later Magadhan dialects. The pronominal *mai*, 'I', as found in Assamese and East Bengal dialects, find a variant, *āmi* <*amhe*, 'I', as in Bengali. There are other competing forms as well.

The simplification of the MIA assimilated conjuncts is a common feature in NIA. The change followed by compensatory lengthening was not complete in the language of the *Caryās* ; e. g.... *dhāma* (22, 44, 5) < *dharma*, *kāpura* (10, 28) < *karpūra ;* but *andhāra* (21, 50), which is *āndhār* in Assamese and *ādhār* in Bengali. This may have been a case of phonetic interruption by vowel dissimilation, which has continued in Assamese *cāk* < MIA *cakka* < *cakra* (mod. As., *mau-cāk*, bee-hive), although we have *cakā* (caryā 14).

yā > *ia* forms in absolutives became more prominent in MIA in place of Skt. *-tvā*, so that kṛ-*tvā* became *kṛ-y*a* > *karia* (*Caryā*). The dropping of the final *a* in Assamese and the addition of a definitive *ā*

in Bengali to give *kari* and *kariyā* respectively are dialect features.

In MIA the various declensions of OIA were gradually converging to one type, and this tendency was evident in Aṣokan inscriptions. In Assamesē as in other NIA languages the declension types were levelled. The paradigmatic signs for nominal inflexion are more or less morphologically similar in the Magadhan languages. The dative in *-lai* has already been noticed. The Early Assamese post-position *hante*, = *sante*, standing for the ablative, seems to have been a present participle form of *√ās* used in absolute construction ; see Mādhava Kandali, bhaya sante nṛpatira śiharila gāwa' 'Fear being, the king's body shivered.' The modern post-position for the ablative, *parā*, may be the same as Skt.-Old Presian *parā* (away, forth). Dr. Kakati takes it as the strengthened form of *par* (OIA pare > *pari, par).

It is interesting to note that the indirect object with *-k* of Assamese is fully established in the *Caryās* ; but it is used with nouns only, whereas the pronouns have the *-re* ending (thākurak, kāhere), which is now used in Bengali. *ka*-genitives, on the other hand, are found in the *Caryās* as well as in Early Assamese and Bengali, although it was not much favoured. The suffix has been variously explained. It may have derived from a post-positional *kṛta* ; hasta-kṛta pustaka > hāthaka pustaka ; hāthaka darpaṇa (Vidyāpati) ; chāndaka bandha (Caryā). It is probably non-Magadhan in origin ; it is the standard genitive suffix in Hindī (kā, kī, ke). The usual *ra*-genitive might go back to *kerakam* ; kerakam > keraam > kera (Early Assamese : jākera e guṇa-nāma).

The *ta*-locative of the *Caryās* persists in modern Assamese, while *hi* and *hi* in them disappear except in the artificial Assamese Brajabuli (caraṇahi).

In MIA the passive past participle assumed the function of the finite past and lost the passive sense in the late MIA. But in the *Caryās*, the *ta|ita*-past retains the passive sense (amhe jhāne diṭhā, Carya 1, i. e., asmābhiḥ dhyānena dṛṣṭaḥ). The Magadhan languages did not retain this past tense ; the *I*-past of Assamese-Bengali-Oriya is fully established in the *Caryās* ; it is probably a phonemic variant of the same suffix ; *ta* > *ḍa* > *la*. See *deta* (caryā 8), 'gave' ; *gāiḍa*, 'sang' ;*samāiḍa* (caryā 2). Where, however, Dr. Sen would seek to read *gāin*, *samāin*, against the manuscript reading.

Assamese, Bengali and Oriya have almost the same types of verbal conjugation ; the difference lies only in the use of personal terminations. In the conditional past, however, Assamese has retained the Apabhraṁśa principle *traikālye śatṛ*. In the *Caryās* the present participle of the verb is used : *keli karanta*, *beni bāṭa bahanta ;* but in the Assamese the present participle of √*as*, *santa*=*henta*=*hēt*, is added to the different tense forms of the principal verb : *karīlo-hēten*, *karile-hēten*.

In this paper, brief as it is, attention has been drawn to indicate the relationship between MIA and Assamese through stages relevant to the geographical position of the latter, so that the native and non-Aryan elements in Assamese remain outside the scope of thestudy.

We have cited above a number of instances of Prakṛitism, woven conciously or unconsciously into

the Sanskrit text of the inscriptions of Bhāskaravarman and other Kāmarūpa kings, whose reign ranged from the 6th to the 12th century A. D. We may be liking to call them a 'madness' ; but we must also say that there is much 'method in that madness'. These departures from the Sanskrit norm betray quite striking non-Magadhan traits, of which ones particularly to be noted are : (i) In the instances cited we have all the three sibilants with the dental tending to dominate a little ; and this would run counter to the rule *ṣaso śah* (Hc. xi. 3) in Magadhi, while we have only an unvoiced guttural spirant, *x*, in modern Assamese in place of all the three sibilants. (ii) *r* never turns into *l*. (iii) The substitution of *k* for *g* and *t* for *d* (abhikāmika, bhaṭṭinanta) is rather on line with Paiśāchī (bhakavatī, matano, tāmodaro). To have *d* for *t* in the one rare case (*ananda* for *ananta*, which might very well be *ānanda*) is a Śaurasenī feature, whereas in Magadhi *t* is not changed to *d* as in that dialect ; nor is it dropped as in Mahārāṣṭrī. Prākṛt. (iv) In Magadhi nominative singular of masculine of words ending in *-a* is obtained by substituting *-e* for *-a* (Hc. iv 287—*eṣaḥ* > *eśe*, *meṣaḥ* > *meśe*, *puruṣaḥ* > *puliśe*) ; but in the instances before us we have the singular nominative in *-o* as in Prākṛts in general. I would just like to place before the eminent Prākṛt scholars and linguists present in this Seminar the question whether the postulation of the author of *The Origin and Growth of the Asamiya Language* of an early Kāmarūpa Prākṛt whence the NIA Assamese emerged may be accepted with confidence.

So far as the Caryā songs, which I have also noticed are concerned, as Dr. Jules Bloch has said,

it is eastern only because it is found in eastern texts, but is not eastern if it is linguistically considered. Dr. Chatterji has noted that it is not Māgadhī, but it bears influences of Śaurasenī Apabhraṁśa and "occasionally of Sanskrit and the literary Prākṛts of the second MIA period." Dr. Sukumar Sen would consider these Śaurasenī Apabhraṁśa traits rather as Avahaṭṭha, which succeeded Sanskrit as the language par excellence of the whole of India at a time (intro. to his edition of *Caryāgītipadāvalī*, Burdwan, 1956). Dr. Banikanta Kakati in his *Assamese—Its Formation and Development* occasionally points out morphological and phonological peculiarities of modern Assamese which would not lend themselves to an explanation by Māgadhī standards. It, therefore, remains to be considered if we can imagine the existence of proto-Assamese stage which would not be Magadhan in all aspects.

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BUDDHISM AND ITS RELATION TO CHINESE RELIGIONS

W. PACHOW

University of Iowa, U. S. A.

I. The religious trends in early China

Buddhism was the earliest foreign religion which was introduced to China in the first century C. E. Being a pioneer, its philosophical tenets, religious organization and practice were not known to the Chinese before. In the initial stage, it attracted the attention of men of high position like Prince Ying[1] of Ch'u and Moutzu, althoguh both of them did not understand the Buddhist doctrine very correctly. This was due to the fact that the Prince was deeply interested in magical arts and the worship of spirits. He believed that Buddhism was a branch of the Taoist cult. Possibly he was influenced by the popular story that the Buddha appeared in a dream[2] to Emperor Ming-ti of the Han dynasty in the form of a golden man. From this one may gauge his knowledge concerning Buddhism. In the case of Moutzu, he regarded the doctrine of Karma or cause and effect to be the same as the continuity of the soul.[3] It was a misinterpretation of the doctrine of Anatta or non-

1. T'ang Yung-tung, Han-wei-liang-tsin-nan-pei-ch'ao-fu-chiao-shih or History of Buddhism in the Han, Wei, Western Tsin, Eastern Tsin, Southern and Northern dynasties, p. 153.

2. T'ang, op. cit. p. 17.

3. T'ang, op. cit. pp. 73-79 and 88.

soul. If the understanding of the well-known supporters of Buddhism like these two, could be superficial to such an extent, naturally, one cannot expect anything better from the masses at that time. On account of this, when great Buddhist missionaries like An Shih-kao,[4] Fu Tu-teng, Kumārajīva, Buddhabhadra and others reached China at different intervals, they were regarded as magicians for their unusual skill to interpret the language of the birds, to cause the growth of a blue lotus from a begging bowl, to predict the arrival of foreign boats from India, to make damp ashes float on the surface of water and many other surprising magical feats. There were only a few learned scholars who showed great respect to their learning and pure conduct in the observance of the Vinaya or discipline. Besides, their secular knowledge of astronomy, geography, the cosmic principles of Yin and Yang and the five elements, the preparing of the calendar, the interpreting of prophecies and the art of healing was considered to be their normal training and qualifications, althogh secular[5] learning was not encouraged by the Buddha. The fact that Kao-seng-chuan or the Biographies of Eminent Buddhist Teachers repeatedly publicised the unique achievement of performing magical feats leads us to suspect that there must be a certain motive behind it. Looking deeper into the matter, we notice that supernatural powers ascribed to these teachers coincided with the traditional Chinese belief of immortality. This is illustrated in the

4. Kao-seng-chuan or Biographies of Eminent Buddhist Monks, *Taisho*, Vol. 50, pp. 322 ff.

5. The Brahmajala-Sutra, *The Sacred Books of the Bddhists*, Vol. II pp. 16-26.

cases of the Han magicians[6] such as Li Shao-chün, Shao-ong, Luan-ta and Hsu Fu who were supposed to be able to command the spirits and ghosts, to reach the Fairy Islands and gather the life-giving herbs for preparing a concoction so that one may become an immortal.[7] On the basis of this observation and since Buddhism was regarded as a branch of Taoism, it was able to gain a footing on Chinese soil. Hence, it received friendly treatment from the Chinese public in its initial stage.

Doctrinally, there is a great similarity between the two religions. The Buddhist concept of leading a life of purity, having no desires for worldly pleasure and being freed from moral blemish is not much different from that of Leotzu's taking no notice of a sage[8] and his wisdom, and remaining in inactivity and self-contentment. We are also aware of the fact that the story of Laotzu's mission to India[9] to convert the Buddha had a profound influence on the Chinese masses who believed that Gautama Buddha was the disciple of Laotzu. That being so, Buddhism was identified with Taoism. But on the other hand, it was due to the

6. T'ang, op. cit. pp. 51-53.

Wang Chih-hsin, Chung-kuo-tsung--chiao-ssu-hsiang- shih-ta-kang or A Brief History of Chinese Religious Thought, pp. 68-69 and 74-5 ; Kenneth K. S. Ch'en, Buddhism in China, pp. 25-27.

7. D. Howard Smith, *Chinese Religions*, p. 99.

8. W. T. Chan (tr.), The way of Lao Tzu, ch. 19 and ch. 75.

9. T'ang, op. cit. pp. 59-60.

W. Pachow, "Laotzu and Gautama Buddha, an enquiry into the authenticity of Laotzu's mission to India", *S. Paranavitan's Commemoration Volume*, Peradeniya, Ceylon, 1965.

striking similarity between Taoism and Buddhism that the latter was enabled to spread far and wide in China in its early years. This is the other side of the coin, we need not feel shy or uneasy about it.

II. Its relation to the state

During its existence in China for a period of nearly two thousand years, occasionally Buddhism received harsh treatment and persecution[10] from several emporors bearing the title of 'Wu'. It began with Emperor T'ai Wu-ti (424-450) of the Northern Wei dynasty, then he was followed by Emperor Wu-ti (561-578) of the Northern Chou dynasty, Emperor Wu-tsung (840-846) of the T'ang dynasty and Emperor Shih-tsung (954-959) of the Later Chou dynasty. During the periods of persecution Buddhism suffered immense damage and great humiliation. However, this does not mean that the Buddhist kept quiet without showing any sign of protest. Actually many of them did register their protest, even at the risk of their lives. Take for instance, Hui-yüan, an eminent Buddhist teacher who wrote a learned treatise pleading in favour of not paying homage to the king when Huan Hsuan, prime minister of the Eastern Tsin dynasty (317-420) was carrying out a purge of the Buddhist Sangha. This is a complicated topic involving many causes and factors which may be summed up as follows :

(1) The Chinese think that they are the descendants of the Yellow Emperor ; that they have a glorious civilization for thousands of years and that they have also long ago left the primitive ways of the cave man

10. Chiang Wei-ch'iao, Chung-kuo-fu-chiao-shih or History of Buddhism in China, ch. 5, pp. 36-39.
T'ang op. cit. pp. 493 and 538.

and entered into a civilized world, where man wears silk dresses, eats tasty meat dishes and stays in palatial buildings. Further, holding the view that China was situated in the center of the Earth, they regard its neighbours as barbarous, uncivilized and unable to contribute anything worthwhile to Chinese learning. As Buddhism came from India which was a country of the barbarians, and as Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhism was an Indian, he was of course a deity of the barbarians. How could it be possible for the civilized to adopt a religion of the uncivilized ? Under these circumstances, if China is to be restored to its pristine purity of the virtues of ancient sages and sage-kings such as Yao, Shun, Y'd and T'ang (ca. 2536-1766 B. C.), the first step in this direction is to reject any institution of a foreign origin. When this was put into effect, Buddhism was the first victim. This trend of national superiority is clearly seen in the official statement made by K'ou Ch'ien-chih[12] who was a Taoist teacher of Emperor T'ai Wu-ti (424-470) of the Northern Wei dynasty. Unfortunately this sparked off the first persecution of Buddhism in China. On account of their national pride, the Chinese were unable to tolerate the culture of a foreign nation, therefore, all foreign elements were subjected to unkind treatment and rejection. Consequently Buddhism was the chief target of attack.

(2) Considering the sayings of Laotzu such as "The Tao constantly does nothing, but everything is done"[13],

11. See Life of Hui-yuan, Kao-seng-chuan, ch. 6 *Taisho*, Vol. 50, p. 322f.

12. T'ang, op. cit. pp. 493-494.

13. Tao-te-ching, ch. 37 :
Fung Yu-lan, Chung-kuo-che-hsuch-shih or History of Chinese philosphy, Vol. I p. 224.

and "Man models himself after Earth, Earth models itself after Heaven, Heaven models itself after Tao and Tao models itself after Nature,"[14] as found in the Tao-te-ching, there is a certain amount of philosophical and metaphysical elements. They deserve our deep respect and admiration. But Taoists of the Han, Wei, and Tsin dynasties (from the second century B. C. to the fifth century) like Chang Tao-lin,[15] Wei Po-yang, Kao Hung and Tao Hung-ching were of a different type. The first person mentioned in the list claimed that Laotzu was the founder of Taoism and hence he established the Taoist cult of Five-Bushels-of-Rice;[16] the rest contributed generously to the final formation of the Taoist sects of Alchemy and Amulets. The theory and practice of these sects are very superficial and not of much value to society. At the most one may say that their function is similar to that of a shaman or an old-fashioned physician. Consequently the ancient emperors and kings who either attended a religious ceremony for the purpose of receiving a sacred text on magic, and then called himself the True-King-of-the-Peace,[17] or held to the belief that Loatzu was their ancestor and, therefore, a posthumous title called "The Mysterious Primordial Emperor"[18] was conferred on that great philosopher. It seems this was not enough. In order to demonstrate their filial piety for the great ancestor young princesses of the royal house of the T'ang dynasty (7th-9th century) were

14. Chan (tr.), op. cit. ch. 25.

15. Wang, op. cit. pp. 75-77.

16. Chiang, op. cit. pp. 33; Tung-han-tsung-chiao-shih or Religious history of the Eastern Han dynasty, pp. 66-77.

17. T'ang, op. cit. p. 494.

18. Chiang, op. cit. ch. 15, p. 9.

ordered to join the Taoist Church and became female Taoists. By this means they blissfully believed that they could attain immortality. We are not sure as to the final attainment of their goal. But one thing is clear, that is to say, Taoism gained the status of a national religion of China in the Northern Wei and T'ang dynasties, whereas Buddhism and Confucianism were in a subordinate position.

On other occasions emperors of warious dynasties used to convene conferences in order to discuss the superiority[19] of the three existing religions in China, viz., Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism, and accordingly seates of precedenee would be allocated to them on official functions. This measure was apparently a white-wash, because they regarded Buddism as a foreign religion which meant that it could not possibly amount to anything worthwhile. To them it was obvious that Taoism or Confucianism should occupy the first position. In other words, from the standpoint of national pride and the preservation of national culture Budhism should be looked down upon and it deserved the third and the last position, because it was a foreign religion.

(3) Contrasting most sharply with the traditional Chinese culture is the relationship between Budhism and conservative Confucianism. They look like ice and burning coal, and therefore, there is hardly any possibility of a compromise. These Confucianists talk about the observance of social relations,[20] that there

19. T'ang, op. cit. p. 541.

20. James Legg (tr.), *Confncian Analects*, Book 12, ch. 12; *The Work of Mencius*, Book IV, part I, ch. 30.; *The Works af Mencius*, Book III, part I, ch. 4.

should be love between the parents and children, justice between the sovereign and subjects.....and distinctive duties between the husband and wife. They also lay great emphasis on the teaching of "Of the three infilial sins, the one being without a son is the worst." and 'Everyone within the empire, including those who live in the remotest corner, is a subordinate to the king.'[21] and many other Confucian ethics. They regard the family to be the basic unit of society. It is the duty of every man to observe the filial piety[22] while at home and fulfil one's obligations in respect of his country. If a person renounces the world and becomes a Buddhist mendicant, it means that he is infilial and disloyal to his parents and the state by neglecting his obligations and duties. Further, according to the Confucian definition of the word 'subject,'[23] it appears that anybody who lives within the boundary of a country is a subject, and he is obliged to pay allegiance to the king. Accordingly a mendicant is also a subject, and therefore he should pay homage to him, too. Owing to this interpretation there arose the question of whether or not a Buddhist monk should salute the emperor. Had it been in India, the question would be whether the parents should or should not worship there children who had entered the Buddhist monastic Order. As customs differ from country to country,

21. The Work of Mencius, Book IV, part I, ch. 4. In quoting the Book of Poetry, it says ;

"Under the whole heaven,
To the boarders of the land,
Every spot is the sovereign's ground ;
Every individual is the sovereign's minister (subject)."

22. *Confucian Analects*, Book 12. ch. 11.

23. See note 21 above.

there exists an entanglement and confusion of misunderstanding which is beyond the comprehension of ordinary man. It may be imagined that when Buddhism was first introduced to China, it had experienced great difficulty and hindrance on account of the differences of national traditions and customs.

However, after a length of time, Buddhism was able to overcome these tremendous obstacles. It was not only highly honoured by the kings, ministers, the intelligentsia and the masses, but throughout the ages eminent and outstanding Buddhist teachers were produced by the Sangha, and the teaching of the Buddha was able to spread extensively in all directions. The various series of Kao-seng-chuan[24] or the Biographies of Eminent Buddhist Monks can be cited as evidence in this respect. The popularity of Buddhism may be due to its profound philosphy, boundless compassion or universal love, religious ceremonies including Buddhist art and sculpture and the organization of the Sangha. It was also due to the translation of two popular Buddhist texts, viz., "The Sūtra on the Original Vows of Kṣitigarbha Bodhisattva"[25] and "The Ullampana Sūtra." The former describes the Bodhisattva's visit to the land of Darkness to rescue his mother who was undergoing painful sufferings and the latter concerned itself over the salvation of the departed and helpless souls. When these Buddhist stories became popular they made a deep impression on the people so much so, that they were inclined to think that Buddhism also showed interest in filial piety. Thus it was in no way

24. *Taisho* Nos. 2059, 2060, 2061 and 206 2.

25. *Taisho* No. 412.

against the Confucian ethics, but it would, on the other hand, help improve the morality of the people.

(4) Tracing the main cause which led to the enforcement of control over the Sangha by the state, one was the controversy about paying allegiance to the king and the other being the economic drain on society. Han Yu, a Confucian scholar of the T'ang dynasty was a formidable opponent of Buddhism under the second classification. Besides, the Sangha was partially to be blamed for the decadent trends as shown by some of its members. In the fifth century there was a Bhikkhuni by the name of Miao-yin.[26] At that time the members of the royal houshold including some of the kings of the Tsin dynasty (317-420) showered on her honors and respect. Taking advantage of this, she frequented the palace and made alliance with the influential nobles. People who desired favours from these high officials often approached her and made her their intermediary. She, too, was deeply involved in the game for earthly considerations. It is said that the number of people who went to pay her visits amounted to many hundreds per day. Their horse-drawn vehicles, were parked just outside her monastery, and this made the place look like a market square. Should this be correct, then where was the Buddhist principle of observing a life of purity, non-activity, non-attachment and the freedom from worldly possessions ? The unbecoming behaviour of this Bhikkhuni and her associates should be held responsible for bringing disgrace on the Buddhist Sangha. As a sequel there was an official purge for eliminating the undesira-

26. T'ang, op. cit· p. 348.

ble elements. Perhaps the Buddhists have learnt a lesson.

III The contribution of Buddhism to Chinese culture

Buddhism's unique contribution to Chinese culture is, perhaps, in the form of an organized religion and the doctrine of Karma which means good or evil action. Through action one my either be rewarded with a happy birth in heaven or degraded to undergo sufferings in hell. Further by the practice of reciting the names of Amitabha Buddha, the devotees will be born in his Paradise of Bliss called "Sukhavati." This is very easy and simple to practise, therefore, the heavenly paradise is within the the reach of every body. In addition to this, by constructing stupas and monasteries, by making statues and translating Buddhist sacred taxts, it helped introduce to China Indian literature, philosophy, fine arts and architecture on the one hand, and sometimes these objects served as a memorial dedicated to one's departed ancestors or men of distinguished service to the nation on the other. In any case, the awe-inspiring monuments enhance the scenic beauty of a particular locality, it was stated by one of the emperors of the Ch'ing dynasty (1616-1911) that most of the famous mountains in China were occupied by the Buddhist Sangha. It means that wherever there is a beautiful spot, one is sure to find an ancient Buddhist monastery in excellent traditional artchitecture. It is obvious that the daily life of the Chinese people has been directly or indirectly influenced by an atmosphere which is thoroughly saturated with Buddhist culture. According to Poet Po Chu-i

of the T'ang dynasty that even a three-year-old child knows of the Buddhist saying from the *Dharmapada,* "To perform all the good deeds and avoid doing the evil ones." This is definitely an indication of the profound penetration of Buddhism into the Chinese masses. This Buddhist atmosphere has become a part and parcel of Chinese culture so much so, that one could hardly make out any difference in respect of its Indian origin.

Among the Buddhist Schools which were developed in China, the Pure Land, T'ien-t'ai and Ch'an or Zen are essentially Chinese products, although some of their tenets could be traced to the Indian origin. As these schools suit the Chinese temperament and climate so well, they are identified with Chinese orientation. Take the case of Ch'an (Zen), it has done away with the bookish learning, it points to the mind of man in order to see his inner nature and thereby to achieve sudden enlightenment.[27] How simple, bold and straightforward ! This Zen of the Chinese patriarchs which allows one's mind ample freedom, is definitely superior to the Indian traditional Dhyāna or meditation. People call this School the "Chinese Ch'an." As it is tinged with strong Chinese characteristics, it adds splendid glory to Chinese culture.

Among the other contributions made by Buddhism to Chinese culture[28] which may be mentioned here are : the translation of Sanskrit texts, phonology, linguistics, imaginative literature, architecture, sculp-

27. W. Pachow, "Zen Buddhism and Bodhidharma", *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 32, Calcutta, India, 1956.

28. Ch'en, op. cit. p. 471.

ture, painting, astrology, calendar-computing, mathematics and medicine. Morever, in terms of its itfluence on religions of Chinese origin, it caused Taoism and Confucianism to formulate their new concepts and philosphy and bring about a religious systematization. Owing to the limited space one is not permitted to go into details.

Thus we see that Chinese Buddhism, in its initial stage, was a lonely and helpless visitor to the Land of Confucius and Laotzu. For quite a long while it attached itself onto the wagon of Taoism, perhaps with a purpose. But finally it firmly established itself in China and made outstanding contributions to Chinese culture.

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PĀṆINI 3. 4. 87-88 *Vis-à-vis* VEDIC IMPERATIVES IN -SI

G. B. PALSULE
University of Poona

1. There are, mostly in the Ṛgveda, about two dozen verbal forms formed from the bare rootstem in the strong form with a suffix *-si* like *kṣéṣi*, *néṣi* *párṣi*, *yákṣi*, *vákṣi*, *śroṣi* etc[1]. They vary in the frequency of their occurrence, ranging from a single occurrence in some cases (*nakṣi* 5. 24. 1, *bhakṣi* 7. 41.2, *yótsi* 1. 132.4, *rátsi* 5. 10. 1, *śróṣi* 6. 4. 7, *sakṣi* 5. 33. 2, *hoṣi* 6. 44. 14) to no less than thirty seven in the case of *yákṣi*.[2] Leaving aside differences of opinion about the interpretation of individual cases, there is a general agreement, among both ancient commentators and modern scholars, that these forms, as a class, have an imperative value[3].

1. The full list given by Whitney and Macdonell is: *kṣéṣi, jési joṣi (= joṣ-si) darṣi, dhakṣi, nakṣi, neṣi, parṣi, prāsi, bhakṣi, matsi, māsi, yakṣi, yamsi yāsi, yotsi, ratsi, rāsi, vakṣi, véṣi, sroṣi, sakṣi, satsi* and *hoṣi*. Others add a couple of forms more which are of a doubtful nature : *gāsi, cakṣi, staṣi*.

2. Sometimes we get two such froms in one and the same *ṛc*. Thus the oft-repeated line: *ā devān vakṣi yakṣi ca* (RV. 5.26.1, 6.16.2 8.102.16; *vakṣi* and *yakṣi* occur in 2.36.4 and 3.4.1 (*yakṣi* unaccented also). *Jeṣi* and *yotsi* occur in 1.132·4; *yamsi* and *prāsi* in 1.42.9; *yakṣi* and *satsi* in 2.6.8; *vakṣi* and *satsi* in 10.3.7; *neṣi* and *parṣi* in 3.15.3. Rarely we get even three forms in a ṛc. Thus *rāsi, yakṣi* and *vakṣi* occur in 3.4.1; and *parṣi, rāsi* and *véṣi* in 6.4.8.

3. The regular indicative forms of the 2 sing. active of these roots, excepting those of the *ad*-class, follow their own types; *nayasi piparṣi, yājasi, vahasi, sṛṇoṣi* etc. In the roots of the *ad*-class both kinds of forms are naturally identical: *kseṣi, prāsi, yāsi veṣi*. But these latter form only a minority.

Opinion differs among modern scholars as to the historical origin[4] of these Vedic forms and their position in the Indo-European family of languages. I am not going to enter into that question for the present. The present paper has a limited object : to investigate whether the forms in question have been noticed and accounted for by Pāṇini. In this connection P. 3. 4. 87—88 are to be examined. The traditional interpretation of these sūtras, which is uniformly the same from the *Kāśikā* downwards[5] is such as, if accepted, would leave the present category of forms unaccounted for in the Pāṇinian system. I propose to give here a new and straight-forward interpretation of these two sūtras which would show that Pāṇini had taken care of the forms in question.[6]

4. They are generally described in grammars as indicative persons of the root-class, used imperatively, (Whitney, *Sanskrit Grammar,* § 624; Macdonell, *Vedic Grammar,* § 451; and so even by the ancient Sanskrit grammarians who describe the formation as *loḍar the lat)*. It has also been suggested that these forms were made by adding-*i* to the injunctive forms of the root-aorist (*Thurneyen, Kuhns Zeitschrift* 27,176). Renou (*Grammaire la langue vedique,* § 316) similarly looks upon them as an autonomous formation, where an ancient suffix -*s* may have been extended by a deictic -*i*. For recent investigation on this subject see Johanna Nartcn, *Die sigmatischen Aoriste im Veda* (Wiesbaden, 1964), and George Cardona, 'The Vedic imperatives in -*si*', *Language* Vol. 41, No. 1 (1965) where both the writers have come to the conclusion that the forms in question function as part of the sigmate aorist system, correlated with 3. sg. subjunctives in -*sat*- connection between forms like *neṣi* and *neṣat* was noticed by Bhawe also, *Soma-Hymns* III. 148.

5. Patañjali does not comment on these two sūtras.

6. The late Dr. S. S. Bhawe has recently emphasized the necessity of utilising Pāṇini for Vedic interpretation. In his *The Soma-hymns of the Ṛgveda* (Vols. I-III), however, where some of our forms are explained, he does not state the Pāṇinian position *vis-a-vis* these forms. Moreover, he is not consistent in his identification of the forms. Once he describes the forms as 'pres. sing, formations having an imperative sense' (I-7) or simply typically Ṛgvedic non-thematic (imperative) (III.148). Elsewhere he calls them 'sigmatic forms——to be taken in a subjunctive sense' (II.92). Still elsewhere he speaks of 'aor. subj. forms like *neṣi*' (III. 148).

2. The imperative meaning of these forms is an accepted fact. Often the context demands it : the passages concerned contain prayers to gods to conquer enemies, to bring wealth, to carry the singer across difficulties, the request to Agni to bring the gods and to offer sacrifice to them etc. Sometimes the forms in question occur in co-ordination with regular imperatives or similar forms like injunctives.[7] This imperative sense of these forms was already noticed by Yāska who twice (*Nir.* 6. 13 ; 8. 14) paraphrases *yakṣi* (RV. 7. 39. 4 ; 10. 110. 9) by *yaja* and once (*Nir.* 8. 19) *vakṣi* MS 4. 13. 7. etc. by *vaha*. Sāyaṇa[8] also, allowing for difference of opinion in some individual cases, almost always paraphrases these forms by those in the imperative. Modern authorities on Vedic grammar have taken note of the peculiar use of these forms. Modern translators and annotators also like Renou, Geldner

7. Thus RV 1.42.9: *śagdhi pūrdhi pra yaṁsi ca śiśihi prāsy udaram|pṛhṣann iha kratum vidaḥ* contains three regular imperatives and two injuctives. RV 2, 36.4; *ā vakṣi devā iha vipra yakṣi coṣan hotar ni ṣadā yoniṣu triṣu|prati vīhi prasthitam somyaṁ madhu pibā āgnīdhrāt tava bhāgasya tṛpṇuhi* has four imperatives. In RV. 1.75.5 *yakṣi* occurs with *yāja* (twice), the regular imperative from the same root.—— RV 10.3.7: *sa ā vakṣi mahi na ā ca satsi* compared with 10.70.3: *ā devān vakṣi ni sadeha hotā* gives the equation *satsi-sada;* similarly the comparison of RV 1.13.1 *susamiddho na ā vaha devā Agne haviṣmate| hotaḥ pāvaka yakṣi ca* with *ā devān vakṣi yakṣi ca* gives the equation *vakṣi =vaha.-yakṣi* is once contrasted with the indicative *yajasi* (6.48.4) and (unaccented) with the subjunctive *yajāsi* (6.4.1). *parsi and pāraya* occur together in 1.174.9=6.20.12, where *parṣi* occurring in a subordinate clause does not have imperative meaning.

8. Thus: *jeṣi (1.132.4)=jayaḥ naksi (5.24.1)=vyāpnuhi; bhakṣi* (7.41.2)=*dehi;ratsi (5.10.1) = vilikha, kuru; sroṣi (6.4.7)=śṛṇu; pra sakṣi (5.33.2)=parābhava; pra hoṣi (6.44.14)=prajuhudhi.* It is needless to multiply instances.

etc. have accepted their imparative value on the whole.[9] The imperative use of the forms in *-si* then, can be accepted as not requiring any further proof.

3. -S*i* (P) is Pāṇini's basic suffix for 2. sing. *parasmai* (3. 4. 77-78 ; 1. 4. 99-102, 105) which, like other basic suffixes mentioned in this rule, undergoes various modifications and substitutions in different tenses and moods. About its form in the imperative P. 3. 4. 87 : *ser hy apic ca* says (1) that this *-si*, when it represents *loṭ* is replaced by *-hi* and (2) that this *-hi* is *apit* (not *pit*). This latter statement was necessary as otherwise the substitute *-hi*, which replaces *-si* (P), would have become *pit* by *sthānivadbhāva* (P. 1. 1.56) i. e. treatment of the substitue in the same way as the original.

Investing this suffix *-hi* with an *apit* character serves many purposes : firstly, the suffix, since it is not *-pit* can be accented (since P. 3. 1. 4 does not now operate); secondly, this suffix which is *sārvadhātuka* (3.4.113; 1. 1. 56) now becomes *ṅit* on account of *apittva* (1. 2. 4) and thus prevents guṇa for the stem-vowel (1. 1. 5 ; *ihi*, *stuhí*, *āpnuhí*); and, thirdly, this same *ṅittva* is also responsible for changing the final *ā* of the stem into *-ī* (6. 4. 113 ; *jānīhí*, *mimīhí*).

This *-hi*, further is replaced by *-dhi* or is dropped in circumstances mentioned in P. 6. 4. 101-103 and 6. 4. 105-6 respectively.

Then follows the next rule (3. 4. 88) : *vā chandasi* 'optionally in the *Chandas*'. Here the question is: What does this option exactly refer to? The whole

9. And also other commentators like Skandasvāmin, Veṅkaṭamādhava, etc.

Indian grammatical tradition is quite firm on this point. It maintains that out of the two statements made in the previous rule, only the second one is rendered optional here ; the option does not extend to the substitution of *-hi* in the place of *-si* . The *Kāśikā* is quite explicit on this point. It says : *Apittvaṁ vikalpyate, nādeśaḥ.*[10] *Chandasi viṣaye hiśabdo vā apid bhavati* '*The apit*-ness is being made optional, not the substitute. In the matter of the *chandas* the word *-hi* becomes *apit* optionally'. Its illustrations are *yuyodhi, prīṇāhi,* and *prīṇīhi.* In *yuyodhi* (with Vedic *ślu* ; 2. 4. 76) the *-dhi* replaces *-hi* by 6. 4. 103, because *-hi,* which is only optionally *apit* in the Veda, can now be *pit,* i. e. *aṅit.* This explains the guṇa in *yuyo-*. Similarly, along with forms like *prīṇīhi* (wīth a *ṅit -hi*), there can also be forms like *prīṇāhi* (with an *aṅit -hi* and consequently absence of *ā* > *ī*).

Bhaṭṭoji's comment on this rule in the *Siddhānta-kāumudī* is terse to the maximum but no less explicit. He simply says : *Hir apid vā* '*-hi* (which replaces *-si*) is optionally *apit* (in the *chandas*)'. There is no doubt that he too does not extend the Vedic option to the substitution of *-hi* in place of *-si.*

3. 1 The commentators give their reason also why they apply the option only the *apittva* of *-hi,* and

10. Pandit Bāla Shastri's ed. (1898) reads *ādeśaś.* The other editions, including the recent one by Svami Dvarikadas Shastri and Pt. Srikālikāprasada Shukla (Varanasi, 1965-67) giving the commentaries *Padamañjarī* and *Nyāsa,* reads *lādeśaś.* The correct reading should be *nādesaḥ* (i. e. the word should begin with *n-;* also the sentence should end after this word and not before it as we find in the editions. The correct reading (*nādeśa-*) is given by the *Padamañjarī.* For the corruption in the *Nyāsa,* see the next note.

not to its very substitution in the place of *-si*. Thus the *Padamañjarī* accounts for the *Kāśikā's* statement *apittvaṁ vikalpyate* on the ground *anantaratvāt*' 'because of immediacy'. Similarly it explains *Kāśikā*'s *nādeśaḥ* 'the substitute is not (being made optional)' on the ground *vyavahitatvāt* 'because something intervenes'. The same explanation is also given by the *Nyāsa*, although the text here is corrupt[11]. It will thus be seen that the commentators take their stand on the Paribhāṣā *anantarasya Vidhir vā pratiṣedho vā* 'A rule, may it enjoin or forbid anything) either enjoins or forbids (only) that which is nearest (to it in some other rule)'.[12] In fact Nāgeśa introduces this Paribhāṣā by citing the very case of the present rules *ser hy apic ca* and *vā chandasi*, remarking that the option would have extended to the substitution of *-hi* (in the place of *-si*) and suggesting that it would have resulted in undesirable forms if the Paribhāṣā *anantarasya* etc. were not there : *Nanu 'vā chandasi' ity anena 'ser hy apic ca' ity*

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11. Both the editions of the *Nyāsa* (that by Srish Chandra Chakravarti, Rajshahi, 1924 and the recent Varanasi ed.) are corrupt here in three places. Firstly, the Pratīka *lādeśa* (which is chosen by the editors of the *Kāśikā* as their *Kāsikā* text) has to be correted into *nādesaḥ* since the *Nyāsa* as well as the *Padamañjarī* explain why the substitute is not rendered optional (*na ādeśaḥ vikalpyate.*) Secondly in the sentence: *ādeśas tu tena vyavahitatvād anantaro na bhavatīti vikalpyate* a word *na* is evidently to be inserted before *vikalpyate.* Lastly, in the sentence: *atrāpi pittvena nittvaṁ nasti tena guṇo na bhavati* (which is a commentary on *yuyodhi*) the words *na bhavati* have to be equally obviously corrected into *bhavati.* (In the second place a *na* is wanted while in the third place there is a *na* which is not wanted. Is it possible that by some curious misprint the *na* is misplaced?

12. Translation by Kielhorn.

anantarasyāpittvasyeva her api vikalpaḥ syāt ... ata āha 'anantarasya vidhir'...[13]

3. 2 The position of the ancient grammarians on this point, then, is quite clear. None of them thinks that P. 3. 4. 88 can make the substitution of *-hi* in the place of *-si* optional. It is therefore no wonder that none of them cites our forms like *néṣi yáksi. váksi, śróṣi* in this connection. Nor is there seen any attempt to account for such forms by invoking any other rule of Pāṇini.

3.3 Sāyaṇa, who was not only a Vedic interpreter but also a grammarian, was hard put to it to account for such forms in the Pāṇinian system. On such occasions he generally follows one of the two following courses. Sometimes he regards these forms as formally present indicative but having an imperative value : *loḍarthe laṭ* as he says while commenting on *yaṁsi* (RV 1. 42. 9) and *néṣi*[14] (RV 3. 15. 3). But he does not cite any rule of Pāṇini to support *loḍarthe laṭ*. In 3. 4. 6 Pāṇini allows the use of *luṅ* (aorist), *laṅ* (imperfect)

13. Similarly Sīradeva in his *Bṛhatparibhāṣāvṛtti and* Haribhāskara Agnihotri in his *Paribhāṣābhāskara (Paribhāṣāsamgraha* p. 215 and 344 respectively). Further, both of them illustrate the alleged obligatory nature of *-hi* and at the same time the optionality of its *pittva* by the forms *yuyuhi yuyohi*. These forms, which are purported to be Vedic, are just figments of the imagination. They are not met anywhere in the Vedic literature and incidentally show how the later grammarians were removed from the spirit of the Vedic language. The imaginary forms become all the more glaring if we read the concluding sentence of Haribhāskara's work: *na paribhāṣāvaśād aniṣṭāpādanaṁ sāṁpratam'* 'It is not proper to coin undesirable forms on the strength of the Paribhāṣās'.

14. Similarly other commentators. cf. Skandasvāmin's remark : *loḍarthe cātra laṭ* on *māsi* (1.92.7) and *yaṁsi* (1.42.9) etc.

and *liṭ* (perfect) with the value of any other *lakāra*. Here he does not mention *laṭ* as having such a capacity. The other course sometimes followed by Sāyaṇa is to regard such forms as formally imperatives. The absence of the substitution of *-hi* in the place of *-si* is accounted for by him merely invoking their *chāndasatva*. Cf. his remarks : *loṭi ... sipo hyādeśābhāvaś chāndasaḥ* (on *yakṣi* in RV 3. 14.5) and *loṭaḥ sipi ..... hirādeśaś chāndasatvān na bhavati* (on *vakṣi* in RV 3. 15. 5). Here too he does not cite any rule of Pāṇini which would account for the absence of substitution of *-hi* in the place of *-si*. He too had not taken into his head to investigate minutely the real significance of P. 3. 4. 88.[15]

2.3 The modern annotators and translators

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15. Though these are the two ways in which Sāyaṇa generally understands these forms (and, of course in the presnt indicative sense in some cases,) sometimes he assigns a past indicative (simple or perfect) meaning also to some of these forms. This is so, for instance, when he paraphrases *vêṣi* (5.30.4) by *aveḥ, agamaḥ; darṣi* (6.26.5) by *vidāritavān asi;* and *parṣi* (6.20.12) by *pratīrṇo bhavasi.* (All the three are understood by Sāyaṇa elesewhere in an imperative sense, vide his explanations of *veṣi* in 1.76.4, *darṣi* in 8.6.23 and *parṣi* in 6.4.8). Here the loss of the *aḍāgama* may be accounted for by P. 6. 4. 75 but the retention of *-i* of *-si* (against P. 3.4.100) cannot be accounted for. Further, Sāyaṇa sometimes takes the form *yakṣi* as some sort of 1 sing. pres ind. (middle?) when he paraphrases it by *prayaje, prakarṣena pūjayāmi* under 6.16.8, by *prayacchāmi* under 10.4.1 and by *āyāce* under 10.52.5. Similarly Venkaṭa Mādhava and Mudgala: *pra yaṁsi* (1.61.2) = *prayacchāmi.* I do not know how they could be thus taken in the Pāṇinian system.-On *jeṣi* (2.30.8) he remarks: *chāndasaḥ śapaḥ sluḥ.* Here *śapaḥ śluḥ* is evidently a mistake for *śapo luk.* On *yakṣi* (3.17.2) he says: *yajer leṭi rūpam.* But in the absence of *aṭ* or *āṭ* (P.3.4.94); *leṭ* 'subjunctive' is unthinkable. Lastly he once (1.141.8) takes *dakṣi* Pp. *dhakṣi*) = *dahati* with the remark : *puruṣavyatyayaḥ.*

follow the traditional interpretation faithfully. Thus, S. C. Vasu, *The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini* Vol. I p. 593 translates P. 3. 4. 88 thus : "In the Vedas, the substitute *hi*" is optionally treated as not having an indicatory 'p'." Besides the illustrations of the *Kāśikā* he gives one more, an hypothetical instance, viz. *yuyudhi*. Böhtlingk translates : 'Im Veda ist dieses हि auch unbetont.' He wisely refrains from giving any hypothetical from.

4. Here, then, is a problem. Here on the one hand is a category of forms, by no means rare, with a pronounced meaning—a meaning which is accepted as belonging to these forms by both ancient and modern authorities ; on the other, if one accepts the traditional interpretation of P. 3. 4. 88, such forms remain unaccounted for in the Pāṇinian system. The acceptance of traditional interpretation would mean that Pāṇini had missed the significance of these forms. That would hardly do credit to his otherwise well-established minute observation of the language. Should we not rather re-examine our own interpretation of his rule?

4. 1 I for one would propose that the option stated in P. 3. 4, 88 refers to the previous rule (3. 4. 87) as a whole i. e. it makes both the statements of that rule optional : the substitution of *-hi* in place of *-si* as well as its *apittva*. In interpreting the option-giving rule in this way we have nothing to lose and everything to gain. For here we not only account for the forms like *yuyódhi*, *prīṇāhi*, *prīṇīhi*, but also for the forms like *kṣéṣi*, *néṣi*, *yákṣi*, *yákṣi* etc. (with the dropping of *śap* by P. 2.4. 73). Thus we fill in a gap in the Pāṇinian system, a gap which owes not to any mistake

of omission on Pāṇini's side, but to our own faulty interpretation of his rule.

4.2 But the question may be asked : what about the Paribhāṣā *anantarasya vidhir* etc. ? The difficulty can be tided over by refusing to regard the Paribhāṣā as something very sacrosanct. The Paribhāṣā may be looked upon as *anitya* 'non-obligatory', as indeed, many others are, and then the option can extend to the substitution of *-hi* also though it is not contiguous. After all, the facts of the language are more important than the conventions of the grammarians. And even though Nāgeśa does not seem to regard the Paribhāṣā as *anitya*, there is at least one work, the commentary on *Paribhāṣāsūcana* of Vyāḍi, which regards this Paribhāṣā as *anitya* : *Evaṁ tarhi siddhe yat sāgrahaṇaṁ karoti, taj jñāpayati, anityaiṣā paribhāṣeti'* (*Paribhāṣāsaṁgraha*, ed. Mm. K. V. Abhyankar, p. 10).

Or, if one does not want to be so irreverent, one can choose to look upon the whole preceding sūtra (3. 4. 87) as *anantara*. There is a unity of the subject matter : both the statements refer to the substitute *-hi*. After all, even Pāṇini has made the two statements in a single sūtra. If we look at it in this way even the *anantara* Paribhāṣā can have no objection.

4.3 It is needless to add that Pāṇini is merely *describing* a particular fact of the Vedic Sanskrit, viz. that the suffix *-si* there has sometimes the value of the imperative. It was not within the scope of his system to give an explanation of this phenomenon. What, however, must be added is this : *-si*, like any other suffix mentioned in P. 3. 4. 87 is primarily only a basic

suffix, unconnceted with any tense-mood. It becomes a representative of *laṭ* only when it actually replaces it (and in which formation, incidentally, it remains unaltered by modifications and substitutions). *-Si*, which is optionally retained in Vedic *loṭ-* formations is the basic *-si* which now becomes a representative of *loṭ*. Consequently it is wrong to say, in the Pāṇinian system, that forms like *kṣéṣi*, *neṣi* etc. are a case of '*loḍarthe laṭ*' 'present indicative having a value of the imperative'. It is *loṭ* itself. *

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IMMORTALITY IN ŚAIVISM

RAJ BALI PANDEY

Religion is an autonomous discipline. Its only justification is direct experience. The tenets of faith are not to be subordinated to material disciplines, whose techniques and aims are limited to their own inherently narrow spheres. They are not subject to physical laws. Even psychology and logic do not enter their precincts ; they only point towards them. One has, therefore, to ascend into the supersensuous origin of existence to grasp their meaning and significance. Immortality is such an experience.

The concept of the immortality of the soul is a common property of all the religious cults of India except those of the *Chārvākas* (materialists) and the Buddhists (the rationalists or agnostics). Even the Chārvākas in the last analysis, concede the continuity of *Prakṛti* (matter) and intelligence (*chaitanya*) and the Buddhists accept the continuity of consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) and *śūnyatā*, which is a peculiar concept meaning neither existing (*sat*) nor nonexisting (*asat*). Śaivism is avowedly a theistic cult believing in the eternal and ultimate principle *Śiva* (the Blissful and the immortality of the soul, which is essentially of the same nature.

The sources of the Śaiva concept of immortality and, as a matter of fact of other main religio-philosophical cults of India, are to be traced in the *Upaniṣads*. Ever since man began to observe and reflect on the nature

of the universe, he found that in the midst of the fleeting and transitory phenomena of the world there is an abiding and immortal principle, which sustains it and gives it a spiritual substance and an ethical content. The *Īśopaniṣad* declares :

> All this—whatsoever moves on this transitory earth—is permeated by the Lord. Enjoy (the temporary objects of the world) through detachment. Do not covet any body else's wealth (or whose is wealth ?).[1]

The Lord is the Supreme Eternal Being, who reveals the above-quoted truth to the individual soul, the enjoyer of the worldly objects. It is a dialogue between the universal soul and the individual soul. Though the objects of the world are transitory, the soul is eternal, who enjoys, suffers, gets into bondage and, through proper knowledge, attains liberation. The proper knowledge consists in the unity of the soul and the universe in the Supreme Self :

> When to the man of realization all beings become the very Self, then what delusion and what sorrow can there be for that seer of oneness ?[2]

The quest of immortality in the world of the mortals is voiced in the *Kenopaniṣad* as follows :—

> Willed by whom does the directed mind go towards its objects ? Being directed by whom does the vital force, that precedes all proceed (towards its duty) ? By whom is this speech

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1. ईशावास्यमिदं सर्वं यत्किञ्चित् जगत्यां जगत् ।
   तेन त्यक्तेन भुञ्जीथाः मा गृधः कस्यस्विद् धनम् ॥ 1
2. तत्र को मोहः कः शोकः एकत्वमनुपश्यतः ॥ *Īśopaniṣad* 7.

willed that people utter? Who is the being who directs the eyes and the ears?[3]

The gist of the question is :

Does the directorship belong to the aggregate of body and senses, which is apparent; or does the directorship through mere will over the mind *etc.* belong to some independent entity which is different from the aggregate?

The answer to the question is :

'Since He is the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind, the speech of the speech, the life of the life, the eye of the eye, therefore the intelligent man, after giving up (self-identification with the senses) and renouncing the world, becomes immortal.'[4]

In the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* a bold question regarding the immortality of the soul is put by Nachiketā to Yama (Death) :

"This doubt that arises, consequent on the death of man—some say, 'It exists,' while other say 'It does not exist'—I would know this, being instructed by you....."[5].

After evading the question and tempting *Nachiketā* with attractive boons, Yama (Death), ultimately, gave the following answer :

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3. केनेषितं पतितं प्रेषितं मनः केन प्राणः प्रथमः प्रैति युक्तः ।
केनेषितां वाचमिमां वदन्ति चक्षुः श्रोत्रं क उ देवो युनक्ति॥ *Kena.*, 1.

4. श्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रं मनसो मनो यद् वाचो ह वाचं स उ प्राणस्य प्राणः ।
चक्षुषश्चक्षुरतिमुच्य धीराः प्रेत्याऽस्माल्लोकादमृता भवन्ति ॥ *Kena.*, 2.

5. येयं प्रेते विचिकित्सा मनुष्ये अस्तीत्येके नायमस्तीति चैके ।
एतद् विद्यामनुशिष्टस्त्वयाहं वराणामेष वरस्तृतीयः॥ *Kaṭha* I.1.20.

The intelligent self is neither born nor does it die. It did not originate from anything, nor did any thing originate from it. It is birthless, eternal, undecaying and ancient yet new. It is not injured even when the body is killed.[6]

The self that is subtler than the subtle and greater than the great is lodged in the heart of every creature. A desireless man sees that glory of the self through the serenity of the organs, and (thereby he becomes) free from sorrow.[7]

In the *Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad* the immorality of the soul is stated in the following stanzas :

The soul (*Haṁsa*) travels in the Cycle of Brahma (*Brahma-Chakra*), which is the substenance of all that exists, the abode of all and all embracing. (Through ignorance) he regards himself and God (*preritāram*) as separate. But when he unites (through proper knowledge) himself with God, he realises his immortality.[8]

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The material objects are perishable (*kṣara*) the soul is eternal (*akṣara*). Both are under the control of God. When the soul fixes itself

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6. न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चिन् नायं कुतश्चिन् न बभूव कश्चित् ।
अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे ॥ *Kaṭha*. I. 2. 18.

7. अणोरणीयान् महतो महीयान् आत्मा अस्य जन्तोर्निहितो गुहायाम् ।
तमक्रतुः पश्यति वीतशोको धातु प्रसादान्महिमानमात्मनः ॥ *Kaṭha*. I.2. 20.

8. सर्वाजीवे सर्वसंस्थे बृहन्ते अस्मिन् हंसो भ्राम्यते ब्रह्म-चक्रे।
पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततः तेनामृतत्वमेति॥ *Sveta*. 6.

on God, he becomes one with Him and is freed from cosmic illusion (*Māyā*).[9]

Śvet. Up 6.10.

In the same Upaniṣad there is an allegorical description of the immortality of the soul :

> There are two birds, friends and eternal companions, perching on the same tree. One of them tastes the fruits (and therefore is involved and suffers.) The other remains unattached (and free from wordly suffering).[10]

In the above-quoted texts reference is to the spiritual immortality of the soul. There is no hint at bodily permanence of the individual. On the other hand, it is accepted that the body is perishable. It is the soul that survives the death of the body. The soul, at its option, through proper knowledge or the grace of the Lord may unite with the cosmic soul, the supreme source of all universe or, through ignorance, may wander in the cycle of births and re-births. It may be in bondage or liberation, but it does not lose its essential character of immortality. The doctrine of re-incarnation as developed in the Upaniṣads implies the continuous existence of the soul independent of the forms it assumes.

Out of the Upaniṣadic moorings, subsequently, the following main schools of Śaivism flourished in course of time (1)—the Mahāpāśupata, (2) the Śaiva-Siddhānta, (3) the Vira-Śaivism and (4) the Kashmir Śaivism. Besides, there arose a number of heterodox of anti-Vedic

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9. क्षरं प्रधानममृताक्षरं हरः क्षरात्मानावीशते देव एकः ।
तस्याभिध्यानाद् योजनात्तत्वभावाद् भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः ॥
Śveta. 10.

10. द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते ।
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्य नश्नन्नन्योऽ भिचाकशीति॥—*Śveta.*4.6.

sects, like the Kāpālika and the Kālamukha. They have their peculiar concepts of the soul and its immortality.

1. *The Mahāpāśupata*—

Mādhavāchārya in his *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha* (14th century A. D.) deals with this school, which shows that it had been in existence long before him. According to it there are five *padarthas* (objects to be known).

(1) *Kāraṇa* (the cause—Īśvara or God).
(2) *Kārya* (the effect, the entire universe).
(3) *Yoga* (union with God through concentration).
(4) *Vidhi* (method or technique).
(5) *Dukkhānta* (cessation of miseries).[11]

Under the second category, *Kārya*, the concept of the soul is explained. The entire universe including animate and inanimate objects is the effect of God (*Pati*). It is dependent on God. It is of three types—*vidyā* (consciousness of animality), *Kāla* (the emergence of elements and organic consciousness and *paśu* (deluded, embodied and endowed with the qualities of births and re-births). In the eyes of the Lord (*Pati* = Parameśvara) everything in the universe is *paśu* (animal).[12]

The ultimate goal of *paśu* (the soul) is to regain its purity and union with its source, God, through *Yoga* and *Vidhi*. This is the state of *dukkhānta* (complete cessation of miseries). It is of two types : (1) *anātmaka* (impersonal) and (2) *sātmka* (personal). In the first

11. *The Pāśupata-sūtras* with the commentary of Kauṇḍinya, Oriental Manuscripts Library, University of Travancore, Trivandrum,

12. Ibid.

case there is the absolute extirpation of miseries. But, at the best, it is a negative condition of existence and therefore, not adequately significant. In the second case the soul becomes not only free from all limitations but it regains its full power of supremacy (*aiśvarya*), consisting of vision (*dṛk*) and action (*kriyā*). Though the soul has to perform a long and arduous journey before it reaches its goal, its existence is not ephemeral. It is an eternal and immortal entity, even though covered with impurity.[13]

2. *Śaiva Siddhānta.*

This cult is mostly prevalent in South India, particularly in Tamilnadu. Twenty-eight Āgamas are the chief authority on the sect. There are various schools of theological doctrines regarding the nature of the soul from monistic to pluralistic. The most current doctrine holds that God, souls and matter are from eternity distinct entities. The object of religious discipline is to disengage the soul from the matter and graudally to unite it with God. The relationship between these three entities is expressed by the allegory of a *paśu* (animal), *pāśa* (the fetters) any *pati* (the master or Lord). Every individual soul, deluded and embodied is a *paśu* (animal) in *pāśa* (fetters) and, therefore, suffers, from sorrow. All sorrows proceed from ignorance and *malas* and they are removed through clear knowledge of these three entities. This knowledge is gained through the grace (*anugraha*) or *arul* or *prasāda*) of *pati* (master) who is Lord Śiva. After becoming free from the *pāśa* (fetters=bondage) the soul regains its pure nature and rejoices in eternity.[14]

13. Ibid.

14. cf. *Śiva-jñana-bodha* by Meykaṇḍadeva; *Pauṣkarāgama*; *Mātaṅga-Parameśvara-tantra.*

In the *Vāyavīya-Saṁhitā* of the *Śivamahāpurāṇa* monistic touch is given to the concept of *paśu* (the soul). It says that though it is difficult to find out any rational plea for admitting a universal soul but experience forces to accept a universal entity which enjoys and suffers and which is different from body, senses and intellect. This entity survives even when the physical body perishes. It is to this universal entity that all objects of experience appeal. It is the inner controller. It is unchangeable through all changes. It is the perceiver of all things, though itself cannot be seen. When it is associated with the body it under-goes all impurities and sufferings and is drawn into the cycle of births and rebirths. This universal entity appears as many and manifests different intellectual shades in different organisms. Therefore, all souls, in the last analysis, are identical with the universal soul and consequently eternal and immortal.[15]

3. *Vīra-Śaiva School.*

According to the *Siddhānta-Śikṣāmaṇi* an authentic work of this sect, *Brahman* is an identity of being (*sat*), consciousness (*chit*) and bliss (*ānanda*). It is devoid of of any form or differentiation. It is infinite and beyond comprehension. In this all pervading existence the entire world of the conscious and the unconscious is included in its potential form and it is from this that the whole universe becomes manifested without any external aid or instrument. The aforesaid qualities of *Śiva* are of transcendental nature (*aprākṛta*). They are manifested through his inherent power (*Śakti*). Under

15. *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, II. 1.611 d-12,

the doctrine of *ṣaṭ-sthala*, the centre of Vīra-Śaiva philosophy is to emphasize the fact that the individual and the world as sustained in God and are indentical with Him. The cult preaches difference-in-unity. It is just like the philosophical doctrine of *Bhedābheda* taught by many Vedāntic schools. In religion this notion means that God, who is transcedent and beyond comprehension out of his free will manifests Himself also in the form of the objects that we perceive in the world and also in the nature of the individual selves. Thus the individual souls share the eternity of God and essentially are immortal.[16]

4. *Kashmir Śaivism.*

Kashmir Śaivism, on the basis of its literature is divided into three sections called *Trik* (Threefold Science) consisting of (1) *Āgamas*, (2) *Spanda* and (3) *Pratyabhijñā*. The other reason why it is called *Trik* is that it deals with three entities—Īśvara, Ātmā and Prakṛti. The *Āgama-śāstra* is regarded as revealed by *Śiva* Himself. The *Śiva-sūtras* were composed by Vasugupta in the ninth century A.D. They form the bedrock of the super structure of Kāshmir Śaivism. The *spanda-śāstra* was developed by Kallaṭa, a disciple of Vasugupta. The *Pratyabhijñā* school was started by Somānanda, the author of the *Śiva-dṛṣṭi* and was further developed by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta.[17]

Kashmir Śaivism is monistic. According to it the only and the ultimate reality is *Śiva* and the entire universe is His reflection (*ābhāsa* or *Prakāśa*). It postu-

16. *The Anubhava-sūtra* of Mayideva.

17. The *Śiva-sūtras* discovered by Vasugupta ; *Spanda-Kārikā* of Vasugupta or Kallaṭa : The *Śiva-dṛṣṭi* of Somananda ; The *Pratyabhijña sūtra* of Utpala.

lates a conception of positivism in a theistic framework. *Śiva* is the cause (*Kāraṇa*) and even the identity (self-*ātman*) of everything in the universe, including the so-called individual selves. He manifests Himself as *Pati* (Master, Lord). *Paśu* (The creatures) and *Pāśa* (fetters =*Śakti*- power). The procees of manifestation involves five-fold successive steps—creation (*sṛṣṭi*), maintenance (*sthiti*), withdrawal (*samhṛti*), merger (*vilaya*) and grace (*anugraha*). Śiva, out of His own free will (*svātantrya*), and without any external instrument projects and withdraws the universe. The innate energy of power through which he performs these functions is called *Śakti* or *Para-śakti* (Primal Energy). Even the soul or *Jivātman* is a reflection of *Śiva* and being of the same nature is eternal and immortal. When, in the process of projection or manifestation, the soul is embodied, it enjoys and suffers ultimately, through the grace of Śiva, he *recognizes* his true self (attains *pratyabhijñā*) and he is freed into its purity and eternity. The question of mortality does not arise, because the soul is a continuously conscious personality and inheres in the cosmic cousciousness, *Śiva*.[18]

In Śaivism as in other religious sects of India, the concept of immortality is based upon direct observation and immediate experience. It is a tenet of faith, rather than a hypothesis or a chain of argumentation. It is the ultimate hope which sustains the man in his all troubles and tribulations. To regard it as a primitve superstition, delusion or illusion will be simply a counter-round of nescience.

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18. The *Īśvara-pratyablijñāsūtrā Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta.

THE PERSONALITY OF GAUDAPĀDA

SANGAM LAL PANDEY

Allahabad University

A book named *Gauḍapādīya Kārikā* or *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* or *Âgamaśāstra* is, by and large, attributed to Gauḍapāda. But recently the personality or historicity of Gauḍpāda has been proved to be fictitious. So we shall enquire whether Gauḍapāda was a historical person.

Max Walleser has shown that the name, Gauḍapāda, is a figment, made up from the title of the book *Gauḍapādīya Kārikā*, "Summary verses consisting in pādas of the Gauḍa School"[1]. His starting premiss is a quotation from the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* wherein its author, Sureśvara, after citing two verses from the *Gauḍapadīyakārikā* and two from the *Upadeśasāhasrī* states : "In this way this meaning has been spoken by our revered Gauḍas and Dravidas"[2].

From this Max Walleser argues that there were two schools of Advaita, the one represented by Gauḍas, the people of North India and the other by Drāviḍas viz. Śaṁkara who is called so because he was a resident of South India.[3] He accepts that by the word Dravidas is here meant Śaṁkara, an individual author of a book, *Upadeśasāhasrī*, but denies a similar meaning to the word 'Gauḍas' and infers that by Gauḍas should mean the anonymous summary verses, consisting in pādas

1. *Der altere Vedanta*, pp. 1, 6, 11.
Review of the book by Dr. L. D. Barnett J. R. A. S. 1910 p. 1362.

2. Evaṁ Gauḍaiḥ Drāvidaiḥ naḥ pūjyairayam arthaḥ prabhāsitaḥ/*Naiṣkarmya siddhi* IV/44. Also *Der altere Vedānta*, p. 2.

3. Op. Cit. p. 3.

of the Gauḍa School. It is difficult to account for the double standard of fixing the meaning of two similar words both of which refer to one and the same type of meaning. As Dr. Belvalkar has said in a similar context we normally expect that the words will possess a similar connotation.[4] It is further impossible to assign the meaning of quarters (pādas) to the word *pāda* in the compound word "*Gauḍapāda*", for the word *pāda* like *caraṇa* and *ācārya* is simply honorific. In Indian literature the pādas are used only to denote the four sections of a chapter and not the verses consisting of four lines. So there is nothing in the text of Sureśvara which can lend support to the conjectures of Dr. Walleser. If the ingenious Doctor would have cared to consult the *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtika* of Sureśvara, an author upon whom he relies for his views, he certainly must have given up his baseless conjectures, for the same author shows beyond an iota of doubt that Gauḍapāda was an individual author of the *Gauḍapādīyākārikā*. The following citations may be given here to this effect :—

(a) "This, as narrated by us, has also been said by ācārya Gauḍa, the knower of the doctrines of the Veda"[5].

(b) The verses of Gauḍapāda and others are witness to the above-mentioned truth. They should be strenuously studied as they emanate from the knowers of the Tradition"[6]

4. The *Vedanta Philosophy,* Part 1 pp. 182-183.

5. Niḥśeṣa-veda-siddhānta vidbhirapi bhāṣitam. Gauḍācāryairidaṁ vastu yathāsmābhiḥ prapañcitam. *Bṛhadārāṇyaka Vārtika* II. 1. 386.

6. Ślokāśca Gauḍapādāder yathoktārthasya sākṣiṇaḥ / Adhīyate'tra yatnena sampradāyavidaḥ svayam // Ibid IV 4.886.

Moreover, Śaṁkara himself refers to Gauḍapāda at several places in his works. The following sources can be produced to eliminate the propaganda against the fact that Gauḍapāda was the preceptor of Śaṁkara's preceptor :—

I. In the *Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya* Śaṁkara salutes Gauḍapāda as his revered *paramaguru.*[7]

II. In the *Upadeśasāhasrī* he, again, salutes Gauḍapāda as the teacher of his teacher[8] (*Guror garīyase*).

III. In the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* Śaṁkara quotes twice from the *Āgamaśāstra* and calls its author by such respectful expressions as the knower of the Vedānta tradition.[9]

IV. In the *Chāndagyabhāṣya* Śaṁkara refers to the author of the *Āgama-śāstra*, a treatise consisting of four prakaraṇas in this way:

"The reality of self which can be known only from such past masters of the philosophy of Vedānta as have given up all desires for external things, have sought shelter into the identity of Ātmā and have adopted the highest stage of a mendicant's life, as has been described by the most revered follower of the school of Prajāpati in the four Prakaraṇas. He alone is teaching it these days and nobody else is doing so[10]".

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7. Yastaṁ pūjya-abhipūjyaṁ paramaguruṁ pādapātair natosmi. *Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya* IV/100.

8. *Upadeśasāhasrī* XVIII 2.

9. Atroktaṁ vedāntārtha Sampradāyavidbhir ācāryaiḥ, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* II. 1.9 and Tathā ca sampradāyavido vadanti, Ibid 1.4.14.

10. Idaṁ tyaktasarvabāhyaiṣaṇair ananyaśaraṇaiḥ paramahaṁsa-parivrājakair atyāśramibhir Vedāntavijñānaparair eva vedanīyaṁ pūjyatamaiḥ prājāpatyaṁ cemaṁ Sampradāyamanusaradbhir upanibaddhaṁ prakaraṇacatuṣṭayena. Tathānuśāsatyadyāpi ta eva nānya iti *Chāndogya-upaniṣadbhāṣya* VIII. 12.1.

The last citation of Śaṁkara's is very important in several respects. In the present context it proves that the four *Prakaraṇas* viz. the Āgamaśāstra which is termed as four *Prakaraṇas* (by Śaṁkara in the introductory sentence of his commentary thereon) were written by one and the same person who alone was teaching the traditional philosophy of Vedānta during the life-time of Śaṁkara.

Thus the very starting premisses of Dr. Walleser are figments of his own mind. The whole edifice that he has built upon this fictitious foundation is simply a *fata morgana* and perhaps shows at best his craze for novelty. It is very significant that his conjecture has universally been disapproved. Dr. Barnett says in the review of his book that "the evidence adduced is very inconclusive". *Prima facie* the name Gauḍapāda is exactly parallel to Dramiḍācārya and the word *Pāda*, properly an honorific ending, is often applied to form titles of individual, e. g. *Pūjyapāda* This seems to us to be the natural explanation of the name and the quotations adduced by Dr. Walleser do not prove his case.[11] Dr. Winternitz writes that the order of succession,[12] Gauḍapāda, Govinda, Śaṁkara, is above suspicion. Professor Vidhushekher Bhattacarya pertinently observes : "There is a text before us known as the *Āgamaśāstra* or *Gauḍapādīya Kārikā*, or passing under any other similar names, and of this text there must be an author. There may, however, be more than one author. The work may represent the view of the predominant school of a particular people. But can we only for this reason think that it is the production

11. J. R. A. S. 1910 p. 1362.
12. *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. III p. 430 note 3.

of the whole people of the land? When a very prominent man of a country pronounces something in public, it may be regarded as the opinion of the country itself and not his personal view, though he may not consult the people of the country before doing so. In the same way, it appears to me, that the present work is by one person and yet it presents the views of the entire country to which he belonged. But who is that person? He is one Gauḍa. When there is no contradiction nor any incongruity, why should we not accept the tradition as far as possible? Thus as we have already seen, the actual name of the author is Gauḍa, or with the honorific word, *pāda* or *ācārya* added to it Gauḍāpāda or Gauḍācārya".[13]

The historicity and personality of Gauḍapāda having been established, we shall now proceed to the examination of his actual authorship. What did he write? In the *Āgamaśāstra* there are 215 Kārikās divided into four Prakaraṇas or Chapters and twelve prose-sentences which occur in the first Chapter. So is he the author of all the 215 Kārikās and 12 sentences? This question has been one of the burning issues in the contemporary journals of Indology and has been replied in different ways. All the views on the subject can be classified into the following divisions:

(a) There is the traditional view in the Advaita order that Gauḍapāda wrote only 216 Kārikās. He did not write the 12 sentences which constitute *Māṇḍūkya*

13. By V. Bhattacharya, *Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, University of Calcutta, 1943, Introduction pp. LXX-LXXI.

Śruti. Gauḍapāda wrote a sort of free commentary upon these passages.[14]

(b) Doctors Deussen and Vekatsubbaih hold that Gauḍapāda wrote the 215 Kārikās as well as the twelve sentences. Dr. Venkatasubbaih further maintains that as Ānandagiri indicates,[15] the first verse of the *Āgama Śāstra-bhāṣya* of Śaṁkara was also composed by Gauḍapāda.

(c) Professor B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma holds the traditional view of Dvaita Vedānta in saying that Gauḍapāda wrote the last three Prakaraṇas only. The Kārikās of the first Prakaraṇa together with the twelve prose-sentences constitute, according to this view, the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* Gauḍapāda simply incorporated

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14. This view is held by Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan in his book *Gauḍapāda* pp. 81-52, by Dr. Belvalkar in the *Vendānta philosophy,* part 1 pp. 195 ff. and by Amar Nath Ray in his article, "The Māṇḍūkya-upniṣad and the Kārikās of Gauḍapād", IHQ. 1934 pp. 566-567.

15. Dr. Paul Duessen writes in the *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads* p. 30 "The commentary on Māṇḍūukya which is extant under the name of Śaṁkara treats this and Gauḍapāda's Kārikās as one and seems to regard the whole as in one sense an Upaniṣad. Dr. Venkatsubbaih writes in his article, "The Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad and Gauḍapāda" in I. A. Oct. 1933 : "It is clear that the twelve sentences comprising the Māṇḍūkya are in the opinion of Śaṁkara of the same nature as the verses which with these sentences, form the Āgama Prakaraṇa, and that they have been written by the same person as wrote the 215 verses" (p. 182). He further says on p. 183 that the other commentators also "referred to by Ānandagiri must have held the opinion that the work before them beginning with "prajñānāṁśupratānaiḥ" continuing the sentence "Om ity etad akṣaram idam" and ending with "Namaskurmo yathābalam" was wholly written by Gauḍapāda. The same view is held by him in P. O. Vol. I Nos. 1-2 ,1936.

them in his work.[16] Prof. Sarma's main thesis, however, seems to be this that "Madhva was propounding no new or startling theory when he identified these twenty nine Kārikās (of the first chapter) as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.*[17] In this way he simply exonerates Madhva from a mistake, if it were so, which on his showing may be laid at the door of many predecessors of Madhva.

(d) There is a view held by Puruṣottama, the grandson of Śuddhādvaitin Vallabha, that all the Kārikās and the 12 sentences constitute the *Māṇḍūkya Śruti.* Mr. Sarma has shown that many latter advaitins also subscribe to this view.

(e) Some hold that these four chapters were written by four different persons. This view is inevitably concluded by those who maintain that there is no unity of composition or thought among the four Prakaraṇas. Max Walleser seems to attribute these Kārikās to four or even more than four authors when he says that they were anonymously current during the time of Bhāvaviveka and other Buddhists.

(f) Finally, there is a view that Gauḍapāda wrote only Kārikās of the first three prakaraṇas and the fourth prakaraṇa was written by a different hand. This view is inferred not only from the fact the fourth Prakaraṇa is independent of the preceding three Prakaraṇas as it

16. Mr. Sarma has defended this view in several articles (1) New Light on the Gauḍapādakārikā R. P. R. II 1931 : (2) Further Light on the Gauḍapāda Kārikās R. P. R. III 1932 : (3) Still further Light on the Gauḍapāda Kārikās R. P. R. Vol. IV 1933 : (4) The Upaniṣadic theory of the Gauḍapāda Kārikās P. O. Vols I and II.

17. R. P. R. Vol. III, P. 45 (the bracketed mine).

has salutatory verses in the beginning and the end whereas the other Prakaraṇas have no such verses, but also from the fact that it is a Buddhist work written by a Buddhist whereas the preceding Prakaraṇas are Advaitic works.

Now it will be shown that none of these views except the first can have even a probability value. The passage which we adduced from Śaṁkara's *Chāndogya* commentary is a *locuss classicus* in this respect. It proves that all the four Prakaraṇas, according to Śaṁkara, were written by one and the same person whom we have identified with Gauḍapāda.

As regards the authorship of the twelve sentences of the first prakaraṇa, there is no doubt that they constitute *Māṇḍūkya Śruti* and are older than the Kārikās. The following pieces of evidence are sufficient for holding this view :—

(a) Maṇḍana Miśra[18] in his *Brahmasiddhi* quotes a word from the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and calls it *Śruti*.

(b) Sureśvara[19] in his *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtika* quotes a full line from the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and explicitly says that it is the statement of the *Māṇḍūkya Śruti*.

(c) The colophon at the end of the first prakaraṇa found in some printed copies and manuscripts of the

18. Tatra 'Sarvajñaḥ,' Sarveśvaraḥ' ityapi Śrutī samādhye eva. *Brahmasiddhi* p. 127 Cf. *Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad* 6.

19. Eṣo' antaryāmyeṣa sarvasya prabhavatyasau, Māṇḍūkeya śrutivacanam iti spaṣṭamadhīyate. op. cit. III 8-26.

Cf. *Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad* 6. This has been also pointed out by Y. Subrahmanya Sarma in the upaniṣadic theory of Gauḍapāda Kārikā, R. P. R. Vol. I, No. IV, 1933 and by Amar Nath Ray in the "Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad and the Kārikāṣ of Gauḍapāda," I. H. Q. 1934. Both these scholars rightly criticize the view of Mr. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma.

Āgamaśāstra reads like this : "Here ends the first Book called *Āgama Prakaraṇa* in the *Gauḍapādakārikā* which is meant to discover the meaning of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*.[20] This proves that the distinction between the Śruti portion and the Kārikā portion had been maintained by scholars of yore also.

(d) The *Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya* of Śaṁkara also maintains the above distinction. The very colophon at the end of the first Book states that "here ends the *Āgama Prakaraṇa* in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad-cum-Gauḍapādīya Kārikā-Bhāṣya*".[21] The colophon at the end of the other Books do not contain the word *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.*

So it is clear that Gauḍapāda was the author of only the 215 Kārikās of the *Āgamaśāstra* and not of the twelve sentences. The twelve sentences were before him. The view of Prof. Bhattacharya that they are later than the Kārikās is a false inference from the premiss that the latter are not a commentary upon the former. The premiss is true ; in reality the Kārikās are not a commentary, for they are simply developing the fundamental idea of the Upaniṣad without commenting on the words that occur in the Upaniṣad. But from this the chronological priority of the Kārikās cannot be established.[22] The twelve sentences were systematically arranged by Gauḍapāda in his *Āgamaśāstra.*

20. Iti Māṇḍukya upaniṣadadarthāviṣkaraṇa parāyāṁ Gauḍapādakārikāyāṁ Prathamāgamaprakaraṇam.

21. Iti Gauḍapādīya kārikā sahitamāṇḍūkopaniṣadbhāṣye Prathamāgamaprakaraṇam.

22. See V. Bhattacharya op. cit. pp. XXXVIII-XLVII for the view that the Upaniṣad is later than the Kārikās. For the criticism of the view see *Gauḍapāda* by T. M. P. Mahadevan pp. 45-50.

Has Gauḍapāda written any other works ? Four commentaries each on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, the *Uttara gītā*, the *Nṛsiṁhottaratāpanīya Upaniṣad* and the *Durgā Saptaśati* and two Tāntrika treatises, the *Subhagodaya* and the *Śrīvidyāratha Sūtra* are passing under the name of Gauḍapāda. But there is no *prima facie* evidence to show that they were written by the author of the *Āgamaśāstra*. Apart from the phliosophical differences between the *Āgamaśāstra* and these works there is also the lack of originality of approach that is a hall-mark of the author of the former. So they may be regarded as spurious. Professor Bhattacharya suggests that they are the works of a different Gauḍapāda.[23] This view may be regarded as highly probable.

23. op. cit. pp. LXXXIX-LXXX.

ABBREVIATIONS

1. R. P. R. = Review of Philosophy and Religion.
2. I. H. Q. = Indian Historical Quarterly.
3. P. O. = Poona Orientalist.
4. I. A. = Indian Antiquary.
5. J. R. A. S. = Journal of Royal Asiatic Society.

COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY AND THE THEORY OF KARMA

R. PANIKKAR
University of California

Whatever the business of Comparative Philosophy may consist of, a necessary prerequisite to it is to understand the 'things' seemingly to be compared. One cannot really understand a thing if the elements which make that thing understandable are not experienced as true elements.

We would not like now to elaborate a theory on Comparative Philosophy and much less on Comparative Religion. Our aim is to offer a single instance of a fundamental notion at home in Eastern spiritualities, all too often misrepresented in Western interpretations and mutual dialogues and try to make it understandable in a modern language intelligible to more than one cultural tradition.

Few doctrines so pervade the religions of Asia as does that which laymen call the transmigration of souls. Few ideas have been so much misunderstood, few deemed more of a stumbling-block in the way of any rapprochement between Christianity and Asian religions.

With the following considerations I do not set up to make a scholarly investigation into the nature of that belief. Rather I should like to rough out my own view by way of a colophon to a monograph on the subject[1]

1. Cf. R. Panikkar, "La loi du karma et la dimension historique de l' homme" in *Hermeneutique et Eschatologie* ed. by E. Castelli, Paris, Aubier, 1971, pp. 205-230.

and to earlier theological reflection on the necessity of trying to understand a doctrine from within it, not from outside it and in terms of alien categories[2].

Let us begin by observing that misunderstandings are not confined to the West, that the belief as commonly held among the Asian peoples does not answer to the underlying insight in the law of *karma*. Now of course a popular belief, whatever deference it may merit, cannot be accounted the last word on the matter. If we assume that a Hindu or Buddhist scholar wished to investigate the christian idea of heaven on the basis of the popular belief he had been able to elicit by questioning factory hands, shoppers, and people coming out of cinemas and churches, it would hardly be difficult to persuade him that the genuine christian idea of heaven is something different altogether, 'toto caelo'. I shall not take the trouble to refute misunderstandings, pointing out, say, that the notion *karma* has little to do with any wandering of individual substantial souls from body to body, being born and reborn down the ages, as though what is "handed on" over and over were an essential selfhood, a personified individuality.

To my mind what the law of *karma* or rather the idea of *karman* seeks to convey is the following : Not primarily a moral law, a psychological trait, or even an anthropological pattern. *Karma* is a thing religious through and through and therefore a universal, cosmic thing. It does not have to do with men alone or their behaviour ; it operates everywhere, because it forms a

2. I refer to my publications on Comparative Philosophy and Comparative Religion.

constituent element in every being. *Karma* is the hallmark of all being's and therefore of every being's contingency and creatureliness ; it expresses the cosmic solidarity and the very time-bound nature of all existence—in other words, the historicity of the whole universe. Let me enlarge.

The word *karman*, of course, means action, but not any action at all, considered on its own, in isolation from its source and its consequences, rather the action whole and entire, single when all is said and done (of which God alone can be the agent in a theistic context), the action whereby the world comes into being and perdures, the action whose echoes ring in every nook and cranny of being, the action which every deed and activity merely mirrors, gives back, individualizes, channels, expresses, lays bare. The underlying idea in *karma* is a single vision of the entire universe. *Karma* is sacrifice—in others words, the strength, the energy if you like, that sustains the universe and keeps it one. It is not an underlying common substance or a sort of shared being that embodies itself variously in particular beings, but rather a dynamism pervading every thing which exists and by that very fact making every thing whatever it is. It is a cosmic dynamism, a universal law—medieval Europeans might say, a 'pondus', an 'impetus', a 'nexus' which does not simply impel or attract beings but atcually constitutes them.

The vision one meets with alive and operative in most of the Asian world's millions, both in times gone by and at present ; what forcibly impresses itself upon one as the archetypes of the Eastern soul, even in those who make up the modern 'educated' 'caste' of intellectuals and far more so in those (still a majority) upon

whom the winds from other climes have not blown ; the implicit infrastructure of Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas, Sikhs, Asian 'animists', and so forth could be epitomized in the word *karma*, which one Upaniṣad says was the esoteric theme the sage Yājñavalkya discoursed on outside the assembly with his friend in an attempt to read the riddle of death. At the end of the day the notion of *karma* springs from an awareness of life as one and undying.

What exists, what is of value, what really matters, is not 'me' my mental 'ego', which born, undergoes change, and dies, but Life itself. Life never dies. I am nothing but the bearer for a while of a torch alight with the flame of life. What matters is the flame. The 'realized' person is the one who acknowledges himself to be a flame, a fire, who communicates in perfect fellowship with all the flames in this world that make up a sole and single fire. *Karma's* insight is the firm persuasion that I bear a thing far more precious than my mental self can lead me to suppose—in short, that I bear and hand on the godhead. Hence the way Eastern men rise above all self-centeredness and treat all pain as comparatively unimportant. Hence too the sense of responsibility on a cosmic scale. I bear a thing that outsoars me. My particular fate is not at stake : rather I hold in my hands the fate of the universe itself. It has been handed on to me and I in turn must hand it on ; it has been entrusted to me and I must treat it in such a way that the flame shall not go out—which means that I must burn away my own life. As Tagore poetically puts the matter : "Life is a gift to us that we can prove worthy of only by giving it up ourselves".

Experience of *karma*, or belief in it, solves most of the problems which otherwise would distress me to the point of neurosis or despair. Even positing a personal God seems less needful. Belief in *karma* fits in both with belief in God and with disbelief in him. *Karma* makes me feel a sense of solidarity with the whole universe, not excluding its gods and perhaps even its divine Creator, who in that case would be the Creator of *karma* itself. I am bound up with everything, everything affects me and my deeds too affect all the universe. *Karma* makes my relations with other people something deeper than a relationship between individuals, which always carries with it the 'individual burden of incommunicability. Divine Providence would be a more or less personalized way of living that universal fellowship which *karma* conveys. What happens to me is neither fated to happen nor purely accidental ; it is caused ; and it is the tremendous cause contrived by the working together of the universe in order that I shall act in a way enabling the universe to continue its upward course and its own pace. What 'happens' to me, therefore, is not something pointless ; and I have no further grounds for tormenting myself by wondering why it has happened to me instead of to somebody else, since I cannot be differentiated from that very occurrence which is my *karma*.

Karma, then, means justice, right order, that framework of things which ensures the cohesion of the universe and its continuance in being. When I die, my ego is not reborn embodied in another ego. Rather if my ego has not died with me that means that I have not yet lived real life, I have not yet discovered that this ego is the primary, nay the only thing shutting me out from

real life— which of course amounts to saying that the torch I bore still has to go on burning and that what I mistakenly looked on as my self, all that weight of ungenuineness, I have not done away with, so that it must go on its way down the history of the universe. My ego does not change owners, passing on again to a new one ; my ego is only the bearer, the embodiment at a given point in time and space, of that part of the cosmos which is my own self operating in the karmatic chain of existence. Hence the more 'realized' a man is, the holier he is, the mightier will be the influence he wields in the total *karma* of the universe.

By the same token, to put the idea of *karma* in a christian context, what happened in Adam or happened in Christ is not something that happend to two individual members of a collective whole, in which case it would demand the utmost subtlety of theologians to account for the transmission of original sin and the efficacy of Christ's redemptive work, but something that happened throughout the karmatic chain, precisely because the one who embodied it at that particular point in time and space was not a mere mental 'self'. (Adam and Christ in this case). Souls do not travel on again : all that is un-soul, all un-life, goes on being a burden until it becomes wholly subject to the *Pantocrator*, the Lord of *karma*, submits to the Source whence it sprang, and God is all in all once more....

It is no easy task trying to make others understand an experience of one's own. It will not do to be wordy, especially when the words all have meanings that are ambivalent to say the least. Awareness of *karma* gives one a peace of mind in life such as few other deep persuasions can do. It does not remove one's

freedom or responsibility but teaches one resignation (not fatalism) and a cosmic sense of proportion which is difficult to achieve when one makes the individual the centerpiece of things. I make no comparisons. I merely try to sketch the underlying insight of *karma* in its sound and positive features ; because just as belief in God may degenerate into an unwholesome reliance on him that destroys men's initiative, so belief in *karma* may degenerate into fatalism—unconcern with personal values, neglect of personal relationships, and the like.

In order to understand the countless texts on the subject we must bear in mind the two points of view from which it is traditionally approached. A schoolman would say of *karma* what he says of creation, that it can be understood actively or passively : either as a metamorphic power, a force which sets the wheel of existence turning, or as the passive material to be metamorphosed—that is, burnt, annihilated. *Karma* is what enables us to live in this life : the karmatic residue is what must be disposed of. These two senses figure over and over again, under one guise or another, in the spiritual writing of the East. *Karma* may be taken as the creatureliness that I must defeat and rise above, as the unburnt material I have been entrusted with, so that my business on earth is to burn *my karma*, turning it into sheer fire, which itself will go out when it finds no more fuel to burn ; or again as the actual burning, the very power that enables me to burn, metamorphosize, cleanse all I have been entrusted with.

I do not wish to enlarge here upon this twofold sense of *karma* regarded as an active force, as the act of creating and metamorphosizing a situation, which

bursts the bounds of all possible imagining, thinking, even being—that is, as the deed whereby the creature ceases to be a creature and reaches the other shore—, or as an act which destroys and also metamorphosizes, but by destroying creatureliness only destroys *karma* itself (in the passive sense) and burns away existence. The first sense would make possible a fruitful dialogue with the religions of semitic origin, particularly with a certain type of christianity ; but at present I do not care to enter upon those rocky paths.

Perhaps the basic theme which a philosophic investigation would bring out is the contrasting experience of individualization as between East and West. Whereas in the modern West men unconsciously, as a rule work from the individual with his duties, his rights, his self-awareness, his intellect, and so forth, making the individual the foundation and the goal of everything, in the East even these days men work from the whole, the collectivity, undifferentiated reality, the bare crude datum. At most Eastern spirituality will tend to individuate and isolate but even then only by way of a theoretical finale, and that very finale will be regarded as a cosmic fulfillment rather than an individual one.

While the personal God is a God who deals with individuals, private or collective (e. g. the people of Israel), and judges them according to their personal conduct and talents, the experience of *karma* rests upon the playing of an actual part in a cosmic order which God may perhaps govern, which he may perhaps even create, but where in fact he too obeys the same law of *karma*, because what he creates outside himself is *karma*. This view scarcely leaves room for interpersonal relations, which it will always look on as useful

but not at all definitive personalizations of cosmic relations. Whereas Western civilization rests on the primacy of the person and defies understanding execpt in terms of the person, Eastern culture rests on a universal fellowship or common destiny in which each partaker plays only his own appointed role. Whereas 'differentiation', 'perfection', and fulness represent positive values in the culture of the West, indifference, simplification, and nothingness take first rank in the Eastern world.

Here we are dealing with primal human experiences and choices, so that there is no use trying to disregard them, or to imitate them when they do not spring of themselves from our own depths. It is idle to say that one world-view outdoes another, that the Eastern soul has not yet learnt to individualize but lies sunk in mass indifferentiation (not the true state of affairs, let it be noted) ; it is idle to find fault with the West, calling it schizophrenic (just as unfair a charge). A man labors in vain to achieve an awareness of universal solidarity and attune himself to the rhythms of the cosmos when his own deliberate will forms the chief stumbling-block athwart that way. My only purpose here is to sketch what strikes me as a basic human experience, without drawing rash conclusions as to the road men should take towards a better civilization than the present one. Possibly even the attempt at anthropological manipulation on this level is absurd, not to say something worse. And yet facing our situation may warrantably help to start the process of growth or even catalize it. One thing does seem certain, at least with regard to the few years of man which we are permitted to gaze back on and peer

forward at : that history is tending to individualize men on one hand and to collectivize them on the other in groupings different from the traditional ones. Everything suggests that a transition is going on from the superindividual stage to the superpersonal stage via individualization and personalization.

Be that as it may, two ideas appear to follow from all that we have said. The first is that no human system can be properly evaluated unless one has gained experience of it from within it. Hence the necessity for experiencing other religions from within, because their deep vision of things flows from a religious experience, not from the mere rational speculation of philosophy. The second idea is that only a profound and connatural understanding of them will place men in a position to arrange that encounter between nations, cultures, and religions so that the symbiosis will be benficial, not ruinous.

In saying all this I have not meant to affirm that the theory of *karma* is true, or false. I have merely tried to show : first, that the theory is far from nonsensical, that it represents a deep insight into the nature of things ; and second, that there is no reason at all for condemning it in the light of christian principles. Indeed, I am convinced that its adoption would enrich Western culture and fructify christian theology, resting as that does exclusively on a judaeo-graeco-western worldview, just as it would enrich and deepen the karmatic experience of reality. The first step might quite possibly bring us to theological pluralism rather than to a theological synthesis, for which unquestionably the time is not ripe. I seem to see a whole spectacular program

stretch out before our eyes. And obviously, until these and analogous attempts bear their fruit it is laughable, not to say insulting, to talk of incarnating the christian faith in Asia or adapting the Gospel message to any culture and mental outlook. The day is done when the 'natives' could be fobbed off with a few concessions to their customs. The difficulties loom large, but the might of the Spirit is not given stingily. There stands the challenge for anyone who cares to take it up.

I have tried to say, quite simply, that experience of faith must not be confused with attachment to a belief.

ON THE MEANING OF THE TERM 'UBHAYA VEDANTA'

V. RAGHAVAN,
Madras

The term '*Ubhaya Vedānta*', 'twofold Vedānta' is current in *Śrīvaiṣṇavism* and is used as an epithet of writers and teachers. It has been understood as referring to the twofold basis of *Śrīvaiṣṇava* thought, the one in the *Tamil hymns* of the *Ālvārs* and the other in the *Upaniṣads* in Sanskrit.

Recently I came across this epithet being used for a Śaivite teacher. The explanation for this that occurs immediately is that as there is the *Tamil hymns* of the *Nāyanārs* the *Śaiva* counter-part of those of the *Vaiṣṇava Ālvārs*, the expression as applied to *Śaivism* could have the same reference to the *Tamil Śaiva* psalms and the *Upaniṣads* as constituting the twofold Vedāntic basis of *Śaivism* too.

But a different and more a likely explanation seems possible. In the above explanation we have to resort to two languages, *Tamil* and *Sanskrit*, which will necessitate also the relevance of this term within the provenance of the *Tamil* area. If the epithet is used for authors and scholars in other areas and centres like Banaras, we should naturally seek something else in addition to the *Upaniṣads* as forming the basis of *Vedānta*, something which too is in *Sanskrit*.

There is a work entitled *Siddhāntaśekhara*, a digest (*nibandha*) of *Śaiva Āgamas* by Viśvanātha of Banaras who came of a family of scholars patronised by the Western

Cālukyas of Kalyān. Viśvanātha who wrote this work in the first quarter of the 13th cent.[1] A. D. describes himself as the pupil of one Kṛṣṇa of Banaras, son of Janārdana Cūḍāmaṇi and proficient in different Śāstras including *Śaivism*. In the colophon to the chapters of this *Siddhāntaśekhara*, Viśvanātha describes his *Guru* in Saivism as an *Ubhaya Vedāntin*:

इति श्रीशुद्धशैवागमाचार्य-श्रीकृष्णयोगीन्द्रशिष्येण उभयवेदान्ति-भास्करसूनुना कृताग्निष्टोमेन विश्वनाथेन विरचिते सिद्धान्त-शेखरे।·····प्रथमः परिच्छेदः।

From the nature of the work *Siddhāntaśekhara*[2] and the background of the author, his family and *guru*, it is clear that the term *Ubhaya Vedānta* means, by the two sources of Vedānta, the *Upaniṣads* and in addition to the *Upaniṣads*, the *Āgamas*. It is well known that in the *Vedānta Sūtras* II. 2. 35-42 the *Āgamas* and their authority are examined and Śaṅkara rejects the views of *Āgamas*, *Śaivite* and Vaiṣṇavite, on the nature of God and creation. But according to Śrīkaṇṭha's *Bhāṣya*, there is no contradiction between the *Āgamas* and the *Upaniṣads* both of them having had their source in the Almighty and being equally authoritative.

वयं तु वेदशिवागमयोर्भेदं न पश्यामः। I.2.35.

Thus according to *Śaivite* Śrīkaṇṭha's interpretation of the *Vedānta Sūtras*, there is a *Samanvaya* between the *Āgamas* on the one hand and of the *Upaniṣads* on the other as basis of *Vedānta*.

This is a significant phase in the history of *Vedānta* showing the integration of the Āgamic and Vedic

1. See R. 5268, Madras Govt. Ori. Mss. Library.

2. An edition of this work with my foreword is being brought out by Sri Sitarama Somayajin, Professor of Saivism, Maharaja's College of Sanskrit, Mysore.

traditions and its theistic interpretation, whether Śaivite or Vaiṣṇavite. If *Ubhaya* in *Ubhaya Vedānta* is taken as referring to the *Pāñcarātra* Āgama texts as a compliment to the *Upaniṣads*, it is quite appropriate to Viśiṣṭādvaita also. Rāmānuja shows this *Samanvaya* between *Upaniṣads* and *Pāñcarātra Āgama*, some texts of which he quotes, in his *Śribhāṣya* II 2. 39-42.

It therefore appears more appropriate to take the term *Ubhaya Vedānta* as referring to the integrated *Upaniṣad-cum-Āgama* approach and as equally valid for *Śaivite* and *Vaiṣṇavite* traditions, both of which have such a dual basis in *Upaniṣad* and *Āgama*.

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DADHYAÑ ĀTHARVAṆA IN THE VEDIC LITERATURE

V. G. RAHURKAR
University of Poona

Dadhyañ is mentioned as the son of Atharvan[1] in ṚV. 6.16.14; 1.116.12; 117.22.[2] He is mentioned nine times in the ṚV. He is a seer who kindled Agni (6.16.14) and is mentioned with Atharvan, Aṅgiras, Manu and other ancient sacrificers (I.80.16; 139.9).

The Aśvins gave a horse's head to Dadhyañ who then proclaimed to them the place of mead (*Madhu*) of Tvaṣṭṛ (1.11,7.22). With the head of a horse Dadhyañ proclaimed to the Aśvins the place of mead (1.116.12). The Aśvins won the heart of Dadhyañ; then the horse's head spoke to them (I.119.9).

Sāyaṇa, while commenting on I.116.12 gives the following legend: अत्रेयमाख्यायिका। इन्द्रो दधीचे प्रवर्ग्यविद्यां मधुविद्यां चोपदिश्य यदि इमाम् अन्यस्मै वक्ष्यसि शिरस्ते छेत्स्यामि इति उवाच । ततोऽश्विनौ अश्वस्य शिरश्छित्वा दधीचः शिरः प्रच्छिद्य अन्यत्र निधाय तत्र आश्व्यं शिरः प्रत्यधत्ताम्।

1. cf. (a) तमु त्वा दध्यङ्ङृषिः पुत्र ईधे अथर्वणः ṚV 6.16.14.
   (b) दध्यङ् ह यन्मध्वाथर्वणो वामश्वस्य शीर्ष्णा प्र यदीमुवाच ṚV 1.116.12.
   (c) दध्यङ् ह मे जनुषं पूर्वो अङ्गिराः प्रियमेधः कण्वो अत्रिर्मनुर्विदुस्ते । ṚV 1.139.9.
   (d) येना नवग्वो दध्यङ्ङ्पोर्णुते । ṚV 9.108.4.

2. cf. Sāyaṇa (a-b) अथर्वणः पुत्रः दध्यङ् एतत्संज्ञ ऋषिः Ṛv 6.16.14, and 1.116.12.
   (c) दक्ष्यङ् अथर्वगोत्रोत्पन्न एतन्नामको महर्षिः Ṛv 1.139.9.
   (d) दध्यङ् एतन्नामकोऽङ्गिराः Ṛv 9.108.4.

तेन च दध्यङ् ऋचः सामानि यजूंषि च प्रवर्ग्यविषयाणि. मधुविद्याप्रतिपादकं ब्राह्मणं चाश्विनावध्यापयामास । तदिन्द्रो ज्ञात्वा वज्रेण तच्छिरोऽच्छिनत् । अथाश्विनौ तस्य स्वकीयं मानुषं शिरः प्रत्यधत्तामिति शाट्यायन वाजसनेययोः प्रपञ्चे नोक्तम् ।

"A legend is told in this connection. Indra taught the *Madhuvidyā* and *Pravargyavidyā* to Dadhyañ and warned him that he would cut off his head if he taught it to some one else. Then the Aśvinas cut off Dadhyañ's head and replaced a horse's head by means of which Dadhyañ taught Aśvinau the *ṚKs*, *Yajus* and the *Sāmans* dealing with *Pravargya-vidyā* and the *Brāhmaṇa* dealing with the *Madhu-vidyā*. Indra knew this and cut off the horse's head with his thunderbolt. Thereupon Aśvinau replaced the original human head. The story has been narrated in details in *śāṭyāyana* and *Vājasaneya*."

In 1.84.13-14 it is said that Indra killed the 99 Vṛtras with the bones of Dadhyañ—

इन्द्रो दधीचो अस्थभिर्वृत्राण्यप्रतिष्कुतः ।जघान नवतीर्नव ॥

While commenting on the *Ṛk* Sāyaṇa gives a historical legend of the Śāṭyāyanins : अत्र शाट्यायनिन इतिहासमाचक्षते । 'आथर्वणस्य दधीचो जीवतो दर्शनेनासुराः पराबभूवुः । अथ तस्मिन् स्वर्गतेऽसुरैः पूर्णा पृथिव्यभूत् । अथेन्द्रः तैरसुरैः सह योद्धुमशक्नुवंस्तमृषिमन्विच्छन् स्वर्गं गत इति शुश्राव । अथ पप्रच्छ तत्रत्यान् नेह किमस्य किञ्चित् परिशिष्टमङ्गमस्तीति । तस्मा अवोचन् अस्त्येतदाश्व्यं शीर्षं येन शिरसा अश्विभ्यां मधुविद्यां प्राब्रवीत् । तत्तु न विद्म यत्राभवदिति । पुनरिन्द्रो अब्रवीत् । तदन्विच्छतेति । तद्वान्वैषिषुः । तच्छर्यणावत्यनुविद्याजत्हुः । शर्यणावद्ध वै नाम कुरुक्षेत्रस्य जघनार्धे सरः स्यन्दते । तस्य शिरसो अस्थिभिरिन्द्रोऽसुराञ्जघान' इति ।

"Here the Śāṭyāyanins tell a legend. As long as Dadhyañ was living on the earth the demons were defeated. But no sooner did he go to heaven than the whole earth was pervaded by them. Thereupon when Indra being unable to face the demons inquired after the *Ṛṣi*, he came to know that he had gone to heaven. He, however, asked the people, "Is there no remnant

of the sage left?" The people said, "Here is the horse's head by which he taught the *Madhuvidyā* to the Aśvins. But we do not know where it is now". Indra then said again, "Go, search for it." They searched and getting it in Śaryaṇāvat brought it to him. (Śaryaṇāvat is indeed a lake in the lower part of Kurukṣetra).[3] With the bones of that head Indra killed the demons."

Indra, besides producing cows from the dragon for Trita gave cowstalls to Dadhyañ and Mātariśvan (10.48.2). These are probably the cow-stalls which Dadhyañ opens by the power of *Soma* (9.108.4). It is noteworthy that in the only older passage (6.16.14) in which the name of Dadhyañ occurs, he is the son of the ancient fire-priest Atharvan and is himself a kindler of fire. Otherwise he is chiefly connected with *Soma* and with Indra in the release of cows.

Owing to his horse's head and his name he can hardly be disassociated from Dadhikrā. Let us, therefore, examine the etymology of the word.

The Etymological meaning of Dadhyañ

Keith says that the word etymologically means "Curdward (*Dadhi-añc*)". It thus may mean either 'possessing' or 'fond of' curdled milk. Monir Williams interprets it as 'sprinkling *Dadhi*' on the analogy of the word *Ghṛtācī* i.e. 'a ladle which sprinkles ghee'. Bergaigne however, is of opinion that Dadhyañ does not differ essentially from *Soma*. Keith further conjectures that Dadhyañ originally represented the lightning form of fire and that the horse's head would indicate its speed; the voice with which it speaks, the thunder; its bones the

3. cf. इच्छन्नश्वस्य यच्छिरः पर्वतेष्वपश्रितम् । तद्विदच्छर्यणावति ॥ Ṛv 1.84.14.

thunderbolt.[4] Yāska and Durgācārya try to derive the word as follows—

दध्यङ् प्रत्यक्तो ध्यानमिति वा। प्रत्यक्तमस्मिन् ध्यानमिति वा— Yāska. दध्यङ् मनुः अथर्वा इति त्रित्वपक्षे आदित्या एवैते तगुदणयोगाद् भवन्ति, द्युः स्थाने समाम्नानात्, पृथक्वे पुनर्द्युस्थानाः तत्सहचारिणः एते ऋषयः। प्रत्यक्तो ध्यानम् प्रतिगतो ध्यानमिति; ध्यानारम्भणे ह्येष उक्तः स्वमधिकारमनुतिष्ठति। तस्मिन् ध्यानकार्यं सफलं लक्ष्यते इति वा। —Durgācārya.

The telling of the mead (मधुविद्या) is interpreted more prosaically by Hillebrandt as referring to the use of honey in the ritual by the Atharvans.

Shri. S.P. Pandit's view

Shri S. P. Pandit, the author of *Vedārthayatna* avers : The ṚV. does not refer to the manner in which Indra killed the enemies with the bones of Dadhyañ. The story given by Sāyaṇa in his commentary does not appear to be a genuine one. This feat of Indra seems to have been completely forgotten in the post-Vedic period. In the *Brāhmaṇas* which are composed many years after the *Saṁhitās* the story seems to have been hopelessly misrepresented.

The statements that (a) the Asuras were frightened at the mere sight of Dadhyañ and were defeated, (b) that Indra was unable to kill the demons, (c) that the demons pervaded the whole earth and (d) that the horse-head of Dadhyañ was found in the lake Śaryaṇāvat in Kurukṣetra do not seem to have originated in the Vedic period. They definitely seem to have a stamp of much later period. As a matter of fact Śaryaṇāvat was

4. Keith further adds that his connection with the secret abode of Soma, would resemble that of the eagle with celestial Soma. The name, too, suggests the curdling effect of the thunderstorm.

a lake in which the *Soma* plant grew in abundance.[5]

Mr. S. P. Pandit conjectures that this may lead us to the rational explanation of the myth that the sage Dadhyañ must have been a symbolism for the *Soma* plant. The lines of arguments are as follows :

(A) The word Dadhyañ means 'a substance mixed with curds' दधि अञ्चति इति and hence it represents Soma mixed with curds (दध्याशिर).

(B) Indra killed the enemies with the bones of Dadhyañ. This only means that the billets of the *Soma* plant resembled bones. Indra drank the *Soma* squeezed from these billets and having secured power thereby, killed the enemies like Vṛtra etc.

(C) Dadhyañ put on horse's head and taught *Madhuvidyā* to Aśvins. This means that the top of the *Soma* plant resembled a horse's head. The Vedas say that the Aśvins endowed various substances with sweetness. They also got the honey prepared by the bees. In the same way the Aśvinau must have come to know that the *Soma* plant also contains sweet elixir. This must have given birth to the myth that Dadhyañ taught *Madhu-vidyā* (i.e. preparation of *Soma*) with a horse's head to the Aśvins.

(D) That Indra at last found the horse's head in a lake called Śaryaṇāvat, thus, supports the interpretation.

(E) That Dadhyañ introduced fire-worship with the offerings of *Soma*, means that in all ages fire was to be

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5. cf. (a) सिन्धून् पर्वताञ्छर्यणावतः Ṛv 10.35.2. (b) अश्वस्य शिरो···विदत् शर्यणावति । Ṛv 1.84.14. (c) मन्दस्वा सु स्वर्णर उतेन्द्र शर्यणावति । Ṛv 8.6.39 (d) ये वादः शर्यणावति Ṛv 9.65.22. (e) शर्यणावति सोममिन्द्रः पिबतु । Ṛv 9.11.3.1.

worshipped first. *Soma* was considered to be an essential requisite in the cult of fire.

The above line of arguments by Shri Pandit apparently seems to be quite logical. It must, however, be remembered that the Western Scholars were the founders of interpreting every Vedic reference, which was ordinarily inexplicable, symbolically. The Indian Scholars were naturally influenced by them. Of course, it must be admitted that symbology is one of the peculiarities of the Vedic language. But that does not mean that even in an apparently historical context symbolism should be sought. But thanks to the critical acumen of some scholars whose researches are proving that the Ṛgveda is a history, a significant social record and not a mere bundle of mystic symbols.

If Dadhyañ is to be identified with the *Soma* plant, how are the *Ṛks* (6.16.14; I.116.12, I.117.22, I.80.16) where he is said to be the son of Atharvā or 'Ātharvaṇa' to be explained? Sāyaṇa definitely asserts that he is the son of Atharvā or at least a sage born in the family of Atharvan or of an Aṅgiras. His commentary on ṚV. 9.100.4 definitely suggests that Dadhyañ and *Soma* are not identical.

Bhāgavata Purāṇa (6.11.20, 8.20.7),[6] Śatapatha Br.(4.1.5.18 etc.),[7] Jaiminīya Br., Pañcaviṁśa Br.(12.8.6),[8] Br. Up. (2.5.22; 4.5.28) refer to him in clear terms as a sage. Dadhyañ, thus seems to be one of the most ancient

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6. नन्वेष वज्रस्तव शक्र तेजसा हरेर्दधीचस्तपसा च तेजितः। and श्रेयः कुर्वन्ति भूतानां साधवो दुस्त्यजासुभिः । दध्यङ् शिबिप्रभृतयः .....॥

7. दध्यङ् ह वा आथर्वणो मधु नाम ब्राह्मणम् उवाच ।

8. दध्यङ् ह वा आङ्गिरसो देवानां पुरोधानीय आसीत् ।

seers. It was due to him that people took to fire-worship. The custom of extracting *Soma*-juice and of offering it to the gods is said to have been started by Dadhyañ with some other seers.

To resume, Dadhyañ Ātharvaṇa seems to be a special figure among the Atharvans. He is mentioned once in *Maṇḍala* VI which is specially fond of Atharvans, and elsewhere only in *Maṇḍalas* I, IX, X. The essential legend about him is that with the head of the horse hidden in the mountains he declared the *Madhu-vidyā* to the Aśvins. Further, Indra is said to have found the horse hidden in the mountains and to have slain ninety-nine Vṛtras with the bones of Dadhyañ. He is the son of Atharvan and the kindler of fire, and he obtains cows from Indra and opens cowstalls by Soma's power. The legned suggests that he is the founder of the *Soma*-cult.*

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PROBLEMS OF YAKṢAS

RAI GOVIND CHANDRA

The various problems of yakṣas have been attracting the attention of scholars both European and Indian for a long time now but like so many unsolved questions of Indian History and Culture these have also remained riddles staring us in our faces. These problems can be divided under three main headings, namely, etymological, theological and ethnological.

Under the etymological problems of the word *yakṣa,* come the questions of determining the exact meaning of this word in the context it appears in ancient Indian literature, its derivation as propounded in the lexicons and from aboriginal languages, its connection with similar words of other ancient languages of the world like Sumerian, Hittite, Babylonian, Pahalavi, Egyptian, Greek and Chinese, the changes in the meaning of this word by efflux of time etc.

From theological angle the problems which crop up are whether the yakṣas belonged to the Āryan pantheon or have got their place in it due to later contacts with the aboriginal inhabitants of India, in case they are of aboriginal origin, the probable time they penetrated the Āryan religion, the forces of nature they represented in the aboriginal religion, the benefit they bestowed, the place they occupied after entering the Āryan religion, the changes in their status and

beliefs about them, the mode of their worship in aboriginal societies and later in Āryan and Hindu religions, the place of their worship, the people who worshipped them, the present mode and places of worship.

Similarly under the ethnological issues come the ethnographical and ethnometric problems of yakṣas, such as questions of identifications of the yakṣas with a particular tribe of ancient India, the regions occupied by the yakṣas, the appearance of the members of the yakṣas tribe, their dress, their mode of life, their food, their occupation, their traits of character etc. Likewise the questions of connecting the yakṣa tribe with a tribe of same name surviving today, the regions occupied by this tribe, the effect of terrain and climate on the physical features and appearance of the members of the tribe, reasons for their migration to their present habitat, the mingling of races and consequent changes in their physical appearances, their houses, their present day dress, their food, their religious beliefs, their customs, their character, the ethnometric date about them, their literature, their number also come within the limits of ethnological problems. The basis of literary evidences will have to be considered within the framework of ethnological issues.

The etymological and theological problems concerning yakṣas have been dealt with by the scholars but the ethnological problem, the foremost one remains still unexplored. The purpose of this paper is to probe it from this angle and to establish that yakṣas are not simply mythological concepts but they represent an Indian tribe which exists even to-day.

The word *yakṣa* according to Coomaraswami is

is not of Sanskrit origin[1]. Hillebrandt finds the earliest meaning of this word : magician uncouth being, unseen spiritual enemy etc., then simply a supernatural being of exalted character.[2] In the *Dhātupāṭha* of Pāṇini *yakṣa dhātu* comes under *curādigaṇa, ātmanepada seṭ* : *Yakṣa pūjāyām* (Dhātu no. 1693).[3] In the *Dhātumālā* of *Saddanīti* it is explained as '*Yakṣa*' *pūjāyām. Yakkheti, yakkhayatiti yakkho. Yakkho ti mahānubhāvo satto* etc.[4] Later lexicons interpret the word as soul, as one who worships, as one who is worshipped. A number of derivations have been suggested of this word e.g. from *yaśa.*[5] ; from Persian *yaśa*[6] ; from the Greek god *Kabeiros* etc.[7] ; It, however, appears to be the name of tribe as the word "*itarejanaḥ*" of *Atharvaveda* (8, 10, 28) clearly suggests. The origin and meaning, if any, will have to be searched in Sumerian as the people with whom they can be identified, if at all, seem to have passed to India from Southern Arabia.

The word *yakṣa,* however, occurs in several hymns of the *Ṛgveda* and here a feeling of antagonism

1. J. N. Banerjee, *Development of Hindu Iconography* p. 337, fn. 1.

2. Hillebrandt, *Vedisch yakṣa un Festigahe Richard gathe,* Erlangen, 1927.

3. *Word Index to Pāṇini—Sūtrapāṭha and Priśiṣṭas*—compiled by Shridhara Shastri Pathak, B. O. R. I., Poona, 1935.

4. *Dhātumālā of Saddanīti,* Ch. XVIII, p. 523, ed. by Helmer Smith, 1929.

5. Renou—*Etude vediques et Pāṇincennes,* III, 38.

6. Mayrhofer, III, (but here Iranian hypothetical word yahś is given).

7. E. W. Hopkins, "*Sanskrit Kabairas and Greek Kabeiros*", J. A. O. S., Vol. II, Sept. 1913, p. 55.

against yakṣas appears, though they are described as beautiful to look at(7, 56, 16) and whose weapons fly as those of Bṛhaspati (1, 190, 4). In the *Yajurveda Saṁhitā* it appears that this antagonism becomes a little subdued as is evident from the verb *yakṣat* formed the noun and used in the sense of worshipping (*SYV*. 20, 24-34 etc.). In the *Atharvaveda itarcjanaḥ* denotes yakṣas (AV. 8, 1078) and signifies that this was a tribe. In the *Śatapatha* Kubera is described as Rājā probably of the yakṣas.

The Āṭānāṭiya Sutta of *Dīghanikāya* describes yakṣas as residents of Uttarakuru and Sudarśana mountain in the northern region. The people born here have no attachments, do not accept things from others, neither they sow seeds, nor plough the fields. They eat wild paddy (*akṛṣṭa-pacya*), scented rice cooked in milk; they go to all directions on bullocks, animals, women and men etc.[8] From this description it is evident that yakṣas were members of a tribe.

Yakṣas, according to Ceylonese chronicles, were ruling at one time the island of Ceylon where they had come from the main land; but when they began to give trouble to the merchants passing via Ceylon, Buddha by his miracles frightened them and made them leave Ceylon and go to Giri Dvīpa[9]. This description also suggests that there was a tribe called yakṣa.

In the *Mūla Sarvāstivāda Vinaya* the story of the

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8. *Dīghanikāya*, ed. by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana & Jagadīśa Kāśyap, Mahabodhi Society, Sarnath (Varanasi), 1936, p. 277-280.

9. V. Rangacharya, *Pre-Musalman India*, p. 596 : also A. A. Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian & Indonesian Art*, Ceylon, p. 158.

initiation of all the four Mahārājas by Buddha is recorded.[10] The story in short runs as follows : Once when Buddha was in Puṣkariṇī kṣetra on the banks of river Mandākinī he resolved to initiate four Mahārājas of all the four quarters. They all came with their followers .....Mahārāja Vaiśravaṇa came along with several hundred thousands of yakṣa followers from the North. They had all brought with them gold and offered that to the Lord, after doing salutation to the Lord by bowing their heads at his feet they sat down before him. Among these four Mahārājas, two belonged to Aryan tribe, i. e, Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Virūḍhaka and other two Virūpākṣa and Vaiśravaṇa were of Dasyu tribe. Buddha thought that if he delivered his sermon in Aryan speech (aryā vāc) two belonging to Aryan tribe would understand, while the rest two who were of Dasyu tribe would not. Similar would be the case if he spoke in Dasyu language. He, therefore, decided to preach the first two in Aryan speech and the rest two in Dasyu speech. He delivered his first sermon in Aryan speech to Dhṛtarāṣṭra Mahārāja in the following words : "*Iti hi Mahārāja jīrṇaḥ kāyaḥ vedanā śītībhūtā saṁjñā niruddhā saṁskārā vyupaśāntā vijñānamastaṁgatam. Eṣa evānto duḥkhasyeti*".....".....Now he turned towards the rest two and preached Virūpākṣa : " *Iti hi Maharāja ene mene daṣphe ḍaṇḍaṣphe eṣa evānto duḥkhasyeti*"; and to Vaiśravaṇa he said : "*Atra te Mahārāja māṣā tuṣā saṁśāmā sarvatra vivāṭhi eṣa evānto duḥkhasyeti*".

Here we find that two groups of languages or speeches have been used for these two groups and there

10. *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya*, 1,255-260; also Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*, Vol. II, p. 425 ff.

is distinction between the speeches used in preaching the two Dasyu Mahārājas namely, Virūpākṣa and Vaiśravaṇa too. Thus from the above citation of the text it is evident that the tribe to which Viśravaṇa, the Lord of the yakṣas belonged had its own particular language which was classified under the Dasyu group of languages and it had certain peculiarities and variations from other Dasyu speeches of the period.

It is significant to note that in the Dulva the whole of the above cited Aryan speech has been translated into Tibetan language but the portions of the sermons delivered to Virūpākṣa and Vaiśravaṇa, said to be in Dasyu language were not translated but were simply transliterated in the original form. Let us consider the possibilities which prompted the ancient scholars to do so. Two reasons for the same that come to mind are : (a) the translation of the text into Tibetan was done at a later stage when these tribal languages had become obscure, (b) the translators kept purposely the original speech to give specimens of the tribal languages of the yakṣas and Kumbhāṅdas to which Vaiśravaṇa and Virūpākṣa belonged.

This also confirms that there was a tribe of yakṣas in ancient India and it had its own speech.

The Dasyu vāca in *Ṛgveda* is called *mṛdhra vāca* which has been described as lisping tongue by Muir.[11] Prof. Macdonell records this to be the language of enemies.[12] The names of the Dasyus which occur in *Ṛgveda* are Cumuri, Śambara and Śuṣṇa etc. The adjec-

11. Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, II, 392.

12. *Vedic Index*, Vol. I, p. 347, fn. 4 & 5 ;

tive '*anās*' used for the Dasyus brings forth the hypothesis that they were members of a tribe. If we take *anāsa* to mean flat nosed then also it depicts certain non-Aryan tribe which comes nearer to aborigins.

The Dasyus have been described in *Ṛgveda* as *akarman*, non-believers in rites, *adevayu*-indifferent to gods, *abrahman*- without devotion, *ayajvan*- non-performers of yajñas, *ayajyu*- non-worshipper, *avrata*- non-believers in laws, *anyavrata*- followers of strange ordinances or pactices (perhaps other than those of the Aryans) : and in *Atharvaveda* as *devapīyu*- reviling gods. They are also described as *anās* and *kṛṣṇa tvac* etc.[13]

Robert Sheafer writes that there is a difference between the Dāsas and Dasyus. Dāsas were enemies who claimed equality with Aryans, to defeat them and to conquer them was laudable. And Dasyus were considered to be of low class who could be beaten and punished etc. He has tried to connect the Dasyus with Bhils.[14] Now the problem arises, can we take that the Bhils and yakṣas belonged to the same ancient common tribe.

In the Census Report it is stated that the Bhils were spread all over India before the advent of Aryans.[15] Perhaps originally they migrated from Sahara region when it turned into a desert and through Arabia reached India. Here, however, when they came in contact with other aboriginal tribes, they were termed as Bhils as in Tamil there is a word

13. Ibid. *Kṛṣṇa tvaca* and *Anās*, RV. 1,130,8.

14. Robert Sheafer, *Ethnography of Ancient India*, Otto Hasrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1959, pp. 32. 33.

15. *Census Report*, 1931, Vol. I, Pt. III–Ethnographic account of Bhils of Central India, 1935, pp. 40-42.

Bhileśvara meaning a person using bow and arrows. The Bhils are not Austroloids, as on the basis of blood grouping the Austroloids have 'A' group of blood while Bhils and Mundas have 'B' group.[16] It appears that before the Tamilians used common nomenclature Bhil, a number of tribes existed which were known by their individual tribal names remnants of which still exist, e. g. there is a tribe living in Gujarat and Western Rajputana, of Bhils known as *Vāsavo* and another tribe known as *Nahalā*. Compbell has described the Nahalas as mostly savages,[17] a prominent characterstic of the yakṣas too. Can there be any connection between this *Vāsavo* and the Pali word *Vessavaṇa* (Vaiśravaṇa - Kubera), the Lord of *yakṣa*. Likewise *yakkha* the Pali word for *yakṣa*, was probably the name of another Bhil tribe which migrated to northern region under certain circumstances and this important factor will be discussed in the succeeding pages.

Bhils have been described in Rajputana Gazetteer as of small stature, dark in complexion, flat-nosed and ugly.[18] Dasyus too were *kṛṣṇa tvac* and *anās* in *Ṛgveda* as referred before. Thus they could have been the modern Bhils. D. N. Majumdar describes Bhils as having both flat and erect noses with alive complexion not unlike their Gujarati neighbours and their women folk is more intelligent than their men[19]—a characterstic

16. D. N. Majumdar, *Races & Cultures of India*, Asia Publishing House, 1951, p. 40.

17. Compbell, *The Wild Tribes of India*, London, 1882, p. 31.

18. *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Calcutta, 1908, p. 87.

19. D. N. Majumdar, *Races and Cultures of India*, p. 40.

ascribed to *yakṣiṇis* in the Buddhist texts. It is possible that he has based his conclusions on those Bhils who inhabit the jungles bordering towns of Gujarat. These physical changes in them appear to have cropped up firstly through their impregnation by Śakas and later on by the Gujaratis.

The migration of Bhils from plains to remote places like hills and jungles must have definite basis. As stated before they were known as Dasyus in *Ṛgvedic* period and after the Aryan advent they must have considered the remote places more congenial for their residence than to live near the Aryan settlements due to constant fear of persecution and forced employment to menial works. In this connection we have the textual testimony to our support. If we consider the problem where did the yakṣas live, the *Ṛgveda* testifies their presence near the Aryan settlements[20] and if we take them as dasyus then at least two battles were fought by Aryans with them, one near Puṣkariṇī or modern Rāvī and another on the banks of river Yamunā.[21] As stated before the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* too records that Lord Buddha preached Vaiśravaṇa, the king of yakṣas, at Puṣkariṇī region which corroborates the fact that the region of yakṣas was in the same area where Aryan settlements took place and they had to migrate.

The regions occupied by the yakṣas.

As per description in the *Āṭānāṭiya Sutta* yakṣas were residents of Uttarakuru in the vicinity of Sudarśana mountain. Their cities were *Āṭānaṭā*,

20. RV. 4, 3, 13.

21. *Vedic Index*, Vol. I, p. 347, fn. 2.

Kusināṭā, Para Kusinaṭā, Nāṭasuriyā, Kapīvanta, Janogha and 99 other cities.[22]

In the *Brahmapurāṇa* yakṣas are said to be the inhabitants of lower Himalayan hills.[23] According to *Śrīmadbhāgavata* they were the residents of Droṇagiri of Himālaya mountains.[24] In the *Kūrmapurāṇa* [25] it is stated that yakṣas lived at a place where the Kailāsa peak separates itself from the main Kailāsa mountain which means that they were living at a place in the lower hilly tract of Kailāsa. *Matsya*[26] and *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇas*[27] record the place round Kailāsa peak situated on the back of the Himālayas as their abode. The *Vāyu Purāṇa* describes Jyotiṣa Śṛṅga (peak) of Meru mountain as the place of Kubera and around it the abode of his generals.[28].

In the *Mahābhārata* Kubera with eight lacs of yakṣas has been described as living on *śveta* peak of Mandāra mountains.[29] Kālidāsa in his *Meghadūta* has described them to be the inhabitants of Alakāpurī situated in the hills where Gaṅgā falls from mountains.[30] The place should not be very far from modern Uttara Kāśī. Buddhist *Jātakas* describe their abode in deserts, forests, mountains and water.[31]

22. *Dīghanikāya*, pp. 270-280.
23. *Brahma Purāṇa*, 108, 1-60.
24. *Śrīmadbhāgavata*, 4, 10, 5.
25. *Kūrma Purāṇa* , Pūrva Bhāga, 48, 4.
26. *Matsya Purāṇa*, 120, 3, 18.
27. *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*, Pūrva Bhāga, 2, 18, 5-17.
28. *Vāyu Purāṇa*, 30, 81-86 ; 40, 8.
29. *Mahābhārata*, Vana Parva, 139, 5, 12.
30. Kālidāsa–*Meghadūta*–Pūrva Megha, 63.
31. Ratilal Mehta, *Pre-Buddhist India*, p. 324 ; *Jātaka* I, p. 99, 349.

Sufficient textual evidence is available which throws abundant light on the origin, physical characteristics, dress and food and special traits of character of yakṣas and thus its discussion is of considerable importance in propounding our thesis.

Their origin

In the Purāṇas yakṣas are said to have been born out of the union of a *brahmarākṣasa* and an *apsarā* (a divine damsel) named Kṛtusthalā.[32] In *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*, however, they are said to have been born to Kāśyapa and Khasā.[33] In the *Rāmāyaṇa* it is stated that when Brahmā created water those who accepted to protect it were given the name of Rākṣasa and those who said that they would worship it were called yakṣa.[34] In all probability it appears from the above mythological statements that the yakṣas were a tribe of the aboriginal races inhabiting India before the advent of Aryans and since their origin was not known, they were described as offsprings of *brahmarākṣasa* and an *apsarā*—a divine damsel. Their being comparatively handsome than other aborigines might have been the reason for the above description. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* the attempt is to establish the meanings of the words Rākṣasa and yakṣa.

Physical characteristics of yakṣas.

According to *Ṛgveda* yakṣas have been described as beautiful. It is stated : 'Marutas are as beautiful as yakṣas[35] .....' In the *Gṛhya sūtras* the Ācārya sitting in his *pariṣad* is described as pleasant to look at like a

32. *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*, upodgāta Pāda III ; 7, 101-132.

33. *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*, I, 197, 2-7 ; *Vāyu Parāṇa*, 79, 134-135.

34. *Rāmāyaṇa*, uttara kāṇḍa, 4, 9-13.

35. R.V. 7, 56, 16.

yakṣa.[36] In the *Mahābhārata* they are said to have red eyes, golden hue, tall and strong body.[37] *Jātakas* also describe them having red eyes which do not wink and their bodies do not produce shadows. They are tall like Tānḍa tree, have big heads of the size of a group of trees (*kuñja*), have big eyes almost as big as bowls, two of their teeth come out their mouth and their nose is like that of a hawk.[38] In the *Purāṇas* they have been described as ugly. *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* describes their physical features almost like Rākṣasas. They are thus dreadful to look at with big teeth, yellow eyes, mouth spread over upto the ears, flat nosed, ears like thorns, thin haired, unusually big bodies.[39] In the *Skanda Purāṇa* they are portrayed as hefty, heavy bodied, dark skinned and having strong voice.[40] The *Vāyu Purāṇa* describes them almost like Rākṣasas with round eyes, yellow colour, fat with protruding bellies, having eight teeth, mouth spread upto the ears, very tall heads like smoke, their body hairs standing on ends ; they have small hand and have lips and tongue of copper colour, long eyebrows, thick noses, red throat and blue skin and of dreadful appearance.[41] The *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* portrays them as pleasant to look,[42] while in *Brahmavaivarta*

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36. *Gobhila Gṛhya Sūtra*, 3, 4, 28 : *Drāhyāyaṇa Gṛhya Sūtra*, 3, 1, 25.

37. *Mahābhārata*—Vana Parva, 161, 28 161, 55 etc.

38. Ratilal Mehta, *Pre-Buddhist India*, p. 324 ; *Jātaka* ; Vol. VI, p. 307 ; I, p. 273 etc.

39. *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*, Vol. I, 197, 5-14.

40. *Skānda Purāṇa*, Kāsī Khaṇḍa, 8, 13-14.

41. *Vāyu Purāṇa*, 70, 56-63.

42. *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*, Upodghāta Pāda, III, 7, 125.

Purāṇa they are described as ugly.[43]

On the basis of ancient Indian Mauryan Sculptural evidence it can be said that they were supposed to be taller (one and half to double the size) than ordinary men. Their body was proportionate and stout, with protruding bellies, face generally round and nose flat at the bottom. Later sculptures depict them as dwarfs with small legs and protruding bellies having ugly faces with flat noses.[44]

Their dress.

As per description in the *Vāyu Purāṇa*, yakṣas used coloured garments. Turban appears to be a popular headgear. It is also stated there that they used to tie the lower parts of their legs. Use of ornaments like earrings, armlets and crown was also in vogue.[45] As recorded in *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* yakṣas come with presents of gold and gems to offer to the Buddha which confirms that the ornaments used by them were of gold studded with gems.[46]

Ancient sculptures show them wearing *mauli* on their heads, *uttarīya* on their shoulders, and *dhotis* on the lower part of their bodies ; the *yakṣaṇīs* are seen wearing dhotis only. Yakṣas are shown wearing jewelled turbans, torques on their necks, several necklaces over the chest, heavy earings, armlets, bangles and jewelled band on the wrists as well as above their bellies and on their loins. In the later sculptures they are often shown

43. *Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa*, Śrīkṛṣṇa Janma Khaṇḍa, 10 ; *Śbdakalpadruma*, Vol. 4, p. 2, col. 1, 2, 3.

44. A. Coomaraswami, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*. p. III, 9 ; Zimmer, *Indian & Indonesian Art*, Fig. 19 : Sāncī West gate ; Amarāvati, Fig. 90, lower left hand pannel.

45. *Vāyu Purāṇa*, 70, 57-63.

46. *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya*, 1, p. 257-258.

carrying a fly whisk in their right arm or holding something with their arms upraisad. In most cases they are depicted as laughing.[47]

Their food.

Regarding their food habits there is a mention in the *Āṭānāṭiya Sutta* that they took wiled paddy rice cooked in milk.[48] In the *Mahābhārata* at one place it is stated that Yudhiṣthira offered rice and lintels mixed (*khicarī*), meat and water mixed with *tila* to yakṣas.[49] *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa* indicates their meal time to be at sunset.[50]

The special traits of their character.

So far as their special traits of character are concerned, one of the hymns of *Ṛgveda* describes them as *adbhutakṛta* (capable of performing miracles) like Mitrāvaruṇa.[51] The *Atharvaveda* records them as *mahat* (great)[52] and Pippalāda Śākhā as *puṇya janāḥ* (virtuous); the *Mahābhārata* accredits them with the quality of swift movement, capable of using various types of weapons and transformation to different bodies.[53] In the *Meghadūta* they have been shown to be the lovers of music, flowers and trees and have also been described as proficient in the art of painting.[54] Their special habitat were the caves as

47. *Infra*, p. 22, fn. 1.

48. *Infra*, p. 5, fn. 1.

49. *Mahābhārara*–Aśvamedha Parva, 65, 6-7.

50. *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa*, Pūrvārdha, ch. 83, p. 317.

51. *Ṛgveda*, 5, 70, 4.

52. *Atharvaveda*, 18, 7, 38 ; 11, 8, 15.

53. *Mahābhārata*–Vana Parva–161, 28-29 ; 161, 55-56 ; 313, 29 ; 314, 2.

54. Kālidāsa–*Meghadūta*–Uttaramegha, 1-11.

suggested in the *Brahma Purāṇa*[55], the same is also corroborated by the *Paumacariu*, a Jain work,[56] and by the *Pavananjaya Nāṭaka* (of later date) as well.[57] Their love for trees is evident from a description in the *Mahābhārata—vṛkṣamāśritya.*[58] According to *Āṭiānāṭiya Sutta* they rode on animals, women and men for their movement from one place to another.[59]

Yākhā tribe.

In the preceding paras we have discussed the ethnological problems of yakṣas based on literary and other sources. On the synthesis of the same we can say that yakṣas were a tribe,[60] of old Dasyus—modern Bhils, which is still found in Nepal and known as *yākhā*, Pali *yakha*—perhaps of non-Aryan origin which was later on Sanskritized as *yakṣa*—a point which needs detailed discussion.

Yākhā, a small tribe of Kiratas.

Yākhā now being a small tribe form part of Kirātas. The term Kirāta includes tribes like Khambus, Limbus, Yakha etc.[61]

The Kirātas.

The Kirātas or Kirantis inhabit the southern slopes of Himalayas—Kiranta Deśa—the mountainous region

55. *Brahma Purāṇa*, 36, 15.16.

56. Kavirāja Svayambhū Deva–*Paumacariu*–Bhāratīya Jnānapītha, 1957, Vol. I. 8. 1-9.

57. Hastimala–*Pavananjava Nāṭakam*–Acts 6 & 7. p. 116.

58. *Mahābhārata*–Vana Parva 313, 39.

59. *Dīghanikāya*, p. 279.

60. Salatore, *The Wild Tribes of India*, p. 126 ; D. C. Sircar, *Geography of Ancient and Mediaeval India*, p. 62.

61. Salatore–Ibid, p. 127 ; Risley, *Castres and Tribes of Bengal*, Vol. I, p. 480.

between Dudkosi and Karvi rivers in Nepal.[62] Sylvain Levi says that the territory between Dud-kosi and Amu is inhabited by Kirātas.[63] Hodgson is of the view that Kirātas have lived in the region for the last 2000-2500 years. They were powerful enough and had extensive territory under their control at one time extending upto the Gangetic Delta. His conclusions are based on *vaṁśāvalis* (ancient chronicles) of Nepal proper, which show a long line of Kirānti sovereigns ruling there from the mythic age of the Shepherd Kings (Gopāla) down to the 14th century.[64] Although the terms Kirāta, Kirānti or Kirānti are of high antiquity and are applied in the sense of the country and the people even today, it is remarkable to note "that the Kirantis themselves do not readily admit the genuineness or propriety of those terms, but prefer the names of Khwombovel Khambo and Kirawa as their general personal designations and seem to have none at all for their country.[65] They are divided into numerous tribes speaking dialects so diverse as to be not mutually intelligible. Division of Kirāntas into Wallo (hither), Manjh (middle) and Pallo (further) is on territorial basis. Yākhā Linbu, Lohorong and Chhingtāng are classified under Wallo Kirāntas though the yākhās and Limbus do not accept that they are Kirāntas yet they are closely related races having essential comity of customs and manners with the Kirāntis. They intermarry and their dialects also do not differ much from the Khwombu tongue.[66]

62. Salatore, *Ibid.*, p. 22.
63. Sylvain Levi, *Le Nepal*, Vol. II, p. 77-78.
64. B. H. Hodgson, J. A. S. B., No. 5, 1858, p. 447.
65. Ibid, p. 448.
66. Ibid, p. 448-449.

Their number.

The number of Kirātas or Kirāntis including yākhās and Linbus and others in the past did not exceed quarter of a million, though in the remote past they were said to be 'No lakha Kirānta'. The village headman known as Pasung enjoyed a good deal of authority—he collected taxes and decided the disputes.[67]

Unlike other citizens of Nepal Kirāntis including yākhās retained the freehold of their ancestors which they called *walikha*. The boundaries of an estate were defined by the run of the water. The tax paid by each landholder or *thungpung hungpa* (lord of the soil) was rupees 5 per annum.

Their profession.

The Kirāntis are generally agriculturists growing maize, buckwheat, millets, peas, dry rice and cotton. The use of plough was not common which is proved by the fact that there is no word in their dialect for plough. They bought their iron implements, copper utensils and ornaments from other tribes.

Their houses.

They lived in small villages, their huts were small, obliquely raised on the outer side to get a level on the slope of the hill. The walls of the huts were of thick reed, neatly plastered and the roofs were thatched with grass. They built their houses themselves.

Their dress.

Till lately members of the tribe used to wear cotton cloth made out of the native cotton grown. The cloth

67. Ibid, pp. 449-450.

was hand spun and hand woven by the women folk of the tribe. Cloth used was generally dyed with madder and with other wild plants—whereof one, a climber, yields a fine black colour. Use of ornaments brought from other tribes was also common.

Their food.

For food they used cereals grown by them and meat. They formented and distilled liquor for themselves and used the former in great quantity.[68]

Their religion.

Their religious notions were vague. They had no term to denote God or any special deity, though the word *mang* may be construed to mean some deity and Khyimmo or Khyimmang for household deity. There was no priesthood and thus there was no class in the society to which the work of worship was assigned. Any one inspired by *mang* could become a priest and his duty was to propitiate the household god of each family by annual worship celebrated after the harvest and to perform trivial ceremonies at marriages and death. He also made offerings to the *manes* (*sankha*) of the ancestors of each house-holder. The priest was called *Nakchhong*.

Kirāntis also believed in black magic and called its priest Krakra or Kunyamayawo. The professional antagonist of the black magic priest was variously named in different dialects, as Janicha, Mangha, etc. He was an exorcist and physician.[69]

They observed only two religious festivals every year, one for the Khyimmo (the household god) and the

68. Ibid, pp. 450-451.
69. Ibid, p. 451.

other for the Samkha (souls of the deceased). The later suggests their belief in Caitya worship which is one of the oldest forms of worship. It contained the relics of the ancestors incarnated as yakṣa, called Khā to-day, who could bestow all wealth. His picture with two jugs holding money appears along with Lakṣmī to whom sacrifice is offered.

Their customs.

The Kirāntis used to buy their wives paying usually in the shape of copper household utensils. If one had no means he would go and earn his wife by working at the would be father-in-law's house. Usually they married at maturity. Divorce could be had at the pleasure of either party but in case it was sought by the wife her family had to pay the price to the husband and the children remained with the husband. Their marriage ceremony was brief—the priest takes a cock in his left hand and strikes it on the back with the blunt side of a sickle till the blood comes out of its mouth, on the basis of the blood mark on the ground prophecy about the offspring whether males or females is made. In case the blood does not flow, marriage was considered to be childless.

Kirātas burried their dead on the day of death on hill tops and made tomb of stones loosely constructed. The funeral had to be attended by the priest who moved with the corpse with a copper vessel in his hand which was struck by him with a stick thus invoking the soul of the deceased desiring it to go in peace and join the souls that went before.[70]

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70. Ibid, p. 451-452.

The law of inheritence gave equal shares to sons and nothing to daughters. They usually wore the hair long and hid the top knot which they carried like Hindus.[71]

Character.

The general character of the Kirāntis has been described as fierce. They used to come to blows especially in their cups.

Physical features.

Kirāntis are of short stature—their height ranging from 5' to 5'-4''. The length of the head ranging between $8\frac{1}{4}$' to $9\frac{1}{8}$' and the width from 6' to $6\frac{1}{4}$', shows that they were long headed people—a charactertic of the aborigins of India.[72]

Their literature.

According to Hodgson Kirāntis never had any literature[73] while Sylvain Levi on the basis of *Lalitavistara,* is of the opinion that they introduced a Lipi.[74]

We get references of Kirātas in *Vājasneyi Saṃhitā.*[75] The *Atharvaveda* contains description of Kirāta girls digging with thin edged spades (kudālī) made of gold.[76] They lived in caves and mountains were their homes. When Bhīma went out for *digvijaya* he came across Kirātas after crssoing Videha.[77] Nakula had con-

71. Ibid, p. 452-456 (for details) ; D. R. Regmi, *Ancient Nepal*, p. 23.

72. Ibid, p. 452-456 (for details) ; D. R. Regmi, loc. cit.

73. Hodgson, JASB, No. 5, 1858, p. 451.

74. Sylvain Levi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 451.

75. *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā*, 30, 16 ; 5. A. V., 10, 4, 14.

76. AV 10, 4, 14.

77. Sylvain Levi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 75-76.

frontations with the Kirātas in the West. In the great battle of *Mahābhārata* Kirātas came under the banner of the king of Prāgjyotiṣa. It is mentioned that they were of golden complexion, ate fruits and dressed themselves in skins. According to Periples they lived on the mouth of the Ganges and had flat nose.[78]

The Yākhā tribes.

As discussed yākhā tribe forms a part of Kirātas. We get only a few details about them. Besides Hodgson we have the evidence of Grierson about yākhās—described as a small tribe found between the Arun river and Singibela range—most of them recorded in Chainpur. Small settlements of the tribe were also recorded in Darjeeling and Sikkim. In the Census of 1904 they were also found in Assam.[79] The peculiarities of their language have also been recorded by Grierson.[80]

On the authority of Sir Herbert Risby, Grierson has described that the members of this tribe called themselves *yak-thomba* or yakherds, with reference to the tradition that this was their characteristic occupation before they crossed the Himalaya into Eastern Nepal; he has further stated that Hodgson was of the view that yākhās were the yākkhas mentioned in the *Mahāvansa* as living in the Himalayas. The yākhās like the Jimidars, use the honorific title Rai to denote themselves.[81] If like Licchavis they were all Rais then their king and leaders would be Mahārājā.

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78. Ibid. Vol. II, pp. 75-76.

79. A. Grierson, *Linguistic Survey of India*, Vol. III, part I, 1909, reprint in 1967, p. 305.

80. Ibid, p. 305-310.

81. Ibid, p. 305.

Conclusion

From the above testimonies it is practically certain that yakṣas were a tribe of Bhils. Their description as being beautiful in the *Ṛgveda*[82] might be a comparative connotation. We also know that Mongoloids had come in contact with the aborigines of India in the proto-historic period[83] and their blood mixture through the process of impregnation with some of the Bhil tribes like yākhā might have resulted in making them comparatively beautiful than rest of the population. When they were pushed away by the Aryans they took refuge in the mountains and forests where their further contact with the Mongolians accounted for further change in their physical features. As mentioned above the burial customs of the yākhā tribe[84] correspond with that of the aborigines inhabiting the Indus Valley.

We can thus conclude that the yakṣas were a tribe, remnants of whom are still present in Nepal and known as yākhā. They had their Caityas which were the abodes of their ancestors and which they worshipped. These are known as Khā in their dialect as short form of yākhā. These ancestors were supposed to give all the wealth one desired and had unrestricted

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82. *Infra,* p. 19, fn. 1.

83. Mongolian skull at Mohenjodaro–Col. Sewell & Dr. Guha in Marshall's 'Mohenjodaro and the Indus Civilization'–II, 643, pl. CLX–5, 7 ; Mackay–Further Excavation at Mohenjodaro–p. 281, fn. 1 , p. 269, pl. LXXV–8–Mongolian slant of eyes, No. 9; D. K. 6197.

84. *Infra,* p. 32.

and swift movement because of being spirits. It appears that later on these beliefs found acceptance among other people of India who started treating them as supermen and thus they became mythological figures. Thus the yakṣas who were worshipped were the ancestors of this tribe. Later on the tribe itself became popularly known by the name of *yakṣa* or *yakkha* ; therefore, the word *yakṣa* denotes a tribe.

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*THE FIGURATIVE USE OF DUHITṚ IN THE ṚGVEDA

RAM GOPAL,

Punjab University, Chandigarh.

It is a truism to say that Vedic interpretation is beset with many difficulties and numerous Vedic passages are still as obscure as before. There are very many Vedic passages which yield no logical sense if only a literal interpretation is placed on them. It is an established fact that the figurative use of several important words is a characteristic feature of Vedic poetry. *Duhitṛ* is one such word as is mostly employed in a figurative sense in the *Ṛgvcda*. In most of the Vedic passages the figurative use of *Duhitṛ* is abundantly clear and leaves no scope for ambiguity.

In more than three dozen passages of the Ṛgveda, wherein it is used in conjunction with the genitive form *Divaḥ* "of Heaven", the word *Duhitṛ* figuratively denotes "Dawn" (*Uṣás*) "the daughter of Heaven."[1] In two Ṛgvedic passages, the dual form of *Duhitṛ* is figuratively employed to denote the well-known Vedic pair of Dawn and Night (*Uṣásā-náktā*).[2] In about a dozen passages of the Ṛgveda the word *Duhitṛ* is used in juxta-

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1. RV. I, 30, 22, 48, 1, 89 ; 49, 2 ; 92, 5-7 ; 113, 7 ; 124, 3 ; 183, 2 ; IV, 30, 8-9 ; 51, 1 ; 52, 1 ; V, 79, 2.3.8.9 , 80, 5-6 ; VI, 64, 4-5 ; 65, 1.6 ; VII, 67, 2 ; 75, 4 ; 77, 6 ; 78, 4 ; 79, 3 ; 81,3.5 : VIII, 47, 14-15 ; X, 39, 12 ; 127, 8.

2. RV. VI, 49, 3 ; X, 70, 6.

position with the genitive form of *Sūrya* or *Svár*, e. g. *Sūryasya Duhitā* or *Sūro Duhitā* (once *Sūre Duhitā*, to denote figuratively a natural phenomenon connected with the *Aśvíns* and the sun.[3] The literal translation of such phrases will obviously be "the daughter of the sun", but the metaphor underlying the Vedic phrases, *Sūryasya Duhitā* or *Sūro Duhitā*, is a subject of diverse interpretations. Sāyaṇa offers no cogent and consistent explanation of these phrases and attempts varying explanations according to his convenience. In his commentary on three passages of the Ṛgveda,[4] Sāyaṇa explains the figurative expression "*Duhitā Sūryasya*" simply as "*Sūryā*" and refers in this connection to a passage of the *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* which narrates a legend relating to the marriage of *Sūryā* with the *Aśvíns*.[5] In his commentary on most of such parsages Sāyaṇa does not attempt any explanation of the figurative sense underlying this phrase. In his commentary on RV. VII. 69, 4 Sāyaṇa explains the phrase "*Sūro Duhitā*" as "the daughter of the sun." But the phrase "*Sūryasya Duhitā*" occurring in RV. IV, 43, 2 is explained by him as "the wife of the sun", and the same phrase occurring in RV. IX, 1, 6 and 113, 3 is interpreted by Sāyaṇa as *Śraddhā* "faith" in accordance with a view put forward by the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (XII, 7, 3, 11) that *Śraddhā* is the

3. RV. I, 34, 5 ; 116, 17 ; 117, 13 ; 118, 5 ; III, 53, 15; IV, 43, 2 ; VI, 63, 5 ; VII, 69, 4 ; IX, 1, 6 ; 72, 3 ; 113, 3.

4. Cf. Sāyaṇa-Bhāṣya on RV. I, 116, 17 ;117, 13 ; VI, 63, 5.

5. Ait. Br. IV, 7 ; cf. K. Br. XVIII, 1 ; RV. X, 85, 8-9 ; AV. VI, 82, 2 ; TS. IV, 7, 15, 4.

daughter of the sun.[6] The same phrase occurring in RV. III, 53, 15 is, however, explained by the scholiast as *Vāg-devatā*, "the goddess of speech", in consonance with the *Nighaṇṭu* (I, 11) which lists *Sūryā* as one of the synonyms of *Vāk*, "speech". In his commentary on RV. IX, 72, 3, Sāyaṇa takes an entirely different view and explains the phrase "*Sūryasya Duhitúḥ*" as "of Dawn." This is a significant departure from his usual interpretations. It is obvious from the foregoing that the explanations offered by Sāyaṇa and other ancient Indian commentators do not help us substantially in arriving at the correct meaning of the figurative phrase, "the daughter of the sun."

Modern scholarship also has not as yet fully succeeded in unravelling the mystery of this cryptic phrase. According to Grassmann and Macdonell[7], "the sun conceived as a female called either *Sūryā* or more commonly the 'daughter of Sūrya' "is meant by the phrase " *Duhitā Sūryasya*". I am unable to subscribe to the assumption that the Vedic phrase, "the daughter of the sun", denotes "the sun conceived as a female". It is abundantly clear from the context as well as from the wording of this phrase that the sun and his daughter are two separate entities. Geldner in his German translation of the Ṛgveda is mostly content with giving a a literal rendering of this phrase. However, in the translation of three passages, Geldner appends footnotes explaining the figurative meaning of this phrase as

6. In their commentary on the Vāj. S. XIX, 4, Uvaṭa and Mahīdhara also take the same view and explain the phrase "*Sūryasya Duhitā*" as "Śraddhā".

7. *Vedic Mythology*, p. 51; *Wörterbuch zum Rigveda*, under *Sūryā*.

"poetry or song"[8], in contradistinction to *Śraddhā* as explained by Sāyaṇa. In the footnote to his German translation of RV. III, 53, 15, Geldner refers with approval to an ancient Indian tradition which, as already accepted by Sāyaṇa, explains the phrase "Duhitā Sūryasya" as *Vāk*, "speech.[9]" Thus the modern scholars leave the position of these passages as doubtful as before.

Any attempt to determine the precise meaning of this phrase "*Duhitā Sūryasya*" must be preceded by a close scrutiny of the Ṛgvedic Hymns addressed to the *Aśvins*, for "the daughter of the sun" is very closely associated with these twin gods in most of the Vedic occurrences. We find that "the daughter of the sun" is replaced by *Sūryā* in about a dozen Ṛgvedic passages concerning the *Aśvins*,[10] and in RV. VIII, 8, 10, the word *Yóṣaṇā* "maiden" replaces "the daughter of the sun". The ancient Indian legend referred to above, which narrates the marriage of *Sūryā* with the *Aśvins* only confirms the view that *Sūryā* or the daughter of the sun" represents a natural phenomenon connected with the *Aśvins*, but it does not help us in identifying that phenomenon. The *Nighaṇṭu's* enumeration of *Sūryā* among fifty-

8. Cf. footnotes to his German translation of the Ṛgveda (*Der Rig-veda*, Harvard Oriental Series, volumes 33-35), IX, 1, 6; 72, 3; 113, 3.

9. Cf. *Bṛhad-devatā*, IV, 112-116; *Nighaṇṭu*, I, 11. Cf. Geldner's footnote to his German translation of RV. IX, II3, 3.

10. RV. I, 184, 3; IV, 43, 6; 44, 1; V, 73, 5; VIII, 22, 1; X,85,8.9.14 ff.

seven synonyms of speech does not solve the riddle[11], although it lends some support to Sāyaṇa's explanation of this enigmatic phrase occuring in RV. III, 53, 15. It has to be admitted that the precise identification of *Sūryā* must remain a conjecture until and unless the identity of the *Aśvins* is established with absolute certainty. It is, therefore: better to leave this question open. However, a passage of the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* (I, 213), which mentions the *Uṣas* "Dawn" instead of *Sūryā* in a legened parallel to the one connected with the marriage of *Sūryā* with the *Aśvins* referred to above, seems to suggest that *Sūryā* or "the daughter of the sun" may stand for the Dawn (*Uṣás*) which is so frequently described in the RV. as "the daughter of Heaven". This view gets some support from the fact the epithet *Yoṣaṇā* "maiden" applied to *Sūryā* or "the daughter of the sun" as stated above is found applied to the Dawn in two Ṛgvedic passages wherein the Dawn together with the Night is called "divine maiden."[12] Another important fact which corroborates this view is that the *Aśvins* are very closely connected with the Dawn (Uṣas) in a large number of Vedic passages.[13] Moreover, it is also a significant fact that the Vedic passages in which Sūryā or "the daughter of the sun" is spoken of in connection with the *Aśvins*, do not mention *Uṣas* separately along with Sūryā. In other words, the

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11. In *Nighaṇṭu* V, 6 *Sūryā* is metiōned after *Uṣāh* among the deites. Commenting on this part of *Nighaṇṭu*, Devarāja Yajvan remarks : सूर्याव्याख्याता वाङ्नामसु । एषैवोषाः सूर्या सम्पद्यते ।

12. RV. VII, 2, 6 ; X, 110, 6. (दिव्ये योषणे)

13. Cf. *Vedic Mythology*, pp. 48 ff. RV. I, 44, 2 ; 183, 2 ; IV, 52, 2-3 ; VIII, 5, 2 ; X, 39, 12 ; etc.

passages mentioning Sūryā or "the daughter of the sun" do not contain any mention of *Uṣas*. This circumstance seems to suggest that in some passages the word *Uṣas* is used in association with the *Aśvins*, whereas the same natural phenomenon is poetically described as *Sūryā* or "the daughter of the sun" in the other Vedic passages concerning the *Aśvins*. In most of the Vedic passages relating to the *Aśvins* the *Uṣas* is described as following the twin gods. This description also accords with the figurative statement of the RV. that Sūryā or "the daughter of the sun" ascends the chariot of the *Aśvins*. The ancient Indian view explaining *Sūryā* as *Vāk* "speech" or *Śraddhā* "faith" may owe its *rationale* to the Indian religious practice of uttering hymns of praise and offering sacrificial oblations to the deities at the break of dawn (*Uṣas*). The time of the *Aśvins* is, according to Yāska, up to the rising of the sun[14]. Accepting this view, Macdonell observes : "Thus their relative time seems to have been between dawn and sunrise."[15] The relative time of the *Aśvins* between dawn and sunrise supports our identification of Sūryā or "the daughter of the sun" with the Dawn and militates against the above-cited view of Grassmann and Macdonell, who identify *Sūryā* with "the sun conceived as a female."

The circumstance that the *Uṣas* is spoken of as "the Yóṣā of *Sūrya* in RV.VII, 75, 5, or in a similar strain elsewhere, does not vitiate our identification of "the daughter of Sūrya" with the *Uṣás*, for different kinds of relationships are conceived by the Ṛṣis between

14. *Nirukta*, XII, 4 :—तयोः कालः सूर्योदयपर्यन्तः ।
15. Op. cit., p. 50.

the gods, as pointed out by Yāska.[16] For instance, the Uṣas is also described as the mother of the sun in some Ṛgvedic passages, as is pointed out by Macdonell in the following words : "Thus as followed in space by the sun, she is conceived as his wife or mistress. But as preceding the sun in time she is occasionally thought of as his mother."[17] Thus there is some basis for identifying "the daughter of the sun" with the Dawn. However, a final word on the subject must wait till the natural phenomenon underlying the *Aśvins* has been identified with absolute certainty.

Now we take up the third category of Ṛgvedic passages in which the word *Duhitṛ* is used in conjunction with the nominative form of *Pitṛ* or a similar word.[18] It is perfectly clear from a cursory perusal of all these passages that a literal translation of the word *Duhitṛ* occurring in them is incapable of conveying the intrinsic meaning of such phrases. It naturally leads us to the conclusion that the word *Duhitṛ* has been used in these passages in a figurative sense which needs to be investigated. That the word *Duhitṛ* along with *Pitṛ* is employed in a figurative sense in these obscure passages is confirmed by the later *Saṁhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas* which explain as an allegory the legend of Prajāpati's passion for his daughter. The legend in question seems to owe its origin to a misunderstanding of some of these obscure Ṛgvedic

16. *Nirukta* VII, 4 : —इतरेतरजन्मानो भवन्ति । इतरेतरप्रकृतयः ।

17. Op. cit., p. 48.

18. RV. I, 71, 5 ; 164, 33 ; III, 31, 1 ; V, 47, 1, VIII, 101, 15 ; IX, 97, 47 ; X 17, 1; 27, 11; 40, 5 ; 61, 5.7 ; 72,4-5 ; 159, 3,

passages[19]. Explaining the allegory underlying this legend, the *MS.* and the *P. Br.* opine that the word *Duhitṛ* in the legend stands for the Dawn.[20] But the *Ait. Br.* and the S. Br. which seem to be confused about the real basis of this allegory, explain that *Duhitṛ* in this legend stands for Heaven or Dawn.[21] The tenor of relevant Vedic passages points to the conclusion that *Pitṛ* or *Prajāpati* of the legend stands for Heaven, who is spoken of as *Dyaús Pitā*, "Father Heaven", in many Ṛgvedic passages.[22]

Thus we see that the word *Pitṛ* seems to have been employed figuratively in the Vedic passages under reference to denote "Father Heaven" and this cryptic employment of the word *Pitṛ* along with *Duhitṛ* appears

19. RV. I, 71, 5:—स्वायां देवो दुहितरि त्विषिं धात् ।

RV. I, 71, 8:—शुचि रेतो निषिक्तं द्यौरभीके ।

RV. X, 61, 5-7;—प्रथिष्ट यस्य वीरकर्ममिष्णदनुष्ठितं नु नर्यो अपौहत्।
पुनस्तदावृहति यत्कनाया दुहितुरा अनुभृतमनर्वा ॥५॥

मध्या यत्कर्त्वमभवदभीके कामं कृण्वाने पितरि युवत्याम् । मतानग्रेतो जहतुवियन्ता सानौ निषिक्तं पिता यत्स्वां दुहितरमधिष्कन् क्ष्मया रेतः संजग्मानो निषिञ्चत् । स्वाध्योऽजनयन्ब्रह्मदेवा वास्तोष्पतिं व्रतपां निरुतक्षन् ॥

20. MS. III, 6,5:—प्रजापतिर्वै स्वां दुहितरमध्यैदुषसं, तस्य रेतः परापतत्, ते देवा अभिसमगच्छन्त ।

MS. IV, 2, 12:—प्रजापतिर्वै स्वां दुहितरमभ्यकामयतोषसं, सा रोहिदभवत्, तामृश्यो भूत्वाध्यैत् ।

P. Br. VIII, 2, 10 ;—प्रजापतिरुषसमध्यैत्स्वां दुहितरं तस्य रेतः परापतत्तदस्यांन्यषिच्यत ।

21. Ait. Br. III,33, 1;—प्रजापतिर्वै स्वां दुहितरमभ्यध्यायद्दिवमित्यन्य आहुरुषसमित्यन्ये ।

S. Br. I, 7,41:—प्रजापतिं हं वै स्वां दुहितरमभिदध्यौ। दिवं वोषसं वा ।

22. RV. I, 90, 7; 164, 33; IV, 1, 10; I, 89, 4,160, 2; 185, 10; 191, 6; VII, 70, 6.

to have led to the creation of this baffling legend in the later times. The process of transforming the figurative statements into legends led to some changes in the original terms employed in such statements. Consequently, the term *Dyaús Pitā*, "Father Heaven" or simply *Pitṛ*, Father", used in relation to the *Duhitṛ* of the above statements, changed into *Prajāpati* in the corresponding legends of the later *Samhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas*. This is why similar legends found in the later works mention the daughter or daughters of Prajāpati. Besides the above-mentioned legend relating to Prajāpati's passion for his daughter, another legend which describes the *Nakṣatras*, "lunar mansions" "as daughters of Prajāpati[23], clearly shows that *Prajāpati* in this legend stands for *Dyaús Pitā*, "Father Heaven", from whom the *Nakṣastras* derive their sustenance. The allegorical statement that Prajāpati's daughter became red when he made amorous overtures towards her refers to the red colour of the *Uṣas* who is called as *Aruṣī* "red" in the RV.[24] Thus the entire evidence available on the subject strongly favours the view that word *Duhitṛ* along with *Pitṛ* or a similar word is used in a figurative sense in the Ṛgvedic passages under discussion.

As regards the main idea underlying such allegorical expressions, it may be stated that the Creator or the source of the thing conceived is poetically conceived as *Pitṛ* "Father", whereas the creation emanating from

23. MS. II, 2, 7 ; KS. XI, 3 ; XVIII, 14 ; TS. II, 3, 5, 1-3; III, 4, 7, 1 ; Vaj. S. XVIII, 40 ; S. Br. IX, 4, 1, 9 ; Ṣaḍviṃśa Br. III, 12.

24. MS. IV, 2,12—सा रोहिदभवत्, तामृश्यो भूत्वाध्यैत् ।
Ait. Br. III,33—तामृश्यो भूत्वा रोहितं भूतामभ्यैत् ।

that source is figuratively spoken of as his *Duhitṛ*, "daughter", who draws (*duh*) her sustenance from him. The S. Br., which allegorically describes *Iḍā* as Manu's daughter, also avers that the Creator is figuratively spoken of as Father in relation to his creation which is allegorically described as his daughter.[25] The Ṛgvedic passages referred to above need to be interpreted in the light of this discussion, and the figurative meaning of *Duhitṛ* should be given due importance.

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25. S. Br. I, 8, 1, 8-9 ;—तां होचतुः "कासी"ति । "मनोर्दुहितेत्याव-योर्बूष्वेति "नेति होवाच । "य एव मामजीजनत तस्यै वाहमस्मीति ···॥८॥ तां ह मनुरुवाच कासीति । तव दुहितेति । कथं भगवति मम दुहितेति । या अमूरप्स्वा-हुतीरहौषधी घृतं दधि मस्त्वामिक्षां ततो मामजीजनथाः । साशीरस्मि । तां मा यज्ञेऽवकल्पय ।" ॥९॥

ABBREVIATIONS

Ait. Br. = Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa.
A. V. = Atharva Veda-Saṃhitā (Saunakīyā).
K. Br. = Kauṣītaki-Brāhmaṇa.
M. S. = Maitrāyaṇī-Saṃhitā.
P. Br. = Pañca-Viṃśa-Brāhmaṇa.
R. V. = Ṛgveda-Saṃhitā.
S. Br. = Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa.
T. S. = Taittirīya-Saṃhitā.
Vaj. S. = Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā (Mādhaṃdinī).

मीमांसान्यायानां शास्त्रान्तरोपयोगिता

वि० श्री० रङ्गनाथाचार्यः, प्रयाग विश्वविद्यालयः

विदितमेवेदं विदुषां यत् शास्त्रान्तरेषु ये न्यायाः सञ्चार्यन्ते ते सर्वे पूर्वमीमांसाशास्त्र व्युत्पादिताः इति । न केवलं शास्त्रेषु अपि तु लोकव्यवहारेऽपि प्रयुज्यमाना न्यायाः एतच्छास्त्रव्युत्पादिता एव । यद्यपि सूत्रकारेण जैमिनिना वैदिकवाक्यान्यादायैव विचारः कृतः तथाऽपि स विचारः वैदिकलौकिकवाक्यसाधारणः । जैमिनिः स्वयमेव लोकवेदाधिकरणे लौकिकानां वैदिकानां च शब्दानां एकार्थत्वं प्रतिपादयति । अयं न्यायः तद्व्युत्पादितन्यायविषयेऽपि अतिदेशमर्हत्येव । अस्मिन्निबन्धे कांश्चन न्यायानादाय ते कथं उत्तरमीमांसाशास्त्रे, व्याकरणशास्त्रे च उपयुक्ता इति विचार्यते ।

उत्तरमीमांसा

ब्रह्मसूत्राणां विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्तानुसारेण भाष्यमारचितवन्तः श्री रामानुजाचार्याः पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोः ऐकशास्त्र्यं मन्यन्ते । ते लिखन्ति 'मीमांसाशास्त्रं 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा' इत्यारभ्य 'अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात्' इत्येवमन्तं सङ्गतिविशेषेण विशिष्टक्रमम्' इति । अत्र पूर्वाचार्यसम्मतिमप्युदाहरन्ति, 'तदाह वृत्तिकारः संहितमेतच्छारीरकं जैमिनीयेन षोडशलक्षणेन शास्त्रैकत्वसिद्धि' रिति । तस्मादाचार्यपादैः बहुष्वधिकरणेषु पूर्वमीमांसासिद्धन्यायसञ्चारपूर्वकं अर्थाः निर्धारिताः । तत्र कानिचन स्थलान्यत्र निर्दिश्यन्ते ।

अपच्छेदन्यायः

जैमिनिना षष्ठाध्यायपञ्चमपादैकोनविंशत्यधिकरणे 'पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यं प्रकृतिवत्' इति सूत्रेण अपच्छेदन्यायः व्युत्पादितः । स च एवंरूपः—ज्योतिष्टोमे दक्षिणादानात् प्राक् बहिष्पवमानार्थं तद्देशं ऋत्विजः गच्छन्ति । तदानीं एकस्य पृष्ठतः अन्यः इति पिपीलिकावत् प्रसर्पन्ति । तत्र पुरतः गन्तुः कच्छं गृहीत्वा पृष्ठतः अन्यो गच्छेत् । एवं सति प्रमादात् ऋत्विजां मध्ये यदि उद्गाता गृहीतं कच्छं मुञ्चेत् तदा दक्षिणामदत्वा यज्ञः समापनीयः । तं समाप्य पुनरपि यज्ञः

अनुष्ठेयः। यदा च प्रतिहर्ता कच्छं मुञ्चेत् तदा तस्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे सर्वस्वं दद्यात्। यदि तु प्रथमं उद्गाता मुञ्चेत्, अनन्तरं च प्रतिहर्ता, तदा उत्तरकालीनप्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदनिमित्तं सर्वस्वदानरुपप्रायश्चित्तं तस्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे कर्तव्यम्। उत्तरज्ञानं पूर्वज्ञानं बाधित्वैव आत्मानं लभते। एवंच उत्तरकाले स्वयं बाधितं सत् पूर्वज्ञानं न उत्तरस्य बाधकं भवितुमर्हति। तस्मादुत्तरकालीनमबाधितमेव वर्तते। तथाचोत्तरकालीनापच्छेदनिमित्तकमेव प्रायश्चित्तमनुष्ठेयम्।

अयं न्यायः श्रीभाष्यकारैः जिज्ञासाधिकरणभाष्ये महापूर्वपक्षोपस्थापनावसरे सञ्चारितः। 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्यादि विधयः पूर्वकाण्डे सन्ति। अत्र स्वर्गकामाद्यधिकारी, यागरूपसाधनं, स्वर्गादिफलं इति कर्ता, साधनं, साध्यं च भिन्न-भिन्नं प्रतीयते। तस्मादेतादृशं शास्त्रं भेदावलंबिशास्त्रम्। 'तत् त्वमसि' 'नेह नानाऽस्ति किञ्चन' इत्यादिशास्त्राणि अभेदावलंबीनि। पूर्वापरापच्छेदे पूर्वशास्त्रवत्, अभेदप्रतिपादकशास्त्राणां निरवकाशत्वात् तैः अभेदप्रतिपादकैः भेदावलम्बीनि ज्योतिष्टोमादिशास्त्राणि बाध्यन्ते। अनेनैव न्यायेन वेदान्तवाक्येष्वपि सगुणब्रह्मोपासनपराणि वाक्यानि निर्गुणप्रतिपादकवाक्यैः बाध्यन्ते। निर्गुणवाक्यानां गुणापेक्षत्वेन परत्वात् बलीयस्त्वम्।

रात्रिसत्रन्यायः

अयं न्यायः पूर्वमीमांसायां चतुर्थाध्यायतृतीयपादाष्टमाधिकरणे व्युत्पादितः। अस्मात् पूर्वाधिकरणे विश्वजिदधिकरणे यत्र फलं न श्रुतं तत्र 'सर्वान् प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात् स्वर्गरूपं फलं कल्प्यत इत्युक्तम्। तदनन्तराधिकरणं रात्रिसत्राधिकरणम्। अत्र विचार्यते–द्वादशाहादूर्ध्वं त्रयोदशरात्रचतुर्दशरात्रादयः सत्रविशेषा उक्ताः। एते रात्रिसत्रनाम्ना प्रसिद्धाः। अत्रापि विश्वजिद्यागवत् फलं न कीर्तितम्। तस्मात् पूर्वाधिकरणन्यायेन स्वर्गः फलं कल्प्यं इति पूर्वपक्षः। अस्मिन् सत्रप्रकरण एव 'प्रतितिष्ठन्ति ह वा य एता रात्रीरुपयन्ति' इति वाक्यं श्रूयते। यद्यप्यर्थवादवाक्यमिदं रात्रिसत्रविधेः स्तावकं तथाऽपि अश्रुतस्वर्गफलापेक्षया एतद्वाक्यश्रुतप्रतिष्ठायाः आसन्नतरत्वात् प्रतिष्ठा एव फलत्वेन कल्प्यते। स्तुतिः पश्चादपेक्ष्यते फलंच प्रथमम्।

अयं न्यायः श्रीभाष्ये जिज्ञासाधिकरणे उपयुक्तः। जिज्ञासाऽधिकरणरचना एवंरूपा। कार्यबुद्धिरेव प्रवृत्तिहेतुः। प्रवर्तकस्यैव शब्दवाच्यत्वम्। अतः कार्यस्यैव वेदवेद्यत्वात् परिनिष्पन्नरूपब्रह्मप्राप्तिलक्षणानन्तस्थिरफलप्रतिपत्तिः वेदवाक्यान्न संभवेत्। अतः ब्रह्मज्ञानफलानन्तस्थिरज्ञानहेतुः ब्रह्मविचारारम्भः न युक्तः इति पूर्वपक्षः।

कार्यार्थं एव व्युत्पत्तिरिति निर्बन्धः निर्निबन्धनः । 'पिता ते सुखमास्ते' इत्यादिवाक्यानि कार्यं किञ्चिन्न बोधयन्ति । तथाऽपि श्रोता एतद्वाक्यार्थं बुद्धयत्येव । अतः वेदान्ताः परिनिष्पन्नं परं ब्रह्म, तदुपासनं चापरिमितफलं बोधयन्तीति तन्निर्णयफलः ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्य एव । अथ वेदस्य कार्यार्थकत्वे निर्बन्धः तथाऽपि ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्य एव । 'आत्मा वा अरे श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः ब्रह्मोपासनं प्रतिपन्नम् । तद्विषयकं कार्यं अपूर्व-नियोगः विध्यर्थः । तत्र अधिकृतः नियोज्यः पुरुषः । अधिकृताय तस्मै पुरुषाय नियोगेन अनुगृहीतं फलं ब्रह्मप्राप्तिः । ब्रह्मस्वरूपतद्विशेषणानि फलकोटिनिविष्टानि । अतः 'यन्न दुःखेन सम्भिन्नं न च ग्रस्तमनन्तरम् । अभिलाषोपनीतं च तत्पदं स्वःपदाश्रयम् ।।' इत्युक्तलक्षणस्वर्गादिवत् ब्रह्मविशेषणान्यपि प्राप्यन्ते । ब्रह्मस्वरूपलाभोऽपि रात्रिसत्रन्यायेन अर्थवादात् भवति । 'प्रतितिष्ठन्ति ह वा य एता रात्रीरुपयन्ति' इति रात्रिसत्रार्थवादवाक्यात् यथा वा प्रतिष्ठारूपफल लाभः तद्वत् अत्रापि वाक्यात् ब्रह्मस्वरूपरूपफललाभो भवत्येव ।

वाक्यशेषन्यायः

पूर्वमीमांसाप्रथमाध्यायचतुर्थपादे एकोनविंशाधिकरणे विचारितम् । 'अक्ताः शर्करा उपदधाति, तेजो वै घृतम्' इति श्रूयते । मृत्तिकामिश्राः क्षुद्रपाषाणखण्डाः शर्कराः । ताः अञ्जनीयाः । केन द्रव्येण ताः अञ्जनीयाः इति संशयः । 'अक्ता' इति शब्दसामर्थ्यात् येनकेनापि अञ्जनसमर्थेन घृततैलादिना अञ्जनीयाः इति पूर्वपक्षः । अत्र 'तेजो वै घृतम्' इति वाक्यशेषेण घृतं तेजस्त्वेन अभिष्टूयते । एतस्माद्वाक्यशेषात् घृतस्य विधिरुन्नीयते । अतः घृतेनैव शर्करा अञ्जनीया इति सिद्धान्तः ।

अयं न्यायः भगवता बादरायणेन सङ्ख्योपसङ्ग्रहाधिकरणे उपयुक्तः । अस्मिन्नधिकरणे बृहदारण्यकस्थ 'यस्मिन् पञ्चपञ्चजना आकाशश्च प्रतिष्ठित.' इति वाक्ये श्रूयमाणपञ्चशब्दविशेषितपञ्चजनशब्दः पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वप्रतिपादक इति पूर्वपक्षः । 'प्राणस्य प्राणमुत चक्षुषश्चक्षुः' इति वाक्यशेषात् ब्रह्माश्रयाः प्राणादय एव पञ्चजनशब्दवाच्याः इति सिद्धान्तः कृतः । एवमस्मिन्नधिकरणे वाक्यशेषन्यायः उपयुक्तः ।

'शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि' न्यायः

अयं न्यायः जैमिनिना तृतीयाध्यायसप्तमपादाष्टमाधिकरणे व्युत्पादितः । स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इति श्रूयते । अत्र क्रियाङ्गसम्बन्धि सर्वं कार्यं किं यजमानेनैव कर्तव्यम् ? अथवा द्रव्यत्यागमात्रमिति संशयः । अनेन वाक्येन स्वर्गभोक्तुः यागकर्तुश्च सामानाधिकरण्यादेकत्वं गम्यते । अतः साङ्गकर्मानुष्ठानमन्तरेण फलासम्भवान्निखिलमेव यजमानेन कर्तव्यमिति पूर्वपक्षः । निखिलानुष्ठानाभावेऽपि प्रयोजकतया यजमानस्य सर्वकर्तृत्वमुपपद्यते । यजमानेन त्यागमात्रं कार्यम् ।

अन्यत्र साङ्गप्रधाने क्रीतानां ऋत्विजामनुष्ठानम् । तथाच साक्षात् परम्परया च सर्वकर्तृत्वस्य यजमाने सम्भवात् तस्य फलभोक्तृत्वं न विरुद्धयते इति सिद्धान्तः ।

अयं न्यायः भगवता बादरायणेन द्वितीयाध्यायतृतीयपादगत कर्त्रधिकरणे उपयुक्तः । आत्मनः कर्तृत्वं नास्ति । अचेतनाः गुणा एव कर्तारः । गुणगतं कर्तृत्वं आत्मा आत्मनि अध्यस्यति इति पूर्वपक्षः । आत्मैव कर्ता, न गुणाः । एवमेव नियोग-प्रतिपादकानां शास्त्राणां अर्थवत्त्वं स्यात् । 'यजेत स्वर्गकामः' 'मुमुक्षुः ब्रह्म उपासीत' इत्यादीनि शास्त्राणि स्वर्गमोक्षादिफलानां भोक्तारमेव कर्तृत्वे नियुञ्जते नहि अचेतना गुणाः भोक्तारः येन तेषा कर्तृत्वं स्यात् । शासनाच्छास्त्रम् । शासनं च प्रवर्तनम् । शास्त्रस्य च प्रवर्तकत्वं बोधजननद्वारा । अचेतनं च प्रधानं न बोधयितुं शक्यम् । अतः शास्त्राणामर्थवत्त्वं भोक्तुः चेतनस्यैव कर्तृत्वे भवेत् इति सिद्धान्तः कृतः । एवमत्र 'शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि' इति न्यायः उपयुक्तः ।

व्याकरणम्

अपच्छेदन्यायः

व्याकरणशास्त्रेऽपि बहवः मीमांसान्यायाः उपयुज्यन्ते । परिभाषाः प्रायः मीमांसान्यायमूलकाः । द्वयोः सूत्रयोः विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यं इति पाणिनिरनुशासनं करोति । अस्य मूलं अपच्छेदन्यायः । परशास्त्रप्रवृत्तिकाले पूर्वशास्त्रं बाधितं भवति । उत्तरज्ञानं पूर्वज्ञानं बाधित्वैव आत्मानं लभते । अयमेव विषयः अपच्छेदाधिकरणे निरूपितः ।

प्रतिनिधिन्यायः

एवं 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः' इति सूत्रेण बहुष्वादेशेषु प्राप्तेषु सदृशतमः आदेशः स्यात् इति सदृशादेशनियमं करोति पाणिनिः । अस्य नियमस्य मूलं जैमिनेः प्रतिनिधि न्यायः । षष्ठाध्यायतृतीयपाद चतुर्थाधिकरणे विहितद्रव्यापचारे कर्मचोदनया आक्षिप्तत्वात् द्रव्यान्तरेण कर्म निर्वर्तनीयमित्युक्तम् । अनन्तरं एकादशाधिकरणे विचारितम्-विहितव्रीह्यादिद्रव्यापचारे नीवारप्रियङ्ग्वादि यत्किमपि द्रव्यं प्रतिनिधीकृत्य तेन कर्म समापनीयमिति पूर्वपक्षः । 'व्रीहिभिः यजेत' इत्यत्र जातिः पुरोडाशं न निष्पादयति । किं तु व्रीहित्वजात्युपलक्षिताः अंशा एव तन्निष्पादका इति अंशानामेव मुख्यद्रव्यत्वम् । ते चावयवाः सदृशे नीवारादौ बहवः अनुगच्छन्ति । भूयोऽवयव सामान्यं हि सादृश्यम् । तस्मादत्यन्तसदृशमेव प्रतिनिधातव्यम् इति सिद्धान्तः ।

'इको यण् अचीति' सूत्रेण अचि परे इ, उ, ऋ, लृ एतेषां वर्णानां स्थाने य, व, र, ल एते वर्णाः आदेशरूपेण विधीयन्ते । अत्र अनियमे प्राप्ते 'स्थानेऽन्तरतम' इति सूत्रेण स्थानादिना सदृशतम एव वर्णः ग्राह्य इति नियमयति पाणिनिः । अयं-नियमः प्रतिनिध्यधिकरणनिष्पादित एव ।

एवं 'स्थानिवदादेशः' इति सूत्रेण स्थानिनः यत् कार्यं तत्सर्वं आदेशस्यापि भवतीत्युक्तम् । इदं च पूर्वमीमांसातृतीयाध्यायषष्ठपादगतेन 'प्रतिनिधिश्च तद्वत्' इति सूत्रप्रतिपादितार्थानुसारेण पाणिनिना उच्यते 'व्रीहिभिर्यजेत' इति विहितानां व्रीहीणां असम्भवे नीवाराः प्रतिनिधित्वेन स्वीक्रियन्ते । एतेषु नीवारेषु जातितः व्रीहिशब्दार्थाभावेऽपि आकारतः व्रीहिशब्दार्थसत्वेन 'व्रीहीनवहन्ति' इत्यादिविधयः प्रवर्तन्ते । प्रतिनिधयः नीवाराः मुख्यद्रव्यस्य कार्यं सर्वं कुर्वन्ति ।

'रामाय' इत्यादिरूपसंपादनावसरे पणिनिः एतन्न्यायमुपयुङ्क्ते । 'ङेर्यः' इति सूत्रेण अतः अङ्गात् परस्य 'ङे' इत्यस्य यादेशः विधीयते । अस्य यादेशस्य सुप्त्वप्राप्तावेव 'सुपि च' इति सूत्रेण अङ्गस्य रामशब्दस्य दीर्घो भवेत् । स्थानिवदादेश इति सूत्रेण यादेशस्य सुप्त्वं प्राप्नोति । ततः दीर्घश्च भवति । प्रतिनिधिः यादेशः मुख्यङेवत् सर्वाणि कार्याणि भजते ।

विकल्पः

एवं 'एकार्थास्तु विकल्पेरन्' आदि सूत्रेण द्वादशतृतीयगतेन पुरोडाशनिष्पादनरूपैककार्यकारिणां व्रीहियवादीनां विकल्पः जैमिनिना उक्तः । इमं न्यायमाश्रित्य पाणिनिना एकस्यैव मत्यादिप्रातिपदिकस्य नदीसंज्ञा विकल्पेन विधीयते । नदीसंज्ञायां 'मत्यै, 'मत्याः' आदिरूपाणि, अन्यथा 'मतये, मतेः' आदिरूपाणि सिद्धयन्ति । नदीसंज्ञायाः सत्त्वे असत्त्वे च षष्ठयेकवचनरूपसिद्धिरूपैककियाकारित्वाद्विकल्पः ।

स्थालीपुलाकन्यायेनात्र मीमांसान्यायानां वेदान्तव्याकरणशास्त्रेषु सञ्चारः दिङ्मात्रेण प्रादर्शि । यदि गाढ़मध्ययनं क्रियते, शास्त्रान्तरेषूपयुक्तानां लौकिकानां च न्यायानां जैमिनिसूत्राण्येव मूलमिन्यत्र न सन्देहगन्धोऽपि भवितुमर्हति ॥

एतन्निबन्धलेखनाय परामृष्टाः ग्रन्थाः :—

(1) जैमिनेः पूर्वमीमांसासूत्राणि ।
(2) खण्डदेवस्य भाट्टदीपिका ।
(3) माधवीया जैमिनीयन्यायमाला ।
(4) मण्डनमिश्रकृता मीमांसाऽनुक्रमणी ।
(5) श्री व्यासकृतब्रह्मसूत्राणि ।
(6) श्रीरामानुजकृतश्रीभाष्यम् ।
(7) पाणिनिसूत्राणि ।
(8) श्री भट्टोजिदीक्षितकृतसिद्धान्तकौमुदी ।

SILVER IN THE VEDIC PERIOD

RAI UMAPAT RAY

University Gorakhpur

Ṛgveda

It is generally believed that silver was unknown in the *Ṛgveda*.[1] This view has gained ground because of its present day paucity in India.[2] As silver is to be won either from argentiferous galena or from native gold which call for some metallurgical skill, acquaintance with silver at a later date in history is only natural. However, a solitary reference to *rajata*, evidences the knowledge of silver in the *Ṛgveda*.[3] The view that *rajata* being used as an adjective implies the sense of white

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1. Dr. A. S. Altekar, *JNSI*, XV, Pt. I, 1953, *The Antiquity of Coinage in India, p. 10 ;* Dr. R. K. Mookherjee, *Ancient India*, p. 69 ; Dr. Lallanji Gopal, The Seminar Papers on the *Chronology af the Punchmarked Coins*, 1966, p. 72.

2. With the exception of the quantity of silver won from the Kolar gold mines aggregating some 15,000 to 25,000 ozs) and lately obtained as a by-product from the smelting of the Zawar lead ores (about 14,000 ozs per annum), no silver is produced in the country.

Wadia, D. N., *Geology of India*, p. 479.

It must be recalled that the yield is largely due to modern techniques.

3. ऋज्रमुक्षण्यायने रजतं हरयाणे ।

रथं युक्तनसनाम सुषामणि ॥ *Ṛgveda*, VIII 25, 22.

rather than that of silver[4] does not carry conviction. The references to *rajata* prove the knowledge of silver in the Later Vedic age ; it might likewise be indicative of the same metal in the *Ṛgveda* despite its use as a metaphor.[5]

Again, *rajata* was not the only term for silver in the Vedic period. The *Atharvaveda*[6] explicitly mentions *arjuna* which otherwise means 'bright', 'white' as a term

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4. Dr. Gopal opines *(op. cit.* p. 70) on the basis of the assumption that there was no common term to signify silver in the early Indo-European languages. It was therefore unknown before the dispersion of the Aryan. Further, according to him, the descriptive names like *rajatam-hiraṇyam* in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā* and *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* suggest a recent acquaintance with silver which is also omitted in the list of metals enumerated in the *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* (XVIII. 13). The arguments are however inconclusive for there is no absence—as we shall see later—of a common term for this metal in the early Indo-European languages. Moreover, in the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā*, *Atharvaveda* and *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, *rajata* is referred to. Its enigmatic exclusion in the *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* does not prove a recent acquaintance.

5. The commentators too have taken the word for silver and there appears no ground to reject the rendering. (Yāska, *Niruktam*, 5, 15) explains it as :

Rajata-vikṛtam : रजतं हरयाणे इत्यपि निगमो भवति । हरयाणः—अविस्पष्टम् । हरमाण यानः इति सुस्पष्टम् । अत्र निगमः 'रजतं हरयाणे' रजतं रजतमयं रजतविकृतं वा । हरयाणे हरमाण याने नित्यमेवाभिप्रस्थित याने ।

Wilson translates it as follows :

"We have received from the son of Sushan, the descendent of Ukshan, the overcomer (of foes), a well going chariot of silver yoked (with a pair of horses).

6. *Atharvaveda*, V. 28, 5, 9.

for silver.[7] Significantly the cognates of *arjuna*[8] in the other Indo-European languages such as Greek, '*apyos*', Latin '*argentum*', and Avestan '*ərəzata*' are the derivatives of ἀEvkós (ápyós) '*albus*', '*aurusa*' respectively—the words for bright or white. Thus the terms for silver in the early Indo-European languages are the derivatives of the common root '*arg*', which in turn should indicate the knowledge of silver to the Aryans from great antiquity.

The word *rajata* too might have been a derivative of *arjuna*, the intermediary stage being Avestan ərəzata to which it phonetically appears nearer.[9] It may also be recalled that by the middle of the third millenium B. C. knowledge of silver had radiated all over the near East and the Hittites—a branch of the Indo-Aryans—were noted for silver industry.[10] As the communication between India and the land of the Hittites is attested as early as the second millenium B. C. from Bokas,

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7. There is at least one reference in the *Ṛgveda* (II. 44-5) alluding to the *vajra* of *arjuna* which in the light of the statement in the *Atharvaveda* may imply silver.

8.	*Silver*	*White*
Latin	*argentum*	*Albus, candidus*
Italian	*argento*	*bianco*
Iranian	*argat*	*find, gel, ban*
Sanskrit	*rajata*	*arjuna*

C. D. Buck, *Synonymns...languages* 9, 65, p. 610 and 15-64, p. 1054.

9. In that case, the *Ṛgvedic* Aryans presumably owed its knowledge to Persia. Persia is said to be very rich in silver bearing lead ores. In S. E. Persia, silver is known to occur in the Kubti-Nugre ("silver mountain") near Herat and at Guleki not far from Asterabad. Sir Edwin Pascoe (Marshall, *Indus Valley*, p. 675).

10. *Hist. of Tech.* I, p. 583.

it was most likely that the *Ṛgvedic* Aryans were acquainted with silver. The knowledge of this metal in the *Ṛgveda* thus appears almost certain.

But the extraction of silver in the *Ṛgvedic* period was certainly unknown. Lead whose ores are the source of silver in India is not referred to in the *Ṛgveda*. Likewise, it is doubtful whether India's only native silver deposit was utilised by them for it occurs on a dangerous and hardly accessible precipice at an altitude of 11,000 ft., two miles near Chargaon in the Sutlez Valley, Himachal Pradesh.[11]

Later Vedic Age.

Specific objects like *rukma*[12], *nishka*[13] and *dish*[14] of silver (*rajata*) are to be found mentioned in the later Vedic literature. *Rajata* alone is also used as a substantive denoting silver.[15] Another expression was *rajataṁ hiraṇyam* in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*.[16] *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*[17] and *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*.[18] It may indicate that

11. Mrs. Mehra, D. N. Wadia, *Minerals of India*, p. 89.

12. शतमानो खमो रजती धस्तात् स्याच्च । *Mait. Saṁ.*, II. 3. 3.

A. M. Shastry holds that in this passage *śatamāna* of silver is referred to. (Seminar papers on the *Chronology of the Punchmarked Coins*, p. 116). *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XII. 8. 3. 11.

13. *Panchaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa*, XVII. 1.4.

14. *Tait. Br.*, II. 2. 9. 7 ; III. 9. 6. 5.

15. *Atharvaveda*, V. 20, 1 ; XIII. 4. 51 ; *Ait. Brāhmana*, VII. 12. 2. *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, IV. 17. 7 ; *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa*, III. 17. 3 ; *Ṣaḍaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa*, VI. 6.

16. *Tait. Saṁhitā*, I. 5. 1. 2.

17. *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*, X. 4.

18. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XII. 4. 4. 7 ; XIII. 4. 2. 10 ; XIV. 1. 3. 4.

silver was rare enough to be mentioned as white gold.[19] Lallanji Gopal[20] offers an appropriate suggestion that *rajatam hiraṇyam* implies electrum,[21] a natural gold-silver alloy with pale appearance. Presumably it refers to gold of Kolar and Anantapur (Madras) which contain silver as a natural impurity.

There is no evidence to show as how to this metal was procured. Apparently it was extracted from argentiferous-lead ores as lead was now recognised in the period as a separate metal.[22] The *Atharvaveda*[23] refers to working of silver with gold (*harita*) and iron or copper (*ayas*). In another passage alloying of silver

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19. Recently Mr. Deenbandhu Pandey has suggested that *rajatam-hiraṇyam* refers to a silver piece of *hiraṇya* weight standard. But it is doubtful that silver pieces of various standards were made in the period of the later Saṁhitās. Moreover, Pandey himself admits that any specific weights of *hiraṇyam* is not known (*On the Monetary use of Silver in the Vedic Age*—a paper read at the Annual Conference of Numismatic Society of India, 1968, Gorakhpur).

20. *Op. cit.*, 72. 174.

21. Electrum is a native alloy of gold and silver, containing 15% to 45% of silver. (Partington, p. 745.)

22. See, Lead.

23. *Atharvaveda*, V. 28. 9.

दिवस्त्वा पातु हरितं मध्यात् त्वा पात्वर्जुनम् ।

भूम्या अयस्मयं पातु प्रागाद् देवपुरा अयम् ॥

By the way a cowrie cast in metal was discovered from the surface of a proto-historic site near Rupar which on microscopic examination showed iron or copper superimposed by gold and silver. (Dr. V. S. Pathak, *A Note on Nishka*, a paper read at the Conference of Numismatic Society of India, 1968, Gorakhpur).

with these metals is apparently alluded to.[24] Its supply was obviously limited for there are but few references to ornaments[25] and dishes of silver in the *Brāhmaṇas*. Its value was recognised in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* where it is said that gold is to silver what lightening is to hail storms.[26] Another statement in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* to the effect that silver being product of Rudra's tears[27] is unfit for *dakshiṇā* is an interesting enigma. Most probably with its greater availability people were growing reluctant enough to part with gold in the name of sacrificial fee and preferred substituting it with silver, much to the chagrin of the priests. To curb the miserly attitude of their patrons the priests prescribed its use in *dakshiṇā* with a threat that whoever gave it as a sacrificial fee would have to see a mourning in his family within a year.

The other possible explanation is that silver being a part of the Vrātya Culture came to be treated as a metal unworthy for auspicious use. In *Vrātyastoma* sacrifice—the sacrifice by which the Vrātyas were converted into the Vedic mode of living—they had to give up among other things wearing of a silver *nishka*. It appears that the Vedic Aryans, who looked them down upon the *Vrātyas* had never a cordial relation with

24. नव प्राणान्नवभिः संमिमीते दीर्घायुत्वाय शतशारदाय ।
हरिते त्रीणि रजते त्रीण्ययसि त्रीणि तपसाविष्ठितानि ॥
Atharvaveda, V. 28. 1.

25. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XII.8.3. 11 ; *Tai. Brāhmaṇa*, II. 2.9.7 ; III. 9.6.5.

26. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XII. 8.3.11. Whether it alludes in any way to the fact that silver is available in raw gold is a matter of anybody's guess.

27. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, II, 2.3.28.

them. Anything typical of the *Vrātya* culture was taken with certain amount of abhorence. That is why silver was perhaps not only banned as *dakshiṇā* but its name was also perhaps omitted in the list of metals enumerated in the Vedic literature.

We may also conjecture that extraction of silver was probably the monopoly of the *Vrātyas*. It is possible that both the factors worked in discarding it. However, in contradiction to its own statement the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* in other passages prescribes a *śatamāna* of silver as an offering.[28]

Amalgamation of silver with gold and copper with silver is spoken of in the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*.[29] Towards the end of the period, some progress in silver working is visible. The *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*[30] mentions the treatment of silver with gold and that of tin with silver. This metal is also referred to in the *Upaniṣads*.[31] At one place in the *Ṛgvedc Khila*,[32] Śrī is described as wearing a silver chalplet or necklace along with other ornaments—a form in which Śrī Lakṣmī is presented in the *Upaniṣads*.[33]

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28. XIII 4.2.10.

29. सन्दध्यात्सुवर्णेन रजतं, रजतेन लोहं । I. 1.14.

30. IV. 17.7. An identical statement occurs in the *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa*, III. 17.3.

31. *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, III. 19.1.2 ; *Bṛhajjāvālopaniṣad*, III. 6 ; *Yogaśikhopaniṣad*, IV. 13.14 ; IV. 22 ; *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad*, III. 4.3.3.

32. हिरण्यवर्णां हरिणीं । सुवर्णां रजत स्रजां ।
चन्द्रा हिरण्यमयी लक्ष्मी जातवेदो मया वहा ॥ II. 6.1.

33. *Saubhāgyalakshmyupaniṣad*, 1.10 ; *Mantrabrāhmaṇopaniṣad* etc.

Monetary use of Silver in the Later Vedic Period.

The antiquity of coinage vis-a-vis the monetary use of silver have been traced to the Later Vedic period on the basis of some references to silver *śatamānas* and *nishkas* in the literature. Dr. Agrawala[34] opined that *śatamāna* of silver in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[35] was the term for a silver coinage of a hundred *mānas*. A. M. Shastri further pushed its antiquity to B. C. 1000 on the basis of a reference to *rajata* in the *Maitrāyāṇī Saṁhitā* where according to him it stands for a silver *śatamāna*. But the passage in question[36] refers to for a *rukma* weighing a hundred *mānas*[37] and not a silver piece. Likewise, silver *śatamāna* mentioned in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* simply means a metallic piece of certain weight and it should not be taken to denote a coin.[38] Moreover, archaeology does not favour a date as early as that of the *Brāhmaṇa* for the introduction of coinage in India. Not a single coin was yielded to spade in course of the regular excavations from layers definitely assignable to 400 B. C.[39] or earlier. The use of silver for coinage in the Later Vedic Age is therefore yet to be proved. The

34. *India as Known to Pāṇini*, p. 262.

35. XIII. 4.2.10.

36. II. 2.2.

37. Maheshwari Prasad, Seminar Papers on *P. M. Coins*, p. 164. A. M. Shastri, *Ibid.*, p. 116.

38. A coin is a piece of a metal of definite weight and value, as a rule bearing the stamp of some issuing agency, whose authority is recognised in economical transaction ; *śatamāna* being an ingot of hundred *mānas* was money but not a coin. At the best *śatamāna* was immediate progenitor of the earliest coins of India.

39. See, Archaeological Evidence,

nishkas and *śatamānas* were, however, monetary tokens with more or less recognised bullion value. The description of *śatamāna* pieces of various shapes (*nānā rūpatāyā*) in the *Śatapatha*[40] of course points out that coinage as such was in the process of incubation.

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40. रजतं हिरण्यन्दक्षिणा नानारूपताया अथो उत्क्रमायानपक्रमाय शतमानं भवति । *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XIII. 4.2.10.

EPIGRAPHICAL NOTES

SADHU RAM

New Delhi

1. The Nigālī Sāgara Pillar inscription records the Great Emperor Aśoka's pilgrimage to the *stūpa* of Konākamana Buddha.[1] Evidently, Konākamana is the same as Konāgamana of the Buddhist scriptures.

Dr. D. C. Sircar calls Konākamana '*Pratyeka* Budda' (Silent Buddha) "who attained knowledge necessary for *nirvāṇa*, but did not preach it to men. His *stūpa* was a Buddhist Tīrtha and was visited by Yuan Chwang who also noted the Aśokan pillar with an inscription.[2]"

But the *Mahāpadāna-sutta* of *Dīgha-nikāya* enumerates a total of seven *Sammā-sambuddhas* (Well-awakened Buddhs), of which the fifth is Konāgamana. He was born of Yaññadatta and Uttarā.[3] Gautama Buddha, too, belonged to this category of the well-awakened Buddhas. Konāgamana is, therefore, different from the *Pratyeka* Buddhas who are enumerated in the *Majjhima-nikāya*.[4]

2. The Mathurā Inscription of the reign of Chandragupta II, dated the Gupta year 61, records the installation of the two *liṅgas*, viz., Upamiteśvara and Kapileśvara, in a *Gurv-āyatana* by a Pāśupata teacher

1. *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, I, p. 165.
2. *Select Inscriptions*, 2nd ed., p. 68, fn. 5.
3. *Dīgha-nikāya*, ii. 2-7.
4. *Majjhima-nikāya*, . iii. 69.

Uditācārya in commemoration of his teacher *Bhagavat* Upamitavimala and teacher's teacher *Bhagavat* Kapilavimala. The relevant part of the text is as follows.[5]

६. ··· ··· (भगवत्क) पिल विमल-शि-
७. ष्य-शिष्येण भगव (दुपमित) विमल-शिष्येण
८. श्राय्योंदि (ता) चार्य्यें (ण स्व)-पु (ण्या) प्यायन-निमित्त
९. गुरूणां च कीर्त्य(र्थमुपमितेश्व) र-कपिलेश्वरौ
१०. गुर्व्वायतने गुरु- (प्रतिमा-युतौ) प्रतिष्ठापितो (१) नै-
११. तत्ख्यात्यर्थमभिलि(ख्यते) माहेश्वराणां वि-
१२. ज्ञप्ति × क्रियते सबोधनंच यथा का (ले)नाचार्या-
१३. णां परिग्रहमिति (परिग्रह इति) मत्वाविशङ्क (—) (पू) जा-पुर-
१४. स्कार (—) परिग्रह-परिपाल्यं (कुर्य्या) दिति (कुर्य्युरिति) (१)

By putting a stop after *saṁbodhanaṁ ca* (line 12) and adding the future verb *bhaviṣyati* after *parigraha* (line 13), Dr. D. C. Sircar interprets lines 11-14 as: ".....but it is a request and an address to the worshippers of Maheśvara. Knowing that this *Gurvāyatana* would become) the property of the Āchāryas in course of time, (the worshippers of Maheśvara belonging to Mathura) should without fear protect the property (of the Āchāryas) and offer worship. This is the request."[6]

Dr. Sircar further remarks that Uditāchārya built a temple-residence (*Gurvāyatana*) in which he installed two *liṅgas* having the figures of his teacher Upamitavimala and teacher's teacher Kapilavimala carved below, representing each of them as bearing a *liṅga* on his head. According to him, the *Gurvāyatana* and the *liṅgas* were finished, but the teachers Upamita and Kapila were not coming to stay there just then. Uditāchārya, therefore, requested the local Śaivas to take charge of them with-

5. *Epigraphia Indica*, XIII, pp. 8 ff.

6. *Indian Historical Quarterly*, XVIII, 1942, 274.

out fear or molestation and being turned out at the arrival of the Ācharyas for staying there.[7]

According to Dr. Bhandarkar.[8] *Gurvāyatana* was a shrine for installing the memorials of the departed *gurus* like the *Deva-kulas* of the Kuṣāṇas found at Māṭ near Mathurā or the *pratima-grhas* in which the statues of the dead kings were kept. Hence, Dr. Sircar's interpretation is not plausible, because, according to it, the Ācharyas were alive and expected to come and occupy the *āyatana* at some later date. Since the two Ācharyas are called *Bhagavat* in lines 5 and 6, they must have been dead by that time. For, the title *Bhagavat* was conferred on those Pāśupata *Yogins* who pass away by releasing their breath through the *Brahma-randhra* i. e., (by bursting of the skull) and being absorbed in Śiva. The teacher Uditācharya had not yet reached that stage and was alive, he has been addressed as mere *Ārya* in the record. The locative in *gurvvāyatane* (line 10) shows that the shrine was already there. The record does not say that it was built by Uditācharya. The expression cannot be interpreted as *gurvāyatanaṁ nirmāya tasmin.*

In view of the above, the interpretation of Dr. Sircar cannot stand. The lines 11 to 14 should, therefore, be translated as : "It is not written for publicity ; (but) it is a request and an exhortation to the devotees of Maheśvara. Considering that this is the property (for installing the memorials) of the Ācharyas, they should, on proper occasion, perform worship and make offerings without hesitation, and protect the property."

7. *Ibid*, 274-75.
8. *Ep. Ind.*, XXI, pp. 1-9.

INCORRECT USE DUE TO IGNORANCE

BABURAM SAKSENA
Allahabad

While speaking our own language we generally commit mistakes in words and formations which are borrowed in our speech or which we do not really understand at the moment. These I would call 'Incorrect use due to Ignorance'. I shall here give a few instances which came in mynotice.

During the course of the study of my own dialect of Awadhi I noticed *maṅgalācāra* being pronounced as *maṅgalācāri* in a song sung by the women folk of my village. Surely *cāri* for *cāra* was due to the ignorance of the correct Sanskrit word and the familiarity with the word *cāri* (four). A fellow inmate of my Hostel was Krishna Mansingh. I used to call him Krishnaman taking Singh to be the surname. People more intimate with him used to call him Krishna. One day Krishna protested to me saying that either I should call him by his full name or the short name as the second part of his name was Mansingh, his uncle's name. Then I realised my mistake. In those very days, I heard my monitor scolding the block servant for uttering my name as Babu Ram without any word of respect such as Mister or Babu. The servant apologised and explained that he thought that my name was Ram Saksena and that Babu was for respect. In the Hindi area we have such names as Sita Ram, Shiva Ram, Ram being the second part of them. A prevalent name is Salig Ram. Evidently

Salig has no sense. The name goes back to Skt. *śāligrāma*, but in our ignorance we have taken Ram as the current second part and separated it from the supposed first part. A very interesting instance recently came to my notice. One Dr. Banerji was attending upon a maid servant. She thought that *Jī* was the usual respectful addition and she referred to the Doctor as Dr. Banar. Similarly they sometimes add *Jī* for respect in ignorance. Once I heard the expression *Shivji Jī*. The devotee did not know that one *Ji* was already there which he wrongly assumed to be a part of the name of the god.

Similar ignorance has been the cause of false etymologies. In my paper entitled 'False Etymologies in the Dhammapada' published many years ago I had pointed out such instances as :

bāheti pāpāni iti bahmaṇo

where the author of the verse was wilfully or otherwise ignorant of the true sense of the word *brāhmaṇa* which was obviously pronounced *bahmaṇo*|*bāhmaṇo* during MIA period. Similar is perhaps the cause of the derivation of *duhitā* as *dūrhita*|*dūre hitā*.

NOTES ON THE SĀṄKHYA–KĀRIKĀ

N. AIYASWAMI SASTRI

Santiniketan

The Standard treatise on Sāṅkhya System, *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* with a commentary retranslated from its Chinese version of Paramārtha has been edited by me under the title: *Suvarṇa-Saptati*, published by the Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati in 1944. A few notes that are collected here are intended to supplement the Sāṅkhya ideas enunciated the treatisc.

The author of the *kārikā*, Iśvarakṛṣṇa himself admitted his indebtcdness to Pañcaśikha's *Ṣaṣṭitantra* for the entire system of thought expounded in his 70 couplets (v. ver. 72). The sage Kapila is credited to have been the first propounder of the thought (v. Introductory remarks in the comm.). Kapila was one of the most ancient sages of India. He has been mentioned in the *Upaniṣad* (*Śvetāśvatara* V, 2) as the first born from the Almighty. The *Bhagavadgītā* declares Kapila as the best of all saints (siddhas), v. X, 26. Sāṅkhya system is generally counted as one of the philosophical schools which plead for heterodoxical opinions about the universe, etc. This may be true so far as the later phase of the system is concerned. It is, however, doubtful whether Kapila who has been respected and quoted as an ideal sage could have propounded himself a heterodoxical system which runs counter against the Upaniṣadic teachings. It is noteworthy that no mention has made been of the *Prakṛti* doctrine amongst the false doctrines of *kāla*,

Svabhāva, etc. (*Śveta*. I, 2; VI, I). The Upaniṣad, on the other hand, declares that one ultimate cause is to be realized through Sāṅkhya-yoga, science of number and meditation (*Śveta*. VI, 13). This position is also probably confirmed in the *Gītā* (III, 3; V. 4-5) which remarks that the Sāṅkhya puts more stress on knowledge and yoga on the disinterested action (*Jñāna-yogena Sāṅkhyānāṁ Karma-yogena yogināṁ*), but their ultimate objective in life is one and the same (V, 5).

I. *Prakṛti*

The fundamental difference between the orthodox and heterodox Sāṅkhya lies in the fact that the former considers *Prakṛti* as subordinate to the ultimate source of universe whereas the latter pleads for an independent position of *Prakṛti*. In other words, the School in its early phase pleads that *Prakṛti* springs up first from the one ultimate principle like *Brahman* and other elements spiritual as well as material come up later from *Prakṛti*, thus upholding the doctrine of Monism (*advaita-vāda*); the same school in the later period, favours an independent position of both *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*, thus leading to Dualism. The school discorded completely the idea of God and reduced men to different separate spiritual units. This turn of the Sāṅkhya doctrine into an anti-God movement might have taken place under the influence of anti-Vedic schools of ancient time like Jainism and Buddhism, etc. The change might have been accomplished perhaps prior to the poet Aśvaghoṣa. According to the poet, Buddha parted company with the Sāṅkhya teachers only on the ground that the latter adhered firmly to the soul-theory (*Kṣetrajña=ātma-vāda*, v. *Buddhacarita*, XII, ver. 80-81).

The first evolute from the Supreme Spirit is variously designated in the Upaniṣads as follows :

Avyakta : *Śveta-up.* I. 8 : व्यक्ताव्यक्तं भरते विश्वमीश : । cp. Kaṭh. I, 1,11.

Hiraṇya-garbha : Ibid, III, 4 : हिरण्यगर्भं जनयामास पूर्वम् । cp. IV 12; VI, 18 : यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वम् ।

Muṇḍaka I, : 4 ब्रह्मा देवानां प्रथमः सम्बभूव ।

Kaṭha. II, 1, 6: यः पूर्वं तपसो जातम् । ... and 7

Prāṇa : Muṇḍaka, II, 13: एतस्मात् जायते प्राणः...

Praśna VI, 4: स प्राणमसृजत. ... cp. IV, 8.

Akṣara : Muṇḍaka II, 1, 1-2 अक्षरात् विविधाः सौम्य भावाः (=जीवाः). अप्राणी ह्यमना शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात् परतः परः । Śveta. I, 10, क्षरं प्रधानं...

Pradhāna: *Śveta.* VI, 16. प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः ...1 cp. ver. 10.

Māyā: *Prakṛti : Śveta.* IV, 10 मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् cp. IV, 9.

Avidyā : *Muṇḍaka* I, 8-9, *Īśa,* 10-11.

The *Gītā* which describes an early phase of the Sāṅkhya doctrine mentions *Prakṛti* as a subordinate principle to God under almost all designations with the exception of Hiraṇyagarbha and *Prāṇa.* The following are some of the references :

Avyakta : VII, 24, : अव्यक्तं व्यक्तिमापन्नं मन्यन्ते मामबुद्धयः ।

VIII, 18 : अव्यक्तात् व्यक्तयः सर्वाः प्रभवन्त्यहरागमे ।
रात्र्यागमे प्रलीयन्ते तत्रैवाव्यक्तसंज्ञके ॥
परस्तस्मात्तु भावोऽन्योऽव्यक्तोऽव्यक्तात्
सनातनः ।
यः ससर्वेषु भूतेषु नश्यत्सु न विनश्यति ॥ 20.

Avyakta refers to Supreme Being :

VIII. 21, अव्यक्तोऽक्षर इत्युक्तः तमाहुः परमां गतिम् ।

II, 25, अव्यक्तोऽयमचिन्त्योऽयमविकार्योऽयमुच्यते ।

XII, 3, अक्षरमनिर्देश्यममव्यक्तम् .....

II, 28, अव्यक्तादीनि भूतानि .....

Akṣara : XIV, 26-7, क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते ।
उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः ॥

Akṣara also refers to Supreme Being in VIII, 11 XII, 3, etc.

Prakṛti, Māyā : VII, 4-5, अपरेयमितस्त्वन्यां प्रकृतिं विद्धि मे परां ।

IV, 6, प्रकृतिं स्वामधिष्ठाय सम्भवाम्यात्ममायया ।

IX, 7-8, सर्वभूतानि कौन्तेय प्रकृतिं यान्ति मामकीम् । ...
प्रकृतिं स्वामधिष्ठाय विसृजामि पुनःपुनः ॥

IX, 10, मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरम् ।

VII, 14, दैवीह्येषा गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया ।

In contrast to the above the *Gītā* in XIII, 19 speaks Prakṛti and Puruṣa both as beginninglcss. *Prakṛti* may be beginningless (*anādi*) like *Avidyā* of Vedāntin and *anādi-vāsanā* of Buddhist. In fact the chap. XIII comes nearer to the classical Sāṅkhya doctrine in the following statements bearing on *Prakṛti's* agency in action and *Puruṣa's* mastership in its enjoyment :—

कार्यकारणकर्तृत्वे हेतुः प्रकृतिरुच्यते ।
पुरुषः सुखदुःखानां भोक्तृत्वे हेतुरुच्यते ॥
पुरुषः प्रकृतिस्थो हि भुङ्क्ते प्रकृतिजान् गुणान् । XIII, 20-21.

cp. also प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः ।
अहङ्कारविमूढात्मा कर्ताहमिति मन्यते ॥ III, 27.

Nevertheless nowhere does the *Gītā* plead for an independent position of *Prakṛti* as it is stressed in the Sāṅkhya Kārikā, 10. The idea of *Prakṛti* being a sole agent in action (*kartri*) is quite contrary to the *Upaniṣads*, e.g.v. "*Sa īkṣāmcakre*", *Praśna*, VI, 3 with *Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya* and "*So,' kāmayata*", *Taittirīya*, *No. 2*, sect. 6. etc.

The subordinate nature of *Prakṛti* is made plain in he order of evolutes arranged in the *Upaniṣads* and *Gītā*, tc:—

Indriya, artha, manas, buddhi, mahān, ātman, avyakta, puruṣa and there is nothing above that *puruṣa*; *Kaṭha* I,3,10-11.

Indriya, manas, sattva (=*buddhi*) *mahān, ātman, avyakta* and *puruṣa* who is *vyāpaka* and *aliṅga*; Ibid, II, 3, 7-8.

Indriya, manas, buddhi and *Puruṣa*;*Gītā*, III, 42.

Ākāśa, ahaṁkāra, buddhi, (mahan) *ātman, avyākṛta* and *Puruṣa–Anugītā*, ch. 35, 55-56.

Evolution of *Prakṛti* from Godhead is further confirmed in the *Anugītā* thus.

ततः प्रधानमसृत् प्रकृतिं स (=पितामहः) सर्वशरीरिणाम् ।

मया ततमिदं व्यातं यां लोके परमां विदुः ।

इदं तत् क्षरमित्युक्तं परन्त्वमृतमक्षरम् । Anugīta III, 26

It may now be evident that *Avyakta* known as *prakṛti* is not an independent material substance but a first transformed image of Supreme Being (*kārya-brahman*) which creates the entire universe and holds it up steadily. This may prove the soundness of Caraka's idea that *Avyakta* is no other than *Kṣetrajña*, i.e. *Ātman* (Refer to my paper "comparative study of Saṅkhya Tenets", *Bhāratīya Vidyā*, 1952, pp. 194.5).

In the Upaniṣadic scheme of creation *Prāṇa* and *Brahmā* (in masculine), etc. being the first created principle these names may be suggested for *Prakṛti* (v. Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* ad *śveta*. I, 4 and p. below).

II. *Pratyaya-sarga.*

The *Sāṅkhya–Kārikā* 46 mentions *Pratyaya-Sarga* under four heads: *Viparyaya, aśakti, Tuṣṭi* and *Siddhi*

with their varieties 50 in all. The 50 varieties are counted in 47 thus: *viparyaya* 5, *aśakti* 28, *tuṣṭi* 9 and *Siddhi* 8. Five *viparyayas* and their Subdivisions, 62, are made clear in 48. *kārikā* 49 explains *aśakti* and its 28 divisions. The next verse counts 9 varieties of *tuṣṭi*. The *kārikā* 57 enumerates *siddhi's* subdivisions. All these topics are well explained in the commentary on the verses above noted.

Now I would like to draw attention of readers to an apparent allusion to this topic in the *Śveta. upaniṣad* I, 4 as interpreted by Sri Śaṅkara. The *upaniṣad* describes Brahman as a wheel (*cakra*) by way of *rūpaka*, metaphor. It has one tyre (*nemi*), three encirding sections, sixteen ends and fifty spokes etc. one nemi, five reperesnts its potontial productive mood, *Kāraṇāvasthā* known as *Prakṛti māyā*, *Śakti*, *Avidyā* and so on. The sixteen ends form the group of 16 evolutes (*vikāra gaṇa* : five great dements etc.) Fifty spokes (*Śatārdhāram*) depict the fifty varieties of *Pratyaya–Sarga* above enumerated. Śri Śaṅkara comments on them almost in the same fashion as other commentators do. But he mentions none of the Sāṅkhya treatises, nor even the *Sāṅkhya kārikā*. His source of information on this topic, he says, is the *Brahmāṇḍap' rāṇa* chap. 60, sixty reluted the elucidation of *Kalpopaniṣad* (*kalpopaniṣad-vyākhyāna-pradeśe ṣastitame adhyāye Brahmāṇḍapurāṇe pañcāśadpratyayabhedāḥ pratipāditāḥ*).

It may appear to us that Śrī Śaṅkara does not like to mention any Sāṅkhya treatise like the *Kārikā* which turned into an anti-God system in later period and he mentions *Purāṇa* instead because the *Purāṇa* kept up the earlier tradition according both God *Pradhāna* their

respective places in the system.

I may cite one more similar instance here. According to the Sāṅkhya tradition *Prakṛti-laya*, merging into *Prakṛti* is resulted due to detachment from the group of 16 evolutes (*vairāgyāt-prakṛti-laya* v. s. *kārikā*, 45). Śrī Śaṅkara attributes this tradition of *prakṛti-laya* not to any Sāṅkhya authors, but to some Purāṇic teachers (*Prakṛti-laya iti Paurāṇikair ucyate, v. Iśopaniṣad-bhāṣya* ad mantra 13).

भट्टप्रभाकरमतयोर्भाष्यानुगुण्यम् ।

एस्० सुब्रह्मण्य शास्त्री, संस्कृत विश्वविद्यालय, वाराणसी

पूर्वमीमांसायां भट्टमतं प्रभाकरमतं इति मतद्वयं लोके विलसति । मुरारिमिश्रमतं तु लुप्तप्रायम् । तत्र भट्टमतं श्रीकुमारिलभट्टविरचितवार्तिकप्रभवम् । इदानीमुपलभ्यमानं श्लोकवार्तिकं तन्त्रवार्तिकं टुप्टीका इति ग्रन्थत्रयं वार्तिकपदेनाभिप्रेयते। बृहद्वार्तिकमिति बृहट्टीकेति च ग्रन्थेषु श्रूयमाणो ग्रन्थः लुप्त एव । तत्र तत्रोद्धृताः केचन श्लोकाः परं शिष्यन्ते। प्रभाकरमतं तु प्रभाकरविरचितबृहती लघ्वीति टीकाद्वयप्रभवं ऋजुविमला दीपशिखेति तट्टीकाभ्यामाविष्कृततत्वं प्रसिद्धमेव। परं तु तट्टीकाकारशालिकनाथविरचितप्रकरणपञ्चिकया निर्णीतः सर्वोऽपि प्रभाकराभिप्रायः। भट्टप्रभाकरयोः पौर्वापर्यं केचन विवदन्ते। परं तु प्रभाकरेण कण्ठत एव भट्टोक्तविषयाणां खण्डनात् , (१) नयविवेककृता भवनाथेन भट्टाभिप्रायं खण्डयितुमेव प्रभाकरेण प्रयत्यत इति स्फुटमभिधानाच्च (२) भट्टः प्राचीनः, प्रभाकरोऽर्वाचीन इति वक्तव्यं भवति। अत एव भट्टमतं प्राचीनदर्शनानुसारि ऋजु भाष्यस्थपदानुरोधि च दृश्यते । यथा चैतत् तथा अस्मिन् लेखे स्फुटीक्रियते।

(१) अध्ययनविधिः

तत्रादौ अध्ययनविधिं तावत्परामृशामः । तत्र भट्टः 'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य' इति विधिः फलस्याश्रवणात् वेदमात्राध्ययनं स्वर्गार्थत्वेन विधेयं विश्वजिन्न्यायात्, न तु अर्थज्ञानार्थत्वेन वेदाध्ययनविधिः सिद्धान्त्यभिमतो युक्तः, विनैव विधिं अनुष्ठानस्य अर्थज्ञानं विनाऽसंभवादेवार्थज्ञानं सिद्ध्यत्येवेति पूर्वपक्षयित्वा अर्थज्ञानार्थत्वेनाध्ययननियम-

(१) संख्याधिकरणे (पृ.866)"तस्माद्यागैकत्वे सप्तदशसङ्ख्यान्वयो न घटते" इति वार्तिकपक्षमुपादाय खण्डयति प्रभाकरः--किमिदमन्याय्यमुक्तं यागनिरूपणोत्तरकालं हि संस्कारप्राप्तिः न संस्कारापेक्षं यागनिरूपणम्। अस्य ग्रन्थस्य भट्टखण्डनपरत्वेन शालिकनाथो व्याचख्यौ ।

(२) अत्र यद्यपि परमते (भट्टमते) लोकइत्यादिभाष्यस्य षडर्थानुक्त्वा दशपक्षी चापरा उक्ता । तदपि मन्दं मत्वा गुरु. सप्तदशमर्थमाह (न. वि P. I.)

विधिरयं यथा व्रीहीनवहन्तीति । ततश्च विध्यानर्थक्यम् । विधिफलं तु वेदाध्ययनानन्तरमपि वेदार्थस्य यथावत् ज्ञानाय धर्मविचारः कर्तव्यः । ततश्च कर्मजिज्ञासासूत्रं अध्ययनविधिमूलकमित्याह । प्रभाकरस्तु स्वाध्यायविधौ अधिकारी न श्रुतः अतः न स्वविधिप्रयुक्तमध्ययनं अपितु अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयीत इति विधौ आचार्यकरणार्थे नीधातोः आत्मनेपदत्वश्रवणात् आचार्यकरणविधिप्रयुक्तमध्ययनम् उपनयनेन कथमाचार्यत्वसिद्धिः ? अध्ययनद्वारा । तया च आचार्यत्वसिध्यर्थं विहितमध्ययनं विवक्षितार्थं भवितुमर्हतीति वेदार्थस्याविवक्षितत्वात् ब्रह्मविद्या नारब्धव्येति पूर्वपक्षे यद्यप्याचार्यत्वसिद्धिः अध्ययनेन सिध्यति तथापि न तस्य मुख्यं फलं बहिरङ्गत्वात् । अर्थज्ञानं तु अन्तरङ्गत्वात् अध्ययनस्य मुख्यं फलं तच्च विचारमन्तरेण न सिध्यतीति धर्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या मीमांसाशास्त्रं च विधिमूलकमिति व्याचख्यौ ।

अत्र प्रभाकर व्याख्याया सम्माननोसञ्जनाचार्यकरणादिषु नियः इति पाणिनिसूत्रमेकमेवानुकुलम् । भाष्यं तु मतत्रयस्यापि साधारणं दृश्यते । "दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनं नाम । न च तस्याध्ययनमात्रात्तत्रभवन्तो याज्ञिकाः फलमामनन्ति" इतीदमेव भाष्यं अध्ययनस्य दृष्टार्थत्वेनादृष्टस्वर्गाद्यर्थत्वप्रतिषेधकमुपलभ्यते ।

(२) विधिविचारः

धर्मं जिज्ञासां प्रतिज्ञाय सूत्रकारः को धर्म इति प्रश्ने "चोदना लक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः" इत्याह । अत्र भट्टः "यो हि यागादिकमनुतिष्ठति तं धार्मिक इति समाचक्षते" इति भाष्यानुसारेण यागादिरेव धर्मः तस्य विधिज्ञाप्यत्वं च चोदना लक्षणोर्थो धर्म इति सूत्रादवगम्यत इत्याह । विधिः लिङ्प्रतिपाद्या प्रेरणा । लिङोऽपि गौणं विधित्वं तत्प्रतिपादकत्वात् अस्मिन्नर्थे भाष्यं चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनं, आचार्यचोदितः करोमि इति हि दृश्यते-इति । अत्र स्पष्टं प्रेरणाया विध्यर्थत्वं प्रतीयते । क्रियायाः यागादेः प्रवृत्तौ कारणं वचनं विधिः इत्यर्थो भाष्यस्य ।

प्रभाकरस्तु कार्यं लिङर्थः, कार्यं नाम अपूर्वयागादिजन्यं तस्य लिङर्थत्वे च भाष्यसम्मतिरुच्यते उत्तरत्र "यः पुरुषं निश्रेयसेन संयुनक्ति स धर्म इत्युच्यते, इति भाष्यम् । अनेन निश्रेयसकरत्वं धर्मस्योपदिष्टं, अपूर्वाधिकरणे च चोदनेत्यपूर्वं ब्रूमः (२-१-२) इति वदन् स्पष्टं भाष्यकारः अपूर्वस्य निःश्रेयसकरत्वं लिङर्थत्वं चाभिप्रैति । केचित्तु यः यागादिकमनुतिष्ठति तं धार्मिक इति समाचक्षते-इति भाष्यम् । तस्यायमर्थः यागानुष्ठानकर्तरि धार्मिकपदप्रयोगः नियोगानुष्ठाननिमित्तकः । तथा हि अनधिकृतयागाद्यनुष्ठातरि न धार्मिकशब्दः प्रयुज्यते । अतो ज्ञायते नियोगानुष्ठानपरमिदं भाष्यमिति ।

भट्टस्तु अपूर्वाधिकरणभाष्यं न प्रभाकरानुकूलं, यतः तत्र भाष्यं अपूर्वं पुनरस्ति इतरथा विधानमनर्थकं स्यात् । भङ्गित्वाद्यागस्येति वदन् अपूर्वस्य भट्टाभिमतां अनुमेयतां स्पष्टमाह । नतु लिङ्वाच्यताम् ।

(३) भ्रमविषये विप्रतिपत्तिः

श्री कुमारिलः भ्रमे विपरीतख्यातिं मन्यते । विपरीतख्यातिर्नाम नैयायिकाभिमता अन्यथाख्यातिरेव । ननु अन्यथाख्यातौ नैयायिकाः ज्ञानलक्षणासन्निकर्षेण दूरस्थरजतभानमङ्गीकुर्वन्ति । नच भट्टमते ज्ञानलक्षणासन्निकर्षात् रजतभानमुक्तं कुत्रापि इति चेन्न । शास्त्रदीपिकाकारेण "अपि च स्मृतेन रजताकारेण यत्सन्निहितस्य शुक्तिरूपस्य तादात्म्यग्रहणं तदनुपरतेन्द्रियव्यापारस्य भवत् साक्षात्संप्रयोगजमेव अपरोक्षत्वम्" इत्युक्तं वर्तते । यद्यपि ज्ञानलक्षणासन्निकर्षः कण्ठतो नोक्तः तथापि साक्षात्संप्रयोगजत्वोक्त्या कल्पनीय एव । उक्तं तत्रैव आभासनिवृत्यर्थं तत्सतोर्व्यत्यय इति ।

प्रभाकरस्तु भ्रान्तिमेव नाभ्युपगच्छति । इदं रजतमिति ज्ञाने इदमिति ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं रजतमिति स्मृतिः । तत्र इदं रजतयोः प्रत्यक्षस्मरणयो विवेकाग्रहात् इदं रजतमिति व्यवहारमात्रम् नतूभयविषयमेकं ज्ञानं इति मन्यते ।

भाष्ये तु "व्यभिचारात् परीक्षितव्यं शुक्तिका हि रजतवत् प्रकाशते" यदा हि चक्षुरादिभिरुपहतं मनो भवति इन्द्रियं वा तिमिरादिभिः सौक्ष्म्यादिभिर्बाह्यो वा विषयः ततो मिथ्याज्ञानम् । अनुपहतेषु च सम्यग्ज्ञानम्" इति कण्ठतो मिथ्याज्ञान सद्भावोक्तिर्दृश्यते इदं भट्टमतानुकूलम् ।

परन्तु प्रभाकरः इदं भाष्यं स्वमतानुसारेण इत्थं व्याचष्टे । तथाहि 'चक्षुरादिभिरुपहतं मनः' इत्यनेन भ्रमस्य अग्रहणनिमित्तताऽवगम्यते । कथं वा इदं हि कथं पुनरन्यसंयोगे अन्यविषयज्ञानं भवति इत्यत्र हेतुः नहि दृष्टा यवादयः शाल्यङ्कुरप्रसवसमर्था भवन्ति । तस्मात् तेन यथावत् पुरोवर्ति विषयस्याग्रहणमेवाभिप्रेयते ततश्च अग्रहणनिमित्तता भ्रान्तेः सिद्धा–इत्याह ।

(४) ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षत्व विवादः

प्रभाकरः ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशमिति मन्यते । स्वप्रकाशत्वं च न स्वविषयकत्वं एकत्र कर्मकर्तृभावविरोधात् । अपितु स्वांशे संशयराहित्यम् । यत्तु तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रभाकरमते ज्ञानं मितिमातृमेयविषयमिति तत् न प्रभाकरेणोक्तम् अपितु जरत्प्रभाकरमतमिति ब्रह्मानन्दानामाशयः । भट्टास्तु ज्ञानं न प्रत्यक्षं अपितु

ज्ञानजन्यज्ञातता विषयगता प्रत्यक्षा तया ज्ञानमनुमीयते। यथा-इयं ज्ञातता घटत्व-प्रकारकघटविशेष्यकज्ञानजन्या घटवृत्तिघटत्वप्रकारकज्ञाततात्वात् इति प्रयोगं वदन्ति।

भाष्ये तु "नह्यज्ञातेऽर्थे कश्चिद्बुद्धिमुपलभते। ज्ञाते तु अनुमानादवगच्छति इति तस्मादप्रत्यक्षा बुद्धिः" इति च उपलभ्यते। इदं तु यथाश्रुते भट्टस्यैवानुकूलम् इदं भाष्यं प्रभाकरस्त्वेवं व्याचष्टे ज्ञानं विषयतयाऽप्रत्यक्षमेव स्वप्रकाशत्वात् अनुमानात् ज्ञानावगमे प्रभाकरस्य न कोऽपि विरोधगन्धः। तस्य ज्ञाने स्वप्रकाशत्वा वबोधकत्वात्। स्वस्य ज्ञानस्य स्वविषयकत्वं यद्बौद्धैरुच्यते तन्निराकरणपरमिदं भाष्यम्। तथाचेदं भाष्यं मतद्वयसाधारणमेव ज्ञेयम्।

(५) लौकिकवाक्यानाम् प्रामाण्यम्।

वैदिकशब्दाः प्रमाणमेव। लौकिकशब्दास्तु लिङ्गविधया प्रमाणम् वैशेषिक मतवत् इति प्रभाकरः। भट्टस्तु लौकिकं वैदिकं च वाक्यं उभयमपि प्रमाणं मन्यते।

अत्र प्रभाकरस्तु--अपि च पौरूषेयाद्वाक्यात् "एवमयं पुरुषो वेद" इति भवति प्रत्ययः नत्वेवमयमर्थ इति" इति भाष्यं प्रमाणम्। एवं "यत्तु लौकिकं वचनं तच्चेत् प्रत्ययितात्पुरुषात् इन्द्रियविषयं वा अवितथमेव तत्। अथाप्रत्ययितात् अतीन्द्रियविषयं वा तत् पुरुषबुद्धिप्रभवमप्रमाणम् अशक्यं हि तत् ज्ञातुं वचनात्" इति भाष्यमप्यत्र मानम्। अपि च प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणनिरूपणप्रस्तावे" शास्त्रं शब्द-विज्ञानादसन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे विज्ञायते" इति शास्त्रलक्षणं वदन् भाष्यकारः वेदस्यैव शब्दविधया प्रमाणत्वमभिप्रैति लौकिकवाक्यानि न लक्षयतीत्याह।

भट्टस्तु "यत्तु लौकिकं वचनं तच्चेत् प्रत्ययितात्पुरुषात् इन्द्रियविषयं वा अवितथमेव तत्" इति भाष्यं प्रमाणप्रस्तावे श्रुतं लौकिकवाक्यमपि आप्तोक्तं प्रमाणमेवेत्यभिप्रैति। अपि च पौरुषेयाद्वचनादित्यस्यायमर्थः पुंवाक्यस्य पुरुषे दोषसंभवेन न प्रतिष्ठितं प्रामाण्यम्। यदि तदर्थः प्रामाणान्तरेण निश्चितः स्यात् तदा तदपि भवति प्रमाणमिति। शब्दमात्रलक्षणप्रस्ताव शास्त्रलक्षणकथनं तु-वेदानुपयोगि प्रमाणं नात्र भाष्यकारेण निरूप्यते। प्रत्यक्षादिकमपि स्वरूपग्राहकत्वेन वेदोपयोग्येव। अतः शास्त्रं इति पदस्य प्रमाणशब्दमात्रपरत्वमित्यर्थ इति।

(६)श्येनादेरधर्मत्वं धर्मत्वं वा ?

भट्टः वेदविहितत्वेन अभिचारकर्मणः श्येनादेः धर्मत्वमेव। परन्तु तत्फलस्य शत्रुमरणादेरधर्मत्वेन शिष्टा नानुतिष्ठन्ति इति जगाद। अत्र भाष्यं-श्येनादयः

कर्तव्या इति विज्ञायन्ते । यो हि हिंसितुमिच्छेत् तस्यायमभ्युपाय इति हि तेषामुपदेशः" इति । अतः वेदविहितत्वेन चोदनालक्षणत्वाद्धर्मत्वमेवेति फलति । प्रभाकरस्तु श्येनादेरधर्मत्वमेवाभिप्रैति ।

अभावाख्यं षष्ठं प्रमाणम्

भाट्टाः अभावाख्यं षष्ठं प्रमाणमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । तत्र च भाष्यं—अभावोऽपि प्रमाणाभावः नास्तीत्यर्थस्यासन्निकृष्टस्य इति । प्रभाकरस्तु अभावाख्यं षष्ठं प्रमाणं नाभ्युपैति । आह च "नास्तीति यदुच्येत तदस्य प्रमेयमित्येतदापद्येत । तथाच यन्न प्रमीयते तत्प्रमेयं इत्यप्रमीयमाणस्य प्रमेयत्वप्रसंगः स्यात्" अतः अभावप्रमाणस्य प्रमेयमेव नास्ति इत्यर्थः । प्रसिद्धिस्तु वटयक्षप्रसिद्धिवन्निर्मूलेत्याह ।

(७) शाब्दबोधप्रकारः

प्रभाकरः अन्विताभिधानमभ्युपगच्छति । भट्टस्तु अभिहितान्वयम् । प्रभाकरस्य मूलं—तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नायः इतिसूत्रम् । अस्यार्थः—तेष्वेव पदार्थेषु कार्यान्वितेषु भूतानां वर्तमानांनां क्रियार्थेन कार्यवाचिपदेन सहोच्चारणं कर्तव्यमिति । ततश्च साक्षात् परम्परया वा कार्यान्विते पदानां शक्तिः कार्यबोधक पदघटितादेव वाक्याच्छाब्दबोधः । वेदान्ते तत्वमस्यादिवाक्यानामपि 'उपासीत' इत्यादिपदयोजनयैव शाब्दबोधः इत्याह

भट्टस्तु अभिहितान्वयबोधमिच्छति । पदेन अभिहितैः पदार्थैः वाक्यार्थबोधः भवतीत्याह । अस्मिन्नर्थे भाष्यम् –पदानिच स्वं स्वमर्थमभिधाय निवृत्तव्यापाराणि । अथेदानीं पदार्था अवगताः सन्तः वाक्यार्थमवगमयन्ति–इति । इदं तु भाष्यं भट्टस्यैव संगच्छते । प्रभाकरस्य तु दुर्योज्यमिति मन्तव्यम् । अपूर्वस्य लिङ्वाच्यत्वं यत्प्रभाकरेणोच्यते तत्रापि "कथं पुनरवगम्यते अस्ति तदपूर्वमिति" इत्यपूर्वाधिकरणविरोधः स्यात् लिङ् पदवाच्यत्वे प्रश्नासंगतेः इति ।

इत्थं एकमूलप्रभवस्य मतद्वयस्य कथं प्रकारभेदः समजनीति यथामति यत्किञ्चिन्यरूपयम् ।

TRENDS IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION ——INDIA AND JAPAN

GENJUN H. SASAKI

Kyoto, Japan

In the 4th century B. C., when Buddhism was expounded, it had to absorb Brahmanism on the one side, and also to revolt against it on the other. Buddhists had to establish their own community to impose their beliefs on all people. Hence, the principle on which Buddhism was founded is faith in the Three Treasures (*Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha*). The community (*saṅgha*) is one of them. Buddhism used the aid of state power or the patronage of King Aśoka to propagate its belief all over the country.

Under the name of freedom of faith there grew up the two main different sects in India. Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism. Since this partition a number of sects and schools had been developed in accordance with divergent views on the Buddha's teachings in the long span of time from the 3rd century B. C. up to the 8th century A. D. The latent function of such a view was to eliminate heretic views and to make all people enjoy the true religion of the Buddha.

The manifest motive of the institutional organization is universal, and common to all religions. What is different is the fact that Buddhism was cast out of India after the 10th century A. D., while it is still living and playing a vital role for cultivation of spirituality of the people in Japan.

Why, then, did Buddhism disappear in India ?

Why has it been developed in Japan, though in a modified form ? The socio-political background will be able to account for the historical differences between Japanese and Indian Buddhism. Let us take a glimpse of the historical development of Buddhism in Japan.

The different sects of Buddhism grew up in the 13th century A. D., as a revolution against the autocratic, polemic Buddhism of the Heian Period from the 8th to the 9th century. Buddhism in the Kamakura Period (the 13th century) can be called the Renaissance in the point that the masses could, separated from the autocratic polemic, gain a freedom of faith. New sects spread their influences over all parts of Japan, insisting on the latent possibility of the salvation of human beings, high and low. All these beliefs penetrated into the fishermen and peasants. Buddhists of new sects tried to have close contact with the peasant class for spiritual cultivation, not for intellectual and scholarly education. Thus, the heterogenious Buddhism had assimilated the national cult, pervading the masses. It was in the Muromachi and Azuchi-Momoyama Periods (1392-1615) when the intensive dogmatic scholarship reached its peak in the realm of Buddhist theology.

In contrast Buddhism in India was centered around the Buddhist community, having been negligent of propagating itself among the masses. The high standard of scholarship did not affect the popularization of Buddhism among the peasant society.

Moreover, there were little or minor diversities between Brahmanism and Buddhism. Buddhism had the majority of doctrines to be assimilated by Brahmanism. In other words, Buddhism was homogeneous to

Brahmanism in its nature. Therefore, it was ready to be assimilated by Brahmanism.

India had to suffer from the invasions of the foreign troops, in particular, of militant Muslims. It would be obvious that Buddhism, not yet rooted deeply among the masses, was exposed to complete decay by the militant attack of Muslims.

In Japan Christianity was placed under official ban by the Tokugawa Government for fear that it would prove inimical to public order. Foreign intercourse was so active that the Tokugawa Government enforced an even stricter ban on Christianity, resulting in a state of complete seclusion from foreign influence. About that time, however, the nation made remarkable progress in all fields of economic activity. Side by side with seclusion, there went on domestic politics in steadfastness through all parts of Japan.

Although the seclusion pursued for more than two centuries, religions succeeded in establishing temples and dominating the relatively under-developed regions of Japan with no disturbances by foreign religions.

The popularization of Buddhism was so intensively and widely perpetuated that the rise and decay of Buddhist scholarship did not affect so much the sentiments of the people. Moreover, the political seclusion (1639-1854) helped even to create a scholarly stability.

This example demonstrates the significant positive relationship between religious beliefs and socio-political conservatism. To some the political seclusion in the Tokugawa Period is a matter for condemnation, but a power principle makes it sociologically understandable.

In India, however, Buddhism could not as yet dominate and perpetuate the sentiments of the masses,

and also brought the Buddhist scholarship to its extreme seclusion from the demand of the people. Besides, after the Aśoka Period Indian Buddhism did not obtain strong Royal patronage. It would be natural that Muslims, a religious group radical in its political orientation, gave a final blow to Buddhism.

Hinduism and its Institution.

Hinduism did not begin at any definite time in history ; it came out of the amalgamation with foreign cultures which resulted from the invasion of India around 1500 B. C. by Indo-Europeans Hence, it is quite natural that Hinduism did not have any specific religious community to propagate its belief among the people. All of Hindu doctrines had been spread over by the individual activities and the social castes, but not by a definite organization of Hindu monks.

With this background Hinduism in modern India has no churches and temples eccleciastically organized. There are a number of temples and Mandirs for use to worship and pray. But, they have no temple-officer or minister who is to engage in religious ceremonies and sermons. They have also no system of membership which could provide economic support. Nevertheless, a group of people, as we can see everywhere, gather at the Hindu Mandirs to take refuge or to pray and worship. The temples themselves offer no food, no accomodation, no conveniences—even no regular meeting or discussion. Notwithstanding of all these deficiencies, the Hindu people are confident in themselves being Hindus. There might be various reasons why Hindus have had no ecclesiastical organization or no system of membership similar to the Christian church. We can consider at least three reasons.

First, philosophically Hinduism is individualistic in its approach to the truth. Although Hinduism has a trinity (*trimūrti*) of gods—Brahmā (creation), Shiva (destruction), and Vishṇu (preservation)—a Hindu devotee can be an agnostic, monist, pantheist and atheist at the same time. It is difficult to describe Hinduism from the viewpoint of Western concept of religion. Hinduism, in essence, is an all-absorptive, all embracing religion. For this reason it could survive through countless invasion and strifes. They believe that the truth (*Dharma*) is present in all existing things, animate and inanimate, and that the truth is made manifest in the form Krishṇa. The requirement for a Hindu is that he should follow the *Dharma* of his caste, hoping he will be reborn in a happy life after death. The Hindus find nothing peculiar in spending long hours in meditation even in the waiting room of a terminal. They are inward-looking. There are many ways of self-training, of which Yoga is the best known. Each person participates in the *Dharma* in his own way. Hence, there is in Hinduism no dogma and no catechism to dominate human intellect and practice. And the institutional organization is of little or no significance.

Secondly, Hinduism has been moulded on the Indian soil among the masses. It forms a religio-social community, having a close contact with the social structure at any period. Sociologically, it has been interrelated with the caste system which is not merely religious, but also political, economic and social.

By 500 B. C., four castes had developed in India. They have persisted into our times. They are Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras. Although recent developments have moderated many of the ancient rigid

laws of castes, the masses of India, the peasants in particular, still adapt themselves to the essentials of the customs of their Hindu ancestors. Brahmins are unwilling or even refuse to work and eat together with the low castes like Shudra or Harijan. Under these circumstances, it is extremely difficult to organize a united Church or Temple which consists of devotees and members at an equal level of participation. There are different status and various distinctions among the castes. Therefore, the religio-social values upheld by particular groups cannot exert influence upon the other classes, being unable to reflect behaviour of lower groups.

Religious institutions have always an impact on social structure. As far as the caste structure is retained in Indian society, there might not be united activities of Hindu temples and the organization of united churches supported by memberships in an equal degree of participation.

Thirdly, politically speaking, Hinduism has a racial and nationalistic feature. In ancient India there were two kinds of literary sources which provide us with ideas about political problems and the unity of the nation. The *Vedas*, the *Upaniṣads* and other philosophical systems provided fundamental concepts of politics, but essentially they referred to theology, religion and philosophy. The *Arthaśāstra* and the *Dharmaśāstra* literature refers intensively to theories of administration.

What was preached in the days of underdeveloped ancient communication was a philosophy of balance and harmonious human integration. Practical emphasis

was implied by a humanistic concept of *ahiṁsā* (non-violence), which is retained in all phases of politics and human affairs in modern India. The philosophy of balance is found in a political remark by Gandhi, when he referred to socialism and communism.

"Socialism and communism of the West are based on certain conceptions which are fundamentally different from ours. Our socialism or communism should, therefore, be based on *ahiṁsā* and on harmonious co-operation of labour and capital, landlord and tenant."[1] This philosophy of balance has been supported and realized by the racial and nationalistic character of Hindus.

Following independence after World War II, and withdrawal of the colonial powers, the primary concern of India has been with the unity of the nation which is essential for the modernization of India.

India, thus, saw cultural revivalism and the industrial expansion as the only true measures of realizing the philosophy of balance. The former principle is expressed by Indian reformers at any social meeting all over India, while the latter is carried out by the Rural Development Plan or the *Pañchayats* movement throughout India.

For example, in conjunction with cultural revivalism, a land reformer Vinoba states at a Shanti Senā rally on the occasion of the 15th Sarvodaya Sammelan at Rajpur : "One gets the power of compassion and it rises from within one's inner being. We desire and firmly believe that if this power is indispensable for the present age, we will get it from within us. Let us see in every soul our own image."

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1. *Bhoodan*, Vol. Viii, 38-39 (January 25, 1964).

This emphasis on "the truth within us" is a deeply ingrained principle of the Hindu philosophy of balance. This is the same idea as embodied in ancient scriptures and Rock Edicts of Aśoka.

In connection with the industrial expansion Indian socialists see rural development as the only democratic means of realizing the philosophy of balance. In line with this idea, India attempts to slow the movement of younger people from rural areas, to the cities. This movement drains, in Gandhi's terms, "the life-blood of the villages." Indian economists increasingly recognize the need to increase the supply and variety of food available for domestic consumption, which entirely depends upon the growth of rural industry.

There is no doubt that glamorous industry, economic and social changes are the proper goal of national development. The primary focus of any rural development program, however, must be to encourage the revival of the traditional spirit of the people in their villages and towns.

Beside these spiritual revival movements, there arose recently some political motives to instigate Indian nationalism, which take the forms of self-defence against the Chinese invasion and of linguistic patriotism through the unity of national languages.

It is one of the important problems to unite the traditional culture and self-assertion in an international policy. In this context it is not an accident that, after India pledged her support to the U. N. and voted to brand the North Koreans as aggressors, Nehru affirmed to the world a policy of non-attachment, an Indian traditional concept, regarding any other decision determined by the U. N. Hindu spiritual tradition still

functions on the Indian polity.

Generally speaking, the Indian traditional, spiritual culture as referred to internal purifications, has been unmindful of political and sociological implication, being thereby not relevant to social improvements.

We come across, from time to time, to such a question as the harmonius unity of the traditional culture and the Indian polity. Such a question as this is given mainly by the young generation, which is critical, even sceptical of the spiritual culture, and yet sympathetic in an implicit way.

India is one of those countries which are proud of their traditional culture and its development through the ages. This strongly sympathetic and emotional attitude towards their own culture is common to all people in India.

Thus, Indian national unity or strength depends upon emotional integration, national impulse and national ethos. In modern India Hinduism is not only a religion, but also national patriotism, upon which the people pursue their own lives. Hinduism means to be an Indian or to be a Hindu in the original sense of the word. It represents the way of Indian life of the Hindu people. The ancient culture provides the people with a national and racial consciousness.

Regional Distribution.

The religious tie in villages still provides a cement for a modern Indian community, which might otherwise be divided into different, independent societies, as the partition between India and Pakistan shows us by its bitter example.

Even after the partition India has 40 million Muslims out of a total of 380 million people. India

has also numerous adherents of various religions and sects such as Sikh, Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism, Parsis, Jews and tribal religions. Among them Hinduism is the predominant religion. It counts 300 million people among its adherents.

The villagers feel responsible for the handicapped or poor men among their caste members. They protect themselves against higher castes and help each other. In their private lives they receive more advantages offered by the caste than offered by the Government Community Plans. The caste system will not be discarded unless and untill social security substitutes for the advantages given by the caste system.

Therefore, the rise and decacy of interest in religion exercise a profound influence upon Indian social revolution. The table[2] shows us the distribution of population by religion in 1963.

2. *Table*

(Population of Major Religious Communities

(Re-compiled from *1963 Census India)*

State/Union Territory	Hindu	Muslim	Christian	Jain	Sikh	Buddhist
Andhra Predesh	3,18,14,025	27,15,021	14,28,729	9,012	8,563	6,753
Assam	78,84,921	27,65,507	7,64,553	9,468	9,686	36,313
Bihar	3,93,47 050	57,85,631	5,02,195	17.598	44,413	2,885
Gujarat	1,83,56,061	17,45,103	91,028	4,09,754	9,646	3,185
Jammu, Kashmir	10,13,193	24,32,067	2,848	1,427	63,069	48,360
Kerala	1,02,82,568	30,27,639	35,87,365	2,967	822	228
Madhya Pradesh	3,04,25,798	13,17,617	1,88,314	2,47,927	65,715	1,13.365
Madras	3,02,97,115	15,60,414	17,62,954	28,350	2,567	777
Maharashtra	3,25,30,901	30,34,332	5,60,594	4,85,672	57,617	27,89,504
Mysore	2,05,82,853	23,28,370	4,87,587	1,74,366	3,287	9,770
Orissa	1,71,23,194	2,15,319	2,01,017	2,295	5,030	454
Punjab	1,29,30,045	3 93,314	1,49,834	48,754	67,69,129	14,857
Rajasthan	1,81,32,690	13,14,613	22,864	4,09,417	2,74,198	759
Uttar Pradesh	6,24,37 313	1,07,88,089	1,01,641	1.22,108	2,83,737	12,893
West Bengal	2,75,42,734	69,71,287	2,01.854	26,973	34,342	1, 09,205
Delhi	22,34,597	1,55,453	29,269	29,595	2,03,916	5,466
Nagaland	34,677	891	1,95,583	263	255	42
TOTAL	36,29,69,634	4,65,50,773	102,78,234	1,46,25,946	78,36,002	31,54,826

Hinduism.

The Hindu population was 86 percent in 1881, but it gradually declined and stood at 83, 67 in 1941. The decline is mainly due to the conversion of Hindus to Sikhism or Christianity and to higher rate of increase of population among the Muslims. The increase in the present census is due mainly to the exodus of Muslims to Pakistan. It is also due to the re-conversion to Hinduism of the imperfectly converted Christians and Sikhs.

Before World War II the Christian community was growing rapidly in numbers ; the Christian population in 1921 was only 69, 882, and it is more than doubled itself within a period of 30 years. There might have been many factors to cause this process of change.

British emphasis on the equality of all individuals in their right and responsibilities gradually cast away Hindu social restrictions. On the other side, industrialization inspired by British policy whittled down caste restrictions on working and living together in urban districts.

Hindu society did not admit the untouchables to enter into temples. Psychologically, temples play an important role in the spiritual lives of the Hindus. Temple-worship or sitting in temples is the only means by which they can release themselves from mental stresses.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that some untouchables abandoned Hinduism, converting to other religious beliefs such as Chrisitanity, Sikhism, or more recently to Buddhism.

After the War, however, the Indian Government's

Development Plan insisted on equal educational opportunities for all, offering scholarships to the untouchables, while Hindu religious leaders urged modification of Hindu caste rules in conjunction with modern religious and social movements.

The setting up of the Welfare State as the nation's goal in 1950 gradually made them realize that the aspirations of the people after the achievement of independence would rise in a tremendous progression. Village *Pañchayats* were organized and powers were given to them to enable them to work as units of villages or inter-villages.

Besides, the racial nationalism, inspired by independence, encouraged the revival of Indian tradition. The political leaders also encouraged the revival of Hinduism against Christianity. Christian missionary works in India had to undergo difficulties because of the shortage of missionaries. Nehru referred to religion once in Kathamandu in 1954 ; "In Asia there are too many of different religions. Christian missionaries must have many things to do in their own countries before they come to India for mission works."

Muslims.

The second important community is Muslim. The Muslim proportion to the total population stood at 13, 74 in 1881, gradually rose to 15, 43 in 1941. In 1951 it declined to 14, 28. The decline is due to the departure of some Muslims to Pakistan.

The growth of a religious community depends on three factors, natural increase, migration and conversion. The large cities like Bombay, Calcutta and New Delhi show a slight fall in the growth rate of Muslims during the

past decade. It was not only due to the partition, but also due to a slowing down of immigration of Muslims from other parts of India. The decline of Muslims is also found in the Hills Division in Assam. It is mainly due to the moving of Muslim Government servants from Shilong, the capital of the Province, to Pakistan.

Through all parts of India the decline of Muslims in number is absolutely comparable with the increase of Hinduism. The increase of Hinduism does not mean conversion of Muslims to Hinduism. It means that Muslims have migrated to their own States in India after the partition. For example, in West Bengal Muslims numbered 4, 28 and 4, 74 millions in 1921 and 1931 respectively. But, in 1941 their number suddenly swelled into 5, 54 millions. It is 4, 92 millions in 1951 and 6, 97 millions in 1961.

Christianity and others.

Christians are large in number in such states as Travancore-Cochin, Andhra Pradesh and Madras. It was introduced into Travancore-Cochin during the early centuries of the Christian era. Since then it has been steadily increasing, thanks to the tolerant policy issued by the princes and people of Kerala. Since the advent of the Portuguese a number of Hindus, particularly the backward people, have been converted to Christianity. Cochin is one of the centers of ancient Jewish colonies. It has held its own Jewish faith, although it is a small community.

Christians are found in all districts, but in Madras they are found only in such places as East Godavari, West Godavari, Krishna, Guntur, Nellore and in the

Circars, Cuddapah and Kurnool districts in the Deccan division, the South Madras division, and also in the West Madras division. What is peculiar to Christianity is the missionary activities among the tribes. Assam is one of the states where the various tribes are living away from the urban districts. According to the 1953 *Census of India*, the situation activities is remarked by Mr. Marar in 1941 as follows ; "Christians are most numerous among the tribal people of the Hills..... It is, however, reported from Lushai Hills that there has been a tendency in the opposite direction also, Christians reverting to their old beliefs and sacrifices, this has been indicated in the house list, but has not been examined to ascertain its extent."

Jainism comes next to Christianity in number. It spread over such states as Maharashtra, Gujarat, Punjab and Madhya Pradesh in large number ; and in Nagaland, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir in small number.

Jainism prevails mainly among urban-dwelling trading communities, except in Belgaum in Southern Deccan where a considerable proportion are agriculturists. The intermarriage is not difficult among Hindus and Jains. The heavy increase in the Jain population during the past decade was probably due to the increased immigration of Jains to Gujarat and Bombay from Kutch and Saurashtra and other districts. The decline in 1951 is due to their returning to the Hindu faith.

It is interesting to note that Jainism and Hinduism are minor in their differences in practice ; this is one of the reasons for the Jains' flexibility in converting to Hinduism.

Sikhism pervades every state, particularly Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. The districts minor in number are Nagaland, Kerala, Madras and Mysore. In 1931 the number of Sikhs in Orissa was almost nil, while in 1941 their number was 476 only. Nevertheless, they grew in 1951 to 4, 163 out of every 10,000 of the population. In 1961 it was 5,030. It is due to the attractions of growing industries and the result of partition. Sikhs are engaging mostly in industry, transport services and contract business. The number of Sikhs in West Bengal has also increased, for military personnal and persons displaced by West Pakistan have contributed a large share to the increased number. Sikhs numbered 37,017 in Bombay State, now included in Maharashtra, in census of 1951, or 0,10 percent of the population. Their number was 839 in 1921, 2,951 in 1931, 8,824 in 1941 and 37,017 in 1951. It shows the heavy increase around Bombay, one of the most industrialized cities in India.

Zoroastrians, influential far beyond their numerical importance, are centering around Bombay, Poona and Surat in Western India. They are living almost in a western way. They are the wealthiest of all the religious communities, being most literate. The followers are Parsis, who number 97,573 or 0,27 percent of the population. Parsis marry later and less than other religious groups. Therefore, the fertility is low, but it counterbalances with an extremely low death rate. It is well known that Parsis contributed much to the Independent Movement of Indian's economic and social fields of activity.

Buddhists have kept up the natural rate of increase. They are most numerous in such districts as Maha-

rashtra, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Punjab and Mysore.

In past decades Buddhists are found not among the native Indians, but among the Chinese and Burmese immigrants. Past census figures testified to the existence of Buddhists mostly in Bombay city and 594 in Dharwar district in 1951. It is estimated that the Chinese probably contributed mostly to the Buddhist figures. They are mainly shoe-makers, furniture-makers, restaurant managers, dentists etc.

Since 1956, however, the proportion of Buddhists is found to have increased very greatly. One of the reasons for this abnormal rise is the settlement of Chinese and Burmese families in several towns in the State. Another reason is that a number of untouchables were converted to Buddhism. The lower classes and the untouchables looked forward to building a new life when freedom came to India. Moreover, their aspirations and hopes were raised up to the unification of Buddhists in different districts, thanks to the religious, political movement of a political leader, Dr. Ambedkar.

There might be many factors which caused this conversion into Buddhism. Among them are the self-awareness of freedom, the introduction of industrialization, and above all, Buddhist insistence on the equality of all individuals before the duty and responsibility.

Such a trend of thought has spread over all parts of India among low classes. Buddhist religious leaders organized 'Nawa Buddhan', a new Buddhist movement, among the Harijan. Some of the low classes were so much influenced by the Nawa Buddhan movement that they replaced even Indian native God and Goddess

by Buddhist statuary. It is worth nothing that the Harijan class around Sevagram, Maharashtra, gather every evening at a small Buddhist temple, led by Buddhist laymen and monks, chanting Buddhist *sūtra* and discussing even political and social problems. All of these *Sammitī*, or meetings are very helpful not only to encourage Indian revivalism, but also to cultivate the spirituality of the low people.

Any religious movement has to be related to the material and intellectual life of the bulk of India's rural population. From this point of view, the *Pañchayat* movement contributes much to rehabilitate the people, offering them economic settlement enough to bring them into unity. Among the various programs of the *Pañchayat* the agricultural revolution is most important to meet the demands of the rural people, for an enormous volume of unemployment existed in the agricultural field. Agricultural work entirely depends upon the seasonal conditions. It is possible only for a portion of the year, i. e. 3 to 4 months in over four-fifths of the country, where there is no irrigation except for monsoon rain, and 6 to 8 months in other areas, where irrigational facilities are built up.

For this reason Buddhist leaders are spreading the Nawa Buddhan movement in relation to the Community Projects and the Land Reform Movement, working with people and answering to their needs. We cannot overlook the contributions of the Indian Government to Buddhist revival. The Government made efforts to draw up a well-adapted, comprehensive program to support the Buddhist revival movement, which came to its height when 2,500th the anniversary of the *mahāparinirvāṇa* of Gautama, the Buddha was held in Nepal in 1956,

A number of publications were released for the Publications Division, Government of India. Among them there are two books valuable and useful: "*2500 Years of Buddhism*" and "*The Way of the Buddha.*"

Two reasons can be considered for the Government's support of Buddhism: First, the Indian Government tries to encourage modern revivalism of Indian culture, inspiring the people to achieve their desires in harmony with the culture of the ancient people.

Gandhi's confidence is vividly living among all Indian people. Gandhi remarked ; "In Hindu culture, I venture to submit, Buddhistic culture is necessarily included, for the simple reason that the Buddha himself was an Indian, not only an Indian, but a Hindu amongst Hindus. I have never seen anything in the life of Gautama to warrant the belief that he renounced Hinduism and adopted a new faith."[3]

Secondly, India came to play her vital role in the world soon after Independence. India was thus to guide her own native culture into wider activities in the international perspective, for Hinduism has here-to-fore remained self-sustained mainly on Indian soil.

There is the imprint of Hindu influence on parts of Asia, which includes Indonesia, Sumatra, Java. Since the Second World War, Asian nationalism has spread all over Asian countries such as Burma, Ceylon, Thailand, China and the Malay States. For India to be not simply India but the whole of Asia, she has to re-learn Hindu universalism and deliver it to the other Asian countries on which Buddhistic influence is imprinted. The message of the Buddha, thus, must be a

3. Mahadev Desai, *With Gandhiji in Ceylon*, p. 129.

message not only for India, but also for the whole world. Whenever Indian statesmen talk on the cultural issues in foregin countries they emphasize and refer to Buddhism as a universal religion, providing a common platform to people of all Buddhist countries. It is, in effect, an extension of Hindu culture, which is capable of embracing all a pects of religion. Efforts are also made to draw up a comprehensive issue to understand the people of different countries, keeping in a view the universal perspective based on Buddhistic or quasi-Hinduistic ideas.

In terms of sex ratio all of these religions in India have a more masculine sex ratio in general. In particular the Sikh sex ratio is heavily masculine, while Hindus, Muslims and Christians are proportioned in sex ratio. Jains and Buddhists have a more masculine sex ratio, while Zoroastrians are balanced in the number of men and women. In the world perspective the Jews sex ratio appears masculine, but well-balanced in India.

The reasons for this proportion of sex ratio in such religions as Sikhism and Jainism are not clearly known. In the case of Buddism it might be added that Buddhism is not as yet a religion deeply rooted in the family and that it is a new special movement in an attempt to pursue the betterment of life, which requires the socio-political approach towards the social organizations in modern India. All these social contacts and activities are to be carried out through men's authorities. Therefore, Buddhist's efforts in modern India are to promote human unity among the low people and to bring them into self-reliance. The Buddhist movement today plays an important role in

the field of social evolution rather than in the gospel of faith.

Hindu Philosophy and Ecclesia.

Hinduism in the course of its history has had innumerable schools. Nevertheless, there are few ecclesiastical institutions in modern Hinduism in India. There is no other system of religion which prevailed deeply among the masses without the ecclesiastical churches and the religious association membership.

In ancient India there was a religious community or *Gaṇa* of *Parivrājakas* in the six century B. C., which had a religious leader (*satthā*). Sociologically speaking, Buddhism formed a sect in the *Parivrājaka* community. Jainism also gives us a view of the early organization of the Order, although materials are not satisfactory, According to Jacobi, *Gaṇa* means a school which is derived from one teacher.[4]

This universalistic character of the religious community is exemplified in the last word of the Buddha. The Buddha repudiates the heritage of his teaching in the Buddhist Saṅgha. His words run counter to the universalistic feature of Saṅgha. The Buddha says: "Be ye islands unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge to yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the truth as an island. Hold fast as a refuge to the truth. Look not for refuge to anyone besides yourselves, (*atta-dīpā viharatha anaññasarṇā atta-saraṇā, dhamā-dīpā dhamma-saraṇā-ānaññ a-saraṇā.*)

Thus, the notion of the paramount authority of a leader or *gaṇadhara* was unfamiliar to the constitution of a Buddhist Saṅgha.

4. Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras*, S. B. E., pt. 1, p. 288, footnote 2.

In early times there revived powerful monarchies and small tribal republics with rulers. However, these republics were ruled by an assembly, collective legislation and democratic voting. Under Buddhist influence, Buddhist bhikkhus escaped from these republics to participate in Buddhist Saṅgha. Even after the death of the Buddha all of these bhikkhus recruited from these tribal republics exercised this republican idea of self-government. K. P. Jayaswal holds a view that the Buddhist Saṅgha was copied out from the political Saṅgha, the republic, in its constitution.[5]

Sukumar Dutta points out to this effect the *Mahaparinibbāna Suttanta*,[6] where the Buddha holds up to his bhikkhus as example to be followed the "full and frequent assemblies" (*abhiṇham sannipātā sannipātā-bahulā*) by which the Vajji tribe governs itself.[7] Thus, a primitive Saṅgha in the Buddha's period represents a republican colony of Buddhist bhikkhus who formed a system of self-government. Each qualified member had an equal right of membership in it.

Behind Saṅgha lies a universalistic tenet or a conception of Enlightenment of the individual. Buddhist Saṅgha or ecclesiology is strongly influenced by inner spirituality. It is more than a sociological community.

In the course of time, however, the Saṅgha took an aristocratic form in the Theravāda school, and a hierarchical polity in the Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Each Saṅgha presented a picture of a completely universalistic society of monks and it allowed to every-

5. K. P. Jayaswal, *Hindu Polity*, p. 103, 1934.

6. *Dīgha Nikāya*, Vol. I, London : PTS. 1903, p. 76.

7. S. Dutta, *Early Buddhist Monarchism*, Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1960, p. 120.

one the freedom to know, to argue and to speak according to one's own conscience (*atta-dīpā*). This supreme freedom of thought opens the door for all kinds of heretical views. It is a characteristic not only of Buddhism, but also of the whole trend of Hinduistic culture.

As far as one holds fast to this freedom of thought as a tenet of Buddha's preaching, there should be no need to organize a social and institutional body in a direct contact with the wordly human society.

It is said that in Kashmir the Buddhist temple was still powerful in the 7th century during the reign of Durlabhavardhana, though Shaivism was increasing.[8] The decline of the Buddhist ecclesiastical community in India had its beginning in the eighth century. Buddhism is in its essence homogenous with Hinduism. The homogeneity of both religions hastened the assimilation and adoptation of Buddhism into Hinduism. The decline of the Buddhist community in West India was hastened by the Arab conquest of India in 712 A. D. At the time of decline Tantrism had been developed in India. Buddhism and Tantrism had many features common to both. For instance, the object of Hindu Tantrism is mundane enjoyments, rewards for moral actions and deliverance, by prayer and worshipping Durgā (the Shakti of Shiva) through *mantra* and meditation. The worship of Shakti stands for the meditation for *prajñā* (the highest knowledge) in the Mahāyāna Buddhism. The development of Tantrism in India shows the assimilation of Buddhism. Later on, the Buddhist tantrism was transferred into

8. Kalhaṇa's *Rājaratarangiṇī*, IV, 3, ff. 80. A History of Kāshmir written in A. D. 1100, the date presumed by G. Sastri, A. D. 1148 by Macdonell.

Tibet, becoming Lamaism, while the Buddhist tantrism in India was completely adopted by Hinduism.

The development of Tantrism in India is analogous to the rise of the *Honji Sui-Jaku* (the Buddhist assimilation of Shintoism) theory in the Heian Period in Japan, which gave rise to the *Ryōbu Shinto* in the latter part of the 13th century A. D. According to *Rhbu Shinto* (the Double Aspect Shinto) Buddhist pantheons represent the indestructible parts of the Shinto gods, while the latter are incarnations or manifestations of the former. The noumenon is termed *Honji*, while the incarnation is termed *Shuijaku* (the descendent). Moreover, *Ryōbushinto* is the acquisition of wealth, health and deliverance through magical prayer. It has multitude of Buddhist Trantric elements.

These assimilations have taken the shape of Tantrism in common. In India the homogenity of Hindusism and Buddhism certainly was one of the reasons for the decline of Buddhist ecclesiology, forming Hindu-Buddhistic Tantrism. In Japan the assimilation has resulted in Buddhist-Shintoistic Tantrism. The Hindu attitude towards life is based on the Indian concepttion (*avatāra*), or the identification of this world with the divine. It is represented in Buddhism by the the identification of *saṁsāra* (the worldly life) with *nirvāṇa* (the super-worldly life).

Hindus as a whole are Vishṇu worshippers and its believers. The Vishṇu cult emphasizes philosophically the principle of preservation as the only reality. It maintains that nothing is destroyed. Destruction symbolized by Shiva and creation symbolized by Brahmā are simply changes of forms. According to Brahmanism

the reality of the world is industructible. The deity in the character of preservation is the most lovable of all Hindu deities. Hindus consider Vishṇu as a deity full of forgiveness and tender thoughts towards his followers.

Vishṇu assumed various forms (*avatāra*) to destroy evil and left his celestial abode for other worlds to establish righteousness. This idea accounts for the contemporary situation of Hindu temples in which the God and its incarnation alone are enshrined but not family members. Hindu temples are merely agencies of worship in India today.

The *avatāras* of Vishṇu are considered to be ten : Matsya or a fish, Kūrma or a tortoise, Varāha or a boar, Narasiṁha or a man-lion, Vāmana or a dwarf, Paraśurāma, Rāmchandra, Krishṇa, Buddha and Kalki. Of these the first five are said to have been born in a world other than ours ; in the next four Vishṇu lived on earth as man ; and the last is yet to come at the end of the world.

The *avatāra* comes as the manifesetation of the divine nature in the human world, irrespective of period and race. The human world may, in its turn, mould its principle in a way that the divine nature transfigures itself into the human world.

In other words, Hinduism assumes a view that we are all living in this world manifested by Vishṇu. Sin can never touch it ; we are divine essentially. Everything in this world has its own significance of existence, and different views are nothing but different roads suitable to different peoples.

In India there was from time immemorial this idea of unity that the divine is One but the forms are

various. Hence, the reality exists behind all the diversities of forms. The different religions are nothing but different stages of the Absolute. There is no need to distinguish Hinduism from other religions, establishing distinctive religious bodies or ecclesiastical organization. The Absolute is immanent and resident in nature, intra-cosmic. The purpose of Hinduism, in a sociological view, is not to create its own "holy community" separated from this real world, but to intensify or transform this human society into the divine. There is no need of intermediator like Saṅgha or Ecclesia between the divine and the human society.

Hinduism is in its essence non-dualism. Nevertheless, non-dualism admits an empirical reality of the human world, considering it as a world under the spell of ignorance (*avidyā*) to be transformed into the divine. It would be obvious when we realize that all Hindu philosophers prescribe moral disciplines including social obligations.

In modern India the Brahma Samāj, the Ārya Samāj and the Rāmakrishna—Vivekananda movement have been emphasizing social service in various forms, having thereby left Hindu temples simply agencies of worship. Hinduism is based upon the archetypes. We must lay stress on the importance of a social element in behaviours of the Indian masses.

An irrational expression such as thc identity of *Ātman* and *Brahman* or the identification of *Saṁsāra* with *Nirvāṇa* is subject to a premordial psychological experein-ce. Hindus believe that Hinduism is not only a religion of a certain race, but also a universal philosophy common to all Indian people. This belief is the hidden

deep-seated sanctuary of Hindus in India today. This conviction does not belong to a personal religious awareness, but to collective unconsious or what is termed the archetypes. From a psychological point of view, Hinduism is analogous to the Shinto cult submerged deeply in the mind of the Japanese people today.

It is true that Shinto is different from Hiduism in the conception of god. The Hindu concept of god is as a symbol of philosophical principle as Brahman is a symbol of creation, Shiva as destruction and Vishṇu as preservation etc. In contrast, Shinto God (*Kami*) is a man-god. Man is deified. The Emperor in Shrine Shinto and the founders of new Shinto sects (*Shūha-Shinto*) are respected as man-god.

As far as the national racial consciousness is concerned, however, we can find some similarities between Hinduism and Shintoism. Shrine Shinto is in Japan supported by a strong communal conciousness. The communal consciouness does not represent itself as sectarianism, but as a spirit inherent to the Japanese native. This inherent spirit is of tolerance, and takes effect in synchronisation with Buddhism and other foreign religions. This inherent spirit or the collective unconscious consists of two psychological elements : a dark facet, and a light facet. This polarity in spirit gives rise to a danger, for when this spirit is set into motion one can restrain the process of action from going into extremes. The history of Japan shows us ample examples : World War II, pro-Americanism, anti-Americnism, ultra-revivalism, Communism and so forth. We can say that the mass movement in Japan today initiates more or less the archetypes or the collective unconcious unaffected by the passage of time.

Nevertheless, the value of the archetypes or collective unconscious must not be overlooked. Getting out of control and going to the extremes will result in danger. But it functions as a protector of the country. History shows a number of examples : the 200 years' isolation in the Tokugawa period, which affected the revival and popularization of native cultures among the peasants through all parts of Japan ; the contemporary cultural revivalism which stimulates reflection upon ancient Japanese culture.

The polarity of Japanese archetypes, as stated above, constitutes a danger, when it is set into motion without control. Nevertheless, Shinto does not describe any means by which polarity can be overcome and brought into unity. Shinto emphasizes purity, casting off impurity. As far as Shintoism is concerned with one side of reality, namely, affirmation, it falls into one extreme, for it cannot include the other side of reality, namely negation. Both concepts, affirmation and negation, constitue totality, as it is.

In order to avoid the inevitable process of the Shintoist spirit, the Japanese people must retain a consciousness of reality, and recognize things as totality from two aspects : affirmative and negative. This philosophical attitude towards reality alone may overcome the polarity of the Shintoist spirit. With the inception of Buddhism in the 6th century A. D., they began to think of reality from these two aspects. Since then, a concept of 'mutuality' (Jap. *Wa*) has come to be the moral code for them. The attitude of *Wa* is by no means an exclusion of negation ; instead, the synthesis of affirmation and negation. Psychologically speaking, it is tranquility in the unsteadiness of the world. Hinduism

is also of the archetypes similar to Shintoism in a way that it is an unshakable element deeply rooted in the Indian mind, conveying to the people the numinous energy.

The polarity of Indian archetypes possesses, like that of the Japanese, a possibility of danger. But unlike the Japanese the Indian people are essentially philosophically minded. Therefore they can overcome radical actions with an idea of *ahiṁsā*. They express their philosophy by the two concepts, *ahiṁsā* (non-violence) in a negative form, and the middleway (*madhyā-pratipad*) in a positive form. The former is the cardinal virtue of Indian humanity, and it has been called the keystone of Indian morals. The latter means a conviction that things are compromised through mediation between the disputants. The middle way is realized in an attitude of indifference or non-attachment. In other words, man accepts facts of life for whatever they may be, with indifference or non-attachment. Man is in the impurity of the world, but not of it. India unashamedly affirms to the world a policy of the middle way with respect to this or any other decision made by the international disputants.

The polarity of the archetypes in Japan leads one often to extremes of action. On the other side the polarity in India leads to extremes of logic. In terms of logic the modern Western logic has been neglected in India. The Indian can work merely with generalization and abstraction, removing ones thereby from the actual understanding of reality, which seems to be only valid. Namely, they go to extremes from generalization to abstraction. There cannot be found a consequent, logical process in between.

The Indian polarity of logic can find its application in religon. Hindus believe that truth is manifested in various forms and that everyone has an equal right in participation in it. This denotes one extreme of truth, that is, generalization or popularization.

Hindus also hold a view that Gods and Goddesses are merely symbols of philosophical, abstract principles. Symbols, myths and rites convey to the whole group of Indians the numinous energy. These elements form direct and fundamental data of the individual religious life. This shows us another extreme of truth, that is, abstraction.

Thus, there is no need of ecclesiastical organizations which provide a medium between generalization and abstraction by and through a logical explanation.

The archetypes in India and Japan formulate symbols, myths and rituals. The sphere of the collective unconscious calls forth, by its archetypes, the mythical, symbolical and ritual aspect of religion. In Japan the Shinto Shrine is a symbol of the abode of an ancestor, and a place where the symbolic ritual is observed. Moreover, Shintoism neglects an essential aspect of the religious life, what is expressed in the word *nirvāṇa*) Enlightenment. Hence, Shintoism does not have the activities of Saṅgha.

It is the same with Hinduism. Hindus in India are divided among themselves between those who prefer the emphasis on Hindu Universalism and those who are interested merely in religious rites. The former is found among the intellectuals, while the latter among people in the rural areas. In either case Hinduism does not need any form of ecclesiastical organization or Saṅgha.

Hinduism, as contrasted to Shintoism, is not content with symbols or rites. Hinduism, in its essence is concerned with Enlightenment. However, Hindu mentality acknowledges only one thing in man and Brahman to which devotion should be absolute. To the Hindu, Brahman is as immediate and therefore as directly experienced as a part of the world and of one's self as is anything which is born and dies. For this reason there is no need of any intermediator or medium like churches or Saṅgha between Brahman and man.

Hinduism is a particular religion which is founded neither by founders nor by prophets. This is one of the characteristics of Hinduism, and also an importaut element to distinguish Hindu groups from ecclesiastically established organizations.

Regarding religious organization, scholars presented various views. For example, Joachim Wach examined, from the typological point of view, the general nature of religious authority. According to his view, religious leaders have an extraordinary power called Charisma, and Wach tried to categorize religious authority upon an examination of the existence and quantity of the Charisma. He noted further that only the founder became the object of the cult when he divided the religious leaders into founders, reformers, prophets and heads of schools.

None of these categories, however, can be applied to the structure of Hindu group. Hinduism has in its essence the two important elements. First, it has a religious element. Secondly, it has a racial nationalistic element. This trend of Hindu thought goes back to the ancient thought of India.

In ancient India, Hindu thought meant *Ārya Dharma*, It implies the law of an inner being such as righteousness, duty, responsibility, truth, moral code and so forth. *Ārya Dharma* includes all the philosophies and faiths orginated in India. Nehru quotes in his book Gandhi's statement.[9] Gandhi defined Hinduism, saying : "If I were asked to define the Hindu creed, I should simply say : Search after truth through non-violent means. A man may not believe in God and still call himself a Hindu. Hinduism is a relentless pursuit after truth...Hinduism is the religion of truth. Truth is God. Denial of God we have known. Denial of truth we have not known."

Thus, Hinduism is a religion by faith as well as a racial nationalism by culture. In much the same way the word 'Hindu' itself exemplifies the characteristics of Hinduism. The meaning of 'Hindu' is described as follows.

The word 'Hindu' came clearly from 'Sindhu'. 'Sindhu' in its turn was tranformed into Hindustani, Hindu, In dus and India. Nehru presumes that 'Hindu' is not referred to in ancient Indian literature ; it is said that 'Hindu' is found in a Tantric work of the eight century A. D., where it implies a people and not the devotees of a particular religion.[10] It is interesting to mention here that the noted Chinese piligrim I-tshing, who travelled to India in the seventh century A. D., refers to 'Hsin-tu' in Chinese, which preferably stands for 'Sindhu' rather than 'Hindu'. Meanwhile, 'Hindu' comes into general circulation in the later period.

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9. J. Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, London : Meridian Books Ltd., 1951, p. 59.

10. Ibid.

The modern Indian people use a concept of Hinduism in distinction from other faiths. In much the same way they intend to use it as a term meaning the Indian culture in general. In this context I should like to refer to the Indian attitude towards Buddhism, which is different from Hinduism by faith and similar to Hinduism by culture.

Buddhism has grown up on Indian soil with the background of Indian culture. Indian culture can be traced back to 2,000 B. C. ; or as far as the literary source is concerned. It has through the ages enriched itself by contact with extraneous influences and evolution. In terms of faith Buddhism is certainly distinguished from a particular Hinduism or even from the Vedic *Dharma*. However, in terms of Indian culture Buddhism is considered as an integral part of Hinduism. Even the students of the High School believe that Buddhism is a sect of Hinduism. I payed once a visit to a public High School in the Mehrauli district around New Dehli in 1964. At the centre of the campus there was erected a stone pillar decorated with various ornaments and coloured *langoli*. On the center of pillar the Buddha image was painted, but not any image of Indian deities at all. Usually almost all of the images in India are Indian deities or the ornaments related to the Hindu mythology. Morever, the students of that school told me that Hinduism was a term used for the native Indian, while Buddhism was a term used for the people of other countries. Both are synonymous. This view represents the most popular opinion in modern India. At least they wish to have it so.

To the masses there is no distinction between religion and culture. The intellectuals, however, do

not want to use 'Hinduism' for Indian culture. They realize the historical development of faith and the tenet of Indian philosophies. In the ancient period the old faith and philosophy are concerned with a way of life and the world view. Hence, it was greatly synonymous with Indian culture proper. But when a particular religion developed with ingeneous rites and observances, it became something religious, less cultural.

In terms of cultural assimilation, there has been a great distinction between India and Japan. All of the cultures and beliefs originated in India are, they believe, included in Hinduism. It was Hinduism that assimilated and adopted various cultures homogeneous and heterogeneous. The Indian native culture has succeeded in embracing the foreign cultures and faith, and not vice versa. This conviction prevails among the Indian people from the highest to the lowest.

However, the cultural situation in Japan was opposed to the Indian. In Japan the heterogeneous culture, namely, Buddhism, entirely assimilated the native culture Shinto. Buddhism orginated in India left the native culture (Shinto) modified or remaining as it was. Shinto is what is known as Deism. The ancient Japanese believed in nature deities, deified a personality of the Emperor, in the moral order of the universe, and in homage to be duly paid to the deities. There was no philosophy and no awareness of negation. Optimism coloured the age. Buddhism brought a new culture, which taught a negative, pessimistic side of life to understand life as a whole. The emphasis on the negation of life was quite unfamiliar and heterogeneous to the ancient Japanese cult. They learned from Buddhism the human powers rather than

the divine power with which they lived. Buddhism left them to their own devices, giving them self-reliance.

In order to celebrate the Buddhist ideal, and to translate it into achieved Japanese life, Buddhism had to organize institutions and exert influence on public affairs. Thus, a political reformation as well as a Buddhistic spiritual innovation took place under the patronage of Prince Shōtoku. Buddhism encouraged them to follow the Buddhist faith. Prince Shōtoku established a monastery Hōryūji temple and other social welfare centers throughout the country. Especially pious was the Emperor Shōmu (701-756), who erected a temple in each province, so that Buddhism might be diffused throughout Japan. Since then, Buddhist monarchism and ecclesia blossomed forth.

This Buddistic Ecclesia is amalgamated with a native character of the Japanese masses, namely, 'collective consciousness. They have a tendency to seek for an authority, to find in it the fundamental power to control them. They lay stress on rules and organizations instead of an inspiration, and tend to regard founders as man-god. For this reason they attempt to institutionalize religious movements and even small religious groups with the 'collective consciousness.'

In contrast, the Indian people are through the ages convinced of the universality of truth (*Dharma*). To them the concept of God is equivalent to the truth from which Indian deities have transfigured themselves in this human world. Therefore, they do not regard such heroes and reformers as Shankara, Gandhi and Tilak as men-gods or controller. These heroes are found simply in their memorial tombs, and not

enshrined in any form as founders of particular denominations. As Hinduism teaches reference to the truth, it cannot but support all the religions. Consequently a Hindu does not believe in or persuade conversion. As far as Buddhism retains Hindu homogeneity, it does not have to ditstinguish itself from Hinduism. This may be one of the reasons for the amalgamation of Buddhism with Hinduism in India today.

To sum up, we have so far discussed several reasons why Hinduism has not organized ecclesiastical orders.[11] We have considered four important reasons : (1) Hindu universality, (2) *avatāra* idea, (3) The archetypes of Hindus and (4) No-founder of Hinduism. The multitude of religious *cum* cultural movements in modern India are going on with the basis of Hindu universalism and non-sectarianism in a wide perspective. The success of cultural assimilation has brought about a development which cuts across the distinctions of tradition even among the native cultures—namely, the rise of new approches to Hinduism, unknown to past generations.

11. A group of Hindu priests are substantially mendicant friars, supported by offerings and contributions from the villagers or a group of casual followers. In some remote villages there can be found instances in which agricultural land is allotted to the temples, the produce from which goes to the priests. (A. B. Bose and S. P. Malhotra, "Anthropo-Geographical Study of the Settlement Pattern of a Desert Village", *Man in India*, Vol. 43, 3, 1963, p. 237.). This village Core, located around Village Korna (located about 36 miles south-west of Jodhpur Shergarh road), gives us some references to the caste distinction among the supporters of the temples. According to Bose's report, there are numerous shrines in the village. These temples, responsive to the prayers of villagers for granting relief from specific ailments, are supported by village prayers on such appropriate occasions as rites and ceremonies. But there are some shrines where prayers are offered only by the upper castes (Ibid). In other words, there is caste-discrimination even among the temples. But all of these offerings are served on casual occasions, as they are unable to organize ecclesia system.

THE FEUDAL TEAM "AVALAGĀ" OR "OLAGĀ"

DASHARATHA SHARMA

Perhaps no Indian feudal term has enjoyed greater currency and shown more vitality than "avalagā" or "olagā". It has been found used in Kannaḍa, Marāṭhī, Sanskrit, Gujarātī and Rājasthānī and is current even now though at times in a modified sense. J. Bucher's *Kannada-English Dictionary,* which is based on F. Kittel's well-known lexicon of the same name, gives the following forms and senses of the word :—

(a) *Ōlagā*—Service, homage, an assembly, an audience, hall, a darbar.

(b) *Ōlaga*—To hold a public levee, to pay homage.

(e) *Ōlaga*—śāle—A hall of audience.

(d) *Ōlagāgu*—To get into the power of, to submit himself, to be subject, to incur.

Thus the feudal affiliation of the word in Kannaḍa is obvious enough, and that this affiliation is neither confined to this language nor is anything new can be shown on the basis of fairly old epigraphic as well as literary evidence.

Of inscriptions the earliest to use the word is Dūdhapānī (Hazārībagh District, Bihār) Inscription of about the eigth centruy A. D.[1] We are told that the king, Ādisiṁha of Magadha, on reaching the forest skirting the villages of Bhramaraśālmalī, Chhingalā and

1. *EI.*, II, pp. 345 ff.

Nabhūtiṣaṇḍaka, all of which belonged to him, sent for the villagers and ordered them to render immediately the *avalagaka* or *avalagana* due from them[2]. As this *avalagana* was performed on their behalf by a rich merchant named Udayamāna who happened to be staying at the time in the village Bhramaraśālmalī with his brothers, its residents made Udayamāna their chief with the king's consent. Next, at the request of the residents of the other two villages, Udayamāna put Nabhūtiṣaṇḍaka and Chhingalā respectively under his younger brothers, Dhautamāna, Ajitamāna, stipulating, however, that these two villages were to recognise the supremacy of Bhramaraśālmalī.[3]

Obviously, the entire set-up of these localities was of a feudal character. There was a feudal over lord to whom *avalagana* was due ; and if instead of the villagers themselves someone else performed this feudal duty, he became entitled to certain privileges, perhaps even to the ownership of the land held on the condition that the *avalagana* would be rendered duly and regularly. It was thus that the rich merchant Udayamāna, though an outsider, came into feudal relationship with Ādisiṁha and gained the lordship of the three villages of Bhramaraśālmalī, Nabhūtiṣaṇḍaka and Chhingalā, of which the latter two he passed on to the sub-feudatories, his own younger brothers, Dhautamāna and Ajitamāna.

The general sense of *avalagana* in the epigraph is clear enough. But as it is no common Sanskrit word, the writers who have so far dealt with the Dūdhapānī Inscription have offered more than one explanation. According to Kielhorn, it probably meant presents or

2. Ibid., verses 13-14.

3. verses 20-23.

supplies.[4] Shri R. K. Chaudhary is disposed to regard it as an instance of "miscellaneous contributions" from the villagers about which we read in the *Arthaśāstra* and the *Smṛtis*.[5] Actually, however, it should (if we keep in view its significance both in the Kannaḍa language and the Dūdhapānī Inscription) mean some sort of personal and perhaps even military service due to the feudal overlord. It has either to be performed by the *avalagaka* himself or by someone else for a consideration. And this consideration, the price paid, could sometimes be heavy, for it could, as in the case of the three villages referred to above, mean the transfer of the ownership of the land held on that basis to the actual *avalagaka*[6] and the reduction of the peasants, unwilling to leave their hearths and homes for *avalagā*, to the position of the new lord's ryots.

In that very century, to which historians assign the Dūdhapānī Inscription, we find the use of the term *ōlagā* in two well-known Prakrit works of Western India, the *Samarāichchakahā* of Haribhadra Sūri and the *Kuvalayamālākathā* of Uddyotana Sūri. Of these the latter, which was composed at Jālor in 778 A. D., describes an "old Thakkura"[7] named Kṣetrabhaṭa, who though a scion of an earlier royal family, had lost all his property and begun the *avalagā* of the ruler of Ujjayinī. In return for it he received the village where he resided and which probably had been his ancestral possession at one time. Later on when the old Ṭhakkura "whose limbs bore the marks of wounds inflicted by the swords

4. *EI.*, II, pp. 343 ff.

5. *JIH.*, XXXVII, p. 302.

6. *i. e.*, one who performs the duty of *avalagana*.

7. *Juṇṇa-Ṭhakkuro*.

of opposing warriors in hundreds of battles" lost the needed strength to put in active service, he put his son, Vīrabhaṭa, in his master's service and began leading a retired life in the village granted to him.[8]

In this case *avalagā* or *ōlagā* appears to have taken the form of personal and military feudal service. In lieu of his service the Ṭhakkura received from his overlord a village which, as suggested above, might once have been his ancestral property and with which he had to part earlier in his life on account of his poverty. His assignment, if we might so call it, was hereditary, because in his old age he passed it on to his son. In the *Samrāichchakahā* we have the forms *olugga* (pp. 499 and 504) and *olagga* (p. 639)[9].

Olage finds a place in the early Mahārāṣṭrī work, the *Jñāneśvarī*, though perhaps only in the general sense of personal service. But we have the sense of feudal service in the *Bharateśvara-Bāhubali-rāsa* of Śālibhadra Sūri (composed in the last quarter of the twelfth century). Asked why he had not gone to attend the coronation ceremony of his elder brother, Bharata, the younger brother, Bāhubali replied, "Let him not wait for my *avalagā*. Let the noble Bharateśvara not feel uneasy on that account, for there are no differences between me and my brother, whatever the mischief-makers might

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8. *Kuvalayamālākahā*, Singhi Jain Granthamālā, p. 50,11.21-7.

9. See the *ASB* edition. For the details of feudal service in the *Samarāichchakahā* read the present writer's paper on "Some Fedual Elements in Ancient Indian Polity" published in the *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, 1961.

say."[10] But that *oḷaga* (probably personal attendance and homage) was expected even from a younger brother and great could be the reward for it can be seen from the Imperial messenger's exhortation, "Do not delay. Go and see your brother at once.....Believe me when I say that Bharateśvara is a giver of elephants and horses of very good breed. He gives villages, cities, towns and ports ; he makes one the permanent ruler of extensive tracts of land. While giving he does not make distinctions by saying that a certain gift can be given and the other one not. Nor does he ignore the claims of relationship. (On the other hand), if he finds that achief is not doing *olaga* through pride he gets angry and destryos him. He protects one who seeks refuge with him. Not for a *ghaṭikā* (24 minutes) does he make a suppliant wait."[11]

The *Kānhaḍadeprabandha* (composed 1385 A. D.) uses the word "*ulagai*" when speaking of the service put in by Kānhaḍadeva's nobles. "Brave and warlike Solankīs, Baghelās, Rāṭhors, Chāvaḍās, Hūṇas, Paramāras, Guhilas, Yādavas and members of the other thirty-six Rājpūt clans served and attended on Kānhaḍade and received in return subsistence-money and villages which they enjoyed. They had from him costly garments, the best of weapons and armour and delicious food."[12]

10-11. D. Ojha and D. Sharma, (Ed.),*Rāsa aur Rāsānyavī kāvya,* Nagari Pracharini Sabha, Banaras, vv. 89-94. Attention may be drawn also to Jineśvara Sūri's *Kathakośa,* where Bharata is represented as asking his brothers either to *serve* him or to give up their kingdoms (p. 53, Singhī Jain Granthamālā edition).

12. Canto IV. 43-51. See also our paper, "Life in Rājasthān in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth centuries", *JIH,* XXXIII, pp. 105-107.

It would be wrong to see everything of even the military aspect of feudalism in these descriptions ; but a general resemblance to it would be hard to deny. The *olangiās*, as such performers of *avalagā* have been called in the *Payāḍā Nihāl-de-Sultān*, were very much like the feudal followers of a European lord, who not only attended on him but also rendered military service, as and when necessary, and received in return board, lodging, equipment and land to maintain the dignity of their status.[13] In another popular poem, *Dḥolā Mārūrā Dūhā* the hero speaks of rendering *ulaga* in the land of Īḍar and sending from there ornaments to his wife, the princess from Mālwā.[14] In *Vīramade rī Bhāvan* we read of chiefs performing *ulaga* at the court of Alāuddīn and of the Sultān's promise that he would bestow Malwa 52 lacs, Gujarat 13 lacs, and Marwar 9 *kotis* on Vīramade Sonigarā if he attended his court.[15] Obviously, *olaga* at the court of powerful and munificent ruler could be a highly paying proposition.

In the old Gujarati poem, the *Virāṭaparva* of Śālisūri (composed before 1421 A. D.) *olaga* takes the form of military service and makes a coward wail, "O Fate, what foolish ideas did you give me ? Why did I take up this *olaga* ? In my house I have a milch buffalo and a wife with tremulous eyes. Today my wife is going to be a widow. Today the Kaurava family is going to ruin me."[16]

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13. See our note on the word *olangiā* in the *Marubhāratī*, VIII, Part 1, p. 132 and the article referred to in the last note.

14. vv. 224-225.

15. *Rājasthān-Bhāratī*, VI, Parts 3-4, p. 102, vv. 3-4.

16. *Gurjararasāvalī*, G. O. S., p. 61, vv. 66-67.

In the decadent days of Indian Feudalism, *avalagā* appears to have assumed a form not very flattering to Rājpūt character, forms more characteristic of a luxury-loving and effect than a vigorous and martial people, eager to inspire the community with their character and high ideals. The *Vividha-varṇaka-samuchchaya*, a Gujarātī work of the sixteenth century, for instance, tells us[17] that subordinate princes, overawed by their lord's prowess, waited on him (*uḷagai*) with mirrors in their hands, shaved off their moustaches to serve him in the guise of women, looked after his kitchen-garden, hewed wood for him and tried to please him by playing buffoonish parts.[18] There must be a good deal of exaggeration in this account. But that it could be served out to poets and writers as a model description of a great ruler, waited on by his feudatories and vanquished princes, is in itself proof enough of some truth in it.

Equally interesting is the description of *avalagā* of later days in the *Sabhāśṛṅgāra* (c. sixteenth century).[19] It speaks of the overlord's orders carried out by the Lord of Pāñchāla, of presents given by the Lord of the Himālayas, of *ulaga* rendered every night by the lord of Kachchha-*deśa*, and of *ulaga* by others too, the objective of all these being to please the overlord, not as of yore by putting in doughty military service but by what can, in many cases, be styled sycophancy and flunkeyism.

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17. p. 67. A similar description elsewhere in the same book speaks of the god's *uḷaga* at Rāvaṇa's court. The same description is given also in its Sanskrit form on p. 164 under the caption, *varṇyavastuvarṇanavidhi*.

18. *Kei gaḍhurā chālai loṭai lilaiṁ oḷagai.*

19. The *MS.* a copy of some older *MS.* is dated in V. 1675.

The last few instances of *olaga* that we propose to quote come not from conventional descriptions of court life but from folk songs. The first one of these is sung by Rājasthānī women when they worship Gaurī in the month of Chaitra.[20] And here we breathe again the fresh air of Rājpūt chivalry and early *olaga*. The worshippers, the song tells us, reach the door of Śiva and Gaurī and tell them that their *olagiās* stand outside eager to wait on them. Śiva responds by saying, "Give *olaga* to my *olagias*."[21] Give them lion-seats to sit on. We shall give the *olagiās* dominion over the fort of Tilaḍī and half of Mālwā." After that Gaurī opens the door and while the famaic devotees ask for *anna* and *dhānya*, the men ask, as naturally they should, for horses.

Having their husbands sent for *avalagā* to the courts of the overlord must have been distasteful to youthful ladies. A lady, for instance, is represented as requesting her husband to send the father-in-law for *avalagā* at least that time.[22] Or if this could not be done why should not he persuade the elder brother to go? Another youthful wife, finding no other way, writes to the queen of Īḍar, requesting her to send back soon her *olagu* Ṭhākur.[23] A *pada* of Mīrā expresses happiness at the return of the *olangiā*.[24] Alāuddīn

20. For its text see *Marubhāratī*, VIII, Pt. 1, p. 116.

21. *Olagiā* is one who does *olaga*. Another form of the word is *olangiā*. The early Hindi poem, the *Pradyumacharita* uses the form *ulagāṇā*.

22. *ab ki olgānai Mārūji susarājī-naiṁ bhej.*

23. *Idargaḍh-ryāṁ rāṇiyāṁ, āpā kali lahiyāha.*
ūṁk ū Thākur olagu, begau moliyāha. | |

24. *Mhārā olagiā ghara āyājī, tanakī tāpa miṭī sukha pāyā.*

Khaljī, we are told in the *Padmāvat*, had 36 lacs of *aurangāṇā sawārs* and 20,000 elephants.[25] All these examples amply attest the feudal duty of an *avalagaka* to be in attendance on his feudal lord.

Bloch regarded *olagā* as a word of Dravidian origin; and his view seems well-founded, if we remember that not only has the term been in continuous use in Kannaḍa[26] for centuries but that it appears in North India perhaps for the first time in the eighth century, with a sense recalling to our minds the Kannaḍa meanings, "homage", audience-hall", and "to submit oneself to". Hemachandra notices it as a *desi* word.[27] Did it then reach Northern India in the wake of some Deceanese raids, of which there were quite a few even before the Rāṣṭrakūṭa invasions of the eighth and ninth centuries ? If it did, we may have to conclude that some of our feudal or quasi-feudal practices originated in India South of the Vindhyas and reaching North India in due course flourished in a soil not uncongenial to their growth.

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25. *Chhatīs lākh auragān asavārā bīs sahas hastī darabārā.*

26. See the *Gurjararāsāvalī*, G. O. S. p. 149.

J. N. Joshi thinks of *olagā* as a word of Kanarese origin (*Proceedings and Transactions of the Seventh All-India Oriental Conference, p. 947*). The word can be derived also from the Sanskrit root *lag* with the prefix *ava*. But if it is an emigrant from the Deccan (which is likely enough) it is sure not to be of Sanskrit origin, even though the Sanskrit word may yield a sense not very different from that in Kannaḍa. In North India its sense appears to have deteriorated steadily, the word in Gujarāt coming ultimately to mean *scavenging*.

27. *Desīnāmamālā*, I. 164.

A FRESH INTERPRETATION OF THE ṚGVEDA II, 12, 3.*

S. N. SHUKLA

Simla-5

0. Object of the paper :

As we know, there are several conflicting and contradictory views regarding the interpretation of the Ṛgveda (ṚV) as a whole, as well as individual words and the verses of the ṚV ; so it becomes obligatory for the students of the ṚV, particularly for those who are actively concerned with the interpretation, to investigate into the argumentations and variations of the views of the exegetists to find out the correct and plausible meaning(s) of those verses and words whose meaning is either uncertain or conjectural or optional, and to see whether those meanings are from an objective point of view sound and valid or open to objection. The verse under consideration also comes under those verses which have been variously interpreted by the exegetists of the ṚV. An attempt has been made in this paper to investigate the various meanings, and to suggest the plausible interpretation of the words and the verse as a whole.

I. 0. Various interpretations-compared :

Before we proceed to give any critical observation, it is desirable to consider all the interpretations rendered on this *ṛk* by oriental (or traditional) as well as occidental

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* यो हत्वाहिमरिणात् सप्तसिन्धून् यो गा उदाजदपधा वलस्य ।
यो अश्मनोरन्तरग्निं जजान संवृक् समत्सु स जनास इन्द्रः ॥

scholars through the ages. The oldest interpretation found yet comes from Durgācārya's *vṛtti* on the *Nirukta* (*Nir*) 8, 2, 2. It runs as follows :—

"तृतियेऽहनि दशरात्रस्य निष्केवल्ये विनियोगः । गृत्समदो ब्रवीति। ऐन्द्रम् रूपमास्थितोऽसुरैर्हन्यमानः किं मा हथ, नाहमिन्द्र इति । कस्तर्हि इन्द्रः ? 'य "हत्वा" 'अहिम्' 'मेघम् 'अरिणात्' 'सप्तसिन्धून्' 'स्यन्दता आकाशनदीः "एला च इला च"— इत्येवमाद्याः 'य' च 'गा': अप 'उदाजत्' उदगमयत् 'अपधा' अपधानेन उद्धाटनेन 'वलस्य' मेघस्य शिराणाम् छिद्राणाम् 'यः' च 'अश्मनोः' अशनवत्योः द्यावापृथिव्योः 'अन्तः' मध्ये 'अग्नि' 'जजान' जनयति 'य' च समत्सु संग्रामेषु शत्रूणां संवृक् सत्रूछेत्ता । 'जनासः' हे असुरजनाः । 'स' इन्द्रः नाहमिन्द्र इति ।"

Veṅkaṭa Mādhava comments as follows :—

"यश्च अहिम् हत्वा निरगमयत् सप्तनदीः यो वा पशून् उदाजत् । अपधा बिलान्तरपिहिता वलस्यासुरस्य यश्च मेघयोः मध्ये अभिघातजं वैद्युतमग्निं जनयति सः छेत्ता संग्रामेषु ।"

Skanda Svāmin explains it in the following way in his commentary on *Nir.* III, 15 :—

गृत्समदाहैन्द्रं रूपमास्थितः। इन्द्रोऽयमिति । मन्यानैरसुरैर्हन्यमानस्तानाह स्मेत्याख्यातम् । मेघम् हत्वा सप्तसिन्धून् व्यत्ययेन पुल्लिङ्गम् । सिन्धुर्नदीः। नदीनां मध्ये या प्रधानभूताः गङ्गाद्याः सप्तनद्यस्ताः प्राधान्यान्निर्दिशिता मन्त्रदृशा । अन्तरिक्षनदीर्वा सप्त अम्बा च अम्बाला चेत्येवमाद्या अरिणात् रिणतिर्गतिकर्मणोऽन्त र्णीतिष्यर्थस्येदं रूपम् । अगमयत् यो वा पशून् उदाजत् उदगमयति इत्यर्थः । अपधा अपेत्येतेषामपेत्येतस्य (अपेत्यदान्मन इत्येतस्य) स्थाने आत्मबोधा निधानेन स्थापनेन मेधमात्मनोऽधो निधाय तावत् पादाभ्यां मृदनाति यावदुदकमस्मि-ञ्जातमित्यर्थः। अवधातेनैव! (अपधानेनैव), बिलोद्धाटनेनैव मेघस्य यश्च अश्मनोरन्तर अश्मेति मेघनाम पर्वतनाम वा, द्यावापृथिव्यौ वा तद् व्यापनयोगात्, अन्तरित्यव्य-यमधिकरणभूतं मध्यमाचष्टे, द्यावापृथिव्यौ वा अत्राधेयवंशयोस्तरुशाखयोर्वा वायुना संघर्षाज्जायते तं दावरूपम् अग्निम् वैद्युतं वा जनयति । सः जनासः, हे असुरजनाः इन्द्रो नाहमिति, सम्यक् छेत्ता हन्ता शत्रूणां संग्रामेषु ।"

Sāyaṇa's commentary on this verse runs as follows :—

"यः अहिं मेघं हत्वा मेघहननं कृत्वा सप्तसर्पणशीलाः सिन्धून् स्यन्दनशीला अपः अरिणात् प्रैरयत् । यद्वा सप्त गंगायमुनाद्या मुख्या नदीररिणात् । 'रीङ्'

1. *Ṛgarthadīpikā* (ed. by L. Sarup, Lahore 1939, vol. III, (Rv. 2,12.3).

प्रस्रवणे। क्र्यादिः। यश्च वलस्य वलनामकस्य असुरस्य अपधा तत्कतृकान्निरोधान्निरुद्धाः गाः उदाजत् निरगमयत् । अपधा अपपूर्वाद्दधातेः आतश्चोपसर्गे (पा० ३,३,१०६) इति भावे अङ् प्रत्ययः । 'सुपाँ सुलुक् 'इति पञ्चम्या आकारः । यः च अश्मनोः अश्नुते व्याप्नोत्यन्तरिक्षम् इत्यश्मा मेघः । अत्यन्तमृदुरुपयोर्मेघयोः अन्तः मध्ये वैद्युतमग्निं जजान उत्पादयामास । यश्च समत्सु संभक्षयन्ति योद्धॄणामायूंषि इति समदः संग्रामाः तेषु संवृक् भवति । वृणक्तेर्हिंसार्थस्य क्विपि रूपम् । सः इन्द्रः नाहमिति ।"

If we observe minutely all these traditional interpretations it will be quite clear that there is very little difference in the totality of their views regarding the meaning of the individual words except those very few which are interpreted optionally in more than one way. On the contrary it may be stated that the subsequent interpreters have followed their predecessors. The alternative interpretations of the words *ahim*, *saptasindhūn*, *gāḥ*, *apadhā*, *valasya* and *aśmanoḥ* make it evident that they (the interpreters) are not sure of their own views regarding the correctness of the interpretations given by them. Here it would not be undesirable to compare the interpretations offered by the occidental scholars.

Among the occidental scholars H. H. Wilson[2] has followed Sāyaṇa ; and T. H. Griffith[3] differs only on the meaning of *aśmanoḥ* which has been rendered by him as 'the earth and the 'sky', and this can be compared with that of SKN's interpretation as '*dyāvāpṛthivyau vā/ tad vyāpan yogāt*. Geldner[4] follows Sāy. but unlike Sāy. he renders *ahim* as 'drachen' (dragon), and he suggests

2. *Rigveda* Translation, Vol. II (Poona, 1925), P. 137f.

3. *Hymns of the Rigveda*, vol. I (Chaukhambha Sans. Ser. Varanasi, 1963), p. 273.

4. K. F. Geldner, *Der Rig-Veda ubersetzt*, vol. I (Cambridge Mass, 1951), p. 990.

the possibility of *apadhā* as *apadhāḥ* against the *padapāṭha*. He cites Oldenberg also who notes that 'durch Aufdeckung des Vala ; Vala bezeichnet sowohl die Berghohle der Paṇis wie den drain hausenden Damon' (by the unclosing of Vala ; vala signifies just the same as the mountaincaves of Paṇi, as being the dwellings of the demons).

Thus the alternative and conjectural meanings given by the traditional as well as historical interpreters open the doors for new enquiries about the meanings of these words as well as the verse itself. Therefore, an extensive investigation into the meaning(s) of these words is desirable.

I. I. ahim variously interpreted :

The word *ahi* occurs frequently in the ṚV. (in all 86 times)[5], and has been variously interpreted by the scholars. Three meanings have been assigned to this word by *Nighaṇṭu*,[6] namely, (i) cloud, (ii) water and (iii) a proper name, but *Nir.*[7] adds one more to it, i. e. 'serpent'. The etymology of this word, given by Yāska is this : '*ahiḥ ayanāt eti antarikṣe, ayam api itaro ahiḥ etasmād eva ; nihrasi topasargaḥ āhantīti*[8]'.

Thus, according to Yāska it may be derived from root *i* or *ay* 'to go' or $i+\bar{a}+han$ (Indo-Europ. angu(h) i — 'serpent'—, Lithu. *angis* 'a snake')[9] ; and thus the root-meaning of *ahi* would be 'one who goes' or 'one who kills' (āhantīti) according to Yāska ; but this ety-

5. See *ṚV. Samhita* vol. V (V. S. M. Poona 4, 1951), p. 92f.
6. *Nighaṇṭu* 1,10,21 ; 1,31 ; 5,4,29.
7. *Nir.* 2,17.
8. Loc. cit.
9. Siddheshwar Varma, *The Etymologies of Yāska* (V. V. R. I. Hoshiarpur, 1953), P. 118.

mology appears to be based on unscientific method of derivation.

Veṅkaṭa Mādhava[10] renders it as *asura* (demon) and *ahantā* (killer) implicitly following Yāska, Sāyaṇa proposes seven meanings of this word, i. e. (1) mid-region, (2) water, (3) cloud, (4) name of Vṛtra. (5) name of Agni, (6) one who kills, and finally (7) a serpent. But all these meanings can be traced back to *Nighaṇṭu* and *Nir*. The modern scholars like Roth, Grassmann, Geldner etc. have followed invariably the meanings proposed by traditional interpreters, which is evident through their respective works.

1.2. *Ahi, Dānu* and *Vṛtra : their relation with Vala :*

Here I would like to propose on equation :

ahi = dānu = vṛtra = vala.

This parallelism is based on the similar statements in the Vedic texts regarding these names. Indra is mentioned as killing *ahi* who was sleeping on the mountain (cf. ṚV. 3,32, II ; 5,306). ṚV. 2,12,11 mentions Indra as killing *dānu* in the same manner (*yo ahim jaghāna/dānum śayānam*—'who has slain *ahi*, the son of Dānu, or Dānu as he lay' (cf. 3,32,11). We find the same statement in ṚV. 6, 72,3, where Indra and Soma smite Vṛtra who is obstructing the waters. Indra-Vṛtra myth is so popular that it does not require any illustration here. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[11] says about Vṛtra etc. that Vṛtra, Ahi, Dānu are the names of only one being variously taken in different contexts :

"स यद् वर्तमानं अभवत् तस्माद् वृत्रो नाम, अथ यद् अपात् समभवत्

10. Op. cit., verse 2,12,3.
11. *ŚB* I. 1,3,4.

तस्मादहिस्तं दनुश्च दनायुश्च मातेव च पितेव च परिजगृहतुः तस्माद् दानव इत्याहुः ।"

In this statement the word *apāt* probably refers to *ahi* as 'serpent'. But nothing can be said with certainity whether *ahi* meant a 'serpent' in the very beginning of the Vedic period ; because in the so called older portion of the ṚV. Saṁhitā there is no clear trace of this meaning. It is only in the later portion where we find this word, though only once, clearly used for 'serpent' ; where '*ahir na jūrṇam ati sarpati tvacaḥ*'[12] (as a serpent he removes his skins) refers to a serpent. This meaning of *ahi* as a 'serpent' must have crept into language on the analogy of creeping streams which was closely related with *ahi*. Now the question arises whether *ahi*, *dānu*, *vṛtra* etc. refer to some living beings or they are just the symbolic expressions of some natural phenomena. It would not be possible here to give a detailed account of the argumentations of the mythologists regarding the identity of these names, but it would not be unwarranted too, to refer to internal evidences of the Veda to have a vivid picture of these names and their connotations in the field of the Vedic interpretation. Indra's battle with Vṛtra, in which the former smites the latter and drives out the streams to flow freely and frequently, is a well known myth in the ṚV.[13] *Ahi* is also related with such contexts. Thus, there appears a complete identity between these two names, and sometimes *ahi* appears only as an epithet of Vṛtra, and except few exceptions (i. e. ṚV. 5,30,6 *ahim ohānam apa āśayānam* ; 7,34,16 *abjām* "born in water" ; 8,3,20 *mahān* "great"—yet Indra blow him away ; 2,12,11 ;

12. ṚV. 9,86,44.
13. ṚV. I. 32,7 ; 80,12 ; 2,26,2 ; 6,13,1 ; 18,6 ; 34,5 etc.

ojāyāmānam "showing his strength") is as a rule left without attribute.[14] Thus it appears that Vṛtra and Ahi denote the same phenomenon. Again, Vṛtra can be identified with *ābhu* which is mentioned in the Nāsadīya Sūkta[15] as covering everything. Nothing was seen except water. This statement probably refers to darkness and clouds which cover everything ; and therefore, Vṛtra and Ahi can be identified with darkness and clouds both.[16] Vṛtra is mentioned as trying to defeat Indra with his thundering uproars and lightening[17], but ultimately Indra defeats him in the battle with his mighty thunderbolt[18]. Here a remarkable statement from *Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa*[19] can be cited where it has been stated that when Indra killed Vṛtra there arose a thundering uproar. Thus this statement of lightening and thundering in relation to Vṛtra explicitly indicates that Vṛtra is the symbolic expression of the clouds and Ahi related to it also stands for the same. The whole symbolism has been woven into a mythological garb.

Another question is related with Dānu. It has been mentioned above that Indra is referred to as the killer of Dānu who was sleeping on the mountain.[20] ŚB. mentions Dānu as the bestower of rains through which grains are made prosperous[21]. This statement clearly,

14. cf. Jan Gonda, *Epithets in the Ṛgveda* ('s-Gravenhage 1959), p. 134.

15. ṚV. 10,129.

16. ṚV. 10,129,3.

17. ṚV. 1,80,12 ; 32,13.

18. ṚV. 1,52, 6.

19. *Tāṇḍ. Br.* 13,4,1.

20. ṚV. 2,12,11.

21. ŚB. 1,1,3,4.

sheds a light on the identity of Dānu with the clouds which cause rain as well as the growth of the grains. In other Indo-Eur. languages also Dānu refers to water and streams.[22]

Thus it can be surmised that the triad of Ahi, Vṛtra and Dānu is connected with the active clouds whom Indra smites with his thunderbolt and drives the water or streams to the fields.

Here a question arises in connection with this triad. Who was the first among all of them to catch the imagination of the Vedic seers, and to take the form of an antogonist of the Gods ? In accordance with the contextual referances Ahi seems to be the first among this triad. Ahi is mentioned as the first—born among the Ahi-race ;[23] and before the commencement of Indra-religion in the Vedic society he was regarded as a deity, which is implicit through the verses of the Ṛv. where *ahirbudhnya* is invoked with *aja-ekapāda.*[24] He was a deity of either the oceanic water or the mid-region, and his name is mentioned solely in the hymns of the *Viśvedevās*. In ṚV. 5,41.16 he is besought not to give his worshippers over to injury, which suggests that there was something hurtful in his nature. This phenomenon was developed in Ahi-Indra-relation later on. Thus it may be surmised that *ahirbudhnya* was not different from *ahivṛtra*, though he is invoked as a divine being

22. Avestan *dānu* 'river', Pahlavi *don* 'river', Ossetic 'don' 'river, etc. See Bartholome, *Altiranisches Woerterbuch* (Berlin, 1261), p. 733f.

23. ṚV. 1,32,3.

24. ṚV. 10,66,11.

who resembles with *Apām Napāt*, his baleful aspect only hinted at.[25]

Ahi may be identified with Azi-Dahak, an antogonist to the old Iranian culture in Khotanese region. He has been referred to in the Avesta also, where Yima, the son of Kərəsāspa, smites him who is 'three jawed, three headed, six eyes etc.[26] certainly he was the antagonist of Ahura-Mazda-religion in the early period of Iranian culture[27], but later on it was developed into a mythic personality. The same Iranian *azi* or Vedic *ahi* continued to be the antogonist of Indra-religion also in Vedic India, and was easily connected with Vṛtra, and later on the myth developed with Vala also.

After considering the mutual relation of the above triad, namely Ahi, Vṛtra and Dānu, now attention may be drawn towards Vala's relation to them. Vala represents the old Iranian *vaṛa*, the dialect form of Indo-Iranian *vara* 'enclosure'.[28] The base being *Var*, can be traced back to Indo-Eur. ǵer 'to shut', 'to shield', 'to protect', to resist etc., and thus *vala* can be identified with Latin *valeo* 'to be strong' and English *valour* and

25. A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology* (Varanasi, 1963), p. 73.

26. Yō janat azīm dahākem
thrizafanəm thrikamərəδəm
xvas—asīm hazanra-yaoxatīm-*yasna* 9, 8.
"Who killed the serpent Dahāk
who was three jawed, three skulled,
six eyed and one thousand baleful intentions . . .".

27. See M. N. Dhalla, *Zoarastrian Theology* (New York, 1914), p. 164,257.

28. H. W. Bailey, *Analecta Indo-scythica*, II, JRAS, 1954, p. 26 ff.

valiant.[29] The same base can be applied with *Vṛtra* also. Thus there is a close resemblance between Vala and Vṛtra so far as their etymology is concerned. As Vṛtra has mainly three functions, viz. (i) obstructing the waters, (ii) covering the uṣas or light and (iii) enclosing or encompassing the cows, all these three functions can be easily assigned to his counterparts, namely, Ahi and Vala also. But Ahi's main function is connected with the obstruction of waters, and Vala is closely related with the cows—either enclosing them or guarding them and therefore, he is called *gomat*—"possessing cows"—(*tvaṁ valasya gomataḥ apāvar adrivo bilam*—ṚV. 1,11,5, "thou o lord of the stone missile[30] (Indra) hast opened the cave of Vala, the possessor of cows"). But Vṛtra plays main role in the demoniac and antogonistic activities, and that is why he is associated with all the activities mentioned above ; and this phenomenon can be observed on a comparative basis in the whole span of Indo-Eur. mythology.[31] As Vala's name seems dis-

29. Llya Gershevitch, *The Avestan Hymn to Mitra* (Cambridge, 1959), p. 162 f. Siddheshwar Varma, *The Etymologies of Yaska* (Hoshiarpur, 1953), p. 71.

30. For the sense of *adrives* see J. Gonda, *Epithets in the Ṛgveda* ('S-Gravenhage, 1959), p. 60 f,

31. Here Sir George W. Cox can be quōted in *extentio* ; "Vrtra the thief is also called *ahi*, the throtting snake, or dragon with three heads, like *geryon*, the stealer of the cows of *Herakles* or *Kerberos*, whose name reappears in carvara, another epithet of the antogonist of Indra. He is also vala, the enemy, a name which we trace through the Teutonic lands until we reach the cave of Wayland Smith in Berksira Grimm, *Deutsch Mythologie*, 943). Other names are Susna, Sambara, Nanuei etc. but the most notable of all is Paṇi, which marks him as a seducer. Such he is enticing the cows of Indra their picture, and more especially as seeking to corrupt Sarama, when at Indra's bidding she comes to reclaim plundered cattle.

The name Paṇi reappears in Paris, the Seducer of Helen". *Mythology of Aryan Nations* (Varanasi 1963), p. 537.

appearing in the later part of the Vedic literature, it seems that the main demoniac force was only Vṛtra whose evolutionary mythology is much more vigorous than Ahi, Dānu, Vala and other inimical powers. Being the strongest one only Vṛtra remains on the scene. However, Vala plays an important role in the stealing or enclosing the cows, and it appears plausible to suggest that originally it was just like Iranian *Vara* 'enclosure', in which cows were enclosed either for shelter from snow, or for stealing purposes. Such types of shelters are described in the Avesta as 'paxrumaeṣu nmānaeṣu (firm houses or strong stables-*Vendidād* II, 23), where cattle were captivated.[32] The image of the rock-caves or stables out of which the Dawns or the cattle were freed, attracted the imagination 'of the Vedic people and came into the mythological form of Vala. Thus originally it was *vara* or *vala*, and later on it developed into a myth and its place was taken by other words as *bilam*, *apadhā*, *apihita*, etc. His frequent mention with the cows indicates towards his evolutionary mythology and gives indications to the new meanings of '*gāḥ*' 'cows'.

2.0. Vala and cows :

After a minute observation of all the contexts in the ṚV. where cows come in contact with Vala, it becomes clear that the 'cows' refer to three distinct traits of meanings, namely, (i) water, (ii) uṣas or light, and (iii) 'cows' in general. With reference to this statement Vala also signifies three phenomena, namely, (i) as a cloud which blocks the waters, (ii) as darkness which obstructs the light or Uṣas, and (iii) as a demoniac power who en-

32. Cf. A. Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, I (Breslau, 1927), p. 41.

compasses the cows (later on developed into Paṇis mythology). Now, these statements can be supported by the internal evidences of the ṚV. In the ṚV. 3,45,2, Indra is invoked as "the destroyer of enemies, breaker of Vala and the impeller of waters ; and in the ṚV. 2,15,8 "He (Indra) broke open Vala, being praised by the Aṅgirases, and scattered away the strong parts of the mountain (cave), flung open (or battered down) the embankments erected by them (i. e. Vala and his followers)[33]", Here 'the artifical obstructions,[34] raised by Vala and his followers, are merely a poetical fancy indicating towards cloud-symbology ; otherwise Vala is not even partly anthropomorphised in the ṚV.[35] In other context (ṚV. 10, 138,1) waters and Uṣas come together with Vala, where Indra is mentioned as smiting Vala with the help of Aṅgirases, and driving out Uṣas and waters (*yatrā daśasyann uṣaso riṇann apaḥ* etc.). This statement reveals another fact that there is a close connection between Indra and Aṅgirases in the destruction of Vala, therefore, it will be desirable here to see this relation with the perspective of releasing the cows.

2.1. Indra and Aṅgirases vs. Vala :

Indra is invoked as the leader of the Aṅgirases.[36] He discovers cows for them, and is mentioned as driving out cows from the encampment of Vala with the help of Aṅgirases.[37] Sometimes Indra smites Vala when he

33. Cf. Velankar, *Ṛgveda Maṇḍala* II (Uni. of Bombay, 1966), p. 45.

34. Cf. *kṛtrimā sadanāni* at ṚV. 1,55,6.

35. H. D. Velankar, Loc. cit.

36. *So aṅgirobhir aṅgirastamo bhūd vṛṣā vṛṣabhiḥ* etc. ṚV. 1, 100,4.

37. ṚV. 1, 51, 3; 8, 14, 8 ; 63, 3 etc.

is praised by Aṅgirases.[38] According to other several contexts Bṛhaspati appears with Indra on the place of Aṅgirases ;[39] and this indicates a close resemblance between Aṅgirases and Bṛhaspati. Like Indra, Bṛhaspati himself is mentioned as breaking the mountain and obtaining the cows :

bṛhaspátir bhinád ádrim vidád gāḥ
sámusrīyābhir vāvaśanta nárāḥ/ṚV. I. 62,3.

"Bṛhaspati left the mountains and found the cattle ; the heroes (gods) shouted with the kine in triumph". Similarly Indra discovers cows for Aṅgirases :

udgā ājad āṅgirobhya āviṣkṛṇván gúhā satīḥ
arvāñcaṁ nunude valám//—ṚV. 8, 14, 8.

"Discovering them in the cave he (Indra) drove forth the cows for Aṅgirases, and cast down Vala".

Several examples of such statements can be traced in the ṚV.[40] Thus *Vala* appears as the common enemy of Indra, Bṛhaspati and Aṅgirases. As Indra and Aṅgirases are always against Vala, similarly Bṛhaspati's antogonist is Vala. He (Bṛhaspati) strikes Vala with his hosts and drives away the cows :

sá suṣṭúbhā sá ṛkvatā gaṇéna
valám ruroja paligám ráveṇa /
bṛhaspátir usrīyā havyasūdaḥ
Kánikradad vāvaśatīr ud ājat / /—RV. 4, 50, 5.

"(Aided) by the praised and brilliant hosts he destroyed with sound the mischievous Vala ; Bṛhaspati

38. ṚV. 2, 11, 20 ; 15, 8 ; 4, 3, 11, 16, 8 ; 1, 62, 5 ; 6, 18, 5.

39. ṚV. 2, 24, 3 ; 14 ; 4, 50, 5 ; 10, 68, 4-10.

40. ṚV. 2, 14, 3 ; 1. 62, 4 ; 3, 34, 10 ; 8, 14, 7 ; 10, 62, 2 ; 67, 6.

shouting aloud, set free the boon-bestowing, oblation-supplying cows."[41]

Bṛhaspati obtains not only the cows but the Sun and the Uṣas also :—

vibhídyā púram śayáthem ápācīm
nístrīṇi sākám udadhér akṛntat |
bṛhaspátir uṣásám sūryam gām árkam viveda
stanáyanniva dyaúḥ | |—ṚV. 10, 67, 5.

"After he has cleft the lairs and western castle, he cut of three together from him who held the waters. Bṛhaspati discovered, while he thundered like Dyaus, the Dawn, the Sun and the Cow.

In this verse the word *udadhi* refers to the enclosures of Vala, as *arṇava* in the ṚV. 10, 67, 10, 111, 4 ; 8, 40, 5, and *arṇasam* in the ṚV. 5,54,6. The last two *pādas* of the verse quoted above, can be compared with ṚV. 10,68, 9, where Bṛhaspati finds out Uṣas, Agni, Sun etc. and disperses the darkness.[42].

Thus, in accordance with the above evidences Indra, Bṛhaspati and Aṅgirases form a triad which is opposed to the another triad formed by Ahi, Vṛtra and Vala, who blocks the other triad of Uṣas, Waters and cows. Or in other words, it may be surmised that one heavenly triad is engaged in either in release or gain of another triad by destroying another demoniac triad. Thus, there is an inter-relationship among all these triads. This whole mythological setting can be said as the struggle between the good and the evil to regain something benevolent,

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41. Cf. ṚV. 2, 24, 3 ; 14 ; 64, 4.

42. See K. F. Celdner, *Der Rig-Veda Ubersetzt*, IV (Cambridge Mass. 1951) p. 242n.

which is much more clear in old Iranian culture through the Avesta-text.[43]

3.0. Various connotations of the word gāḥ :—

The word *gāḥ* (accusative plural of *go*), as stated above, has several connotations in the ṚV. At the very outset it denotes 'cow', but when observed deeply it signifies more than its surface meaning Roth[44] and Grassmann[45] have attested several meanings to this word, but here only those are cited which are generally applicable to the ṚV. :—

(i) Rays of the Sun,
(ii) Water or streams,
(iii) Uṣas or light,
(iv) Vāk 'Speech',
(v) Praise (according to Sāyaṇa), and
(vi) Cows in general.

A few examples seem necessary here to exemplify the above meanings :—

Rays of the Sun :

In several contexts we find *gāḥ* standing for the rays of the Sun, as :—

údapaptann aruṇā bhānávo vṛthā
svāyújo áruṣīr gā ayukṣata /—ṚV. 1,92,2.

"Their purple rays have readily shot upwards, they have yoked the self yoked and ruddy kine (rays) (to their chariot)".

Here in the context of Uṣas, the word *gāḥ* explicitly signifies the rays of the sun. It may be compared with

43. See M. N. Dhalla, *Zorastrian Theology* (New York, 1914), PP. 26-53. A. A. Macdonell, *Lectures on Comparative Religion* (University of Culcutta, 1925), P. 50.

44. *Sanskrit Woerterbuch* (*Garaz*, 1959), P. 178.

45. *Woerterbuch Zum Rigveda* (Wiesbaden, 1964), P. 407 ff.

other contexts also.[46]

Water or Streams : This meaning can be observed in the following verse of the ṚV :—

agnáyo ná śuśucānā ṛjīṣiṇo
bhṛmim dhámanto ápa gā avṛṇvata /—ṚV. 2,34,1.

"(The Maruts) brilliant like fires, and impetuous have uncovered the (rain giving) cows by blowing away the cloud."[47]

Uṣas or light : Uṣas is mentioned frequently as the mother of the cow, but sometimes the word *gāḥ* denotes the Uṣas itself directly or by the way of comparison. Thus this word has become a mythological synonym of the Dawn herself.[48] The light is often mentioned as coming after the darkness is dispersed.[49] For example :

yújam vájram vṛṣabáścakra índro
nirjyótiṣā támaso gā adukṣat /—ṚV. 1,33,10.

"Indra, the showerer, grasped his bolt, and with its brightness milked out the cows (light) from the darkness." (cf. ṚV. 7,36,1)"

When the first streaks of the Dawn reddens the sky, the light appears to be similar to the red cows which approach towards the east.[50] *Vāk* or Speech The word *gāḥ* has been taken in the sense of 'speech' also, as :—

abhisvárā niṣádā gā avasyáva
índre hinvānā dráviṇāny āśata /—ṚV. 2,21, 5.

"Seeking his favour and sending their speech (prayers) to Indra, they enjoyed riches (from Indra)".

46. cf. ṚV. 1, 10, 8 ; 83, 5.
47. cf. Max Mueller, *SBE*, Vol. 32, P. 298f.
48. cf- Hillebrandt, op. cit, P. 39.
49. cf. A. Bergagine, *Religion Vedique* I, 242 ff.
50. Hillebrandt, op. cit., P. 41.

Here also we find a reference to the Aṅgirases and the Vala episode in the preceding part of the verse.

Praise (*according to Sāyaṇa*). Sāyaṇa has taken this word in the sense of 'praise' also.

'Cows' in general. The word *gāḥ* denotes cows in general in several contexts of the ṚV.

4. Various meanings of udājat :

Udājat is 3rd pers., sing., 'continuative imperfect,[51] form of the root *'aja-gatikṣepaṇayoḥ* (put forth, set in motion, drive out, impel, propel etc.) with the prefix *ud* which gives the compounded meaning as 'drive out from some place' (heraustreiben),[52] or 'to find out.' This form occurs only thrice in the ṚV.,[53] and everywhere it is connected with the same contexts, viz. 'driving out the cows from Vala's enclosure'. In the first two places Indra is the subject, but in the ṚV. 2,24,14 Bṛhaspati "drove out the cows, broke Vala with his hymns, hid away the darkness and caused the Sun to shine." The 3rd pers. plur. imperfect form with the prefix *ud*, occurs only once,[54] and without prefix also only once.[55] In both these contexts, which present "continuative and 'non-successive description",[56] Pitṛs are the main force to bring out the cows from the

51. See J. Gonda, *The Aspectual Function of the Ṛgvedic Present and Aorist* ('s-Gravenhage, 1962), P. 102.

52. Roth & Boehtlingk, *Sanskrit Woerterbuch* (Graz, 1959), P. 15.

53. ṚV. 2, 12, 3 ; 14, 3 ; 24, 14.

54. ṚV. 10, 62, 2.

55. ṚV. 4,1,13.

56. J. Gonda, op. cit., P. 115.

enclosure of Vala. The forms *ajati* (ṚV. 1,33,3), *ājat* (ṚV. 1, 83, 5 ; 2,24,3,4,50,5 ; 8,14, 8,10, 68, 5 ; 7), *ājata* (ṚV. 1, 161, 6 ; 3, 44, 5), *ājatam* (ṚV. 1, 112, 16) etc. give the indication of other meanings as 'to make available', 'to find or receive', 'to impel', 'to set in motion' etc.

Thus, the root meaning of *ājat* can be extended in several ways, but when it is prefixed with *ud* it conveys the meaning of only 'driving something out', or 'to find out something from some place', which is clear through the above contexts, and it sheds some light on the form and meaning of the word *apadhā* also.

apadhā : A controversial form :

apadhā is a *hapax legomenon* in the Vedic literature. So far as its meaning is concerned there is not much controversy among the commentators of the ṚV, but its form has always been controversial. SKN and Durgācārya[57] explain it as '*upadhānena bilodghāṭanena*' (by uncovering of the enclosure) which explicitly indicates that they have taken it as the instrumental sing. of *apadhā*, and perhaps on the anology of *pratidhā* (*ekayā* —ṚV. 8, 77, 4). Veṅkaṭa Mādhava[58] explains it as '*bilāntar apihitā*' (enclosed in the cave) which indicates that he thinks it as a form of locative singular, and perhaps taken on the analogy of *guhā* (*dāsam varṇam adharam guhākaḥ*—ṚV. 2, 12, 4). Sāyaṇa explains it as the form of oblative singular, and derives it as "*apa pūrvād dādhātoḥ 'ātaścopasarge'* (*Pāṇini* 3.3.106) *iti bhāve aṅ pratyayaḥ ; 'supāṁ suluk' iti pañcamyā ākaraḥ.*"

Among the modern commentators Roth[59]

57. *Nir.* comm. 3,115 ; 8,2.
58. *Ṛgartha Dīpikā* III, (2,12,3).
59. *Sanskrit Woerterbuch* s. v.

Grassmann,[60] Ludwing,[61] Lanman[62] and Macdonell[63] follow SKN's line explain it as an instrumental singular, while Wilson,[64] Geldner[65] and Griffith[66] take it as an oblative sing. explicitly following Sāyaṇa. Peterson[67] thinks it as a locative singular form, but translates it as 'from the enclosure', which is clearly ablative singular. Velankar[68] explains it as an instrumental singular form.

Thus, according to these commentators *apadhā* can be taken either as an instrumental sing. or ablative singular or locative singular. But which one is the most probable, this is the question here. Other analogous forms like *bilam*, *paridhin*, *apihitam* etc. which give the same meaning, are mostly in the accusative, and are either opened or destroyed by Indra, Bṛhaspati, Aṅgirases etc., from where these deities find or drive out the cows: A few examples seem desirable here :—

(i) *indro valasya bilam apaurṇot—Tait. S.* 2.1.5.1.
"Indra destroyed the enclosure of Vala".

(*ii*) *indrō.....bhinad valasya paridhīn*...ṚV. 1, 52, 5.
"Indra...broke through the defences of Vala".

(iii) *tvam valasya gomato 'pāvar' adrivo bilam*—ṚV. 1, 11, 5.

60. *Woerterbuch Zum Rig-Veda* (Wiesbaden, 1964). P. 72.
61. *Kommentar zur Rigveda*, Pt: 2, P. 53.
62. *Noun Inflection in the Veda*, P. 447.
63. *Vedic Reader* (Oxford Un: Press), 1960 P. 46 f.
64. *Rigveda Trans. Vol. II*, P. 138.
65. *Der Rigveda ubersetzt*, Pt. I, P. 290.
66. *Hymns of the Rigveda*, Pt. I, P. 173.
67. *Hymns from the Rigveda* (6th ed ; Bombay, 1938), P. 116 ; 310.
68. *Ṛigveda Maṇḍala* II, (Un. of Bombay, 1966), P. 33.

"Thou didst open the cave of Vala, who had there concealed the cattle".

(iv) *apām bilam apihitam yadāsit*
Vṛtram jaghanvān apa tad vavār /—ṚV. 1,32,11.
"By laying Vṛtra, Indra set open the cave that had confined the waters".

All the above examples clarify that *apadhā* is not an 'action' as explained by Skanda Svāmin and Durgācārya in the way of '*udhāṭanena*' 'by uncovering'; but it indicates the *locale* like *bilam* 'enclosure' from where the cows are either 'driven out' or 'regained'. Thus, *apadhā* can be taken as an ablative singular form of the same stem, i. e. *apadhā*, meaning 'enclosure'.

6. *Connotations of Saptasindhūn* :

The oft repeated phrase '*saptasindhūn*' raises some controversy of interpretation. The traditional interpreters have explained it as 'seven rivers' which is evident through '*gaṅgādyāḥ nadyaḥ*' or '*elā ca ilā ca*', but at the same time their alternative interpretation as '*syandanāḥ nadīḥ*' 'flowing rivers' raises question whether the word *sapta* stands here for some specific 'number' or for some attributive epithets. As numbers play an important role in the cultural life of peoples,[69] the word *sapta* may be taken here to denote number 'seven', which may be exempliified by the usages as *sapta-aśvaḥ*[70] having 'seven horses', *sapta-āsyaḥ*[71] 'seven months', *sapta-ṛṣayaḥ*[72] 'seven seers', *sapta-cakram*[73] 'seven wheeled, *sapta-jāmayaḥ*[74]

69. See the observation made by F. Heiler, *Erscheinungsformen und Wesender Religion* (Stuttgart, 1961), P. 161 ff.

70. ṚV. 5,45, 9.

71. ṚV. 4,50,4.

72. ṚV. 10,109, 4.

73. ṚV. 1,164, 3 ; 2,40, 3.

74. ṚV. 9,10, 7.

'seven sisters', *sapta jihvaḥ*[75] 'seven tongues' *sapta-putram*[76] 'having 'seven sons' *sapta-mātaram*[77] 'seven mothers', etc. in the ṚV. Thus, it appears that the number 'seven' was very common in the usage to denote either the plurality of the things or some ominous phenomenon. The predilection for the number 'seven' in ancient Indian-as well as modern-culture is also apparent from a special rite called *sapta-padī*.

So, the phrase *sapta-sindhūn* does not refer here to any particular name (or names) of the river (s),[78] but it indicates all the rivers which are made free to flow by Indra.

Meaning of aśmanoḥ :

aśmanoḥ, the locative dual form of *aśman* 'rock' or 'cloud' occurs only here in the ṚV. Here, the allussion is to the lightning form of Agni who in several passages is said to be 'in the rock'[79] or 'to be produced from the rock'[80] and is called 'son of the rock, (*adreḥ sūnuḥ*).[81] Thus, it is clear that it does not refer to the 'earth and the sky' as explained by Skandin and Durga, and followed by Griffith.

The verse as a whole represents six distinct functions of Indra-mythology, namely, (i) smashing the clouds

75. ṚV. 3,6, 2.

76. ṚV. 1,164, 1.

77. ṚV. 10,107, 4.

78. For details see A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Kieth, *Vedic Index*, Vol. II, P. 424.

79. ṚV. 2,1,1.

80. ṚV. 10,20,7.

81. Cf. A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Reader* (Ox. Un. Press, 1960), P. 47.

in the form of *ahi*, (ii) setting free the rivers to flow freely, (iii) driving out the cows (in the form of Uṣas or light), (iv) destroying Vala (in the form of enclosure' or obstruction or darkness), (v) producing fire (lightening) between two rocks (clouds), and (vi) being victorious in battle. Thus, all the main functions of Indra-mythology are contained in this single verse of the ṚV.

CONTRIBUTION OF PRAKRIT LITERATURE TO THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES OF ANCIENT INDIA

J. C. SIKDAR

Ahmedabad

Literature is to be judged by its value to humanity. An estimation of it is determined by the principles to what extent does it contribute to the progress of mankind by enabling it to live with more happiness, more intensity, more profoundness, more wisdom and more freedom in the mundane world. From this angle of vision on literature Prakrit literature testifies sufficiently to the linguistic and literary development of its age and its value to mankind by conveying various aspects of Indian Culture.

Here an attempt has been made to bring to light the contribution of Prakrit literature to the physical sciences of Ancient India in course of her cultural evolution.

The Jaina Āgamic Prākrit literature (Śvetāmbara and Digambara) has made a great contribution to the development of the physical sciences of Ancient India by making analysis of Matter (*Pudgala*) in its different aspects, while dealing with the metaphysical problems from the point of view of *dravya* (substance), *Kṣetra* (field or locus), *Kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (condition)[1]. The authors of this vast literature kept in view the concepts of Matter as embodied in different Indian

1. *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, 2.10.118.

Systems of thought. Matter has been studied by every philosophy in its own manner. *Bhūta*[2] of the Cārvākas, the *Prakriti*[3] of the Sāṁkhya -Yoga, the *Jaḍadravya*[4] of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika[5] and the Mīmāṁsaka,[6] *Rūpa*[7] of the Buddhists, *Māyā*[8] of the Śaṅkara-Vedānta, *Acit*[9] of the Rāmānuja-Vedānta and *Pudgala*[10] of Jaina Metaphysics are only the diverse views on this problem. The Jaina conception of Matter preserved in the Jaina Āgamic Prākrit literature forms the basis of the physical sciences in Jaina metaphysics in a nascent form ; on it a superstructure of analysis of Matter has been raised by Umāsvāti and others in the post-Āgamic period and Darśanakāla, having taken a synthetic view of all other concepts of Matter embodied in other Indian systems of thought on the basis of its conception as a permanent substance endowed with infinite qualities and modes in the light of many unique notions of Matter as found in the modern physical sciences.

Matter (*Pudgala*) is conceived as *Dravya* (substance) endowed with *guṇa* (quality) and *paryāya* (mode)[11] and it is studied from the aspects of *dravya* (substance), *kṣetra* (locus,) *Kāla* (time) and *bhāva*

2. *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*, p, 1.
3. *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 8.10.11.
4. *Vaiśeṣika*, 1.1.5.
5. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 16, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 16, etc.
6. *Prabhākara Mīmāṁsā*, pp. 35 ff.
7. *Abhidharmakośa*, 1.24.
8. *S. Bhā.* on *Brahmasūtra*.
9. *Śrībhāṣya*, 1.1.1.
10. *Bhs.*, 2,10.118.
11. *Bhs.*, 2.10.118 ; *Anuyogadvāra*, 5.121 ; *Uttarādhyayana*, 28.6 ; 28.3.

(condition)[12] on the basis of the metaphysical speculation which runs parallel to the conception of Matter as revealed in Western Philosophy and modern physics to some extent. It is to be noted that the subject 'Substance' of Western Philosophy corresponds to *Dravya* (substance) of Jaina Metaphysics, the predicate and the relation of the former to *guṇa* (quality) and *paryāya* (mode) of the latter respectively. A substance is defined as "that which can only enter into a proposition as subject, never as predicate or relation. Metaphysically substances have generally been held to be indestructible."[13] "The physical world consists of substances with qualities and relations."[14].

The most visible form of Non-living substance (*ajīvadravya*) is Matter. It exists in different forms, such as, earth, water, shadow, objects of the four senses, mind, speech, bodies, etc. upto Karmic matter (*karmapudgala*) and ultimate atom (*paramāṇu*)[15]. Matter is a tangible reality existing within the sensuous and supersensuous experiences in perceptible and imperceptible conditions. It is also accepted as a reality in other Indian systems of thought as pointed out in the beginning. Jaina *pudgala* is equivalent to Matter of the physical sciences. The derivative meaning of the word '*Pudgala*', skt. *Pudgala* (Pud+gal=to integrate and to disintegrate) is that the substance which undergoes modification by the process of combination and dissociation is called *Pudgala*[16]. In the physical sciences also Matter

12. *Bhs.*, 2.10.118.
13. *Analysis of Matter*, Bertrand Russel, p. 238.
14. Ibid., pp. 243-4.
15. *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, Vol. III, p. 3.
16. *Bhs.* (comm.), 20.2.664 ; *Dravyasaṁgraha*.

is conceived as the substance in the sense of 'stuff, of which the material universe is constituted, undergoing changes by the process of intergration and disintegration.[17]

Matter is a permanent, non-living, extensive, physical, corporeal and concrete, active, disintegrating and integrating, and changeable substance[18]. It is infinite in number, co-extensive with the universe, possessed of the capacity to be received by soul[19] and to be of assistance[20] to it. It possesses infinite eternal modes of capacities like colour, taste, smell and touch, etc. It is characterized by origination, decay and permanence without giving up its essential nature of existence.[21] Both the Jainapudgala and the Sāṁkhya *Prakriti*[22] (Primordial Matter) are non-living, eternal, infinite and all-pervading, undecaying and indestructible in nature. The Buddhist conception of the two general characteristics of *Rūpa* (Matter), viz. *vikāritva* (modifiability) and *sapratighātva* (impenetrability)[23] is identical with the Jaina view of the general characteristics of *Pudgala*, viz. *pariṇāmitva* (changeability) and ghataśarīratva (impenetrability) of the effects of Matter.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy Matter is conceived as intrinsically non-living and essentially substantive eternal reality, having the characteristics of existen-

17. Inter Physics p. 2.

18. *Bhs.*, 2.10.118 : *Tattvārthasūtra*, 5.1,2;3,4,6 ; *DS.*, 15 ; *Bṛhaddravyasaṅgraha*, p. 67.

19. *Bhs.* 2-10. 118 ; Ts. 8.2.

20. *Bhs.*, 2-1-90.

21. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, III. 3.

22. *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 8.10.11.

23. *Abhidarmakośa*, *kā*, 1.13, *Sphuṭārthā*.

tiality (*astitva*), knowability (*Jñeyatva*), self-identity (*abhidheyatva*) and inherent causality (Svātmasyāram-bhakatva).[24] Impenetrability, perceptibility and mass are the essentical aspects of its nature. In Western Metaphysics also Matter is accepted as one of the ultimate principles or substances of which phenomena are manifestations. The physical world consists of the material substances with qualities and relations, i. e. modes. In the physical sciences it is the substance in the sense of stuff which constitutes the whole material universe.[25] Earth, water, shadow, objects of the senses, Karmic matter and ultimate atom[26] are in general the elements of Matter according to Jaina Metaphysics. It appears from this order of the elements of Matter that this philosophy commenced with the conception of its grossest form and entered into the conception of its subtile force by stages in its dealing with this problem like Metaphysics and physics. The most valuable point in the conception of elements of Matter is this that each of its effects, when studied, is ultimately found to have been formed of one or more of the elementary particles. The Jaina conception of elements of Matter, when compared to that of other Indian systems of thought, appears to be unique in its origin, for it has accepted not only earth, water, fire and air, etc. as the basic elements of Matter but it has given place to

24. *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 16 ; *VS.* II. II, 26 ; *PP.* B*ha.*, p. 16 ; *Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,* p. 58 ; PP. Bhā., p. 20 ; PP. Bhā., p. 20. Nyāyakandalī p. 21, vide *Conception of Matter According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,* p. 59 ; VS., 1.1.9.14.

25. *Atoms, and the Universe,* ch. VI, Matter and its properties, pp. 126-149.

26. *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama,* Vol. III, p. 3.

indriya (senses), *Karma* (action) and *leśyā*[27] (condition of soul) as the material elements in its fold by making a synthesis of all of other Indian philosophical views on the subject on the basis of psychophysical aspects of the material substance.

Action (*Karma*) is energy and energy is the attenuated form of Matter. According to the physical sciences, energy like Matter is something which exists in Nature, though in different kinds. It pervades throughout the universe but has no bulk to be apprehended by the senses. It has also no weight and extension or compression. Whatever be its nature, work can never be produced without application of energy. So energy and work (*Karma*) are accepted as synonyms. What is energy is work and what is work is energy.

The speculation on the concept of *paramāṅu* (ultimate atom) marks a stage of emergence and development of a subtle thought in the field of Indian philosophy of the Āgamic Age, post-Āgamic Age and Age of Indian Metaphysics (Darśanakāla). In this speculation the Jaina, Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Mīmāṁsaka, Bauddha and Vedānta systems of thought have attacked the problem in their respective manners. Jaina philosophy conceived this atomic theory on the basis of destruction and origination of the material world from the stand-point of transformation taking place in it due to external and internal causes and made a synthetic view of the concept of atom from the aspects of *dravya* (substance), *kṣetra* (locus), *Kāla* (time) and *bhāva*

27. *Pañcāstikāyasāra,* 89 ; *Uttarādhyayana sūtra* (leśyā) (comm.), 34 p. 650 ; *Paṇṇāvanā,* 13 (comm.), p. 336 ; *Karmagrantha,* (4th.), gā. 3 ; *GS., Jīva.,* 531, etc.

(condition)[28].

The Jaina conception of elementary particles of Matter has a parallel theory of elementary particles of Matter in Western philosophy and physics. The concept of hyle or ylem (Primordial Matter and its elements), when compared to Jaina *Pudgala* shows that originally the name 'elementary particle was applied to the four elements—fire, earth, air and water.[29] It is to be noted that like Jaina philosophy, Western philosophy and physics also began the study of the conception of gross elements of Matter and gradually entered into the subtle atomic theory, according to which all material substances are constituted of small units called atom. Atom means indivisible, but the physical sciences have demonstrated that atom is divisible.

According to the physical sciences, there are stated to be one hundred and three elements of Matter. In the Āgamic Prākrit literature also there is found a list of a number of basic elements of Matter which are common to the physical sciences and Jaina physics, e. g. silicon, sulphur, iron, copper, tin, lead, silver, gold, carbon, etc.[30] The value of the Jaina conception of basic elements of Matter lies in the fact that, like the alchemists of the Middle Ages the Jaina Ācārya conceived the idea of pure element of Matter as distinguished from the base forms of it with their keen insight into the womb of Nature even in the absence of developed experimental physical sciences of modern age.

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28. *Bhs.*, 25.4.740 ; 20.5.670 ; *Acārāṅga Cūrṇi*, p. 195 ; *Uttarā. Ṭīkā* (Kamala Saṁyama), p. 99.

29. *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. II, W. K. C. Guthrie, p. 141.

30. *Paṇṇāvanā*, 2. *Jīvapaṇṇāvanā*.

Paramāṇus (ultimate atoms) are infinite in number with regard to *dravya* (substance) ; it is the finest particle of matter with regard to *kṣetra* (locus) ; it is momentary from the aspect of *kāla* (time) and its quality is changing from the stand-point of bhāva (condition).[31] *Paramāṇu* is both cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*)[32] of the material world from the point of view of transformation, but not only the ultimate material cause of it like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *Paramāṇu*.[33] This conception of *Paramāṇu* as cause and effect is parallel to the conception of energy and consequence of energy of the physical sciences[34]. In the Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophy *paramāṇu*[35] is conceived as a produced entity (*Janyapadārtha*) but not as an eternal entity. It is evolved out of the first *tanmātra* (infra atomic potential) ; it is divisible. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conceives the indivisibility of *paramāṇu*[36] while the Buddhists maintain the divisibility of paramāṇu (*saṁghāta paramāṇu*)[37] which consists at least of eight parts of elements of *Rūpa* (Matter) (*aṭṣadravyaka*). According to the physical sciences, atom is divisible without limit. In the Jaina view *sūkṣmaparamāṇu* is indivisible, but *vyavahāraparamāṇu*[38] and four qualities of paramāṇu,

31. *Bhs.*, 25.4.740 ; 20.5.670.

32. *Uttarā.*, 1.33 ; See *Tīkā* (Śānti Ācārya) p. 24 ; *Rājāvārtika*, p. 491.

33. *Nyāyavārtika*, IV, 1.33.

34. *Atomic physics*, p. 4.

35. *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, 62, ch. 1, 35 ; Yogabhāṣya, IV, 24.

36. *VS.*, 4.1.1.

37. *Abh. K.*, II, 22.

38. *Anuyogadvāra*, Sū. 133 ; Jambūdvīpa, 19.100, p. 169 ; *Loka Prakāśa*, 1.21.

viz. colour, taste, smell and touch, have infinite divisions.[39] This conception suggests that *paramāṇu* conceived in Jaina Metaphsics is divisible without limit like the atom of the physical sciences. Saṁghāta paramāṅu of the Buddhists is *avinirbhāgin* or *bhoga* (indistinguishable), while the Jaina *paramāṇu* is *anantabhāga* (infiniteth part) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *paramāṇu* when compared. It is eternal from the substantial point of view and non-eternal from the modal stand-point.[40] A *paramāṇu* is *abhedya* (homogenous or impassable), *acchedya* (uncuttable), *avibhājya* (indivisible), *adāhya* (incombustible) and *agrāhya* (non-receivable by soul)[41].

It is *anardha* (without half part), *amadhya* (without inner part) and *apradeśa* (without having part) from the point of view of *kṣetra* (field)[42]. It is itself beginning, it is itself middle, it is itself end.[43]

Paramāṇus are of one class only. A *paramāṇu* can assume any form in accordance with the causal condition. The paramāṇu which underwent change into the form of earth can undergo transformation into the forms of water, fire, etc. on the alteration of the materials. The capacities-colour, taste, smell and touch, exist as equal in each and every *paramāṇu* and can change into any form according to the cause.[44] Even though they are equal in all paramāṇus, the variousness of their transformation occurs because of the difference of materials.

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39. *Bhs.*, 254.740.
40. *Bhs.*, 14.4.512.
41. Ibid., 20.5.670.
42. Ibid., 5.7.215.
43. *RV.*, 5.25. 1. p. 491.
44. *Paramāṇukhaṇḍaṣaṭtriṁśikā*, pp. 1-4.

The *skandha* (molecule) formed by the combination of *paramāṇus* is not any new material substance. It is only one particular form out of the combination of *paramāṇus*. All *paramāṇus* are permanent in their respective individual nature[45] and their *pariṇāminityatā* (permanence-in-change) is explained by accepting *skandha* (molecule), *guṇa* (quality) and *paryāya* (mode or action) as being produced as a result of transformation of *paramāṇus*.[46] Thus the *skandha* is accepted as some how non-different as well as different from them.

All gross and fine material creations are explained on the basis of the capacity of transformation of paramāṇus and their combination and dissociation. It appears from the study of the nature of paramāṇu that the Vaiśeṣika philosophy stops by conceiving paramāṇu as the sixth part (or division) of *rajakaṇa* (mote) perceived in the sunrays,[47] whereas Jaina philosophy accepts one *paramāṇu* also as skandha (molecule) of infinite *sūkṣmaparamāṇus*.[48]

According to its view, infinite paramānus and infinite *skandhas* (molecules) also can exist in a subtle form in one space-point, in which one paramāṇu exists, by virtue of its capacity of contraction (*saṁkoca*)[49]. On this ground paramāṇus are conceived as fine and unmanifest like the *Prakriti* of the Sāṁkhya. The difference between them is that the *Prikriti* is one, whereas the Jaina paramāṇu is infinite in number.[50].

45. *Bhs.*, 20,5.688.
46. *Paramāṇukhaṇḍaṣaṭtriṁśikā*, pp. 1-4.
47. *NV.*, p. 647.
48. *Anuyoga*, 133 ; *Jambudvīpa*, 19.100.
49. *Paramāṇukhaṇḍaṣaṭtriṁśikā*, p. 2.
50. *Bhs.*, 25.4.740.

The Jaina view of atomicity of matter bears a striking similarity to the concept of atomicity of matter of the physical sciences in some respects although it differs from the latter in other respects. The hypothesis of W. Prout that "the atoms of all elements are built up of one atom, the atom of hydrogen corresponding to the Prime Matter, the Ylem of the Greeks[51] comes nearer to the Jaina conception of paramāṇu which is of one class only. "Individual atomic events are not observed directly, though their consequences may be and hence greater reliance must be placed on logical inference and methodology than in most other branches of sicences"[52]. The Jaina conception of oscillation and motion of paramāṇu[53] is nearer to the conception of oscillation or vibration and motion of atom of the physical sciences, for the oscillatory behaviour or wave motion is applicable in atomic physics[54] the wave aspect of elementary particles is possibly their most fundamental characteristic. The Jaina principles of *Vega-pratighāta* (resistance to atom in its motion), *bandha-pratighāta* (resistance to atom by its binding-transformation) and *upakārābhava-pratighāta* of *paramāṇu* (resistance to atom at the last border of the Universe in the absence of the assistance of *Dharmāstikāya*-Principle of Motion) in the Non-Universe compare well with the process of collision of neutron with proton like two billiards balls, the physical law, "every atom exerts a force upon every

51. *Atoms and the Universe*, p. 28.

52. *Atomic Physics*, p. 4.

53. *Bhs.*, 1.5.7.217 ; 25.4.744 ; 16.8.584 ; *Paṇṇāvanā*, 16.471-4; *Sthānāṅga*, 10.9.35.211 (274).

54. Physics, 261 ; Atomic Physics, p. 12, 1.4 ; p. 65. Atoms and the Universe. pp. 84, 87.126 ; Mysteries of Space, p. 5.

other atom and there is a tendency for atoms because of their force of attraction to draw together and stick" and the law "nothing can go beyond the border of the universe because of the absence of the support of motion" respectively, according to the physical sciences.

The Jaina conception of the four general properties of Pudgala, viz. colour, taste, smell and touch[55] is well supported by the physical sciences. The notion of five colours-black, red, yellow, blue and white[56] is identical with the conception of the five natural colours of Matter of the physical sciences.[57] Infinite modes of these five colours can be compared with the difference of wave lengths ; "as the apparent colour of a material substance depends upon its state of the sub-divisions, it becomes lighter as large particles are ground up into small ones"[58] In regard to the five kinds of taste of Pudgala it is to be noted that sweet, bitter and sour, are common to both Jaina metaphysics and the physical sciences, while saltish and insipid[59] tastes of the latter are different from the acidic and astringent tastes of the former. Two kinds of smell—pleasant and unpleasant are the common properties of Matter mentioned in all metaphysics and the physical sciences. Eight kinds of properties of Matter conceived in Jaina philosophy can be reduced to the following four physical properties of Matter of modern

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55. *Bhs.*, 2.10.118. PS. 52.

56. *Bhs.*, 12.5. 450.

57. Report of the Colorimetry Committee, 1922, Optical Society of America, vide Cosmology, Old and New. p. 168.

58. General Chemistry, Pauling, p. 12.

59. "Taste and chemical constitution" by A. J. Mee, M. A. in the *Science Progress*, October, 34, vide Consmology, Old and New, p. 164.

physics, viz. scale-hardness (*mṛdu-kaṭhina*), density (*guru-laghu*), temperature (*śīta* and *uṣṇa*) and structure (*snigdha* and *rukṣa*). Besides, the property of impenetrability of the effects of Matter is its common property according to all metaphysics and physics. Motion[60] is the intrinsic property of Matter. *Parispandana* (oscillation)[61] of *Pudgala* is the common property of Matter according to the Sāṁkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta philosophies.[62] It represents the oscillation of elastic bodies of the physical sciences,[63] while Jaina pudgalagati corresponds to the motion of Matter of physics according to which motion is the change of position of a body with time. Every thing is in motion, though on object may be at rest in relation to another, Motion and rest are relative, for the motion of a body involves a change of its position with respect to some known object as there are no such fixed points in Nature.

The viśreṇi gati of Jaina *Pudgala* may be compared to the curvilinear motion of Matter of physics, while *vigrahagati* and *kuṭilagati* may correspond to the rotatory and complex motions of Matter of the physical sciences respectively. In Jaina metaphpsics and modern physics the motion of a body is specified by its successive positions in time. Both of them study motions which take place along a straight line as well as a curved line, uniform horizontal motion and a verti-

60. *Paṇṇāvanā*, 1.474 ; TS. *Bhāṣya*, 5.6. 386.

61. *Pravacanasāra*, II. 37 (See Pradīpikāvṛtti).

62. *Tattvakaumudī* 10 (Vācaspati), Raghunath Siromaṇi, *Nyayakusumañjatī*, Stavaka, V ; Saṅkara, vide *Positive Sciences* of the *Ancient Hindus*, p. 121.

63. Inter Physics, S. C. Roy Chowdhury and D. B. Sinha, p. 488.

cal motion of free fall[64]. The value of the Jaina conception of the general properties of Matter and its motion lies in the fact of its scientific approach to this problem. Matter exists in Nature, occupying some volume in perceptible and imperceptible conditions in various forms. Its effects appear as earth, water, fire, air, and vegetation[65], body, speech, mind and respiration[66], while its manifestations are found as sound, combination, fineness, grossness, shape, division, darkness, shadow, heat, light[67] etc. Earth, water, fire, air and vegetation are also accepted as the effects of matter in the physical sciences.[68] Besides, the bodies of mobile being, organs of speech, mind and respiration[69] are regarded as material in metaphysics and physics.

The Jaina view of sound (*Śabda*) is similar to the conception of sound of modern physics. According to the former, sound is generated by molecules when they strike one another, which may be natural or artificial, hence sound is associated with atom also. In physics it is explained that "usually sound originates in vibrating bodies.[70]" In regard to the wave of sound and its propagation both the Jaina and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika[71]

64. *Bhs.*, 3.3.153 (comm.), p. 121 ; TS. *Bha*, 2.29, p. 182.

65. *Bhs.*, 24.12-21. 702-707 off. ; 25.4.739 ; *GS.*, *Jīva*. 182.

66. *Bhs.*, 13.7.473-4-5, *TS.*, V. 19, p. 341.

67. *Uttara.*, 28-12 ; DS., 16 ; TS., v. 24.

68. Inter Physics, S. C. Roy Chowdhury and B. D. Sinha, p. 2.

69. *Human Anatomy*, Henry, Grey, p. 1016 ; *The principles of Psychology*, William James, pp. 145 ff.

70. P. S., 79 *Physics-Principles aud Application* by Margenau, Watson and Montgomery, 38.1, p. 560.

71. *Bhāṣārahasya*, 5 ; *Paṇṇāvanā*, *Bhāṣāpada*, 11.398. PP, Bhā, p. 156 ; NK., P, 157 ; NV., p. 286 ; *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Gaṅgeśa.

systems of thought agree on the point that sound becomes refracted as well as diffracted according to the causes of its fineness and manifoldness, and association with other substances like air, etc. and expands in all directions upto the last border of the universe. The unbroken sound attains division and dies out at last after crossing countable distance with the growing of the momentum of the impact of series feebler and feebler.[72]

Tha Jaina theory of wave of sound and its propagation with pitch, intensity and quality is well supported by modern physics. It explains that "sound waves exhibit the properties of reflection, refraction and diffraction-characteristics of all forms of motion"[73]. "Every point of a wave front may be considered to be a new sourse of disturbance from which spherical wave-lets issue"[74]. "The vibrations are transmitted through elastic medium usually air, as wave motion of the longitudinal type[75]. Jaina *parāghātabhāṣādravya* (sound generated by vibrating particles of speech)[76] increase infinitefold and expands and goes in a straight line, a curved line and a parallel line or in a mixed to all directions.

Combination (bandha), fineness (*saukṣmya*), grossness (*sthaulya*), shape or figure (*saṁsthāna*), heat (*ātapa*), light (*udyota*) except shadow (*chāyā*) find place as the manifestations of Matter in the physical sciences.

72. *Bhāṣārahasya*, 6 ; *Paṇṇāvanā*, , 11.398 *Bhāṣāpada*.

73. *Physics-Principles and Applications*, Margenau Watson and Montgomery, 28.1, p. 560.

74. Ibid., p. 552.

75. Ibid., p. 560.

76. *Bhāṣārahasya*, 10 See also *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* for sound, 336, 337, 351-54 ; 375, 377.

The Jaina conception of *ātapa* (heat) and *udyota* (light)[77] is important in this respect that it touches upon the theory of heat and light-energies[78] of modern physics in a nascent form. The infinite modifications of Matter as dealt with in the Jaina Āgamic Prākrit literature from the stand-point of substantiality, modality, immersion, duration and qualities[79] are thought-provoking, when they are studied in the light of the physical sciences from the aspects of substance, quality and relations with regard to their existence in space and continuity in time. *Pariṇāma* (change and transformation) takes place in *Dravya* (Substance) due to external and internal causes. *Dravynparamāṇu* (material atom) undergoes transformation as a result of internal causes and external influences, e. g. the restlessness of mind owing to the impact of external conditions *Jaḍavastu* (non-living thing) like mind, hence there takes place also internal change in the atomic structure of the body. The properties in *paramāṇu* are changing from moment to moment, e. g. transformation of its *rūpaśakti*, (colour), etc. *Viśiṣṭapariṇāma* (particular transformation) is taking place in it, e. g. *ekaguṇakālaka*, *dviguṇakālaka*, etc. (onefold black, twofold black, etc.). This transformation of colour can be compared with the latest view of the late National Professor Dr. C. V. Raman, Nobel Laureate, on the transmission (or emission) of ray of colour from flower. The view of the Jainas on the division of smell-particles is most scientific and thought-

77. Bhs., 8.8.344 ; *Sarvārthasiddhi*, p. 296 ; *Sūriyapaṇṇatti*, 3.24-8 ; *Candapaṇṇatti*, 28.

78. Physics, pp. 248, 588.

79. Paṇṇāvanā, 266-279.

provoking in the physical sciences. *Agurulaghupariṇāma*[80] (transformation of the quality of neither heaviness nor lightness) is the general transformation taking place in all substances, i. e. there occur the decrease and increase of this quality in them. *Pudgala* becomes of one form (*egarūva*)[81] by the process of transformation like the energy of Matter of the physical sciences. Besides the Jaina theory of transformation of Matter brought about by the process of integration, dis-integration and integration-cum-disintegration[82] compares well with the principle of chemical behaviour of atoms and molecules as laid down in the physical sciences. "Molecules can sometimes interchange atoms and form new substances and molecules already formed can sometimes dissociate again into separate atoms."[83] "In more complex reactions in which atoms are interchanged between molecules there are more qualities of energy to be considered. There are the energies which have to be supplied before the separate molecules can be dissociated and also the energies gained by formation of the new types of molecule.[84]" The combination of particles of Matter takes place as a result of the inter-actions between ultimate atom having the force of attraction (*snehakāyatva*) and the force of repulsion (*rūkṣatva*) of unequal degree (quantum).[85] This Jaina view of the interactions between ultimate atoms which give rise to the

80. There are ten kinds of *Pudgalapariṇāma* including *agurulaghupariṇāma, Bhs.*, 8,10.355 ; *Paṇṇavanā*, 13, 417.

81. Bhs., 14.4.510.

82. *Ts. Bha.*, 5.28, p. 372.

83. *Atoms and the Universe*, p. 132.

84. Ibid., 132-33.

85. *Bhs.*, 1.10.80 ; 8.9.345 ; *Paṇṇāvanā*, 13.418 ; *Bandhaṣaṭtriṁśikā* 10.

existence and behaviour of Matter in bulk bears some points of similarity with that of the physical sciences regarding inter-atomic forces and the combination of atoms. It is explained in this way that "every atom exerts a force upon every other atom. The details and the magnitude of the force vary as between one type of atom and other, but in general the force is always the force of attraction when the atoms are at a distance apart greater than their normal diameters. changing to a force of repulsion if the atoms are forced very close together. Thus there will be a tendency for atoms because of their force of attraction to draw together and stick."[86]

This brief analysis of Matter shows the great contributions of Prākrit literature with scientific approach to the problem even in the absence of the critical verifying data of modern experimental science, The reality of Matter has amply and brilliantly been expressed by it, together with the three potent factors origination, decay and permanence, in the daring flight of human imagination, not sacrificing the logical aspect of knowledge in the thoughts of its metaphysical and physical existence and in the synthetic views of its qualities, modes, basic elements, properties, effects and modifications, evolution and combinations, as it exists in space and continues in time with its static and dynamic forces in the cosmic universe.

86. *Atoms and the Universe*, O. Jones, J. Rotblat and Withrow, p. 126.

ABBREVIATION

Abh. K	=	Abhidharmakośa.
Anuyoga	=	Anuyogadvārasūtra.
Bhs.	=	Bhagavatī Sūtra.
Ch.	=	Chapter.
Comm.	=	Commentary.
DS.	=	Dravyasaṁgraha.
Ga.	=	Gāthā.
GS.	=	Gommaṭasāra.
Jambūdvīpa	=	Jaṁbūdvīpaprajñapti.
Jiva.	=	Jīvakāṇḍa.
Kā.	=	Kārikā.
NK.	=	Nyāyakandalī.
NV.	=	Nyāyavārtika.
Paṇṇāvanā	=	Paṇṇāvanāsūtra.
PP. Bhā.	=	Praśastapādabhāṣya.
Ps.	=	Pañcāstikāyasamayasāra.
RV.	=	Rājavārtika.
Ś. Bhā.	=	Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya.
Sthānāṅga	=	Sthānāṅgasūtra.
Sū.	=	Sūtra.
TS.	=	Tattvārthasūtra.
TS. Bhā.	=	Tattvārthasūtra Bhāṣya.
Uttara.	=	Uttarādhyayanasūtra.
VS.	=	Vaiśeṣika Sūtra.

ON THE ṚGVEDA I. 115.14.
(*SŪRYA ĀTMĀ JAGATAS TASTHUSAŚ CA*)

V. C. SRIVASTAVA
University of Allahabad

It is too often asserted that the concept of Sūrya centres round the material form of the Sun in the Vedic literature.[1] It is said that the spiritual element in him is a later and superimposed feature.[2] Such views have been mechanically repeated so many times that they look like plain and simple truths while the matter is otherwise. It appears that the Vedic Āryans from the very beginning had conceived of Sūrya as a great spiritual force in the universe. To them he was the ultimate source and the highest reality. He was the spirit of all animate and inanimate things of the universe. The Ṛgvedic *pāda* (I. 115. 1d) *Sūrya ātmā jagatastasthuṣaśca* presents before us a similar idea. It may be taken as a characteristic phrase for Sūrya because it has not been repeated for any other god except once for Parjanya in the *Ṛgveda*[3] and that too in a different sense. In the case of Parjanya the phrase looses all weight because he is said to possess in himself the vitality of all the moveable and immoveable. He is not identical with the soul of all the moveable and immoveable things as is the case with

1. Macdonell, A. A., *The Vedic Mythology*, p. 30 ; Griswold, H. D., *The Religion of the Rigveda*, p. 266, Wilson. H. H. (Tr.) *Rigveda*, Intro. p. XXX.

2. Hopkins, E. W., *The Religion of India*, pp 44-45.

3. VII. 101.6-*tasminnātmā jagatastastasthuṣaśca*; cf. Bloomfield, M., *Rigveda Repetitions*, p. 121.

Sūrya. The word *ātmā* has been interpreted in these two contexts by the commentators differently. Sāyaṇa[4] interprets the word to mean the soul of the world, the cause of all effects whether moveable or immoveable in the case of Sūrya while in the context of Parjanya it means, according to him,[5] only the body. Mādhava, a pre-Sāyaṇa Commentator of the *Ṛgveda*, also takes the word to mean *jīvabhūtaḥ* in the case of the former, while in the case of the latter no such meaning has been given.[7] Yāska does not explain its sense though he says in the context of its preceding *pāda* that Sūrya by its greatness has filled the earth, heaven and the intermediate region.[8] From the context the all-pervasive character of Sūrya is clearly expressed. Therefore the interpretation of the commentators appears to be correct. Similar phraseology with slight difference has been used in case of Sūrya at least twice. Once[9] in place of *ātmā patim* has been used while in the second phrase[10] *gopā* replaces *ātmā*. The phrase in question is continued in its use

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4. Max Müller, F. (ed) *Rigveda*, Vol. I, p. 509- *idrigbhūtamaṇḍalāntarbarto Sūryo antaryāmitayā sarvasya prerakaḥ paramātmā jagato jaṅgamasya tasthuṣaḥ sthāvarsya cātmā svarūpabhūtaḥ| sa hi saravsya sthāvarajaṅgamātmakasya kāryavargasya kāraṇam ...| sthāvarajangamātmakasya sarvasya Prāṇijātasya jīvātmā|.*

5. ibid, vol. III, p. 210- *atasminna Parjanya jagato jaṅgamsya tasthuṣaḥ sthāvarsya cātmā deho vartate|.*

6. Sarup, L. (ed) *Rigveda Samhitā*, vol. I, p. 600.

7. ibid, vol. IV, p. 1159.

8. *Nirukta*. XII. 16-*āpūpurad dyāvā-prithivyau cāntirikṣaṁ ca mahattvena sūrya ātmā jaṅgamasya ca sthāvarsya ca|.*

9. *RV*., VII. 66.15- *Śīrṣṇaḥ śīrṣṇo jagatastasthuṣaśpatim|.*

10. ibid, VII. 60.2- *Viśvasya sthātur jagataśca gopā.*

throughout the Vedic literature[11] in connection with Sūrya while in the case of Parjanya there is no continuity of the tradition.[12] In view of all these facts we are inclined to brand it as a distinctive phrase applied to Sūrya.

This phrase contains the highest metaphysical thought of the identity of the self and the god. It shows one of the earliest forms of Brāhmanical monism. It is significant to point out that in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[12]-a it is explained as the soul of all fixed and moving things. The *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*[13] cites this verse as the evidence in favour of its doctrine of the identity of the self and the Sun. Sāyaṇa as shown earlier takes it in a metaphysical sense and illustrates the doctrine by a quotation from the *Brahmasūtra* (III. 3). Thus it is evident that in the period of the later Vedic literature it was definitely of great spiritual significance.

Hopkins[14] contends that this identification of the Sun with the all-spirit is distinctly a late feature does

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11. *AV.*, XIII. 2.35d ; XX. 107. 14d ; *VS.*, VII. 42d ; XIII. *TS.*, 46d ; 1. 4. 43 II.4.14.4d *MS.*, 1.3.37d : 43.9 ; *KS.* IV. 9d : XXII. 5d ; *Ārs.*, V. 3d ŚB. IV. 3.4.10d ; VII.5 .2.27 ; *TB.*, II. 8.7 4d ; *AĀ.* II.2. 4. 7; 3.2.3. 10d ; *TĀ.*, I.7.6d ; I.13.1d. In the *Grihya* and the *Śrauta Sutras* the use of hymn of which this is a part is mentioned. see *ŚŚS.*, IX. 20, *AŚ.*, VI. 5. 8. ; *ŚGS.* IV.6.4. cf. Bloomfield, M., *Vedic Concordance*, 1025.

12. *Vedic Concordance*, p. 413.

12-a. *Sūrya ātmā jāgatastastasthusaścetyeṣa hyaṣya sarvasyātmā* yacca *jagadyaśca tiṣṭhati* ; Weber (ed) *ŚB.*, p. 617.

13. II. 2. 4. 7-*tad yo'haṁ so'sau yo'sau so'sam, Sūrya ātmā jagatastasthuṣaścetiḥ Anukramaṇikā* quotes it in support of its stand that there is only one god. *Bṛhaddevatā* (I. 61.) regards sūrya as the source of all that moves and is stationary.

14. op. cit. p 42.

not appear to bear scrutiny. This question of the relative antiquity of this concept may be examined from the following points of view. The time of the passage where it occurs is to be examined. According to Keith[15] the hymn in question will fall in the second stage of the development of the *Ṛgveda*, the first being that of the family-books (II-VII). It will be earlier than the third (VIII-I. 1 to 50), the fourth (IX) and the last (X) (books) stages of the development. In view of the fact that similar phrases[16] with slight differences of words but of similar meanings are applied to Sūrya in the family books we are inclined to place it in the first stage of the development.

The author of this hymn, Kutsa[17] belongs to the Āṅgirasas, one of the oldest families of the *Ṛgveda*. Āṅgirasas are referred to in the earliest strata of the *Ṛgveda*.[18] There is a reference to Jiṣṇu, son of the Aṅgiras in one of the family books[19]. It shows that the earliest portions the *Ṛgveda* were familiar with the Āṅgiras family. In the *Atharvaveda*[20] there were definite families of the Āṅgirasas. In view of all these it is difficult to agree with those who view the Āṅgirasas as the semi-mythical beings.[21] More acceptable is the view that they were originally priests of the Indo-Iranian period.[22] However,

15. *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣads*, p. 2
16. *ṚV.*, VII. 60.2 ; 66.15.
17. Sāyaṇa on *ṚV*. I.115,1 assigni is to Kutsa.
18. III.31.5-10.
19. IV. 40.1-*Āngirasasya Jiṣṇoḥ*.
20. XXIII. 4.8, cf. *TS.*, VII. i.4.1. ; *PB.* ; XX. 11. 1. see Macdonell, Op. cit. p142-143.
21. Macdonell & Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, Vol., I, p. 11.
22. Weber, *Indische Studien*, I, p. 219.

it is indicated that the author of the hymn belonged to an ancient family and it is no wonder if his expressions are products of an ancient tradition.

Thirdly from the point of view of the similarity in thought the question may be examined. The identity of the god and the universe in connection with the Sūrya is expressed in many hymns occurring in the family books whose early character has been accepted. Thus once it is said that Sūrya is beheld by all the same, the creator and the created.[23] In another verse[23-a] he has been described as the lord of every moving and stationary object. Here the words, *Sīrṣṇaḥ, sīrṣṇo* show complete identity. At other occasion he is called the preserver of all that is moving or stationary.[24] In the last two cases the phraseology is similar to that in discussion. There are many references[25] to the supremacy and identity of the sun with the universe in other parts of the *Ṛgveda* but in view of their late character we are not taking them as evidence here. It is significant to point out that the phrase is part of the description of the material Sun. It shows that the concept of a spirit behind the physical phenomenon was always present before the Vedic seers from the very beginning. In the *Upaniṣads* such concept of a *Puruṣa* in the Sun was directly voiced. Thus it may be suggested that Sūrya

23. *ṚV.*, VII. 62. 1 *Samo divā dadriśe rocamānaḥ kratvākṛtaḥ sukṛtaḥ kartribhir bhūt |.*

23. a ibid, VII.66. 15.

24. ibid, VII.60.2.

25. X.114.5 ; X. 177 cf. *AV.*, VII.1.2, *TS.*, II.12.1 ; *T.B.*, III.5.7.2.

26. *BĀU.*, II.3.1 ; *MU.* ; VI.3 ; *CU.* 3.19.1.
Ādityo brahmetyādeśaḥ.

was regarded as the source of all moving and stationary objects in a Ṛgvedic circle represented by Kutsa of the Āṅgirasa family.

It is an expression of the belief of the Indo-Āryans that the Sun is the nucleus of the original power which is immanent in all creations and which transcends all the moveable and the immoveable things of the universe. This concept approaches the Upaniṣadic ideal of monism and pantheism.

ŚĀNTARAKṢITA AND KAMALAŚĪLA

ANANTALAL THAKUR

Patna

I

The spread of Buddhism in Tibet was largely the work of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla, two Indian missionaries from Nalanda. The heyday of the Buddhist University was not over. Scholars from far and near still came there and it continued in its premier position among the centres of Buddhist culture with the joint help of the Pala Kings, the benevolent citizens of the Kingdom and above all, the devoted Professors and students.

Śāntarakṣita was born in a princely family of Gauḍa in Zahor, identified with Sābhār in the district of Dacca, now in Bangla Desh. The date of his birth is unknown. But it is said he was born in the reign of Gopāla (died c. 705 A. D.), the first Pala King of Gauḍa and Magadha.

About his early life and education we know but little from the accounts preserved. But a study of his extant works shows that he was well-versed in all the branches of Indian Philosophy, Sanskrit grammar and *belles lettres*, besides Tantras which formed an important item in the curriculum in those days. Tibetan records inform us that he was a Svātantrika-mādhyamika and was raised to the position of a Professor at Nalanda. He is sometimes called the high priest of Nalanda and the spiritual teacher of the King of Magadha.

Śāntarakṣita's stay at Nalanda was fruitful. Scholars like Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra studied under him. He was respected as a scholar as well as a man. Presumably he wrote the *Vipañcitārthā* on the *Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti and the *Tattvasaṁgraha* while at Nalanda. But it is not clear from the records why and when he left Nalanda. We find him in Nepal when King Khri Sron. de. Tsan (728-864 A. D.) ascended the throne of Tibet (743 A. D.) and wanted that Buddhism should take the place of the Bon feticism as the state religion of his country. He engaged scholars both Tibetan and Indian to translate the Mahāyāna texts into Tibetan. But here the King was opposed by some of his ministers. Those in favour of the religion of the Buddha sougth help from the South and sent their men to Mon. yul. One of these men came to India for pilgrimage and on his way back met Ācārya Śāntarakṣita in Nepal. Highly impressed by his character and erudition, the Tibetan dignitary, Gsal.snan became his disciple, took him to Man.yul and erected a monastery there. The Indian preceptor conferred upon him, the title of Yese.dvan. After a brief stay at Man.Yul, Śāntarakṣita returned to Nepal. His disciple went home to inform the King of the Ācārya and the help to be expected from his visit to Tibet.

The King removed the obstacles in his way and sent a mission headed by Yese.dvan to Nepal to invite the Ācārya to Tibet. Eventually the Ācārya reached there and was accorded a reception befitting his position. He expounded the doctrines of Buddhism. But his stay in Tibet was cut short by calamities which befell the land and were thought to be the consequence of the attempt at introduction of the new religion. The Ācārya again returned to Nepal.

Yese. dvan now went to China to study Buddhism and was highly honoured there. The King of Tibet in the meantime tried in vain to take Śāntarakṣita back to his Kingdom. On his return from China, Yese. dvan was deputed for this purpose and he succeeded in his mission. Disturbances broke out again to quench which the assistance of Padmasambhava, a great Tāntrika Ācārya from Uḍḍīyana was thought necessary. Another mission was sent and Ācārya Padmasambhava was found at Man. yul on his way to Tibet.

The joint efforts of the two Indian Ācāryas began to bear fruit. The great monastery of Sam. ye with its twelve temples, two mausolia and the surrounding wall was built. The famous monastery of Odantapuri in Magadha served as the model. The walls of the new monastery displayed portraits of the great sages like Śārīputra, Rāhula, Nāgārjuna, Śubhaṅkara, Śrīgupta and Jñānagarbha. The Buddhist images in the temples were of course made on Tibetan pattern.

It was the beginning of Lamaism in Tibet. Ācārya Śāntarakṣita was appointed head of the Buddhist church in the country. At first twelve Indian monks of the Sarvāstivāda school of Magadha were invited. And then they picked up seven novices from among the Tibetans. Gradually Tibetans began to be ordained as monks. The deep erudition of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita and the uncommon occult powers of Ācārya Padmasambhava brought spiritual and material prosperity to the Kingdom. A good number of Indian scholars were invited to translate the Sanskrit Buddhist works into Tibetan with the help of Tibetan scholars. As a result religious literature of Tibet was highly enriched. The scholars,

thus invited took up on themselves the task of looking after the spiritual welfare of the newly ordained monks.

After thirteen years of distinguished service to Tibet, Ācārya Śāntarakṣita met with an accident which resulted in his death. Before this, it is said, he foresaw a split in the Tibetan Buddhist church. To counteract this he advised his followers to invite Ācārya Kamalaśīla from Nalanda, who, as pointed out earlier, happened to be his disciple and wrote the *Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā* on the *magnum opus* of the teacher.

A rift actually occurred when Mahayana Hoshang, a Chinese Buddhist scholar came and began to preach unorthodox ideas. He gathered considerable following in the country. The Tibetan Buddhist church was now split into two warring camps. It was a matter of concern to the devout Buddhists including the King. The latter at the advice of the true followers of the path decided to act upto the wishes of the late Ācārya and Kamalaśīla was invited to Tibet. On his arrival, an arrangement was made for a debate between the Chinese and Indian scholars. The King acted as the umpire. Kamalaśīla refuted his opponent and established his thesis. As previously settled, his adversary garlanded him and left the country for good. Amply rewarded by the King, Kamalaśīla was placed at the head of the metaphysical branch of the Buddhist church of Tibet.

It is said that the opponents of Kamalaśīla murdered him. And his embalmed body is still preserved in a Tibetan monastery.

Kamalaśīla has been called a 'great Buddhist Philosopher of Magadha'. But his sur-name śīla (Sans, *Śrī-la*) seems to indicate that he also hailed from

Bengal. This sur-name along with 'Rakṣita' is still current there.

The three Indian Ācāryas along with the King are highly respected in Tibet. Ācārya Śāntarakṣita is also called 'Bodhisattva' which signifies his place in the heart of the Tibetans.

II

Śāntarakṣita wrote on Philosophy and Tantra as well as composed hymns. It may be presumed that all his works were first written in Sanskrit and then gradually translated into Tibetan by members of his school. The Tibetan catalogues give the following list of his works :

(1) Aṣṭatathāgatastotra

(2) Tattvasaṁgraha

(3) Mādhyamakālaṁkārakārikā

(4) Vajradharasaṅgītabhāgavatastotraṭīkā

(5) Vajravidāraṇidharaṇīṭīkā

(6) Vipañcitārthā Commentary on the *Vādanyāya* of Dharamakīrti.

(7) Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā

(8) Saptatathāgatapraṇidhānavistarasūtrāntavacana

(9) Saptatathāgatapūrvapraṇidhānaviśeṣavistarakalpavacanavidhi

(10) Sarvatathāgatapūrvapraṇidhānaviśeṣavistarasūtrāntopadeśa and

(11) Hevajrodbhavakurukulyāpañcamahopadeśa.

Besides these, Sanskrit manuscripts of Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasiddhi* have been discovered. The *Tattvasaṁgraha*

is the most important work of the Ācārya. The original Sanskrit version of it along with the *Pañjikā* by Kamalaśīla was published in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda. A complete English Translation of both the text as well as the commentary by Mm. Dr. Ganganatha Jha appeared in the same series. Another edition of the text and the commentary with some textual improvements on the basis of fresh manuscripts has been published from Varanasi. Since their first publication in 1926, the *Saṁgraha* and the *Pañjikā* have opened up new vistas of research to the students of Indian Philosophy.

The Tibetan sources inform us that the *Saṁgraha* and the *Pañjikā* were translated into Tibetan by the Indian Panditas Guṇakaraśrībhadra and Kumāraśrībhadra with the help of the Tibetan scholars Lha. bla. ma. shi. wa. hod. and Shes. rab. hbro. sen. kar respectively. The *Tattvasaṁgraha* is written in verses, their total number being 3645. It is a compendium divided into twenty-six sections called *Parīkṣās* 'examinations'. Each of these sections examines a doctrine prevalent in the then Indian schools. Śāntarakṣita first collects the views of the opponents on each topic and then crtically examines them one after another. Below is given a list of the topics dealt with in the *Saṁgraha*.

(1) Primordial matter (*prakṛtiparīkṣā*) of the Sāṁkhyas.

(2) The Creator of the universe (*Īśvara*) of the logicians.

(3) Matter *cum* God (*Prakṛtīśobhaya*) of the Pātañjalas.

(4) Self-existence (*Svabhāva*).

(5) *Śabdabrahma* of the Grammarians.

(6) Anthropomorphic God (*Puruṣa*) of the Vedas and Purāṇas.

(7) Soul (*Ātmā*) of the logicians, Mīmāṁsakas, Sāṁkhyas, Digambaras, non-dualists and Buddhists of the Vātsīputrīya school.

(8) Permanence of things (*Sthirabhāva*) of the Mīmāṁsakas, Logicians and others.

(9) Actions and their results (*Karmaphala*).

(10-15) Categories of the Vaiśeṣika School.

(16) Relation between words and objects (*Śabdārtha*).

(17) Perception (*Pratyakṣa*) of the Logicians, Mīmāṁsakas and others.

(18) Inference (*Anumāna*) in non-Buddhist schools.

(19) Other means of cognition (*Pramāṇāntara*) accepted by the opponents.

(20) Non-absolutism (*Syādvāda*) of the Jainas.

(21) Three points of the time (*Traikālya*).

(22) Cārvaka doctrines (*Lokāyata*).

(23) Existence of the external world (*Bahirartha*) of the Logicians, Mīmāṁsakas and some Buddhist schools.

(24) Revealed Literature (*Śruti*)

(25) Self-validity of knowledge (*Svataḥprāmāṇya*),

and (26) Omniscience (*Sarvajña*)

This shows that the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṁsakas are the main targets of Śāntarakṣita's attack. The other schools received less attention. But he was well-read in all the branches of learning—orthodox and non-orthodox. Many texts he has quoted or used

have been lost. The *Saṁgraha* along with the *Pañjikā* has thus proved to be a source of information about the missing links in the history of different philosophical schools. Among his predecessors in the Buddhist school, the *Saṁgraha* quotes or mentions Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Among the non-Buddhist authors Kumārila, the Mimāṁsaka and Uddyotakara, the Naiyāyika occupy the most important position. He has quoted a number of verses from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭikā* which is no longer extant.

The *Vipañcitārthā* explains in detail the position of Dharmakīrti in relation to the points of defeat (*nigrahasthānas*). Dharmakīrti accepts only two such points (*asādhanāṅgavacana*—presenting in a debate a proposition non-conductive to the establishment of the thesis of the speaker and *adoṣodbhāvana*—non-pointing to a fallacy in the opponent's argument) and refutes the Nyāya position which accepts twenty-two types besides the five *hetvābhāṣas* (fallacies of the probans). While explaining the text Śāntarakṣita refers to the views of Aviddhakaraṇa, Prīticandra and Bhāvivikta among the important Nyāya commentators (whose works are no longer extant) along with that of Mādhava, the Sāṁkhya scholar, who earned the sobriquet *Sāṁkhyanāśaka* —destroyer of Sāṁkhya (the reading in the printed text : *Sāṁkhyānām śakamādhava* is evidently faulty). Dr. V. Raghavan in one of his articles has given useful information about Mādhava whom Umbeka places before Kumārila. The Sanskrit version of the *Vipañcitārthā* has been published in the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society (Vol XXI, pt. IV & XXII. pt. I) along with the text of the *Vādanyāya* by Mahāpaṇḍita Rāhula Sankrityayana from manuscripts preserved in Tibet.

About the other works of Śāntarakṣita preserved in Tibetan versions our knowledge is scanty. The titles show that they were Tāntric texts connected with esoteric practices of Buddhists.

Besides the voluminous *Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā*, Kamalaśīla wrote :

(1) Āryavajracchedikāprajñāpāramitāṭīkā
(2) Āryasaptaśatikāprajñāpāramitāṭīkā
(3) Ḍākinīvajraguhyagītīmarmopadeśa.
(4) Tattvāloka
(5) Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasaṁkṣepa
(6) Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayaṭīkā
(7) Bodhicaryāpradīpa
(8) Bodhicittabhāvanā
(9) Bhāvanāyogāvatāra
(10) Mādhyamākālaṁkārapañjikā
(11) Mādhyamakāloka and
(12) Sarvadharmasvabhāvasiddhi.

He is further said to have translated the *Mahāmudropadeśavajraguhyagītā* into Tibetan. Of his works the *Pañjikā* alone is extant in Sanskrit. Kamalaśīla like his preceptor has followed the practice of giving historical and philosophical information about the text he comments upon. While commenting upon the *Tattvasaṁgraha* he quotes the views of authors of the different schools many of whom are otherwise little known.

Among the Naiyāyikas Kamalaśīla quotes from the subcommentaries of Aviddhakarṇa, Bhāvivikta and Śankarasvāmin on the *Nyāyabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana. We have, elsewhere, tried to assess the importance of these quotations. Among the Vaiśeṣika works, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* have been quoted several times. These quotations

suggest the necessity of re-editing the current text of Kaṇāda's treatise. The next Vaiśeṣika author quoted by Kamalaśīla is Praśastamati. He has been identified by us with Praśastapāda, author of the *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*, wrongly called the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. This Praśastamati or Praśastapāda wrote an elaborate commentary on the ancient *Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya* from which passages have been quoted in the *Dvādaśāranayacakraṭīkā* of Siṁhasūri also. The present *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*, called *Padārthapraveśaka* by Kamalaśīla is but a short digest of his views given in the *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*.

Apart from Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, Buddhist authors like Śubhagupta, Ghoṣaka, Dharmatrāta, Yogasena, Buddhadeva and Vasumitra have been mentioned by him,

Ubeyaka of Kamalaśīla seems to be identical with Umbeka, the earliest commentator on Kumārila's *Ślokavārtika*. Samaṭa and Yajñaṭa are two little-known Mīmāṁsa authors mentioned in the *Pañjikā*.

Ahrīka is not a person as has been supposed. The word points to a Digambara Jaina in general. Sumati, Pātrasvāmin and Ācāryasūri are other Jaina scholars referred to by Kamalaśīla. Rudrila identified with Vindhyavāsin, the Sāṁkhya author has also been mentioned by him. So are Kambalāśvatara and Purandara, two authors of the Cārvaka school. Besides these, Kamalaśīla mentions a literary work called *Sītāharaṇakāvya* which might be identical with the *Jānakīharaṇa* of Kumāradāsa.

The works of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla received less publicity in India than they deserve. It may be due to the author's missionary engagements in Tibet and the rise of the Vikramaśīla University which, later

on eclipsed the glory of Nalanda scholars. Vācaspatimiśra and Vidyānanda, however, quote and criticise verses from the *Tattvasaṁgraha* in the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā* and the *Āptamīmāṁsā* respectively. Cakrapāṇidatta in his commentary on the *Carakasaṁhitā* (I. xi. 25) quotes two Kārikās from the *Tattvasaṁgraha* with the *Pañjikā* thereon.

With all the recent critical studies, the works of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalśīla have not received the attention they deserve. A comparison of the Sanskrit texts with the Tibetan versions may clarify many a naughty issue, while a thorough study of the Tibetan versions where Sanskrit original is lost may throw new light on the authors and their environment.

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FOLK DANCE-TRADITION IN MITHILĀ

UPENDRA THAKUR,

Magadh University, Bodh-Gaya

Folk-dance is of great national importance and aesthetic value as it often portrays the character of a people through their amusements for in the hour of mirth, the mind is unrestrained and takes its natural bent. Distinct from the so-called sophisticated art, known as the classic art, this rural art, though placed in a lower scale of value, faithfully displays a profundity of philosophical conception, an integrity of feeling and a standard of virile and artistic expression, in no way inferior to the sophisticated forms of art and dance. On the other hand, they are, in some respect, of greater significance as they are a very faithful, subtle, direct and natural expression of the innermost spirit of a community. Like the folk-songs, folk-dances also speak of pleasures and sorrows, tears and smiles, ups and downs, success and frustration and the various currents and cross-currents in the day-to-day life of the common man. Indeed, it is the only medium through which his suppressed soul and intense feelings and sentiments find a free play, unrestrained and unobstructed. It is really the mirror of the common man, who has remained all the same throughout the centuries inspite of the numerous outward changes and convulsions in the society, because it manifests his temperament, art, culture, social status, customs, religion and creed.

I

Mīthilā or North Bihar may well be termed as the land of folk-songs and classical music. The extensive folk-literature of Mithilā amply speaks of the mode how the people at large tried to express themselves in folk-forms. Its variety and richness is unique. It reveals the worlds of idealism and romance, the supreme moments of happiness and glory. The Maithila folk-dance tradition is unique in that it contains certain peculiarities that are hardly to be found elsewhere. Its historicity is to be traced back to the hoary past and goes side by side with folk-songs which are varied in nature and rich in contents. Right from birth to death it covers all the aspects of the living and the dead. It is however, to be noted that while we have very interesting description of the various forms of the dancing in Jyotirīśvara Thākura's *Varṇana Ratnākara*, (14th century), we have no such description or enumeration of the different forms of folk-dance in any other ancient or later work.

In Mithilā, the land of excessive orthodoxy and conservativeness,[1] dancing, as an art, was an object of hatred and abhorrence among the intellectuals and as such deserved outright condemnation rather than appreciation and encouragement at their hands. And, folk-dance, to say the least, attracted little or no notice of the sophisticated and cultured in the world of intellect, as it was all a rustic affair with little or no aesthetic value whatever. Moreover, the language of the village-folk or mass was never deemed a proper vehicle for intellectual expressions or learned dissertations among

1. For details, see Upendra Thakur, *History of Mithilā*, and *Studies in Jainism and Buddhism in Mithilā*.

the Paṇḍitas. All honour, therefore, to Jyotirīśvara, who, first of all, described and enumerated the various kinds of dancing in his immortal work, *Varṇana Ratnākara* (in Maithilī).[2] He has devoted three sections of his work to the art of dancing.

We have mention of the ten qualifications of the drum-player (*muraji*), twelve kinds of drum music (*murajavādya*), the time beats (*tāla*), the ten *rasas*, the thirty *vyabhichāribhāvas* and so forth. Accordingly, the *Pātra* was a dancing girl who was well-versed in the thirty-two kinds of movements and the equal number of grace. The *Preraṇa* was a male-dancer. We have discription of the various kinds of dances they executed, and finally we have a list of 27 kinds of *vīṇās* (or lutes).[3] We have yet another work, *Śrī Hastamuktāvali*[4] (in Sanskrit), composed by Mahārāja Shubhaṅkara Thākura (16th century) of the Khaṇḍavāla dynasty[5] which deals with various kinds of the art of dancing on traditional line. But both these works are mainly concerned with the various forms of classical dancing.

Though literary sources fail to give us complete picture of the folk-dance tradition in Mithilā, the folk-songs (songs of the rustic) preserves some of the dance-traditions, yet performed at the time of certain religious

2. Edited by S. K. Chatterjee and Śrī Srikrishna Mishra and published by Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta.

3. Ibid.

4. MS. is preserved in the Library of Shri Hemraj Sharma, Nepal.

5. For a detailed history of this dynasty, see Upendra Thakur, "Socio-economic Life in Mithilā" and "Sanskrit Learning in Mithilā under the Khaṇḍavāla dynasty" in *JBRS* (Mahārāja Kāmeshwar Singh Memorial Vol., Pt. I), 1961, Section II, pp. 64-104.

and social ceremonies. Beside these, archaeological sources also enlighten us on this important aspect of social life. The terracotta art—the art of the rustic mass, throws a vivid light on the different aspects of folk-dance. The clay-figurines, as they are known to us, speak of the centuries-old glorious tradition which even now survives in some form or other. They offer valuable material for the study of contemporary religious conceptions, amusements, pastimes, dress and ornaments. Terracotta figurines found in Vaiśālī and other parts of Mithilā constitute glowing testimony to this wonderful art of the people which was otherwise neglected and very often condemned to languish for want of adequate patronage and encouragement by the sophisticated section of the society.

These little clay-toys, burnt or otherwise, give us a clue to the whole outlook of the people of those times. They are in many ways better records of the thoughts and aspirations of the people of the times than the overwhelming flood of philosophical treatises and literary compositions synchronistic with these terracottas. It is true that we do not get an exact idea of folk-dance from these clay figures; nevertheless they present some of the forms that still survive in this centuries-old tradition. An examination of the Vaiśālī terracottas discovered in different excavations at Kauśāmbī, Buxar, Pāṭalīputra, Belwa (Saran), Kāsiā (Kuśīnārā) and the Didarganj image of the Mauryan age as well as the reliefs at Bharhut of the following century reveals some of familiar aspects of folk-dance tradition in Mithilā in the matter of dress—the same pattern followed throughout Northern India all through the eight centuries beginning with the Mauryas (300 B. C. - 500 A. D.). The head-dress and necklace,

the waist-chain and the *dhotī* going round the waist with one end pressed by the chain behind and the other end hanging down in front between the things and the legs up to the ankles and rings round the ankles ; no cover for the portion of the body below the neck and about the waist and, in case of males, no cover for the thighs and the legs, and nothing for the arms except a broad chain round each of them against the armpit, as gleaned from these terracottas, unfold a unique story for us about the life and work of this common man. Poor and helpless as always, he directed his energies towards creating the stage on which to appear himself with the wife, the children, kinsmen and the comrades, singing and dancing all, playing on the *mṛdaṅga* and the *Vīṇā*, in perfect glee as it were, partly because of his love and enjoyment of life and partly because of his desire to forget his troubled existence for a while, and also for the recreation of his master, the king or the noble. Bereft of all aspirations after perfections as set for the ideal of life in the philosophical treatises and literary compositions, these myriads of unthinking human beings found solace in their traditional songs and dance—their only medium of recreation and merry-making.

II

Against this background, it is interesting to make a study of the folk-dance tradition in Mithilā which still survives partly, if not wholly. Notwithstanding the transformations in the process of evolution as regards the costumes and other aspects, the principle remains the same, though performance varies according to variances in individual taste and communal trends of thought and culture.

As we know, art in India receives its greatest inspiration from religion whether that art be painting, architecture, literature, music or dancing. Unlike other countries, in India, in all cases, religion is the background. Naturally, therefore, dance-themes mostly depict scenes or episodes from the stories of mythology or scripture.

The folk-dance of Mithilā may roughly be divided into two broad classes: (i) the women's dance and (ii) the men's dance. Unlike the Santhals and other aboriginal tribes, the sexes do not generally take part in dancing together in Mithila. According to the subject-matter, the dances may then be divided into two main classes — (i) Social—those being semi-religious and connected with seasonal festivals and (ii) purely religious. It is, however, never possible to place a particular dance exclusively in any one of these main categories as most dances though predominantly religious or social, also bear traces of other themes. It is, therefore, dangerous to draw a line between social and ceremonial dances for, that which is serious ritual in one generation, becomes merely the amusement of the next, and perhaps even the children's game of the phase following. But, inspite of these rapid changes, most of these dances retain sufficient of their ancient character from which inferences about their origin may be drawn. The festivals and ceremonies with which they are now linked, also furnish, to some extent, a valuable clue to their pristine significance, however much the performers may have forgotten about their meanings.

Some of the popular folk-dances that are even now performed in Mithilā on different occasions, are as

follows :—

(1) *Dasaut* or *Ghasakaṭṭī*

A grass-cutting dance performed by women on the occasion of the marriage ceremony among the Mithila Brahmins.

(2) *Kīrtana* or *Kīrtaniyā*

A dance performed by all people without distinction of caste or rank and associated with the worship of Viṣṇu, based on Purāṇaic episodes, founded by Umāpati Upādhyāya (17th C. A. D.).

(3) *Rāmalīlā*

A part of the famous Yātrā (journey) which is rather an operative than a dance performance, generally staged in the open greens of villages in honour of Rādhā-Kriṣṇa, Hara-Pārvatī, Gaṅgā, based on *Mahābhārata* episodes.

(4) *Holī.*

A dance performed by the villagers on the eve of the Holī festival.

(5) *Jaṭā-Jaṭina.*

A versified performance by the young women (resembling one-act play) depicting the matrimonial life of the *Jaṭā* (lover) and the *Jaṭina* (lady-love), for bringing rain.

(6) *Sāma-chakevā.*

A simple village-dance in which actors are represented through clay-images, performed for inspiring pure love in the hearts of brother and sister.

(7) *Nayanā-Jogina.*

A ritual connected with the marriage-ceremony among Maithila Brahmans, bearing Tantric sinificance.

(8) *Salhesa-pūjā.*

The song of King Salhesa, popular among low-caste people, written in prose and chanted.

(9) *Kamalā-pūjā.*

The song of Kamalā, the water-goddess who is worshipped by Mallāhas (fishermen).

(10) *Kosī-pūjā.*

Celebrated against the background of the song of the Kosī river, prevalent in some parts of Tirhut *

III

Besides the above dances, there are other minor dances among the different classes of low-caste people. The *Goraiyān* dance among the Dānukas and the Musaharas; the serpent dance among the *Saperas* or *naṭas* ; the *Rāhu dance* among the *Dusādha* ; *Dīnābhadrī* among the Musaharas and others among the Chamaras (Domes) ; the *Mana-chubbhi* and Bhikhārī Ṭhākur's *Bidesiā* deserve special mention. Of these the *Rāhu-pūjā* among the Dusādhas is of no less importance than the *Salhesa Pūjā*. The Dusadhas trace their descent from Rahu who is as such a great object of worship among this caste. On this occasion a huge sacrificial pit is made and out of it spring forth the raging flames towards the sky. The *bhagata* or the priest with a stick in his hand chants a song and crosses the flames along with two others. And, then the *Bhagata* starts showering blessings on the devotees who include all classes of people. The style of performance is almost the same as in the *Salhesa-pūjā*. The *Manachubhi* (one which pierces the mind) and the *Bidesiyā* (though not originally

* This section of the paper is abridged by the Editorial Board.

Maithila and imported from South Bihar) are also very popular dances with the low caste people.

And lastly, a few words about *Marciā*. The Muslims of almost every district of Darbhanga and Muzaffarpur have incorporated dancing into their great mourning period of Muharram as part of the ceremonies which express their grief. The principal dances of this occasion are called *Marciā* and *Jāri* (meaning mourning). The dancers form themselves into a ring, and holding up the flowing skirts of their dhoties in one hand, and waving scarlet pieces of cloth in the other, move round stamping out a rhythm with the aid of the ball-anklets worn on the ankles and small bamboo sticks to the tune of songs led by the presentor of the group, who stands outside the ring of the performers and intones the dirges relating to the tragic events on the battlefield of Karbalā when the two brothers, Hassan and Hussain, met their untimely ends.

It can be safely remarked that the life and energy of the dance seem to be derived almost entirely from incidents in the colourful lives of the Hindu heroes and gods whose festivals are celebrated in great number throughout the year or, it may be suggested, it seems to be derived from the incidents of the peasant's own lives, lived so close to nature, and so dependent on her moods.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE TENSE-FORMATION IN SOME OF THE MAIN DIALECTS OF HINDI.

UDAI NARAIN TIWARI
University of Jabalpur

0.1 The ten classes (gaṇas) into which the Sanskrit grammarians arranged *OIA* verb roots became levelled down to one in Apabhraṁśa. Original thematic affixes were either dropped or incorporated with the root in *MIA*. The elaborate system of tenses and moods underwent the greatest simplification possible in *NIA* languages and dialects.

0. 1.1 Below are given the suffixes which form various tenses in the three main dialects of Hindi. These three include standard Hindi, Braj Bhākhā and Awadhī. The materials on which the analysis is based is the standard Hindi of the upper class people, Braj Bhākhā of khurjā Tahsil of Bulandshahr and Awadhī of Meja Tehsil of Allahabad district.*

0. 2. For the purpose of analysis, the tenses of verb of these three dialects can be classified as follows :—

0. 2. 1. Radical Tenses.

0. 2. 1.1 Compound Tenses.

0. 3. First of all, the participial and auxiliary-verb forms have been analysed separately. After this the formation of various tenses have been explained.

*The materials for Braj Bhākhā and Awadhī have been supplied by my two students Dr. Mahavir Saran Jain and Śri Dinesh Prasad Shukla, M. A.

1. 1. Participial Forms.

In standard Hindi, Braj-Bhakhā and Awadhī, the compound tenses are formed by suffixing the auxiliary verbs to the participial forms. The progressive tenses are formed by adding the auxiliary to the present participial forms, the perfect tenses are made by adding the same auxiliary to the past participial forms and the simple tenses are made by adding the very auxiliary verbs to the future participial forms. These three participial forms, in the three dialects, are given below :—

1.1.1. *Present Participial Forms* :—

(A) *Standard Hindi*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	–t–a	–t–e
F.	–t–ī	–t–ĩ

(B) *Braj—Bhākhā*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	–b–ə̃e~t–ɔ̃	=
F.	–b–ə̃e~t–ī	–bə̃e–tĩ

(C) *Awadhī*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	it~t~ə̃t	=
F.	=	=

1.1.2 *Past Participial Forms*

(A) *Standard Hindi.*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	– a~ya	– e
F.	–ī	≏ – i

(B) *Braj—Bhākhā*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	ɔ~yə̃	– e
F.	– ī	≏ – i

(C) *Awadhī*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	–a~e~ϕ	=
F.	–ī	=

1.1.3. *Future Participial Forms* :—

(A) *and* (*B*) *Standard Hindi and Braj-Bhākhā*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	–na	=
F.	=	=

(C) *Awadhī*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	–∂b~b	=
F.	=	=

1.2. Auxiliary Verbs.

These are found in the following five forms :–

1.2.1. Present Definite auxiliary verb.

1.2.2. Past Definite auxiliary verb.

1.2.3. Future Definite auxiliary verb.

1.2.4. Present Imperative auxiliary verb.

1.2.5. Past conjunctive auxiliary verb.

1.2.1. *Present Definite Auxiliary Verb.*

In all the three dialects, the differences due to person, and number exist. In Awadhī, of course, the gender also affects some forms.

(A) *Standard Hindi*

	Sg.	Pl.
I	–h– ũ	–h–ə̃e
II	–h–əe	–h–o
III	–h–əe	–h–ə̃e

(B) *Braj-Bhākhā*

	Sg.	Pl.
I	– ũ	–ə̃e
II	–əe	–ɔ
III	–əe	–ə̃e

(C) *Awadhī*

	Sg.	Pl.	
		M.	F.
I	–h–∂ī~∂–h–∂ī	=	=
II	∂–h–e~h–∂e	∂–h–yʌ	h–∂ū ~∂–h–ū
III	∂–h–∂i	h–ẽ ~∂–h–e	h–∂ī ~∂–h–ĩ

1.2.2. *Past Definite Auxiliary Verb.*

In Standard Hindi and Braj, differences occur due to number and gender but in Awadhī, Person also causes differences.

(A) *Standard Hindi.*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	–th–a	–th–e
F.	–th–ī	–th–ĩ

(B) *Braj—Bhākhā*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	–ə	–e
F.	–ī	–ĩ

(C) *Awadhī*

	Sg.		Pe.	
	M.	F.	M.	F.
I	γəh–e	=	=	=
II	γəh–e	=	γəh–yʌ	γəh–ū
III	γəh–a	γəh–ī	γəh–ẽ	γəh–ĩ

1.2.3. *Future Definite Auxiliary Verb.*

In all the three dialects—Standard Hindi, Braj-Bhākhā and Awadhī, differences occur due to number gender and person.

(A) *Standard Hindi.*

	M.		F.	
	Sg.	Pl.	Sg.	Pl.
I	—ũ—g—a	—ẽ—g—e	—ũ—g—ī	—ẽ—g—ī
II	—e—g—a	—o—g—e	—e—g—ī	—o—g—ī
III	—e—g—a	—ẽ—g—e	—e—g—ī	—ẽ—g—ī

(B) *Brdj—Bhākhā*

	M.		F.	
	Sg.	Pl.	Sg.	Pl.
I	*—uṅ—g—ɔ	—h—g—e ~ ∂ṅ—g—e	—uṅ—g—i	—ṅ—g—ī ~ ∂ṅ—g—ī
II	—e—g—∂	—∂—g—e	—e—g—i	—∂—g—ī
III	—e—g—∂	ṅ—g—e ~ ∂ṅ—g—e	—e—g—ī	ṅ—g—ī ~ ∂ṅ—g—ī

(C) *Awadhi*

	M.		F.	
	Sg.	Pl.	Sg.	Pl.
I	—b—ϕ —b—∂ī	=	=	=
II	—b—e	—b—yʌ	—b—e	—b—ū ~ b—iu
III	—e	—h—ī	—e	—h—ī

* ṅ = ङ् ।

1.2.4. *Present Imperative Auxiliary Verb.*

The forms of present Imperative are found in the second person only. The forms of first and third persons are the same as those of Present Definite auxiliary. In all the three dialects, differences occur due to number only.

(A) *Standard Hindi.*

	Sg.	Pl.
Imperative	$-\phi$	$-O$
Honorofic	$-\phi$	$-$iye

(B) *Braj—Bhākhā*

	Sg.	Pl.
Imperative	ϕ	$-\text{Ɔ}$
Honorofic	ϕ	$-$ie

(C) *Awadhī*

Sg.	Pl.
$-u \sim \phi$	ϕ

1.2.5. *Past Conjunctive Auxiliary Verb.*

The form of Past conjuntive is formed by adding two suffixes after the root √hō. The first Suffix i—ti is

past conjunctive and the second suffiix indicates gender and number in the Standard Hindi and Braj-Bhākhā and person, gender and number in Awadhī.

(A) *Standard Hindi.*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	ho – t – a	– ho – t – e
F.	ho – t – ī	– ho – t – ī̃

(B) *Braj—Bhākhā.*

	Sg.	Pl.
M.	ho – t – ɔ	ho – t – e
F.	ho – t – ī	ho – t – ī̃

(C) *Awadhī*

	Sg.		Pl.	
	M.	F.	M.	F.
I	– ho – tϕ	– ho – t – i	– ho – t – ϕ	– ho – t – i
II	– ho – t – e	– ho – t – e	– ho – t – yʌ	– ho – t – ū
III	– ho – t – ∂i	– ho – t – i	– ho – t – ẽ – eh	– ho – t – in ~ ini

1.3. *Tense formation*

1.3.1. *Radical Tenses*

1.3.1.1 *Present Definite Tense*

Root + Present Definite auxiliary (modified by person, gender and number).

1.3. 1.2. *Past Definite Tense*

Root + Past Definite auxiliary (modified by person, gender and number).

1.3 1.3. *Future Definite Tense*

Root + Future Definite auxiliary (modified by person, gender and number).

1.3 1.4. *Present Imperative Tense*

Root + Present Imperative auxiliary (modified by person, number and gender).

1.3. 1.5. *Past Conjunctivc Tense*

Root + Past Conjunctivc auxiliary (modified by person, number and gender).

1.3.2. *Compound Tenses*

1.3. 2.1. *Present Progressive Definite Tense*

Present Participial forms + forms of Present Definite Tense.

1.3. 2.2. *Past Progressive Definite Tense*

Present participial forms + forms of Past Definite Tense.

1.3. 2.3. *Future Progressive Definite Tense*

Present participial forms + forms of future Definite Tense.

1.3.2.4. *Past Progressive Conjunctive*

Present participial form + forms of Past Conjunctive Tense.

1.3.2.5. *Present Perfect Definite Tense*

Past Participial forms + forms of Present definite Tense.

1.3.2.6. *Past Perfect Definite Tense*

Past participial forms + forms of past definite tense.

1.3.2.7 *Future Perfect Definite Tense*

Past participial forms + forms of future definite Tense.

1.3.2.8. *Past Perfect Conjunctive Tense*

Past participial forms + form sof past Conjunctive Tense.

1.3.2.9. *Present Simple Definite Tense*

Future participial forms + form of present definite tense.

1.3.2.10. *Past Simple Definite Tense.*

Future participial forms + forms of past definite tense.

1.3.2.11. *Future Simple Definite Tense*

Future participial forms + forms of future definite tense.

1.3.2.12. *Past Simple Conjunctive Tense.*

Future participial forms + forms of past conjunctive tense.

पाणिनीयाः 'अभ्यासः' 'आम्रेडितम्' 'अभ्यस्तम्' चेति शब्दाः

भागीरथप्रसाद त्रिपाठी 'वागीशः शास्त्री',
संस्कृतविश्वविद्यालयः, वाराणसी

महामुनिना पाणिनिना 'एकाचो द्वे प्रथमस्य' (६, १, १) इति 'अजादेर्द्वितीयस्य' (६, १, २) इति च सूत्रद्वयाधिकारे द्वित्वमापन्नस्य शब्दस्य द्वयो रूपयोः प्रथमस्याभ्याससंज्ञा विहिता 'पूर्वोऽभ्यासः' (६, १, ४) इति सूत्रेण । कृते सति द्वित्वे मूलरूपस्याभ्याससंज्ञा विधीयते तत्परिचयायेति भवन्ति तत्रैव कार्याणि, नान्यत्र । नास्ति पाणिनीये शास्त्रे काचन व्याख्या खल्वेतस्या अभ्याससंज्ञायाः । 'लिटि धातोरनभ्यासस्य' (६, १८, ८) इति सूत्रेणाभ्याससंज्ञामप्राप्तस्य धातोर्द्वित्वं भवति । लोके द्वित्वस्याऽऽवृत्तेर्वाऽभ्यासरूपेण प्रसिद्धिः (द्र० मेदिनीकोशः) ।

द्वित्वमुपेतं रूपद्वयमेव 'अभ्यस्तम्' इत्युक्तं पाणिनिना–'उभे अभ्यस्तम्' (६, १, ५) । षाष्ठप्रकरणोक्तं द्वित्वमिदम् । जुहोत्यादिप्रकरणपठितानां समेषां धातूनां भवति द्वित्वं सार्वधातुके–√हु–जुहोति, √दा–ददाति, √धा–दधातीत्यादि । चतुर्षु स्थलेषु दृश्यते तद् धातूनाम् ।

१. लिटि,
२. सन्यङ्यङ्लुक्षु,
३. जुहोत्यादौ सार्वधातुके,
४. चङि चेति ।

अभ्यस्तस्य (द्वित्वस्य) द्वितीयं खण्डम् आम्रेडितम् इति प्रतिज्ञातं पाणिनिना (८, १, २) । 'आम्रेडितं भर्त्सने' (८,२, ९२) इति सूत्रे भट्टोजिदीक्षितस्तु–आम्रेडितग्रहणं द्विरुक्तोपलक्षणम्' इति व्याचष्टवान् । अस्मिन्नेव सूत्रे खण्डद्वयमाम्रेडितत्वेनाभ्युपगतम् । 'स्वरितमाम्रेडितेऽसूयासंमतिकोपकुत्सनेषु' (८,२,१०३) इति द्वितीयमेव खण्डम् आम्रेडितत्वेन स्वीकृतम् । अष्टमेऽध्याये 'सर्वस्य द्वे' (८, १, १) इति सूत्रेण विहितं द्वित्वमाम्रेडितमेव–'संभ्रमेण प्रवृत्तौ यथेष्टमनेकधा प्रयोगो न्यायसिद्धः' इति वार्त्तिकम् ।

'जक्षित्यादयः षट्' (६, १, ६) इत्यनेन सूत्रेण तथाविधानामदादिपठितानां

सप्तधातूनां क्रियतेऽभ्यस्तसंज्ञा, येषां काप्यष्टाध्याम्यां द्वित्वं विहितं नास्तीति महच्चित्रम् । ते चेमे—

१. √जक्ष् (जक्ष)=भक्षहसनयोः (प)
२. √जागृ = निद्राक्षये (प)
३. √दरिद्रा = दुर्गतौ (प)
४. √चकास् (चकासृ)=दीप्तौ (प)
५. √शास् (शासृ) = अनुशिष्टौ (प)
६. √दीधी (दीधीङ्)=दीप्तिदेवनयोः (आ)
७. √वेवी (वेवीङ्) =वेतिना तुल्ये (आ) इति ।

एतेषामभ्यस्तसंज्ञकत्वे फलम्–शतुर्नुमभावः ('नाभ्यस्ताच्छतुः' ७, १,७८) । एवं तावद् गच्छन्,गच्छन्तौ, गच्छन्त इत्यादिवन्नेह नुम्–जक्षत्, जक्षतौ, जक्षत इत्यादौ । अभ्यस्तानां (जुहोत्यादि–जक्षित्यादीनाम्) धातूनां तिङ्रूपेष्वपि झस्यान्तादेशो न भवति, 'अदभ्यस्तात्' (७, १, ४) इति निर्देशात् । इत्थं लङ्लङ्लोडादिषु लकारेषु वर्जितो नुमागमः ।।

जक्षधातोरर्थद्वयी लभ्यते—भक्षणं हसनं चेति । धातुरेष धातुद्वयसंमिश्रणरूपः । √घस् इति, √हस् इति च तौ । घस्धातोर्लिटि प्रथमपुरुषस्य द्विवचने बहुवचने च 'जक्षतुः' इति 'जक्षुः' इति च प्रयोगौ परामर्शनीयतामर्हतः । हस्धातोर्द्वित्वे जहास' 'जहसतुः' इत्यादयो दृश्यन्ते प्रयोगाः । हस्य घः, घस्य च ह इति सामान्यम् । अतो हेतोर्घस्हंसोः सभूय द्वित्वप्रयोगः–√जक्ष् इति विज्ञेयः । ऋग्वेदे भक्षणे (जक्षीयात्–१०, २८, १) हसने (जक्षतः–१, ३३, ७) चेत्यर्थद्वये प्रयुक्त एषः ।

जागृधातुः √गृ (गृ) धातोर्द्वित्वीकृतं रूपम् । गृधातुः क्रयादिगणे शब्दार्थ–कश्चुरादौ च विज्ञानार्थको लभ्यते । शब्देन जागरणरूपो निद्राभङ्गो जायते, ज्ञानयो–निर्वा शब्दः । जागरणस्यार्थो ज्ञानम् (अज्ञानक्षयः) अपि संभवति । शब्दार्थकस्य विज्ञानार्थकस्य वा गृधातोर्यङ्लुगन्तं रूपं भवति लटि प्रथमपुरुषस्यैकवचने–'जागर्ति' इति । एवमेव विक्षेपणार्थकस्य √कृ इत्यस्य, प्लवनार्थकस्य √तृ इत्यस्य च यङ्लुगन्तस्य भवति क्रमशो रूपम्–'चाकर्ति' इति, 'तार्ति' इति च ।

दरिद्राधातुः स्वप्नार्थकस्य द्रा (द्रै) धातोर्द्वित्वीकृतं रूपम् । √एष द + √द्रा इत्यनयोर्धात्वोर्मिलितं रूपमपि संभाव्यते । वस्तुतस्त्वभ्यासं प्राप्तस्य √द्रा इत्यस्य स्वरभक्तिवैदिकस्य चन्द्रस्य (चन्दिर) इन्द्रस्य च (इन्दिर) इव न, किन्तु 'दरि' इति जातेत्यद्वितीयं निदर्शनम् । द्राधातोरर्थः–पलायनं निद्रा चेति । दरिद्राधातावनुगतं द्वयमेव । अलसाः पलायनशीलाश्च पुरुषा भवन्ति दुर्गताः ।

दीप्त्यर्थके चकास्धातौ सुस्पष्टं भासते द्वित्वीकृतं रूपं दीप्त्यर्थकस्य सायणनिर्दिष्टस्य कास्धातोः ।

अनुशिष्टयर्थकस्य शास्धातोर्द्वित्वस्य न भवति स्पष्टतेति तदीयमभ्यस्तं विचिकित्सितम् । इच्छार्थकेन (आ) शंस् इत्यनेन धातुना तदीया योजना न संभाव्यते सध्रीचीना ।

√दीधी (दीधीङ्) धातुर्ध्याधातोर्द्वित्वीकृतं रूपम् । एतद् दीप्धातोः 'दी' इत्यस्य, 'ध्या' इत्यस्य च योजनयापि शक्यते भवितुम् ।

√वेवी (वेवीङ्) धातुः स्पष्टत आदादिकस्य गतिव्याप्त्याद्यर्थकस्य वीधातोर्द्वित्वीकृतं रूपम् । उभयत्रार्थाः समानाः ।

'जक्षित्यादयः षट्' इति सूत्रस्य प्रणेतुरिमानि द्वित्वानि विदितान्यभूवन् नवेत्यनुयोगः । नूनं विदितानि किन्तु तेषां नैयत्याभावादेव प्रणीतवान् भगवान् पाणिनिः पार्थक्येन सूत्रमेतत् ।

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THE ROLE OF "YOGIC PERCEPTION" IN THE BUDDHIST THOUGHT

C. L. TRIPATHI

Allahabad University

The joys and pleasures of the Tuṣitaloka where the Amitābha rules, the luxuries and enjoyments of the *Sukhāvatī Vyūha*, the delightful city of Akṇiṣṭha free from the habitation of unclean beings, the grand and glorious personality of the invisible Tathāgata, the vision of the four Noble truths, the *deśanā* of the Lokanātha, the invisible grand vision of the *mahābhiniṣkramaṇa* of the Śākyamuni at midnight, the sentiments of love and piety or *Karuṇā* and benevolence which impel the Blessed Lord to descend on earth, in order to remove the sufferings of the ignorant people and to lead them to the gate of Nirvāṇa revealed to the Buddhists the hollowness of other types of cognition which deal with discrete bare instants and with objects mingled with imagination. They thought 'Is there not a method by which all the grandeur of the objects of sense perception and noble conception be apprehended within a moment ? Is there not some instrument which may reveal the secrets of the heart, the treasures of the hidden earth and the mighty waves of the future ? Is there not some source of the knowledge which may transcend the barriers imposed by sensibility and understanding ? And the result was the discovery of yogic perception.

The yogic perception[1] is the source of revealing

1. *Yogi pratyakṣa.*

all the objects, physical and mental, past, present and future, remote and near, hidden and visible, which are beyond the limits of the intellect or ordinary human beings. It may be defined as the cognition which arises out of contemplation of things, and which is free from conceptual content and error. According to Dharmakīrti it is the perception which is produced from the subculminational state of deep meditation on transcendental reality.[2] In order to understand it, it is important to explain what is 'transcendental reality' and what is 'subculminating point.'[3]

The 'Reality' is transcendental. It is 'existence as such'. It is the basis of all our knowledge. It is self-luminous, and falls short of all descriptions.[4] It is beyond the triad of knower, known and knowledge. The ideas of the 'apprehender' and the apprehended[5] cannot touch it. The means of cognition are simply a device to indicate it as a child is given a mirror to apprehend the moon, but he is not the actual apprehender of the real moon. This reality which is the substance of all things,[6] and which is devoid of all the attributes,[7] becomes an object of contemplation for the saint who takes vow to see a vision of it. The Yogin focusses his attention on this reality again and again,[8] in his consciousness. By his repeated practice of meditation he comes to a stage when the Reality begins to emit its

2. *Nyāya Bindu* 1. 11.
3. *prakṛti prabhāsvara.*
4. *anirvacanīya.*
5. *grāhya grāhaka Vinirmukta*
6. *bhūtārtha.*
7. *sarvopādhi vinirmukta.*
8. *Nyāya Bindu Ṭīkā, p.* 15.

lustre, though it has not yet been realised. It is the stage when the image of the contemplated object begins to reach a condition of clarity as though it were present before the meditator.[9] It is called the culminating point of contemplation. The sub-culminating stage is that stage which precedes culminating stage.[10] It is the degree of clarity which precedes complete vividness.[11] Now the yogic perception may be defined as 'a perception of Reality which occurs at the subculminating stage of contemplation. It is a knowledge which apprehends with absolute vividness the contemplated image as though it were actually present before the meditator.[12] This knowledge of the Mystic is nonconceptual, uncontradicted by experience, vivid and non-illusory. It is a new piece of knowledge unapprehended prior to this stage and has its origin in contemplation.[13] It is a faculty by which the saints are capable of completely changing all ordinary habits of thought and contemplating directly the universe *sub specie aeternitatis* in a vivid image.

Is yogic perception a different source of knowledge ?

In a yogic perception there is no sense contact with the object. Hence it cannot be regarded as perception. If it is perception, how is it possible for it to apprehend those objects which are beyond its reach ? If on the other hand, the yogic perception is not perception but conception, the entire knowledge of the saint which

9. Ibid, p. 15.
10. Ibid, 1.15.
11. Ibid, 1.15.
12. Ibid, 1.15.
13. *Pramāṇa Vārttika* 3,282.

results from it will become unreal because conceptual knowledge which proceeds through dialectical process has no reference to external reality and is a mere thought-construction.[14] Consequently, there would be no difference between the knowledge arising from 'yogic perception' and the knowledge which arises from infatuation, sorrow, fear, lunacy, illusion and dream.[15] These questions led Kumārila to deny perceptual character of yogic perception. According to him yogic perception is in fact a fanciful imagination like wiseful thinking and memory. It cannot be regarded as a kind of perception, because it lacks the contact of objects with the sense-organs which is an ingredient of perception[16] It may be argued that it results from contemplation, but the contemplation is nothing except '*concentration of the mind on an object.*' Actually what happens in a 'mystic intuition' is that there appears a series of memory-images of an object uninterrupted by the thought of another object[17] with such vividness and clearness that it comes to be regarded as perception.

Śāṁtarakṣita and Kamalaśīla find Kumārila's objections to the theory of yogic perception as baseless. According to them 'all things can be manifested'[18] by the clear and unflinching light of knowledge called yogic preception.' Even those objects which are not in direct sense-contact and are depicted as 'illusory' are cognised through the 'mystic intuition' of the saint

14. *Pramāṇa-Samuccaya* quoted in the Fragments from Dignāga Fragment G.

15. *Pramāṇa Vārttika*, 3.283.

16. *Śloka-Vārttika*, 4.26-31.

17. Ibid, IV. 29.

18. *Tattva-Saṁgraha*, 3269,

through the 'mind' whose perceptiveness has been brought about by the impressions of the past experiences.[19] The mental power of the saint is capable of apprehending even the most subtle and remote things. All superiorities and peculiarities lie within the field of mental cognition. Nothing lies beyond its field. Therefore, the questions regarding the restrictedness of sense-organs in their scope or the apprehension of one thing by one sense-organ alone does not arise.[20] Through the contemplation of 'Reality' in the meditation the mind of the yogin and his mental cognitions become superior. He acquires a superior grade of wisdom, mercy and other qualities. By constant practice of the yoga his mental faculty of apprehension of objects reaches the highest stage. He acquires power by which all the objects past, present and future, become apprehensible for him like an āmalaka fruit. He has no need to resort to inference for their apprehension.[21]

The position of a yogin may be compared with a young goose.[22] Just as a young goose in the beginning is incapable of going even out of his nest but through constant practice becomes capable of crossing even the vast oceans, similarly the meditator on 'Reality' has at first a limited power but through constant practice of yoga he acquires tremendous powers.[23] The moment a yogin reaches the highest stage of his meditation, he suddenly acquires the transcendental intuition.[24] He changes

19. Ibid, verse 3319.
20. Ibid, verses 3381-3389.
21. Ibid, verse 3474.
22. *rāja haṁsaḥ.*
23. *Tattva-Saṁgraha*, verses 3428-3430.
24. *yogi pratyakṣa.*

completely. He becomes another *pudgala,* a saint, an *Ārya*, a Bodhisattva. All his habits of thought are changed. He acquires the habit of realising the relativity,[25] and unreality of the phenomenal veil[26] concealing absolute reality.[27] He enters the Mahāyānistic *dṛṣṭimārga* and first of the ten Mahāyānistic stages which is known as '*pramuditā*'. At the same time he is filled with overwhelming devotion to the salvation of all living beings.[28] He then understands the Four Noble Truths of the Saint in their Mahāyānistic interpretation as a formula intended to support the equipolency of *Saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa* in a monistic universe."[29] On the basis of this transcendental capacity he can know whatever he wishes to know. He can apprehend things either simultaneously or successively or both as he likes. There shall be involved no logical inconsistency, because he has shaken off all evil and has reached a stage which is beyond the sphere of logical thought.[30]

In fact perception is a process which envisages the objects clearly and distinctly without the help of the categories of understanding or imagination. On the other hand the conception cannot envisage an object without the help of the categories of imagination. The object of perception is the extreme particular, the point-instant, devoid of all attributes, while the conception deals with those objects which are expressed through the medium of words. In a yogic perception the objects

25. *Śūnyatā.*
26. *saṁvṛti.*
27. *paramārtha, bhūtārtha.*
28. *mahā karuṇā.*
29. *Buddhist logic*, II, p. 32.
30. *Tattva-Saṁgraha*, verses 3628-3629.

appear simultaneously and vividly in their original form where the language has not begun to play its role. Hence the whole knowledge arising from it is preception.[31] Dharmakīrti argues that 'the objects of knowledge whether they are external or internal remain within the range of perception as long as the words do not start their business of dichotomy and dialectic.[32]

The knowledge arising from the yogic perception is vivid and results from the contemplation on the absolute reality in a mediated and undisturbed condition, while the knowledge arising from dreams, illusions and hallucinations is vague and conceptual. This is a characteristic difference of yogic preception from dream, illusion and hallucination.[33] Another difference between these types of knowledge is that yogic perception is uncontradicted[34] by normal experiences of mankind, whereas the knowledge of dream, illusion and hallucination is contradicted. The latter knowledge is conceptual while the former is perceptual. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is right in maintaining that the yogic perception is the highest degree of perception. He contends that although it is rare, it is not impossible. The yogic perception is thus probable for normal human beings. This probability is converted into a reality by Saints through the development of their meditation.[35] For the Mīmāṁsakas, yogic perception is not a source of right knowledge at all. It is simply a fancy which owes its origin in human imagination. It is like the fancy of ordinary man. But

31. *Pramāṇa Vārttika*, 3.286-287. *Tattva Saṁgraha*, verse 3475.
32. *Pramāṇa Vārtikālaṁkāra*, 3.287.
33. *Pramāṇa Vārttika Bhāṣya*, p. 327, lines 32.35.
34. *Tattva saṁgraha Pañjikā*, p. 902, lines 11-12.
35. *Indian Psychology*-Perception, pp. 339-340.

their view is mistaken. It is a means of valid knowledge because it is a kind of perception.

According to *Dharmottara* the knowledge arising from yogic perception cannot be inferential or rational because there is no middle term. When a yogin reaches the highest stage of his contemplation he has the vision of the Reality as vivid and unconstructed as sense-perception. It is not contradicted by experience. The object which is apprehended in 'meditation' is 'pure'.[36] Thus the knowledge arising from yogic perception is different from inferential and illusory knowledge.

36· *Nyāya Bindu Tīkā*, p. 15, lines 8 ff.

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CONCEPT OF PRATIBIMBA*

K. C. VARADACHARI

In the philosophy of Madhva the individual soul is held to be *pratibimba* of the *Īśvara*. What does this exactly mean ?

If God is the *bimba* the individual is its *prati-bimba*. Image of reflection.

Prati as prefix indicates (a) towards, in the direction of (b) back, in return, again ; (c) in opposition to, against counter, (d) upon, own upon.

B. As a prefix to nouns not directly derived from verbs it means (a) likeness, resemblance, equality (b) opposite of the opposite side. eg : *Prati-bala, Prati. Chandra, Prati-Puruṣaḥ.*

C. *Prati* also means every, each in a distributive-sense. The enormous diversity of the meanings given to this prefix is undoubtedly a great handicap for any serious philosopher. When similarity and opposition are both intimated by the same prefix whether prefixed to a verb or to a noun, the philosophical ambiguity could become a source of paradox and worse.

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* In the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* Passage

"Yathādarśe Tathātmani
Yathā Svapne Tathā pitṛloke
Yathāpsu parivṛtaiva tathā gandharva loke
Chāyatapayoriva tathā Brahma loke.

It is shown how the *Brahman* appears in the different worlds, The first line suggests that Brahman's *Pratibimba* is all that we see. *Brahman* himself is far Beyond.

There are some concepts such as *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa* which in debate refer to the two opposing or differing stand points both of which cannot be true or be the locus of the hetu or reason or the middle term, that connects the miner and the major.

But the concept of *Bimba* and *pratibimba* would refer to the one being reflection or image of the former. Normally it is said to be a reflection as in a mirror or the lake in which case the *prati-bimba* would be an illusory appearance of the original. This is surely not the view of Madhva about the individual soul but that of the Māyāvādins of this *bimba-pratibimba* school. These latter would emphasize the view that the one supreme form appears in each and every (*prati*) thing or is reflected in it or present in everything which therefore would be called *prati-bimba*. This of course is really an ingenious explanation which combines the two meanings-as something reflected and in each and every - of the prefix *prati*.

If the meaning of *prati* can be shown to primarily refer to the presence of the one in the many distributively and not collectively, the individual souls could be shown to be *bimba* in the many. But the reality of the things as many would be needed and matter is the infinitely many-atomistic, diversity, and Madhva insists upon this aspect of Matter or *Prakṛti*.

The inner dialectic however between the One and the many remains as the oneness of the *bimbas* in the *Bimba* and the manyness of the *prati-bimbas* in the matter.

Once the *prati-bimbas* are not considered to be reflections of the One but the images of the one of presences in each and every thing it would perhaps help us to understand the reality view.

But even this is rather difficult to accept for the individual soul is not infinite or a reflection of the infinite or an image of the infinite. If it is finite that does not expand into an infinity even for a season. The idea of image is sometimes said to be a view which has the Christian conception of man as an image of God. This leads to so many further conclusions such as the infinity of man, his omnipotence and so on or it may mean the diminution and distortion of the divine which yet produces the image even as in Plato's concept of the mirroring of the Eternal form in the shadows or as shadows. If it is said to intimate the theory of correspondential identity as in the macrososm so in the microcosm, then too the *bimba-pratibimba* would only intimate the identity of constitution between the original and its reflection or reproduction. The *prati* would mean reproduced similarity. But if in the Divine *Sat Cit* and *Ānanda* are infinite (*ananta*) in the individual these three would appear much reduced and limited by the inescapable finiteness of the individual soul.

Thus it is clear that the *prati-bimba-vāda* would not help except in a general way the notion of similarity between the divine and the souls in respect of constitution but limited severely by the finiteness that is the basic differentia between God and the individual soul.

In the context of knowledge, the *pratibimba* should seek to know the *Bimba :* in respect of conduct the *pratibimba* should do activities which are almost particularised activities of the bimba, and in respect of love or Bhakti or devotion it is clear that it should align itself with the Divine, or act as God acts or loves in respect of these several individuals. However it becomes necessary to think about the manner of the relationship between

the *bimba* and *pratibimba* not as contradictory to one another or each other but as resembling or reciprocating their structures or form and functions. Analogous behaviour might well be considered to be the *prati-kārya* or *kriyā* following up the activities of the Divine reciprocally.

Thus the contradictoriness between the individual and the Divine yields place to reciprocity and resemblance and togetherness as such.

It is clear then that the prefix *prati* has quite a lot of inflation of meanings which had led to the several philosophical realisations which had more than confused the philosophers. Simply stated the individual's relation to the Divine is in the nature of confrontation and then complementariness and reciprocity and resemblance which annuls the contradictions but retains the difference. It enhances the perception of similarity and identity of spiritual union. If the devotion or love of one's opposite is a true one, then the love of the soul to God is the love of its unlike or opposite. Perhaps if the resemblance of husband and wife is said to be one of *prati-bimba* then such love could be classed as dualistic devotion, not the love of one's self or one's like but love of one's opposite or different.

Thus *Advaita* love insists that one likes one who is like oneself. But one knows that like poles repel and only unlike poles attract. Madhva sees the truth of the second axiom of attraction as well as the falsity of the first axiom. Śrī Rāmānuja sees that one likes one who is one's self who is in every one and as self of all.

The significance of the prefix *prati* thus goes beyond the usual counter-correlativeness or opposition or negation which supplies the challenge of attraction between unlikes.

THE CONCEPT OF "AGENT"--PHILOSOPHICAL AND GRAMMATICAL—IN SANSKRIT TRADITION,

SIDDHESVAR VARMA
Hoshiarpur

I. Introductory :

The term "agent" here is used in the widest possible sense, including the independent doer of an action or a mere instrument, for in nearly all schools of thought in Indology, the term "doer" or "agent" has been used in diversely flexible and remote senses.

II. "Agent" as a Philosophical Concept :

The agent or doer (Sanskrit *kartā*), according to Gotama, ((*Nyāya Sūtra*, 2.1.58) is one who is at least partly responsible for an action : for in the Sutra concerned (2.1.58), it is stated that "the so-called untruth in the Veda comes from some defect in the act, operator or materials of sacrifice".[1]

Moreover, according to the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*,[2] the actor is inherently connected with action, and consequently according to the author of this work, the actor of such an action is primarily an actor ; but in an utterance like "wood burns", the agenthood or "doerness" of wood is only secondary.

1· S. C. Vidhyabhushan, *The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama*, 2.1.58. *na karma-kartṛ-sādhana-vaiguṇyāt.*

2. Quoted by *Nyāyakośa*, p. 203 :—
Kriyāyāḥ kṛtervā samavāyitvaṁ idaṁ naiyāyika-matānusāri mukhyaṁ kartṛtvaṁ, tanmate acetane kāṣṭhādau kartṛpada-prayogastu gauṇah.

This view would therefore associate some voluntary or deliberate activity with the concept of agenthood necessarily and primarily. The agenthood of inanimate objects would be then taken only in a secondary sense.

III. "Agenthood" Involving Consciousness of Action :

According to Annambhaṭṭa.[3] the concept of Agent involves a consciousness of the action to be performed, of something to be produced, implying a direct perception of that object. The example given is of the potter, who produces a pot, with a direct knowledge of what is to be produced.

Such a view would consequently exclude from the concept of the agent all unconscious action.

IV. The Sāṅkhya View as Reproduced by The Bhagawad Gītā :

The Sāṅkhya view has been eloquently reproduced by the *Bhagawad Gītā*[4] 5.14, where it is stated that there exists neither an actor, nor action, nor even the fruit of action, God having absolutely no hand in these phenomena. What actually exists is only the nature of things.

This Sāṅkhya-based view tends to be mechanistic as well as metaphysical and can throw no light on the actual range of individual action, the responsibility involved, and the role of the agent in that action (Cf. Para X below).

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3. Quoted by *Nyāyakośa*, sub-voce *kartṛtvam*. (p. 904). *Upādāna-gocarāparokṣajñāna-cikīrṣākṛtimatvam. Yathā kulālasya ghaṭa-kartṛtvam.*

4. 5.14.

na kartṛtvam na karmāṇi kasyacit sṛjati prabhuh. na karmaphala-saṁyogam svabhāvastu pravartate.

V. The Concept of "Agent" as a Totality :

According to *Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha,*[5] an "agent" represents the totality of all those who have had a hand in the production of any action whatsoever, so that it includes, metaphorically, or by implication, like the Instrumental, the Dative in a syntactical content, which are often stated to be the mediums of a particular action, e. g. in the utterance "Caitra goes to the village".

VI. The Agent's "Doing"—Gadādhara's View :

According to some authorities, two relationships are involved in an utterance like "Caitra is cooking" viz. that of the producer and that of the intender. According to Gadādhara[6], even the intender's relationship involves an element of the producer, in view of the objective necessarily to be taken into account, e. g. in cooking, the producer's objective has to be borne in mind.

VII. "Agent" Presupposed by The Concept of Instrument :

In an utterance like *"kāṣṭhena pacati"*, although *kāṣṭha* - is a necessary instrument, it necessarily involves, according to Gadādhara,[7] the sense of the agent as well, for an instrument is dependent upon the agent.

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5. Quoted by Nyāyakośa, Ib., p. 204.
itara-kārakāprayojyatve sati sakala-kāraka-prayoktṛtvam. Yathā caitro grāmaṁ gacchatītyādau Caitrasya kartṛtvam.

6. Gadādhara : *Vyutpattivāda,* Bombay, 1970, p. 416 *'caitraḥ-pacati' ityādau viṣayatā-ghaṭita-kartṛtva-bodha-nirvāhāya yathā kṛtau pākāderupa-dhāyakatva-viṣayitvobhaya-sambandhenānvayaḥ, viṣayitāyāḥ sambandhatvepyupadhāyakatvaniveśa āvaśyakaḥ.*

7. Ib., p. 417.
"kāṣṭhena pacati" ityādau karaṇatvaṁ tṛtīyārthaḥ. tacca vyāpāravatkaraṇatvam ; vyāpāre kartṛvyāpārā-dhīnatvaṁ niveśa-nīyam.

VIII. Instrument as a Factor of Logical Conclusion :

When something is inferred from a sign, as fire from smoke, the phenomenon, according to Gadādhara,[8] should be called *karaṇa-*, mere instrument, for which Pāṇini 2.3.18 *kartṛkaraṇayoḥ tṛtīyā* offers a scope. For any conclusion depends upon an instrument of cognition, which further depends upon a contact of the soul with the mind, according to the school of Nyāya.

IX. Causality in a Logical Context :

A "Cause" would be an "instrument" in a Syntactical context, but according to Gadādhara,[9] in a logical context, e. g. when fire is inferred from smoke, the smoke which a Grammarian may call a *hetu* "cause" from Pāṇini 2.3.23 *hetau*, the logician would call the smoke as an indicator, not a producer.

Here we see how logical and grammatical terms overlap.

X. Usage Extending The Concept of "Agent" to other Spheres :

According to the *Gautamasūtra vṛtti*[10], usage extends the use of a word from a secondary sense to the primary

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8. Ib, p. 420.
Liṅga-jñānasyānumiti-kāraṇatāmate 'dhūmena vahnim anuminomi' ityādau dhūmādipadaṁ tadbhānaparam. sa cātmamanoyogādirūpānumātṛpuruṣādhina iti tasya niruktakaraṇam abādhitam eva.

9. Ib, p. 421.
Liṅga-jnānasya kāraṇatve api 'dhūmena vahnim anuminomi' ityādau dhūmādipadaṁ mukhyārtham eva ; "hetau" iti sūtreṇa tatra tṛtīyā-hetutvasya kāraṇatāvacchedaka-sādhāraṇa prayojakatva-rūpasya tatra vivakṣitatvāt.

10. Quoted by *Nyāya-kośa*, p. 204.
kvacit vyāpārāśrayatvam, yathā ratho gacchatītyādau rathādeḥ kartṛtvam ; kvacit pratiyogitvam, yathā ghaṭo naśyatītyādau ghaṭasya kartṛtvam.

sense : e. g. "the chariot goes" ; here the support of the action functions as the goer proper ; in "the pot vanishes", the thing negated functions as if doing some action.

XI. Universal Mind's Spontaneous Activity : Sāṇkhya View :

The Sāṇkhya[11] view conceives of the "agent" as the tendency of the universal mind to natural activity. This characteristic, however, is a generalization, excluding the individual from any specific role, which is denying the empirical approach altogether (Cf. para IV above, in which the reproduction of this view by the *Bhagawadgītā* has been recorded).

XII. "Instrument" as a Philosophical Concept—A Necessary Condition for any Action :

Instrument—*karaṇa*—a term being common both to philosophical and Grammatical schools—is, according, to *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi*,[12] that by the existence of which alone all actions can be effectual ; instrument is a necessary condition for the effectiveness of any action.

But according to the *Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī*, any extraordinarily effective cause is an instrumet, just as an axe[13] for cutting purposes, the knowledge of invariable concomitance for inference, or an organ of sense for perception.*

*NOTE :—A loose term *sādhana* is also used in philosophical contexts in the sense of "instrument", but its nuance does not go so far as to denote effectiveness.

11. Quoted by *Nyāya-kośa* p., 205 :—
anukūla-kṛtimadantaḥkaraṇa-prakṛtitvaṁ kartṛtvam.

12. Quoted by *Nyāyakośa*, p. 199 :—
Yasmin sati kriyā bhavatyeva tat.

13. Quoted by Nyāyakośa, p. 200 :—
vyāparavadasādhāraṇaṁ kāraṇam, yathā chidikriyāṁ prati kuṭhāraḥ, anumitiṁ prati vyāptijnānaṁ karaṇam, pratyakṣaṁ prati indriyaṁ karaṇam.

XIII. "Agent" in Sanskrit Grammatical Tradition :

Like philosophical tradition, Grammatical Tradition about "agent" is pivoted on two terms *kartā* and *karaṇa* the former referring to agent proper, the latter to secondary agent. The Grammatical Tradition concentrates most of its attention on two Sūtras of Pāṇini, 1.4.54 *svatantraḥ kartā* and 1.4.42 *sādhakatamaṁ karaṇam.*

XIV. "Independence" - A Distinctive Feature of the Grammatical Agent :

In 1.4.54 Pāṇini had characterized the grammatical agent (or subject) as "independent". This "independent" has been explained in various ways :—

(1) Patañjali explains the "independence" of the subject as ,'preference". Patañjali here refers to Sanskrit usage and states that when Sanskrit usage spoke of the independence of a Brahmin, it implied his preferential position[15]. Thus in certain contexts the nominative excludes the use of other cases.[16]

(2) Other grammatical authorities declared that the "independence" suggested by the Sūtra should be taken in the sense of dependence on the action implied by the verb.[17]

(3) The "independence" of the agent has been further explained by the grammatical commentary

14. Cf. *Nyāyakośa*, page 993 :—
"Yathā parvato vahnimān dhūmāt" ityādau dhūmaḥ sādhanam.

15. On 1.4.54,
ayaṁ tantra-sabdaḥ prādhānye vartate ; tad yathā svatantro asau brāhmaṇa ityucyate.

16. Cf. the commentary *Prabhā* on *Vaiyākaraṇa bhūṣaṇa* - (Benares, 1947), p. 191 :
prādhānyaṁ ca kārakāntarāprayojyatvenāvivakṣitam.

17. p. 191.
svātantryaṁ ca dhātvartha-vyāparāśrayatvam.

darpaṇa - as "setting the ball of other cases rolling"[18] in all grammatical contexts'.

(4) The grammatical authority *Bhūṣaṇa* points out, on the other hand (Cf. No. 2 in this section) the limitations of the action itself; for action, by itself, is inadequate for manifesting the sense, unless the cases play some part.[19] the commentary of the *Siddhānta kaumudī*,[20] states that all cases by their own particular functions contribute to the consummation of the action, so that with "who cooks"? - in such a context, several cases like "with whom"?, "with what?", "in which?" etc. are also n the picture.[21]

The above data should compel us to appreciate Patañjali's explanation of "independence" as "preference", in view of the interdependence of cases in so many contexts. The concept of "independence" of the agent is therefore a selective preference.

XV. Agent, Functioning as a "Grammatical Instrument" :

Nāgeśa, while quoting Bhartṛhari defines instrument as the "capacity for bringing about", being that "by which a task is accomplished immediately",[22] when we

18· Ib. p., 195.
svātantryam ityarthakena kārakacakraprayoktṛtvam.

19. p. 194.
phalānukūla-vyāpārānukūla-kṛter dhātuavācyatvena tatra vibhakti vācyatvasambhavāt.

20. On Pāṇ. 1.4.23., *kārake.*

21. *tataḥ kaḥ kena kiṃ pacatīti vivakṣāyāṃ sva-sva-vyāpara-vaśena-karaṇāditvam.*

22. *Laghu-Mañjūṣā*,, page 1251.
karaṇatvaṁ ca karaṇatā-śaktimatvam ; sā ca śaktir yadvyāparāvyavadhānena kriyā niṣpattirvivakṣyate tanniṣṭhā.

say : "cooking is effected by the cooking pot", it is usage[23] which gives the intended sense by implication. This usage, continues Nāgeśa, is an element of linguistic convention[24] (lit. grammar), not anything tangible.

XVI. Grammatical "Instrument" as the most Efficient Medium :

Pāṇini (1.4.52) defines this grammatical instrument as "the most efficient medium".[25] As Patañjali explains it, other cases are efficient but the Instrumental case would be the most efficient one.[26]

XVII. Instrumental in the Associative sense :

In 2.3.19 Pāṇini mentions a secondary sense of the Instrumental case, viz. the associative sense,[27] the accompanying agent having only a secondary function, as in *putreṇa sahāgataḥ pitā*. Here the direct connection with the verb is only of *pitā*. The secondary connection of *putra* - being only apparent.[28]

XVIII. Various Usages of the Instrnmental :

Grammarians have pointed out various usages of the Instrumental e. g.,

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23. p. 1251.
sthālyā pacyata ityeṣā vivakṣā dṛsyate yataḥ.
24. *Ib., vivakśyata ityanena vivakṣaiva vyākaraṇa aṅgam, na bāhyavastu sattetyuktam.*
25. 1.4.42.
sādhakatamaṁ karaṇam
Patañjali :
sarvāṇi hi kārakāṇi sādhakāni tama-grahaṇe punaḥ kriyamāṇe na doṣo bhavati.
26. On 1.4.42.
tad jñāpayatyācāryaḥ, kārakasaṁjñāyāṁ tara-tama-yogo na bhavatiti.
27. 2.3.19 *sahayukte apradhāne.*
28. *Kāśikā* on Pāṇ. 2.3.19 :—
'putreṇa sahāgataḥ pitā', pituratra kriyādisambandaḥ śabdenocyate putrasya tu pratīyamāna iti tasyāpradhānyam.

(1) Indicatory, as in *jaṭābhistāpasaḥ*.[29]

(2) Deformity, as *pādena khañjaḥ*.[30] Such usages of the Instrumental occur in some other parallel Indo-European languages.[31]

XIX. Conclusion :

The above data, it may be presumed, would give us the following points :—

(1) Comprehensiveness : The tendency of ancient Indian thought was to comprehend into an organic whole various concepts like action, agent, instrument.

(2) Flexibility : These concepts sometimes passed into one another, there being no rigidity in their use.

(3) Overlapping : The flexibility of terms was often liable to overlapping, as in the philosophical and grammatical use of the term *hetu* - (Cf. para VIII).

(4) Usage : The importance of usage, both in philosophical and grammatical parlance was noticed, so that we find in ancient Indian thought, the germs of Stylistics.

(5) Pragmatism : The pragmatic view of Pāṇini, who took the "instrument" as the most efficient medium, was interesting and worthy of appreciation.

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29. Nāgeśa, Ib., p. 1259.
Jaṭābhistāpasa ityādau jñāpyatvaṁ tṛtīyārthaḥ.

30. Ib., p. 1259 :—
pādena khañja ityādau vikāraprayuktatvarūpasambandhas tṛtīyārthah.

31. As in Russian, from :
Pulkina and others : *Russian*, p, 109:—

(a) Instrumental with the verb "to be" as in "he will be an Engineer" (b) with the Russsian verb for "to seem" as in "The ship in the distance seemed a mere dot."

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EXPRESSION *MUṢṬINDHAYA*

T. VENKATACHARYA

University of Toronto, Canada

The word *muṣṭi* is noted in lexicons as having more than one meaning. But its usage is commonly found in the sense of a fist, a clenched hand. For instance, the usage by Kālidāsa and others may be noted in the following lines :—

1. *prajighāya kṛtāntasya muṣṭiṃ pṛthag iva sthitam* (Raghu., 15-21)
2. *udaraṃ parimāti muṣṭinā* (Naiṣadha., 2-35)
3. *dṛḍhataranibaddhamuṣṭeḥ kośaniṣaṇṇasya sahajamalinasya. kṛpaṇasya Kṛpāṇasya ca kevalam ākārato bhedaḥ.* (Gobhaṭṭa)

In the context of some kind of boxing the expressions *muṣṭiyuddham* and *muṣṭimuṣṭi* seem to have been used. The word is derived from the root *muṣa steye*, and as Prof. Monier Williams notes the usage of the word in the sense of a fist perhaps had originally something to do with stealing. Subsequently the word came to be used for a fist in general even when it was not involved in any type of stealing.

The expression *muṣṭindhaya* is recorded in the sense of an infant by some lexicographers such as Puruṣottama, the author of the *Trikāṇḍaśeṣa*, and Vāmana Bhaṭṭabāṇa of the *Śabdaratnākara*, and perhaps following them by Prof. Monier Williams. Monier Williams and V. S.

Apte explain the literal meaning of *muṣṭindhaya* as "one who sucks the thumb", and so they say that the meaning intended is an infant. They do not, however, cite any usage of *muṣṭindhaya* in this sense from any work. I have not come across any such usage[1] either.

Now, I see a problem which I am unable to solve, if the word *muṣṭindhaya* is to mean an infant, as recorded by Puruṣottama, Vāmana Bhaṭṭabāṇa, Monier Williams, and Apte. Here is the problem. Mallinātha in his commentary on the *Ekāvalī*, and his son Kumārasvāmin in his *Ratnāpaṇa* say as follows :

jagati vividhavidyāsindhumuṣṭindhayānāṃ
parabhaṇitiparīkṣā yujyate sajjanānām,
tad iha mama nibandhe dūṣaṇaṃ bhūṣaṇaṃ vā
bhavati yadi vidagdhais taddhy avaśyaṃ vimṛśyam.

Also in *Mallikāmāruta* of Uddaṇḍa we find the usage thus *tapaścaraṇacuñcavaḥ sakalaśāstramuṣṭindhayāḥ* (I-16)

The meaning intended in brief by the expression *muṣṭindhaya* in this context seems to be "A master of all the śāstras,'. It seems strange if the word were to convey the meaning of a highly learned person, as is the case in this example, while it is noted in the Dictionaries in the sense of an infant, an ignorant one. Even if we take

1. I learn from Dr. K. K. Raja that Nārāyaṇa, a poet from Kerala, uses *muṣṭindhaya* in the sense of a child in his *Subhadrāharaṇa-kāvya.*

This is one of the meanings of the expression mentioned by Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa too in his grammatical work the *Prakriyāsarvasva.* This single usage, coming from Kerala, alone cannot be taken to prove the expression to convey the meaning of an infant according to the rule of Pāṇini or Pāṇini's commentators. Excepting this one instance, it does not seem to have been used by any writer outside Kerala.

the general meaning of the word *muṣṭi*, i. e. a fist, I am at a loss to know as to how the fluids like water (of the ocean in this context) can be referred to as being held in a fist for the purpose of drinking.

We may find a solution to the problem here, if a meaning similar to that of *culukīkartṛ* be possible of the expression *muṣṭíndhaya*. But *muṣṭi* is not noted, as far as I know, in the Dictionaries as a synonym of *culuka*. *Culuka*[2] means "a hand hollowed to hold water or the like", whereas *muṣṭi*, according to the Dictionaries, stands for a clenched hand. I do not think that the word *muṣṭi* could have ever been used as a synonym[3] of *culuka*, because of the fact that the meaning of the root *muṣa steye* must have some bearing prior to the figurative application of the word. In the practical life a *culuka*, which is an open hand so to say, could not be seen so involved in stealing as a *muṣṭi*, a closed hand, could. In this context I should like to point out a few facts which I think may help us in finding a solution to the

2. The word *culuka* seems to have been in existence even in the days of Pāṇini, as it occurs in one of the lists of the *gaṇapāṭha* of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (4.1.105).

3. Murāri uses in his *Anargharāghava* the expression *catussamudramuṣṭindhayena* (p. 231, N. S. P.),—I am obliged to Dr. K. K. Raja for bringing this usage to my notice—, and this is explained by the commentator as *tat* (*catussamudram*) *muṣṭīkṛtya dhayati pibati iti muṣṭindhayaḥ* (*tena*). The commentator does not quote any lexicon to show that *muṣṭi* is a synonym of *culuka*, and he does not even use the word *culukīkṛtya*, but uses only *muṣṭīkṛtya*. The expression *muṣṭīkṛtya* of the commentator may be explained also as *catūssamudram* prabhūtam *api muṣṭīkritya*=(as I show at the end of this paper) *stokadravadravyavat kṛtvā*, *anāyāsena pibati* iti, etc. Otherwise my doubt, as to how liquids like waters could be mentioned as being held in a *muṣṭi*, clenched hand, as in a *culuka*, remains unanswered.

problem. Though the word *muṣṭi* meant primarily a clenched hand, it was later on used in many other meanings. For instance, *muṣṭi* was used as a unit of measurement, which was also known as *paṇaḥ* in the examples such as *mūlakapaṇaḥ* and *śākapaṇaḥ*. The remarks of the author of the *Kāśikā* on these examples are worth noticing. He says:

> *samvyavahārāya mūlakādīnām yaḥ parimito muṣṭir badhyate, tasyedam abhidhānam mūlakapaṇa ityādi* (3-3-66).

Sāyaṇācārya also notes this in his *Dhātuvṛtti*. *mūlakapaṇaḥ* or *mūlakamuṣṭiḥ* means a handful or a bunch of radishes intended as a unit for transacting business by a seller of the vegetables. (This custom prevails even today in india.) By the by, *muṣṭi* in its figurative application in Sanskrit seems to be similar to the expression "handful" in English. In this sense of a handful again, the word is used by Kālidāsa and others also.

1. *bhavati viphalapreraṇā cūrṇamuṣṭiḥ* (*Meghasandeśa*)
2. *keyūracūrṇīkṛtalājamuṣṭim* (Kumārasam., 7-69)
3. *nabhobījamṣṭim dadhānā* (Raghu., last verse), etc.

Just as *muṣṭi* was thus used as *alākṣaṇikaśabda* for solid things measured by a fist, so also it was used in the sense of a particular measure of fluids. In the *Śārṅga-*

(1) In any lexicon *muṣṭi* is not noted as a synonym of *culuka*.

(2) Nārāyaṇa the author of the *Subhadrāharaṇa* too does not seem to use the expression *muṣṭindhaya* in the sense of *culukīkartṛ* ... I presume this as I am not given to understand any instance of the type, and Dr K. K. R. cited only in the sense of a child from that *kāvya*.

(3) The author of the *Prakriyāsarvasva* does not explain either *muṣṭi* as a synonym of *culuka* or *muṣṭindhaya* as a synonym of *culukīkartṛ*.

dharasaṃhitā ((1-24) *muṣṭi* is actually recorded as a synonym of a *pala* (2 *śuktis* or 4 *karṣas*, or half a *prasṛti*). As a container like a bamboo-pipe or a reed-pipe made suitably could hold a necessary measure like *pala* of fluids of medicine etc., and as it (the pipe), on its turn, could be held in a *muṣṭi*, the word *muṣṭi* must have come to mean the measurement of a *pala* by some indirect *lakṣaṇā* (instead of *tātsthyāt*, *tatstha-sthatvāt*). Thus *muṣṭi* can be used in the sense of *a small quantity of fluids* like water etc., just as it was used in the sense of *a small quantity of solid things* in the examples such as *cūrṇamuṣṭiḥ*, *lājamuṣṭiḥ bījamuṣṭiḥ*> *mūlakamuṣṭiḥ* etc. In essence, therefore, in the context of fluids *muṣṭindhaya* should convey a meaning like *stokadravyapāyin*, similar to that of *culukikartṛ* or *culukapāyin*. This seems to be the meaning intended in the verse of Mallinātha and Kumārasvāmin quoted above, though this meaning for the *muṣṭindhya* was not noted in the Dictionaries of Puruṣottama and others. The meaning of an infant sucking the fist or the thumb, on the other hand, though noted in those Dictionaries is definitely not applicable in this context. Consequently the first half of Mallinātha's verse, under reference, should be understood in the following manner :

"An examination of the writings of others is proper on the part of those learned persons, by whom the entire ocean of all knowledge in all branches, was treated as a small quantity like one *pala* and was thus drunk off easily".[4]

(4) Either in *Bhaṭṭikāvya* or in other works of grammarians *muṣṭi* is not found in the sense of *culuka*, and so also *muṣṭindhaya* is not seen in the sense of *culukīkartṛ*. Because of these considerations I am not inclined to take *muṣṭindhaya* in the sense of *culukīkartṛ*, until some conclusive and positive evidence is available.

An established usage of a word and an idiom in a language are unquestionable facts. Grammarians and Lexicographers have simply to record the facts as found in a language. This was definitely true with Sanskrit. Patañjali says.

avaśyaṃ lokaḥ pṛṣṭhato' nugantavyaḥ keṣv artheṣu laukikāḥ kān śabdān prayuñjata iti ((1-2-164).

Muṣṭindhaya was noted by Patañjali too, but only as an illustration for the grammatical points related to the rule *nādīmuṣṭyoś ca*. The meaning in which the expression might have been used in those days is not clear.

Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa, the author of the *Prakriyāsarvasva*, notes *muṭṣindhaya* in the sense of an infant, and in the sense of one who drinks liquid measured or measurable by *muṣṭi*. He also does not note the meaning of a learned person for the expression *muṣṭindhaya*. The word *muṣṭindhama* is noted by him in the sense of a *malla*, in addition to the meaning of a *svarṇakāra*.

In the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* we generally find idiomatic uses of important words and phrases illustrating some

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The usage of *muṣṭindhaya* by Murāri is similar to that of Mallinātha. Probably Mallinātha's usage is based on that of Murāri. So the problem being same in both the cases, any solution to the usage of Mallinātha will be the answer to that of Murāri too. The ideas of mythology are expressed by poets sometimes in their own figurative way. Therefore the expression *muṣṭindhaya* of Murāri need not be in the exact sense of *culukīkartṛ*. But, in the light of the explanation as *muṣṭīkṛtya* by the commentator, instead of *culukīkṛtya*, and also in the absence of any lexicon to show *muṣṭī* to be a synonym of *culuka*, and for other reasons mentioned above, I feel that the expression may be in the sense of (*muṣṭīkṛtya*) = *stokadravadravyavat kṛtvā, anāyāsena pibati iti*, etc.

4- In a reply to my query Prof. V. Raghavan also says that only this type of meaning is possible in this verse. The details of this paper are, however, worked out by me.

noteworthy grammatical aspects as mentioned by Pāṇini in his *Aṣṭādhāyayī*. Of the rules of Pāṇini *ejeḥ khaś* (3-2-28), *nāsikāstanayor dhmādheṭoḥ* (3-2-29), *nāḍīmuṣṭyoś ca* (3-2-29), Bhaṭṭi has given one illustration each in the following verse

sattvamejayasimhāḍhyān stanandhayasamatviṣau,
kathaṃ nāḍindhamān mārgān āgatau viṣamopalān. (6-95)

Here we find the uses of *sattvamejaya*, *stanandhaya*, and *nāḍindhama* at illustrations respectively of the rules of Pāṇini quoted above. It is my bad luck (or our bad luck) that Bhaṭṭi did not find a suitable situation to employ *muṣṭindhaya* instead of *nāḍindhama* for illustrating the rule *nāḍīmuṣṭyoś ca* >. He goes on to illustrate the next rule of Pāṇini *udi kūle rujivahoḥ* (3-2-31) in the following verse.

uttirṇau vā kathaṃ bhimāḥ saritaḥ kūlamudvahāḥ
āsāditau kathaṃ brūtaṃ na gajaiḥ kūlamudrujaiḥ. (6-96)

It is clear from this that he has not included the use of *muṣṭindhaya* for illustration, and as a result we are unable to know what the significance of the idiom *muṣṭindhaya* would have been in the opinion of the learned Bhaṭṭi. Puruṣottama and Vāmana Bhaṭṭabāna thought that the significance of *muṣṭindhaya* was "an infant", perhaps because of the expression *stanandhaya* mentioned by Pāṇini in the previous rule (*nāsikāstanayor dhmādeṭoḥ*). If this is to be the significance the first para *muṣṭi* of *muṣṭindhaya* may be understood to retain its primary meaning *muṣṭi* standing either for a fist or *muṣṭyavayavāṅguli*, and the second element *dhaya* may convey, not the primary meaning of pāna (of *dheṭ pāne*) but, a figurative sense like chewing, or licking etc. I wonder why Pāṇini did not mention a word like *aṅgulindhaya* or *aṅguṣṭhandhaya*,

if an infant was meant by *muṣṭindhaya* in the sense of sucking the thumb. In the interpretation applicable to Mallinātha's usage, the second element *dhaya* may retain the primary meaning of *dheṭ pāne* (drinking), and the first part *muṣṭi* may be understood to be in a figurative sense of a *small quantity of fluid*... i. e. like *palam*.... In view of the recording in the *Śārṅgadharasamhitā* of the word *muṣṭi* as a synonym of a *pala*, the particular measurement of fluids, (perhaps this was so recorded in some other texts also on *āyurveda*) Mallinātha's figurative usage of *muṣṭindhaya* in the sense of a learned man seems possible, because of the idea of treating the entire *sindhu* as a *pala*, a small quantity, and thus drinking it off easily. If we can find any usage of *muṣṭindhaya* in the sense of an infant sucking the thumb, of which I am doubtful, then both the meanings of the expression *muṣṭindhaya* (i. e. an infant, and a learned person) may be taken to be possible. In that case *muṣṭindhaya* would appear to be similar to words having quite opposite meanings, such as *ārāt* (*dūra* or *samīpa*), or the element *artha* at the end of a compound like *bhūtyartham* (in *prajānām eva bhūtyartham sa tābiyo balim agrahīt)* and *maśakārtho dhūmaḥ*, where *artha* in the first means *prayojana*, and in the second *nivṛtti*, or the root *yu miśraṇe amiśraṇe ca* (to unite or to separate, like the English verb cleave which means either to unit or to cut asunder). *Muṣṭindhaya* thus may be taken to have opposite meanings, i.e. a *stokapāyin*, an infant, an ignorant one, and an *astokapāyin* a highly learned person. Of these two opposite meanings one or the other may be applicable to specific cases depending upon the context. This is what I feel, in conclusion, while trying to understand the signifieance of the usage of *muṣṭindhaya* in Mallinātha's and Kumārasvāmin's verse referred to above.

THE SYSTEM OF LAND RIGHTS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF LANDED PROPERTY DURING THE LATE ANCIENT AND EARLY MEDIEVAL PERIOD OF INDIAN HISTORY

B. N. S. YADAVA

Allahabad University

Property rights, including those in land, can hardly be understood apart from the particular social situation in which they function. Among other factors, changes in economy and social hierarchy have been found to bring about changes in the nature of right over land and other resources.[1] During the late ancient and early medieval period of Indian history we come across the increased agrarian character[2] of society, and the emergence of the *sāmanta* system along with a sizable class of landed aristocracy. Among the notable features of this period are the growth of a hierarchy of ruling aristocracy involved to a considerable extent in a sort of land-vassal nexus, the emergence of the phenomenon of political authority becoming closely connected[3] with landed property which became in some measure the actual basis of social and political status, and the rise of a fairly large class of rural

1. Cf. Sprott, *Sociology*, p. 153 ; section on land tenure in the *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*.

2. See, e. g., Vṛddha-Hārīta, 7.189.

3. *Upamiti-bhava-prapañca-kathā* (10th century A. D.), p. 59 : *kvacidvitrāṇāmapi kṣudragrāmāṇāṁ lābhaṁ cakravartitvaṁ manyate, kvacit kṣetrakhaṇḍamātra-prabhutvamapi mahāmaṇḍalikatvamākalayati.* see also *Aparājitapṛcchā* (12the century A. D.), pp 201 ff.

aristocracy connected with land[4]. Land was commonly assigned by the rulers, with rights of varying degree, to Brāhmaṇas and religious institutions, to vassals for military service, to members of the clan or family, and even to officers.[5] Some inscriptions reveal that the regular rights of the local officers like the *talāras*[6] and the *pratīhāras*[7], and of the local diginitaris like the *paṭṭakilas*[8], and the occasional rights of petty officers like *cāṭas*[9] to a portion of the produce of the soil, were also recognized by the rulers. The evidence of the *Lekhapadhati*[10] suggests the existence of revenue farmers too in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries A. D.. Thus there developed a great variety of interests in and rights over land, claimed by the various grades of intermediaries.

In the feudal pattern from the supreme overlord, his *sāmanta*, the latter's *sāmanta* and so on down to the peasant who worked on the soil, there emerged many parties claiming rights over land and its produce. But the number of intermediaries was not the same everywhere and the peasants were also of many categories[11]. Then again, the hierarchy of ruling landed intermediaries was not so elaborate and well-defined, and so deeply

4. *Land System and Feudalism in Ancient India*, ed. D. C. Sircar, pp. 83 f.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 72 ff.

6. Cf. D. Sharma, *Early Chauhān Dynasties*, pp. 207 ff., *Lekhapaddhati*, pp. 7, 8.

7. U. N. Ghoshal, *Hindu Revenue system*, p. 262.

8. *E. I.*, XXI, No. 15, p. 92.

9. See, e. g., the grant (V. S. 1230) of Paramardi, *E. I.*, XVI, No. 2.

10. *Lekhapaddhati*, pp. 8-10.

11. *Land System and Feudalism in Ancient Imdia*, pp. 90 f.

involved in the lord-vassal nexus as in medieval Europe.[12] Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that the *sāmanta* hierarchy and the consequent fragmentation of political authority together with its having become connected with property in land, could not but have contributed to the complexity and multiplicity in the system of land rights.

Under the particular conditions of the age, what eventually prevailed in regard to ownership of land does not appear to have depended so much on theory as on the actuality and the circumstances of situation in various regions and kingdoms. This fact also, and not only legal subtlety and the demands of logical soundness, may be regarded as responsible for the formulation of the doctrine of *laukikasvatvavāda* by Vijñaneśvara and his followers, which maintains that 'property has its basis on popular recognition without any dependence on the *Śās tras*'.[13] The issue of the ultimate ownership[14] of land appears to have become complicated as a result of the immense complexity of the situation, and, as such, we find the medieval authorities conceiving of a multiplicity

12. In Medieval Europe there had emerged such a multiplicity of land rights from the supreme overlord through the hierarchy of vassals down to the tenant that 'the word ownership as applied to landed property would have been almost meaningless...' (Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society*, pp. 115-116).

13. P. N. sen, *The General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence*, p. 42.

14. For recent discussions on this point see R. S. Sharma, *Indian Feudalism*, Chap. IV ; L. Gopal, *The Economic Life of Northern India*, Chap. I. ; R. C. P. Singh, *Kingship in Northern India*, Chap. VI ; D. C. Sircar, *Landlordism and Tenancy in Ancient and Medieval India* etc., pp. 1 ff ; R. Chaudhary, *Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Indian History Congress*, pp. 118. f. ; *Journal of the Allahabad Historical Society*, July, 1962, pp. 14 ff.

of rights[15] over land, which can rightly be understood not only in terms of the linear development and elaboration of the earlier ideas, but also in the background of the actual conditions prevailing during that period. The medieval Indian jurists conceived of property (*Svatva*) as qualitatively sub-divisible--'the *svatva* of the king, the *svatva* of the land-owner, the *svatva* of the tenant farmer, and even the *svatva* of the mortgagee in possession (as against the trespasser)'[16]--thus giving rise to various incidents of the manifestations of ownership. All might have been regarded as *svāmis* within their respective boundaries. But the jurists and logicians did not bring out the differences between various kinds of tenures or interests,[17] It appears that so far as land is concerned, the view of concurrent, though distinct, rights of ownership between the king[18] and the *sāmantas*, on the one hand, and the rulers and the ruled, on the other, may not be unsatisfactory.

Amidst the circumstances characterised by the emergence of so many parties claiming and enjoying land-rights of various grades, we notice certain marked tendencies during the early medieval period. One of them was represented by the growing royal claim of the right of ownership over land--a tendency which may be noticed to some extent even during the Gupta period. Two verses of Kātyāyana, a lawgiver of that period, as quoted

15. Cf. Derrett, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London*, XVIII (1956), pp. 481 ff.

16. Derrett, op. cit., p. 484 ; p. Banerjea, *A History of Indian Taxation*, p. 361, fn. 1.

17. Derrett, loc. cit.

18. The theoreticians mainly took into account only the immediate ruler, and as such they did not define the relative land rights of the *sāmanta* rulers and the supreme overlord.

in the *Rājadharma-Kāṇḍa*[19] of Lakṣmīdhara (12th century) and explained by Mitramiśra[20] later on, have led K. P. Jayaswal[21] to plead for private ownership of land, Ghoshal[22] to infer king's ownership of land, and Kane[23] to think that 'the state was deemed to be the owner of all lands as a general proposition' but 'individuals or groups that had cultivated lands in their possession were regarded practically as owner's thereof subject to the liability to pay land tax and the right of the state to sell land for non-payment of tax.'

It is clear that what we find here is neither the absolute ownership of the king nor the fullest individual ownership of the ordinary inhabitants of the kingdom. The verses in question suggest the idea of concurrent, though distinct, rights of ownership between the king and the subjects in respect of land. It may be noted that the king's claim to a part of the produce is sought to be justified here not on the ground of the protection which he afforded to the subjects--a view which was dominant in earlier times--but on the ground of his *svāmitva* of land.

A clearer statement of king's ownership of land to such an extent as to render the land right of the cultivators somewhat tenuous is found in the commentary of Asahāya (8th century) on the *Nārada Smṛti* (4.93). Explaining the term *narendra-dhana* he states[24] :

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19. Kātyāyana quoted in the *Rājadharma-kāṇḍa*, p. 90.

20. *Vīramitrodaya* (Rājanīti), Benares Ed., p. 271.

21. K. P. Jayaswal, *Hindu Polity*—Pt II, pp. 173 ff.

22. U. N. Ghoshal, *Indian Historiography and other Essays*, p. 164.

23. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. III, p. 495 ; also *Kātyāyana-smṛti-sāroddhāra*, vs. 16, 17.

24. Quoted in *Vyavahāra-kāṇḍa* of Lakṣmīdhara, p. 186; fn. 3.

narendra-dhana-śabdena bhūmiruktā kila narendrāṇāṁ bhūmireva dhanamityataḥ. Strīnarendradhane viṁśatī-varṣairapi na naśyata iti.

The further development of this idea may be noticed in the commentary of Bhaṭṭasvāmin (C. 12th century) on Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* which states that the king is admitted as the owner of both land and water and that the people can exercise their right of ownership over all things except these two.[25]

Significant in this context are a number of inscriptions which reveal that during the early medieval period kings began to grant the nearest title to an absolute estate[26] with rights to lands, waters, timber, mineral, treasures etc., and also with the authority[27] over the people in the main capacity. It may be noted in this context that the *Mitākṣarā* postulates the transfer of proprietary right in connection with land-grants.[28]

In a verse[29] of the *Nārada Smṛti* which has been quoted with approval in the *Vyavahārakāṇḍa* of Lakṣmīdhara the right of the king to deprive a peasant of his field and house enjoyed even for three generations has

25. *Arthaśāstra,* tr. Shamasastry, 4th Edn., p. 144.

26. Derrett, loc. cit.

27. Some land-grants in which peasants, artisans etc., or the inhabitants as a whole are specifically mentioned along with the lands or villages donated to Brāhmaṇas or religious institutions, suggest in a way the transfer of the people concerned to the donees; see below.

28. *Mitākṣarā* on *Yāj.* I. 318. However, there is also the provision for granting only usufructory rights (*nibandha*).

29. Nārada quoted in the *Vyavahārakāṇḍa,* p. 459 ; for a more or less similar view see *ibid.*, p. 450.

in a way been recognized, though in another verse[30] he has been given the moral advice that he should not adopt such a drastic and risky measure for they constitute the householder's means of subsistence and it is on account of them that the latter resides there. In the same text it has been enjoined on the subjects to be subservient to the commands of the ruler, and to remain bound to him for they depended upon him for their means of subsistence.[31]

It appears that at least in some regions the rulers began to realize a land tax[32] which appears to have been claimed by virtue of their increased rights of ownership over the soil, and was in addition to the protection tax amounting to one-sixth of the produce. This is clear from the account of Alberuni :

"With regard to that which he earns by the crops or from the cattle he is bound first to pay to the ruler of the country the tax which attaches to the soil or to the pasture-ground. Further, he pays him one-sixth of the income in recognition of the protection which he affords to the subjects, their property and their families. The same obligation rests on the common people...".[33]

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30. *Ibid.*, p. 460.

31. *Nāradīya-Manu-saṁhitā,* ed. K. Sambasiva Sastri, 18.23. This verse has been quoted with approval in the *Rājadharma-kāṇḍa.*

32. It is well-known that according to the ancient theory, the king was entitled only to one-sixth of the produce of land, though the rate could differ according to the nature of the soil and other factors—in lieu of the protection which he afforded, and not to any separate land tax in addition to it. It is not clear how far land tax had partaken of the character of rent in this period. However, the commentary of Abhayatilakagaṇi on a verse of the *Dvayāśraya* (III, v. 18) of Hemacandra (12th century A. D.) reveals that the ruler realized *kara* from the peasants for using the royal land (*rājakīya-bhūmi*) for the purpose of agriculture, pasture etc.

33. *Alberuni's India,* tr. Sachau, Chap. LXVII, p. 149. The revenue terms like *talārābhāvya, baladhipābhāvya* etc. occurring in the inscriptions also suggest the same.

The school of the royal ownership of land which represented a dominate trend during this period mainly supported the interests of the ruling aristocracy and the class which derived benefit from their land grants, as against those of the peasantry. But in an age in which the rulers were viewed, and also functioned to a considerable extent as private persons[34], royal ownership of land could not have been coterminous with State ownership; it appears to have acquired the complexion of private individual ownership[35]. This becomes further clear from the private religious purpose of numerous landgrants made by the rulers.

Side by side with the increasing extent and the changing complexion of the king's right of ownership over land, the issue of the royal ownership of land became very much complicated in actual practice due to the increasing claims of the ruling *sāmanta* hierarchy and rural landed aristocracy in this respect. Some inscriptions[36] of the early medieval period reveal that the monarchs and overlords gave land-grants in the territories and estates of the *sāmantas*. Some verses in the *Upamiti - bhava-prapañca-kathā*[37] may suggest that the superiormost right over land was deemed to have been vested in the supreme overlord. The *Mitākṣarā* (on *Yaj.* I. 318) has also laid down that the *bhūpati* (king or ruler) and not *bhogapati* had the right to make the grant of lands or revenues. But the term *bhogapati* appears to

34. B. N. S. Yadava, *Some Aspects of Society in Northern India in the Twelfth Century A. D.* (D. Phil. thesis, Allahabad University), Chap. III.

35. Cf. R. S. Sharma, *Indian Feudalism*, pp. 152 153.

36. See, e. g., *E. I.*, IX, pp. 120 ff.; *E. I.*, XX, No. 11.

37. *Upamiti-bhava-prapañca-kathā*, p. 840.

mean here governor or the enjoyer of only the usufructory rights of an estate, and not *sāmanta* for it was the rulers themselves who constitued the *sāmanta*, hierarchy. A land-grant[38] (11th century A. D.) of a *sāmanta Rāṇaka* Amma of the Gaṅga family, reveals that he was a petty chief holding 84 villages and his overlord Yaśovarman was in turn the vassal of Bhoja Paramāra from whom he had received one-half of the town of Selluka and was enjoying 1500 villages. The *Rāṇaka* made the grant to a Jain monk without referring the matter to his suzerain. Another inscription[39] (c. 1157 A. D.) found in the Monghyr district of Bihar states that in the victorious reign of Madanapāla and in the *rājya* of *Pīṭhīpati Ācārya* Devasena the queen of a *mahāmaṇḍalika* (a petty vassal chief) granted a village along with its lands and waters to a Buddhist monastery. The village appears to have formed an integral part of the fief of the queen. No permission appears to have been taken from the superior authorities in the feudal hierarchy, i. e. Devasena and Madanapāla in the ascending order. Instances like this may be found in inscriptions belonging to other regions also. In some other inscriptions, however, there is no mention of the superior authorities at all. Thus it appears that in actual practice the rights enjoyed over land by the overlords and the *sāmantas* of different grades depended upon their actual power and prestige. Under the rule of weak kings, the *sāmantas* increased their power and tried to become independent. The increased power of the *sāmantas* with their claims to greater rights over land must have meant a corresponding curtailment of the actual land rights of the overlords.

38. *E. I.*, XIX, No. 10.

39. *E. I.*, XXXVI—Pt. I—No. 5.

Thus two sets of Caulukya copper plates[40] (A. D. 1074) reveal that a powerful *sāmanta* made it impossible for his overlord's grant of a village lying in his territory to be issued, the reason being that the landgrant charter did not contain the sign of the former. When the service and military tenures of even smaller chiefs and warriors became hereditary,[41] they used to claim real proprietary right over the lands under their possession. A famous poem of Hemacandra indicates that a piece of land apparently granted on condition of military service was regarded as the ancestral property (*bappī kī bhuṁhaḍī*)[42], when it became hereditary. Such secular assignees, the petty *sāmanta* chiefs, some Brāhmaṇas enjoying land-grants and other landlords, who were immediately connected with land, constituted the land-holding rural aristocracy.

We also find at the same time the evidence of the private individual ownership of land in the law-books and in some inscriptions. The former[43] contain clear provision for the lease, gift, partition, sale and mortgage of villages, fields etc. These provisions mainly referred to the landed aristocracy. But the *Rājataraṅgiṇī*[44] records that a petty tanner was paid a compensation for a plot of land by a generous king. While this may be regarded as a rare case, it is obvious that the conditions may

40. *Journal of the Bombay Branch of Royal Asiatic Society,* Vol. XXVI, p. 258.

41. However, the *Lekhapaddhati* (p. 24) reveals that the estates granted to chiefs for military service could be seized, if they failed to fulfil their obligations.

42. *Prākṛta-vyākaraṇa* (IV. 395) of Hemacandra.

43. *Vyavahārakāṇḍa*, pp. 152, 153, 430 ff. ; K. V. R. Aiyangar, *Int. to Vyavahārakāṇḍa* (Baroda, 1958), p. 68.

44. *Rāj.*, IV. 55. ff.

have differed from kingdom to kingdom. It is also to be borne in mind that royal ownership of land and private individual ownership thereof were not mutually exclusive in the context of land system of this age, and then again the former did not remain very much different from the latter.

The theory of private individual ownership of land also appears to have been utilized by one school for upholding the claim to the right of ownership over land by the landholding aristocracy as against that of the monarchs and rulers. The continuation of this trend may be noticed in the commentary[45] of Abhayatilakagaṇi on The *Dvayāśraya*, and further in the *Vyavahāramayūkha* of Nīlakaṇṭha (1615-1645 A. D.) and the commentary on the *Dāyabhāga* by Śrīkṛṣṇa Tarkālaṅkāra, who 'regard the *bhaumikas* (landlords) as the real owners of the soil held by them'[46] and the king as having the mere right to collect revenues from them in lieu of the protection he afforded to them in the peaceful enjoyment of their property[47].

The law-digests and commentaries reveal that there were peasant proprietors in villages[48]. The *Samarāṅgaṇa-sūtradhāra* (p. 29) of Bhoja (11th century) suggests the existence of well-to-do peasant proprietors in some regions of the kingdom. However, the *Mahāpurāṇa* (XVII. 164) of Jinasenācārya defines a village in a way which reveals that usually the majority of village population was composed of Śūdra *karṣakas* who were share-

45. On *Dvayāśraya*, III, v. 2 ; see also *Bṛhat-Parāśara*, V. 149-50.

46. & 47. P. N. Sen, op. cit., p. 51. However, the view that the king was not entitled to the ownership of soil was already upheld by the Mīmāṁsā school.

48. See, e. g., Aparārka on *Yāj*, p. 579.

croppers, temporary tenants, field labourers etc. It appears that during the early medieval period the bigger peasant proprietors were making their way into the ranks of the ruling aristocracy and the smaller ones were being reduced to poverty by oppression and overtaxation, and also due to the curtailment or extinguishment of their land rights. The former trend is more clearly reflected in the *Rājataraṅgiṇī*[49] of Kalhaṇa which informs us that, after having derived much income from their landed property, the prosperous and ambitious cultivators used to become Ḍāmaras or feudal barons in Kashmir, who lived in forts, gathered retainers and often violated the authority of the king. This phenomenon may have occurred in varying degrees in other regions of Northern India also. But it is quite clear from the policy of a king[50] of Kashmir in the eighth century that the rulers tried their best to check this tendency and the phenomenal expansion of the ruling aristocracy may have meant its corresponding enfeeblement during the later phase of the early medieval period.

As regards the latter trend, there are many pieces of evidence suggesting that it had become more common. A verse in the *Subhāṣita-ratna koṣa* (35.28) indicates how on account of the *bhogapati's* oppression the peasant proprietors in villages used to be reduced to such straitened circumstances as to find themselves on the verge of being uprooted. The chances for such a state of affairs were obviously greater in the small estates of *sāmanta* chiefs and landlords who held the land more directly and with greater personal connection than the kings in their wider territories.

49. Rāj., IV. 346 ff. VII. 494 ff.

50. *Ibid.*, IV. 347 f.

Then again, the *Bṛhannāradīya Purāṇa* (38.86), the *Ukti-vyakti-prakaraṇa*[51], the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* etc., reveal a state of insecurity and violence which could not but have affected the land rights of the peasants. The commentary of Haradatta (12th century A. D.) on Gautama envisages a situation in which fear might prevent the weak persons from asserting the right of ownership over their property against the powerful individuals[52]. Though it is laid down that under such conditions the owners did not lose their proprietary right, yet it is stated in the commentary of the next *sūtra* that no long enjoyment was necessary to acquire the right of ownership over land[53] (fields and gardens), as also over cattle and female slaves. Whatever the legal position in this respect, the commentary reflects the conditions under which peasant proprietors may have sometimes lost their land holdings or their real right of ownership over arable land to powerful individuals[54]. The continuation of a

51. *Ukti-vyakti-prakaraṇa* of Dāmodara (12th century A. D.)p. 40 l. 21; Ind., 84.

52. *Gautama Dharma Sūtra*, Ed. U. Pandeya (Kashi Sanskrit *Series*, No. 172, com on II. 3.35, p. 126.

53. *Ibid.*, Com. on II. 3.36. It may be noted that there was also the tendency of increasing the period of adverse possession, after which a stranger in possession of the land or other immovable property of any other individual could acquire the right or ownership over it ; cf. K. V. R. Aiyangar, *Int. to Vyavahāra-kāṇḍa*, pp. 28-29. It appears that, under the conditions noticed above, this could have been advantageous mainly to the land holding aristocracy.

54. One may be reminded, in this context, of the *deśī* terms *grāmaroḍā* and *koṇḍio*, occurring in the *Deśīnāmāmālā* (II. 48, 90) of Hemacandra, which were prevalent in this age for such persons who acquired rights over villages and enjoyed them by manipulation.

variant of this tendency may be found in some regions of Rājasthān afterwards, where the weaker peasant proprietors surrendered their lands to chiefs and rulers for protection and then laboured on the same as common tenants[55]. Without taking into consideration these trends and tendencies, we cannot fully understand the growing poverty of the common mass of peasantry, which, however, has also got to be viewed in the background of the overtaxation, and the laws of debt and mortgage[56]. During the early medieval period there was a considerable growth of dependent peasantry, and there is also some evidence of restriction on the mobility of peasants in some regions in the estates of chiefs and landlords[57]. The emergence of the *sāmanta* hierarchy and a sizable class of landed aristocracy was bound to affect adversely the land rights of the common peasantry.

Of the communal rights in land the prevalence of which in early times is attested to by the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra* (VI. 7.3) of Jaimini and the commentary of Śabara on it, there can be found some faint traces and vestiges during

55. Tod, *Annals and Antiquities* of *Rājasthān*, Ed. W. Crooke, Vol. I, p. 206.

56. Cf. R. S. Sharma, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.VIII, No, I, pp. 70f.

57. The *Lekhapaddhati* (p. 19, ll. 21-22) which reflects the conditions of Gujrat, Rājasthān and the adjoining regions during the early medieval period, reveals that one of the methods adopted by the chiefs to prevent the migration of peasants was to threaten a fugitive with confiscation. A number of inscriptions which mention the grants of lands or villages along with the inhabitants thereof—peasants, artisans etc. —also suggest the same restriction on their mobility; e. g. *E. I*, XXXV, Pt. III, No. 17 (A. D. 1020-Bihar), No. 178. (V. S. 1083-Bihar); some Candella grants (*E. I.*, XX, p. 131; *E. I.*, XXXII, pp. 121-23).

this period. Thus there is some evidence of collective rights over pasture grounds, but a number of land-grants reveal that they were undermined[58] by the rulers who began to transfer the right over them along with the grants of villages. The evidence of the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (VIII. 2226) also reveals the same trend. It informs us about the resumption of a pasturage of cows, given in charity, which led to the suicide of a cowherd who was highly aggrieved at this state of affairs. The increased claims of kings and the ruling landed aristocracy to rights over land and the widespread practice of enfeoffment and subinfeudation were bound to obliterate to a considerble extent the traces of communal or collective ownership of land.

58. Cf. R. S. Sharma, *Indian Feudalism*, p. 140.

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SOME MUNDA ETYMOLOGICAL NOTES ON NAMES IN THE RĀMĀYAṆA

N. H. ZIDE
University of Chicago

Summary. It is suggested—not for the first time—that the name 'Sītā' may have a Munda source, and further evidence for this is given. It is also suggested that certain animal, bird and ethnic names mentioned in the Citrakūṭa scenes of the *Vālmīki Rāmāyana*—including the name 'Citrakūṭa' itself—are perhaps Munda in origin. These two suggestions have separate but relatable implications. The latter suggestion-and its support in the etyma for 'Khara', 'tiṭṭibha' etc., will I think surprise nobody. The former again is not new, and some of those against it will not be persuaded by newer and better data. One further implication of the acceptance of a Munda etymon for 'Sītā'—not provable, but not implausible, and getting some small support here—is that Videha and Janaka—what we can retrieve of them—may have been culturally at least partly Munda themselves. This does have implications for the history of ancient India, and particularly for the shaping and putting together in later times of the *Rāmāyaṇa* as we now know it, since if such was the case these facts were unknown or inadmissible at those times. This implication is independently verifiable to a degree, and obviously needs suppporting evidence. There is nothing in our knowledge of the North Munda groups and their institutions (including language), that makes such as-

sumption implausible a priori, and a little that seems to favor it.

The history (and prehistory) of the speakers of the various Munda languages and of those groups for which we have evidence of previous Munda affiliation - what there is of it - is not well known. For a few of the North Munda groups—the Santals and the Mundari (or Munda) —traditional histories are known and recorded, but even in these cases not much effort at corroboration or connection has been made. S. C. Roy in his 'The Munda and Their Country' brought together and organised into a continuous narrative a mass of interesting information, from tribal traditions, Sanskrit literature, archeology, linguistics, etc., but this information is of all sorts and of varying degrees of reliability. Roy's work showed a great deal of interest, ability and energy, but since he wrote the book - more than fifty years ago - not much more has been done either following up work or suggestions of his, or taking up independently questions concerning the histories of these peoples.

In this contribution to a volume honoring Pandit Kshetreshachandra Chattopadhyaya I offer some linguistic evidence on some names of persons (including Sītā) and animals mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, and suggest that Munda etymologies—and no better ones—for these are available. I draw a few implications from the hypothesis that 'Sītā' and perhaps 'Videha' are Munda names.

The paper is organised as follows : first, the linguistic data and justification for an etymology of 'Sītā, is given (note that Roy—and presumably others—assume that the borrowing was the other way around, from Sanskrit to Munda; most Sankritists now seem quite certain that

si in Sanskrit is a loan, and that it is not from Dravidian). Then, some other etymologies of *Rāmāyaṇa* names, personal and animal, those of *Khara, tiṭṭibha, sṛmara and gokarṇa* are offered. Finally, a comment on place-names of Munda origin, an aside on 'Videha', and some conclusions on the implications of these etyma taken together, in particular some speculations on what follows if Sītā and Videha could be shown to be (at Janaka's time) culturally Munda.

I should at this point toss in a caveat to ward off uncritical acceptance or exaggerated rejection. False hypothesis - particularly those relating to 'peripheral Indological matters', e. g. 'tribals' - die hard in India. For instance, the term 'Austric' - which Grierson and Konow took fresh from Schmidt at the beginning of the publication of the *Linguistic Survey of India* (before 1906) - is still used in India as if there were an 'Austric' family of languages in the same way that there is a Dravidian family of languages. The hypothesis that underwrote the term 'Austric' is : that the Austroasiatic languages (which do form a Linguistic family, which family includes the Munda subfamily) and the Austroasian language family (also a demonstrable genetic stock) are themselves genetically related, the composite superstock being called Austric. Since the relationship has never been proved—and there have been more than a few attempts—one must assume that though there are typological similarities, there is no relationship, or an extremely distant one. Until such a relationship can be demonstrated, it is confusing - at the least - to use a term, Austric, which presupposes it.

I suggest that *si* is from North Munda, and not from South Munda (which also has cognate and

phonetically similar forms), not on linguistic but on cultural (geographic, consistency with the rest of the data, etc.) grounds.

First, some relevant linguistic background on Proto-Munda **si-* 'to plough' and **s-Vn-i*, 'plough.[1] There is a fair amount of morphological elaboration, retained more fully in South Munda than in North Munda, which supports - if support is still needed - the claim that **si* goes back to Proto-Munda. I should make explicit some tentative assumptions I am operating with : that the split between North and South Munda is old, say three thousand years old (although the divisions within North Munda are not very old), and that certain characteristics of North and South reconstructed from the modern languages can be reconstructed to and offered as characteristic of North and South Munda two thousand years ago or more. Obviously, this can be done only very tentatively, and I am aware of the amount and kind of evidence I am using, and its validity.[2]

1. The words now in use for 'plough' in North Munda are not related to *si* : Korku *nāgar* (a loan from Dravidian), and Kherwarian **nahçl*.

2. One further assumption and its corollary : anything reconstructable for Proto-Munda predates Aryan arrivals and contacts. Also, anything elsewhere in Austroasiatic (e. g. in Khmer) which has a Proto-Munda cognate must go back to old Austroasiatic, and can not be a Sanskrit borrowing. Words in Khmer (Cambodian) that are cognate with PM **bvleX* 'ripe. ripen, fruit', **jeX* (*V*) *n* 'foot, leg' have been called borrowings from Sanskrit *(phala, jaṃgha)*. They are not, although there may also be borrowings from these Sanskrit words in Khmer. If the similarities between the Munda and the Sanskrit items are not fortuitous, the borrowing must have been to and not from Sanskrit - which is not (for these cases) implausible.

A common process in Munda (and in some of the other Austroasiatic languages) derives the names of 'instruments' from verbs whose actions they serve. The word for 'plough' is derived from the stem *si* - using the nominalising infix - (*V*) *n* (thus Gata ? *s-n-i*, Gutob *s-un-ei*, *s-un-oi*, etc). The same infix with certain verbs is also used to derive 'endproduct' nominalisations, thus Gutob *b-un-a*j 'drawing, decoration' - from *baj* 'to draw, decorate', Korku *-on-ol* 'edgem border' from Korku *ol* - 'to mark, write', etc. (the productive use of this sort of infixation is dead in Korku, though alive in Mundari, and a number of the South Munda languages) and conceivably the word for 'furrow' could once - or more than once - have been formed by this process, and this would have been homonymous with 'plough' (*s-n-i*, etc). One can, however, reconstruct for Proto - Munda on the available evidence only the verb **si-* 'to plough', and its derivative **s-V-n-i* (or the like) 'plough', but no other drivatives of it, Gata ? derives - quite regularly - *s-n-si* ;place for ploughing' (from an old Munda - and probably old Austroasiatic - infixation of -((*V*)*n*- into a reduplicated verbstem). The word for 'furrow' in Gata ? is *g-n-ur-si*, a nominalisation of the verb *gur-* 'to dig in, penetrate', used with the qualifying combining form of the verb *si-* (or of a noun derived from it). The derivation of 'Sītā' then from a Munda noun (presumably one derived from a verb) meaning 'furrow' is unlikely. The derivation is from - and to - a verb meaning 'to cultivate with a plough', 'to plough'. As to strictly linguistic evidence of a North Munda source over a South Munda source, or a more specific source within North Munda, at the present stage of reconstruction of vocalism, and of the study of Sanskrit reflexes of Munda-borrowed vowels,

we do dot know enough to make such distinctions, if they are there to be made.

The source form in North Munda would have been either a verbstem (*si-*) or an infinitive. The infinitive if derived from a CV (C)- stem presumably would have been reduplicated, but if of CVV shape (like modern Korku *siu*), the infinitive would not have been reduplicated, and would have been homonymous with the verbstem. Whether the source was a reduplicated verb (where Sanskrit would have had no trouble in de-reduplicating it) or a verbstem in a finite verb form (where it would have been followed by mode, and object suffixes) the obvious stem (to any more or less bilingual user of Sanskrit) to borrow would have been *si*, or the like.

As for - *ta*, we take it as a Sanskrit morpheme—the feminine past participle found in a number or verb-derived women's names in Sanskrit ; otherwise, a possible source of *ta* could be the third person kinterm possessive morpheme indicating 'inalienable possession',(Munda had a set of affixes for kinterms and bodyparts which includes *-te* ?, perhaps an allomorph of *ta*). The *ta* - whether or not it can be identified with *-te* ?—however, presents problems. It occurs with a restricted set of nouns: kinterms and bodyparts. As to other North Munda words, perhaps derived using this or another *ta*, a preliminary survey turns up only Santali *seta*, etc, 'dog' where the *se* (*C*) is known to be separate morpheme from other evidence (SM **soXd* (*?*) 'dog'), and *hel-ta*, *kel-ta* 'bamboo', where the cognate forms elsewhere (e. g. Gorum *ta-bon*) suggest that the *-ta-* is a morpheme meaning 'bamboo' - or perhaps 'plant (of a particular kind)'. In R. D. Munda's reconstruction of proto-Kherwarian there are

the forms *hi* (-) *ta* 'seed' and *ki* (-) *ta* 'tree (sp)', which do not help much though the *-ta* could be connected with the one in *hel-ta*. In Korku it occurs in kinterm duals - as *-ta-kiñ*. It is also found in certain Korku demonstratives, e. g. *cuttha* 'which one' from *mi-n-ta-ej* 'one', like Hindi *-wālā* in present usages, (Korku *pulum-mithaj* 'white-one'). I find no example of verbstem *-ta* (or drived verbal noun-*ta*), and the occurrence of a verb-stem (e. g. *si-*) plus *ta* or a nominalised verbstem *s-Vn-i* followed by *ta* is unlikely. That the *-ta* in *hel-ta*, *ki* (-) *ta* and *hi* (-) *ta* has something to do with plants is noteworthy, but the same form class (i. e. non-verbal) derivational restrictions would hold against '*Sītā*' as including this same *-ta*, if, that is, the *si-* is the verb 'to plough'. One might of course guess that '*si-ta*' was an old plant name folk-etymologised in old North Munda but apart from the new borrowing problems this presents, as yet there is no evidence for this.

The liklier alternative would be to assume no connection with any North Munda *ta*, but to assume the verbstem *si* to be borrowed from a North Munda verbstem *si*, its Sanskrit derivative in *-ta* giving 'Sītā'. It might be nice to have a source for all of Sītā, in Mundā, but none is visible to me. (There is no phonemic length in Munda. The *a* in *ta* (any *ta*) would be borrowed as *tā* in Sanskrit.)

S. C. Roy suggests in his 'The Mundas and Their Country' that the name 'Citrakūṭa' in the *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa* (Ayodhyā kāṇḍa, passim, etc.) may have as its original first element, not the Sanskrit *citra*, picture, but the Mundari *citri* 'partridge' (the Korku *cithere* would be even closer) or something related to it. The

suggestion seems worth pursuing - but one would like supporting evidence in the form of firmer etymological connections for *cithere* with the Indo-Aryan forms (e. g. Hindi *ṭītar*), - the complexities of who got what from where when could be considerable - and independent evidence from the *Rāmāyaṇa* that in fact there were partridges in the Citrakūṭa region.[3] A reading of the Citrakūṭa sections of the *Rāmāyaṇa*—and of those subsequent sections that don't take us back to Ayodhya—suggests that further Sanskrit vocabulary with Munda etyma can be turned up. I offer one more fairly plausible item, and three possible ones, but the surface of *Rāmāyaṇa* etymology has barely been scratched. The plausible item is *tiṭṭibha*, 'a species of bird' (Ayodhya, Kāṇḍa, sarga 54). Korku and North Munda *ti* (*t*) *thid* (the '*d*' being preglottalised). A morpheme cognate with -*tid* 'bird' -probably a general term for small (song?) bird - is found in the five (South Munda) Koraput languages as well, but not in the reduplicative derivative characteristic of North Munda, so that the form would be a borrowing from North Munda. The dissimilating -*bh*- for '*d* needs comment; the aspiration for preglottalisation is not surprising (but obviously additional support for such a development is needed). The *bh* for *d* (the question of whether the preglottalised '*d* in this possition was retroflex or not is open) is somewhat unexpected, although the unreleased preglottalised final '*d*' would be hard for a Sanskrit speaker- and listener - to perceive as such, and *b* (*h*) as a transcription of what heard would not be surprising.

The other items—all of them suggested as possibilities, with no great self-evidence to them, are (1) the

3. Also, all the other names with *citra* ought to be examined.

name Khara (Ayodhyā Kāṇḍa, e. g. sarga 103. Āraṇya Kāṇḍa, e. g. sarga 28) the leader of the local rākṣasa army (from *koXro*) 'man, person, member of the Koro community'; *koro*, can refer to almost any North Munda group (*korku* - in Korku - is the plural of *koro*, the word for 'man, person, Korku'). The 'Kherwarian' - (or 'kharwarian') note the word - groups (Santali, Mundari, Ho, etc.) call themselves *hoṛo* (or similar-cognate-names), a cognate word, but with *h* for earlier *k*, and regular *r* for Korkur we have no way of dating the *k h* change, but it could well have postdated the period referred to in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Khara, not surprisingly, is called Rāvaṇa's younger brother, and Rāvaṇa is still revered by many of the central Indian tribal groups, including the Korkus. (2), (3) there are two species of 'deer *sṛmara* and *gokarṇa* (Ayodhyā kāṇḍa, sarga, 103). The former could be cognate with the deer (species) name reconstructable (in South Munda) as *sVram*. The second, less likely, perhaps to the 'antelope' called *ghotari* in Korku and *ghotre't* in Santali. (This could be a loanword in North Munda, but not from Sanskrit.)[4]

As to 'citra-kūṭa' and placename formation in Sanskrit and later Indo-Aryan, we note in modern times such names as *Alang-paḍa* (in Koraput District, Orissa),

4. There was no contrast between *t* and *ṭ*, and *d* and *ḍ* in the older Munda languages. What we reconstruct for South Munda is a (phonetically) retroflex *ḍ* and a dental *t*, but the allophones of these have not been established. The phonetics of North Munda *t* and *d* have not been satisfactorily worked out (but see R. D. Munda on Kherwarian, and Zide and Munda on Proto-North Munda). tiṭṭibha is informative in this connection, but one would like a larger corpus of Sanskrit Munda-derived forms before drawing any conclusions.

the first morpheme of which is clearly from a Munda language, Gutob (Gadba). The Gutob name for this village, a Gutob village,is *alun-ūgom* meaning 'interior-village'. The official (Oriya) name replaces *ūgom* 'village, by the non-Munda *paḍa* 'village', and takes over—with some modification—the Gutob word as the first piece. The application of similar processes could have resulted in '*citra-kūṭa.*

Very little has been done on Munda toponyms and much of what has been is fantasy. There is some useful (with several grains of salt) material in Roy's book. The two commonest and most widespread placename suffixes—both of them meaning 'village'—seem to be *-ḍih* (as spelled in Hindi, Kherwarian **ḍi*) and *-sini* - from *-sin-* (from Sora). The (former suffix suggests itself as possibly relavant to an etymology of 'Videha'' although of course IA *deśa* > *deha* 'village (?)' has to be contended with. The Kherwarian form is perhaps related to South Munda *ḍin* (*oXn*) 'house' - and related words in Austroasiatic - or is conceivably an old loan from Indo-Aryan.[5]

Another word of more interest to a study of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and its placenames is North Munda (without, apparently, any cognates in the South) *lanka* 'far

5. There is some additional support for *ḍi* as the old North Munda term and also some additional support for it as a source of 'Videha'. First, it turns out to have a cognate in a South Munda language, Gorum, (distantly related, and geographically far away), *-ḍi* ? the echo word for *da* (-) *o* ?, 'village'. Second. the usual Kherwarian (but presumably not North Munda, since no cognate has been found in Korku) word for village, *(*h*) *atɔ* (Mundari *(h) atu,* Santalis *atɔ*) seemes to be an old loan from IA *-yastu vat (t) hu* ; the aspiration is neatly reflected in the **ɔ* reconstructed. Lastly, although more evidence is needed, *deha* is not common in placename formations.

away'. As R. D. Munda has pointed out this suggests an etymology for 'Laṇka,' Rāvaṇa's home base which was eventually identified with Ceylon (although 'Laṇka, is not an old name for Ceylon). North Munda *lanka* suggests how 'Laṇka' may have got its name and further connects 'Laṇka' with the North Munda peoples, although it does not necessarily connect them with Rāvaṇa.

What relation - supporting ? contradictory ? might there is between the existence of Munda etymologies for 'Citrakūṭa' and some of its animals and people - and the possibility of a Munda etymon for 'Sita', and conceivably, for 'Videha' ? In the *Rāmāyaṇa* of cource Sita is a gently nurtured Videhan princess who has to be shown how to wear the rude barkcloth, clothes of the primitive forest people. If she was originally from a less 'sophisticated' background, she would not have been a stranger to such clothing. More interestingly, the possibility of a 'tribal' background for Sītā suggests other answers to the old questions of Rāma's reasons for rejecting her on her return (e. g. that, as one of putatively 'tribal' background, suspiciously free behavior could reasonably be imputed to her, particularly in a period of Aryanising pruning and purification ; I am assuming that the marriage customs and attitudes of the Mundas, North and South, go back a long way, and can be plausibly reconstructed for this period - the period of the establishment of the text, and perhaps for the earlier period as well). Also, perhaps more - or at least differently - explainable from such a point of view is the nature of Sītā's 'autochthonous response' to her rejection, Rāvaṇa's interest in—and perhaps connection with—Sītā in the first place, e'c.

What is useful about the hypothesis that Sītā came

from a (partly) Munda background is that it is testable : a close reading of the *Rāmāyaṇa* with an intelligent eye to supporting and contradictory evidence for such a hypothesis would be very much worth making. (I am aware that the study of *Rāmāyaṇa* origins and antecedents is not exactly new, and that these implicit suggestions as to urforms, basic motifs and their contexts are not incompatible with some of the approaches and conclusions that have been made. I have read only a little of the available literature and now have no access to the rest. I should acknowledge here the benefit gained from a reading of Bulcke's *Rām Kathā*', T. B. Naik's paper on tribal Rāmāyaṇas, and, most of all, from conversations with Romila Thapar.) I don't think that e. g.' Bodding's volumes of Santal folktales, and the published Mundari folk literatur - the best collections for Mundari are in press, and have been for some time - have been properly explored in this connection. All of this must of course be connected with whatever else we can retrieve of Munda life and contacts at the period : with North Munda kinship and social organisation (which is reconstructable), the early importance of sacred trees and groves in this part of India which is strikingly like what we know of certain institutions of present day Mundas, North (particularly) and South, etc.

I have not tried to provide any further precision in arriving at the location of Citrakūṭa, in the Vindhyas, or eleswhere. First, this does not much matter since the usual approximate locations suggested are all quite consistent with the general identification of the place and its people as North Munda. Second, to add to previous discussion, I would need access to the earlier materials,

which I do not have. The identification of the place and some of its inhabitants as Munda, does not mean that there were only North Munda-speaking people in the area and not, say, Dravidian and other tribes as well. There are many places (in Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa) where there are Munda and Dravidian groups now living in proximity to each other, and in some cases in close association as well. This could have been the case at much earlier times. I should note somewhere in this paper that to date there has not been any tiein of present day Munda cultures with archeological remains in the Munda areas, or anywhere else.

As to the existence of early 'chiefdoms', 'dynasties', etc. of Munda stock' there is no reason to find this dubious a priori. The actual identification of specific ethnic names in Sanskrit texts with Munda, speaking groups known more recently is not something that has been done with any justifiable assurance. Burrow - whose guidance have taken in this messy area - in a paper called 'Sanskrit And The Pre-Aryan Tribes And Languages', says only 'No doubt in any of the later dynasties in the later history of Orissa were of the same (tribal)-Dravidian or Munda) nationality, though Brahmanised in religion using Sanskrit as their official language. We may instance the Bhauma Karas, the first part of whose name correspnds in sense and derivation to such modern terms for these aboriginals as Bhumij and Bhuiya, whereas the second term be a Sanskritisation of the Kolarian word for 'man'." Other identifications of Munda groups with tribal names in Sanskrit texts e. g. those of Shafer seem quite unsupported. This acculturation and 'de-Mundaisation' has continued to the present day. Most of the Bhumij, for instance, have

divested themselves of their Kherwarian language - they now speak Bengali - and clan names and other Munda features that were identified by them as such have been junked or reetymologised as Indo-Aryan ; but that there have been in the past and up to the present rajas and jagirdars who belonged to various North Munda groups, and maintained their language and - more or less -traditional culture is known (see e.g. Roy's book).

I agree with Burrow's general approach to finding Munda loans in Sanskrit although I disagree with the provenance of certain Sanskrit words he claims to be from Munda (in his 'The Sanskrit Language' and elsewhere). Certainly, it is to be expected that the names of fauna and flora of eastern and central India would be borrowed from the older inhabitants of the area. To my knowledge, nobody has ever made a checklist of Sanskrit (and Indo-Aryan not derived from Sanskrit) and Dravidian plant and animal names that have no good etymologies and systematically combed the lexicons of the various North and South Munda languages for etyma. Ideally, ethnobotanical studies should be made in these areas, and the plants identified and their uses properly described.

The line of research recently begun by A. R. K. Zide in exploring what lexical items can be reconstructed for proto-Munda (or branches of it) and what conclusions about aboriginal culture can be drawn from proto-Munda vocabulary (e.g. with regard to metalworking, food preparation and spices, etc.) is also important, and has already turned up some interesting results.

In the case of 'administrative' vocabulary, it has been observed - on the basis of partial and casually collected materials - that words for 'headman' (*pāṭel*, *muṇḍa*,

manjhi, naiko) as well as those for 'king' (*raja* mostly) - which is less important -in North and South Munda are borrowed ones. This, of course, is no guarantee that the institutions have been borrowed (though they may have been to greater or lesser degree), any more than the fact that proper (personal) names in many of the Munda groups are all borrowed (from Indo-Aryan, largly) indicates that the Munda groups concerned had none unlil the Ino-Aryans came along and lent them some.

So far the number of sound Munda etyma for Sanskrit words is very small, although the etymologies proposed - which it would be convenient if some one put together in one place - are fairly numerous. The general impression of what sorts of things were taken from the Mundas (e. g. the banana-pepper-ginger group) is misleading, since in the light of newer data, 'pepper, 'turnsout to be borrowed into Munda, and the only evidence for 'banana' or 'ginger is in Sora, although for the former there are old non-cognate words in other South Munda languages. Another possibility - perhaps one that Burrow would not reject - is that such items ('banana' and perhaps 'ginger') were borrowed into Sanskrit - and Sora ? - (in India) from other - non-Munda - Austroasiatic languages, languages that, presumably no longer exist. Further work on Austroasiatic ought to provide evidence for such a view, if the view is correct. Any cultural generalisations from Munda loanwords in Sanskrit ought, ideally, to be based on a larger corpus of solid items than as yet exists, so that details of what and - linguistically - how can be speculated about a little less airily. All the proposed etyma - including of course the ones offered in this paper - could use more

support. If certain ones permit cultural inferences to be drawn from them and these are independently verifiable, so much the better, but it is to be hoped that before long there will be a sufficient stock of established Sanskrit-loanwords-and-their-Munda-sources to permit the application of stricter linguistic criteria in evaluating them.[6]

This paper has offred Munda etymologies for a few lexical items from the *Rāmāyaṇa*, two of these being for 'Sītā, (this along with a discussion of the possible bases for such an attribution, which is not new one) and 'Videha'. None of the etymologies offered is irresistible, but all of them (or the discussions incurred in presenting them) purport to add something to the etymological knowledge of these words. If the etymologies for 'Sītā' and 'Videha, were both unimpugnable then the suggestion offered above -that Videha at the time of Janaka must have been culturally at least partly North Munda- would have to be taken very seriously. This hypothesis, as I have suggested, is confirmable - more and less supportable -on the evidence of various sorts of analysis of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, analysis which to some degree exist, and which would be worth extending for other reasons. Mrs. Karve's remarks in *Yugānta*' on Sītā - in comparing Draupadī with her (for instance, commenting on her parents comparative lack of concern for her, noting that her mother is not named and otherwise little noticed) are interesting in this respect as are her notes on "some

6. Bibliographical Note. The linguistic data in this paper on Gorum come from A. R. K. Zide, on Kherwarian and Proto-Kherwarian from R. D. Munda, and on Korku Gutob, Gata ? and Comparative Munda from me. I have profited from conversations on matters taken up in this paper with Arlene Zide and Romila Thapar, and from correspondence with R. D. Munda.

social groups mentioned in the *Mahabharata*". A similar anthropological-literary analysis of the *Rāmṇyaāa* along with a sophisticated folkloric analysis of structure and and content would probably provide the material for a fairly definite answer to the questions of Videha and its cultural background at the time of Janaka.